Specialised anti-corruption institutions can play a key role in combatting high-level corruption. While these institutions exist in most Eastern European countries their effectiveness in combatting high-level corruption depends on the clarity of their mandate and the scope of their powers, their level of independence, and the availability of sufficient resources to attract and retain specialised staff. The chapter examines the challenges in creating these specialised anti-corruption institutions in the region and also looks at emerging institutional arrangements. The chapter also describes key aspects for reinforcing the prioritisation and independence of these institutions, including by harnessing public relations strategies to counter external pressure. The quality of the staff of these institutions is their most valuable resource and the chapter examines approaches used to cultivate dedicated and specialised human resources necessary for effectively combatting high-level corruption.
Combatting High-level Corruption in Eastern Europe
Abstract
Traditional anti-corruption strategies consist in improving the implementation of the rule of law, enhancing transparency and accountability in public administration, and ensuring that accountability for violations of anti-corruption rules is ensured. The centrepiece of such strategies is usually a specially modelled anti-corruption institutional framework tailored to the local context.
Various models are applied for setting up such a framework, each focusing on achieving different objectives. In most cases, the core function is to ensure the effective prosecution of all those who have committed a crime related to corruption, which is often the term included in the statutes that regulate the mandate of specialised anti-corruption institutions. Accordingly, specialised anti-corruption institutions can and must be key players in ensuring the eradication of the perception of impunity and the implementation of the principle of the inevitability of punishment. This should lead to the "breaking" of corrupt arrangements between narrow interest groups that use corrupt means to achieve non-competitive advantages.
With the support of civil society, honest politicians and businesses, the anti-corruption infrastructure can and should become a critical factor in transforming a society plagued by corruption into one where high-profile corruption is the exception rather than the norm.
The respective institutional approach is already being tested in Eastern European countries – almost every country in the region has a specialised anti-corruption law enforcement agency or unit, and some have also created specialised anti-corruption prosecutor’s offices or divisions and even courts. However, the anti-corruption institutional framework may also be subject to capture or undermined by narrow interest groups in their countries.
Subsequently, such groups, responding to the public demand to reduce the level of corruption, may try to instrumentalise the anti-corruption institutional framework, by ensuring that these specialised agencies can only achieve limited results and that they do not have sufficient independence, powers, capacity or resources to pose a threat to their interests (Transparency International, 2023[1]). This can be done by establishing control over anti-corruption institutions through appointed or influenceable executive officials, or by implementing tacit agreements to only prosecute low-level officials not affiliated with narrow interest groups in return for not curtailing the powers or resources of these bodies. Such attempts to undermine anti-corruption agencies often trigger defensive reactions from civil society and the international community.
An example is a unique series of campaigns against Ukraine’s NABU and the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office. For example, after a number of criminal proceedings were opened against high-level officials and their associates in 2017, the parliamentary majority registered an urgent draft law to simplify the dismissal procedure of the heads of the NABU and the SAPO. Only after the intervention of the public and international partners, the draft law was withdrawn from the parliament's agenda.1
In 2019, the Constitutional Court of Ukraine declared criminal liability for illicit enrichment unconstitutional. Further, in 2020, the Constitutional Court issued another ruling that jeopardised all anti-corruption reforms implemented in 2016-20, leading to a political crisis in the country. In its urgent opinion, the Venice Commission acknowledged that the 2020 Decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine lacked clear reasoning, had no firm basis in international law and was possibly tainted with a major procedural flaw – an unresolved question of a conflict of interest of some judges, while encouraging the national authorities to respect the role of the Court and implement the decision.2
In its recent technical assessment of NABU, a group of international experts stressed that during the past several years, NABU continued to be targeted by attacks on its independence through various means, including Constitutional Court decisions, changes in the legislation, interference in investigations, attempts to dismiss NABU’s Director and so on. The activity of politicians and other influential actors trying to undermine NABU’s operation has continued during the past three years. They were not as dramatic as before (for example, the deliberate disclosure of NABU’s undercover operations and physical altercations between NABU staff and the prosecutor’s office) but kept constant pressure on NABU. The civil society and international partners remained active in defending NABU against such attacks (National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, 2023[2]).
Thus, the actual confrontation with narrow interest groups requires special protection and guarantees for anti-corruption institutions, including that which is beyond the classical understanding of anti-corruption standards (OECD, 2024[3]).3
Accordingly, the EaP and other Eastern European countries' anti-corruption frameworks can only be effective in combatting high-level corruption if they are accompanied by robust and tailored legislation, powerful and independent anti-corruption institutions committed to enforcing this legislation, provided with the broadest possible support from civil society, independent media and international stakeholders.
Traditionally, specialised anti-corruption institutions aimed at prosecuting corruption have consisted of investigative and/or prosecutorial bodies.
Ukraine is among several countries in the world to form a complete and almost fully autonomous system of institutions, the primary focus of which is high-level and grand corruption. This framework consists of an investigative body (the NABU), a prosecutorial body (the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (SAPO)) and a judicial body (the High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC)). The creation of a separate specialised court was necessary due to the lack of capacity and independence in the existing courts, which hindered their effectiveness in adjudicating NABU and SAPO cases.
The HACC was established in 2019. The competitive selection of its judges was unprecedentedly open and involved civil society, as well as international experts nominated by international organisations, including the OECD. So far, this approach has proven to be effective. The OECD report highlighted Ukraine’s unprecedented leap in tackling high-level corruption through the work of the dedicated independent investigative, prosecutorial, and judicial institutions. With the HACC actively concluding cases, an increase in convictions for high-level corruption has become significant (OECD, 2022[4]).
The European Commission's report on Ukraine's application for membership in the European Union states that “the establishment of HACC in 2019 through a transparent, merit-based recruitment of judges and staff has greatly facilitated the work of the anti-corruption institutions and led to an overall more effective adjudication of corruption cases”.4
From September 2019 to September 2023, the HACC delivered 139 verdicts; 157 persons were convicted, and 23 persons were acquitted. This is the highest rate of all Ukrainian courts. The total value of confiscated illicit assets by the HACC in 19 proceedings was UAH 138 million (EUR 3.3 million). There are currently more than 250 criminal proceedings in HACC’s first instance chamber (Pravda, 2023[5]). Since its launch, the HACC has continuously increased its overall operational performance and output, as illustrated in Table 3.1.
At the same time, the first experience of the HACC's functioning also revealed the very first practical challenges, in particular those related to HACC’s heavy caseload and insufficient number of judges.
Source: European Commission, Ukraine 2023 Report Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 2023 Communication on EU Enlargement policy, p.32, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52023SC0699
The length of court proceedings in the HACC negatively affects the performance of anti-corruption institutions, as the court has not yet adjudicated many NABU cases involving high-ranking officials. The Criminal Procedure Code allows for tactics which may be used by defence attorneys that can lead to significant delays in court proceedings. The HACC statistics show that the average time for consideration of a criminal case is 444 days; out of 214 proceedings pending in 2023, 97 proceedings were considered for more than two years. To address this problem, the number of the HACC's judges was increased and the selection of 25 new judges was initiated last year. The HAAC’s performance could also be optimised by allowing a single judge to review certain cases and amending the Criminal Procedure Code to avoid trial delays caused by defence lawyers’ tactics.
A similar institutional development happened in Armenia. Since 2021, the Anti-Corruption Committee, a specialised investigative body supported by a new designated department in the Prosecutor's General Office, has been operating in Armenia. The Anti-Corruption Court, as a specialised court, was established in Armenia in 2021. The Anti-Corruption Chamber of the Court of Cassation – in 2022 and the Anti-Corruption Court of Appeal in 2023 (Council of Europe, Group of States against Corruption, 2024[6]).
The Anti-Corruption Court shall comprise 15 judges, with at least 10 specialising in criminal corruption cases and a minimum of 5 focusing on civil anti-corruption matters. The selection of judges for the court included separate interviews conducted by a national non-governmental expert and an international expert for the purposes of integrity and personal quality checks. In addition, the Corruption Prevention Commission (CPC) issued opinions on the candidates’ integrity. However, neither the conclusions of the interviews nor the CPC opinions were binding for the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC).
In its analysis, the NGO “Protection of Rights Without Borders” stressed concerns regarding at least 6 out of 16 candidates on the list of judicial candidates for the court approved by the SJC in terms of integrity checks. The concerns mainly related to the financial means and/or property in the declarations of the judge candidates or their family members submitted to the CPC.5
An issue with the integrity assessment was highlighted in one case of a person whom the SJC recommended for the judicial position in the Anti-Corruption Court in November 2022. However, it should be noted that the candidate in question was not selected unanimously by the SJC, and some of its members expressed their opposition to the selection of the candidate. CSOs highly criticised the selection, and the candidate reportedly received a negative opinion of the CPC. Eventually, this person was not appointed as a judge of the Anti-Corruption Court according to his own withdrawal, but in a short time, the SJC selected him as the president of the first instance general jurisdiction criminal court of Yerevan (OECD, 2024[7]).
The President of Moldova submitted to the Parliament a draft law "On the anti-corruption judicial system and on amending some normative acts" aimed at creating specialised anti-corruption courts. The Moldovan president emphasised the importance of the draft law "as one of the state's top priorities in the justice reform agenda." Efforts by the National Anti-Corruption Center and the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office are often undermined by decisions of the courts.
The draft law aims at creating a system of specialised courts offering “an increased degree of independence to judges”. Despite the reform of the judiciary, including the external evaluation (ongoing vetting) of judges, “the judicial system still does not have the courage to act contrary to the perception established in the system, i.e. to protect the interests of judges even when this does not align with the public’s interest. Thus, high-profile cases continue to be postponed, the corruption cases against judges are mostly decided in favour of the judges, the cases regarding the appeals against the decisions on the external evaluation of judges remain unresolved for long periods of time despite the limited deadlines provided by the law”.6
In addition, the draft law also aims at shortening the length of corruption-related proceedings. A study conducted by the Legal Resources Center from Moldova indicated that “the average rate of examination of a corruption case is approximately 3.5 years. The procedures for adjudicating a corruption case, from the time it is referred to the court to the adoption of a final decision, lasts between 138 days and 10 years, and in one case, the proceedings lasted 12.6 years [...] The speed of examination of corruption cases by the courts analysed in the study was four times slower than the national average and 2.4 times slower than the Council of Europe’s median”.7
Albania serves as another example, where corruption cases are handled by specialised anti-corruption institutions – the Special Anti-Corruption and Organised Crime Structure (SPAK). This structure, operational since 2019, includes a prosecutorial authority known as the Special Prosecution Office, which operates independently from the rest of the prosecution services, and a subordinated investigation unit, the National Bureau of Investigation. Cases falling under the jurisdiction of these specialised anti-corruption institutions are adjudicated by a system of specialised courts with jurisdiction for high-level corruption and organised crimes – SPAK Courts (Court of First Instance and Court of Appeals). These courts, established in 2016 and operational since 2019, have jurisdiction over cases related to corruption, organised crime and cases involving the country’s highest-level officials, instilling confidence in the effectiveness of the system. Special courts or chambers that hear corruption and organised crime cases (and, in some jurisdictions, other serious crime cases) function in Croatia, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia (U4, 2022[8]).
Source: Information compiled through the Secretariat’s desk research.
3.3.1. Strengthening autonomous specialised anti-corruption institutions
The need for creating new anti-corruption institutions is a divisive issue. Some argue that it may contradict the principle of unity or that efforts and resources should be invested in reforming the regular judiciary and law enforcement agencies.
However, practice in the region has demonstrated that conditions are more complex. State capture by narrow interest groups may also translate into their control, either entirely or in part, over institutions that promote the rule of law, for example, law enforcement bodies and the judiciary. Consequently, any attempts at reforming the existing institutions, which are ineffective and/or lack independence, can be met with internal opposition and resistance from these narrow interest groups, usually derailing reform efforts from other stakeholders in the country (OECD, 2017, p. 24[9]).
Thus, the creation of new autonomous specialised anti-corruption institutions that were not "captured" by any interest groups can be seen as a more viable solution for strengthening the efforts to combat high-level corruption in the EaP and other Eastern European countries. The model tested in creating anti-corruption systems can be extrapolated to broader reforms of the justice and law enforcement sectors. For example, the experience of selecting judges of the High Anti-Corruption Court of Ukraine with the participation of international experts was later used in the selection of members of the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine in 2022-23.
At the same time, if the anti-corruption institutional framework in place exhibits progress in combatting corruption while upholding its independence and autonomy, the establishment of specialised units, task forces or chambers targeting high-level corruption may prove to be an adequate measure. Whatever the institutional decision is, any transformations must be organised with an appropriate level of control over the quality of recruitment of professional and integrity personnel to the relevant institutions, as well as their autonomy and independence. Ukraine recently moved towards providing greater autonomy to the specialised anti-corruption prosecutor's office. The experience of the SAPO functioning during 2016-23 showed that even its relatively high level of autonomy within the prosecution system allowed for external interference in its activities. The European Commission, in its report on enlargement, noted that «SAPO should be further protected from possible undue interference by improving the selection procedures for the Head of SAPO and its key officials, increasing its organisational and procedural autonomy, and improving its accountability framework”.9
As a result, Ukraine further strengthened the SAPO's autonomy by transforming it into a separate legal entity, and by increasing its level of procedural autonomy, as well as by establishing robust mechanisms for external and internal control and discipline.
Full autonomy of the anti-corruption institutional framework is not only a closed group of institutions but rather a system that ensures that these institutions have the necessary powers to prosecute high-level corruption. It may come as a surprise that the standard set of powers to investigate, prosecute, and try high-level corruption cases may not be sufficient for the entire anti-corruption ecosystem to function effectively. For example, in Ukraine existed rather technical pretexts to restrict the activities of the NABU and the SAPO - the NABU is not provided with powers to carry out wiretapping without the involvement of the State Security Service; the powers of the NABU and the SAPO to carry out international co-operation without the participation of the Prosecutor General's Office, which was in conflict with the anti-corruption institutions, were blocked on arbitrary technicalities. Therefore, the fight against high-level corruption should give these specialised anti-corruption institutions the widest possible range of powers so that they can exercise them without relying on outside assistance. It would be fair to say that specialised anti-corruption institutions are not always able to deliver the results expected by society.
In Bulgaria, corruption-related criminal offences committed by high-level officials fell under the jurisdiction of the Specialised Criminal Court and could be appealed to the Specialised Court of Appeal, and ultimately to the Supreme Court of Cassation. The Specialised Prosecutor's Office and the investigating bodies were responsible for the criminal investigation into cases falling within the jurisdiction of the Specialised Criminal Court. However, fundamental changes were enacted in April 2022, when the Specialised Prosecutor’s Office, the Appellate Specialised Prosecutor's Office, the Specialised Criminal Court and the Appellate Specialised Criminal Court were abolished, with their competencies and cases transferred to the regional and appellate level authorities.
Inefficiency is cited as one of the reasons for the abolition of the specialised prosecutor's offices and courts, given the low number of high-ranking officials indicted for corruption, which was perceived as not adequately reflecting the level of corruption in Bulgaria (U4, 2022[8]). Although too little time has passed to make any conclusions on the appropriateness of this step, GRECO noted in its report that the cause of inefficient prosecutions into corruption cases involving high-level officials in Bulgaria, “is less in the architecture of the relevant prosecutorial services, and more in the overly complex pre-conditions imposed by the prosecution on investigative bodies and apparent lack of resolve to carry out fully-fledged investigations and bring cases to court, coupled with possible undue influence on and within the prosecution service” (Council of Europe, Group of States against Corruption, 2022[10]).
However, Bulgaria has returned to a specialised approach for investigating high-level corruption, following the entry into force of the new Anti-Corruption Act (Article 19) and of amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code (Article 194(6)) in 2024, the Anti-Corruption Commission, through its Investigating inspectors, is exclusively responsible for investigating high-level corruption.
While this example does not mean that autonomous anti-corruption ecosystems are ineffective, but rather underlines that all elements of the anti-corruption institutional framework, including a robust legislative framework, the will and courage of the leadership of the specialised agencies, motivated and professional personnel, effective co-operation with colleagues from other law enforcement agencies and sufficient resources are critical for the efficient operation of a country’s anti-corruption institutional framework. If at least one element in the anti-corruption institutional framework is not fully operational, it is entirely at risk.
3.3.2. Specialisation and prioritisation
The experience of the EaP countries shows that specialised anti-corruption institutions still suffer from overly broad mandates and a lack of understanding of their mission and priorities.
In Ukraine, the Law of "On the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine" defines the task of this institution as "counteract corruption and other criminal offences committed by senior officials authorised to perform the functions of the state or local self-government and constituting a threat to national security." However, the list of such "senior officials" defined in the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine is too broad, resulting in NABU dealing with corruption crimes that do not pose a high threat to society or, as stated in the law, do not threaten national security.
As a result, the NABU is overloaded with relatively minor corruption cases, and its capacity is insufficient to investigate important cases of high-level corruption. In this regard, the NABU Technical Assessment Report recommends that the list of subjects covered by the NABU's mandate be reviewed and reduced (National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, 2023[2]).
Under Article 216 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the NABU is authorised to investigate corruption crimes committed by:
The President of Ukraine, whose powers have been terminated, a Member of Parliament of Ukraine, the Prime Minister of Ukraine, a member of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, a First Deputy and Deputy Minister, a member of the National Council of Ukraine on Television and Radio Broadcasting, the National Commission for State Regulation of Financial Services Markets, the National Securities and Stock Market Commission, the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine, the Head of the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting of Ukraine, the Head of the State Property Fund of Ukraine, his first deputy and deputy, member of the Central Election Commission, Chairman of the National Bank of Ukraine, his first deputy and deputy, Chairman of the National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption, his deputy, Director of the Bureau of Economic Security of Ukraine, his deputy, member of the Council of the National Bank of Ukraine, Secretary of the Council of National Security and Defence of Ukraine, his first deputy and deputy, Permanent Representative of the President of Ukraine in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, his first deputy and deputy, adviser or assistant to the President of Ukraine, the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the Prime Minister of Ukraine.
The following public officials are also included:
a civil servant whose position belongs to category "A" (heads of central executive bodies, heads of departments of these bodies),
member of the Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, member of a regional council, city council of Kyiv and Sevastopol, a local self-government official whose position is classified as the first and second categories of positions,
a judge (except for judges of the High Anti-Corruption Court), a judge of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, a juror (while performing duties in court), the Chairman, Deputy Chairman, member, inspector of the High Council of Justice, Chairman, Deputy Chairman, member, inspector of the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine,
prosecutors of the prosecution bodies referred to in paragraphs 1-4, 5-11 of part one of Article 15 of the Law of Ukraine "On Prosecution" (management of the Office of the Prosecutor General and regional prosecutor's offices),
a senior officer of the state criminal executive service, civil defence bodies and units, senior officers of the National Police, a customs official who has been awarded a special title of state advisor of the customs service of the III rank and above, an official of the state tax service who has been awarded a special title of state advisor of the tax service of the III rank and above,
a senior officer of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the Security Service of Ukraine, the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine, the State Special Transport Service, the National Guard of Ukraine and other military formations established in accordance with the laws of Ukraine,
head of a large business entity with a share of state or municipal ownership exceeding 50% of its capital.
Source: Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine, Article 216.
The situation was similar in Moldova. The overly broad mandate of the anti-corruption bodies has led to the fact that both bodies investigating corruption crimes – the National Anti-Corruption Center and the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office – have been overwhelmed with cases of petty corruption (OECD, 2024[11]). The relevant shortcomings were corrected during the 2023 reform: the mandates of the mentioned institutions were revised, and high-level corruption remained the responsibility of only the specialised prosecutor's office.
Given the above practices, a similar problem may arise in Armenia, as the Anti-Corruption Committee has been mandated to investigate all corruption crimes since January 2024 (OECD, 2024[7]). The Prosecutor General may transfer to the Anti-Corruption Committee some earlier cases with the consent of the Committee’s Chairman.
In addition to the list of high-ranking officials, the mandate of anti-corruption institutions is often determined by the amount of material damage caused or the amount of unlawful benefit obtained through a corruption offence (Ukraine and Moldova). A low threshold for such material damage or undue advantage also leads to an unjustified expansion of the mandate of anti-corruption institutions and overloading them with minor cases. Therefore, when determining the competence of anti-corruption institutions, the amount of undue benefit or damage caused by a corruption crime should be considered.
When anti-corruption bodies have a broad mandate, their focus can shift towards investigating crimes. However, these crimes may not be the most relevant in the fight against high-level corruption. This is because they are easier to investigate and require much fewer resources, and as such, they present low-hanging fruit to demonstrate results quickly. Investigating many low-level crimes, in turn, leads to a lack of resources to deal with high-level corruption. As a result, anti-corruption institutions stagnate and begin to lose their effectiveness and reputation.
When resources are insufficient to effectively investigate corruption cases within the institution's mandate, it is necessary to focus on the crimes and cases that pose the greatest threat to the public’s interest, such as high-level corruption cases. As the practice of the EaP countries shows, the policy of prioritising investigations on high-level corruption cases has not been employed in national anti-corruption and criminal policies.
A similar problem has been present in some other countries of the region. For example, the North Macedonian Public Prosecutor’s Office for Prosecuting Organised Crime and Corruption (OCCPPO) was found to lack strategic planning in handling investigations and cases, which affects its overall efficiency. The European Commission concluded the Office could be more efficient if more specialisations were introduced and resources were focused on the most complicated cases (European Commission, 2023[12]). Considering this, it is essential to introduce tackling high-level corruption as a priority policy objective for specialised anti-corruption law enforcement institutions to ensure that they identify and prioritise the investigation of high-level, high-profile and systemic corruption.
Upon establishing such priorities, anti-corruption institutions must be vested with the authority to reassign investigations of cases that fall outside these priorities, such as those related to petty corruption, to other pre-trial investigation bodies. It is also essential to ensure the exclusive jurisdiction of respective specialised institutions over high-level corruption to preserve their independent investigations by avoiding the cases being removed from them. Such practice may only be permitted in exceptional circumstances, based on legally established reasons, and following clear criteria for transferring such proceedings to other entities.
The OECD indicated the problem of sensitive cases being removed from the Ukrainian NABU in violation of the law in the 2017 IAP evaluation report, and the 2022 5th round Pilot report found that these breaches had been increasing since then. These circumstances raised serious concerns about what seemed to be blatant violations of the jurisdiction of the NABU, which pose a severe threat to the rule of law and undermine the fight against corruption in Ukraine. The monitoring team strongly urged that Ukraine act to preserve in law and guarantee in practice the independence and autonomy of the NABU, protect its exclusive jurisdiction, and ensure independent investigation and prosecution of corruption cases (OECD, 2022[4]).
Consider assigning the investigation, prosecution and adjudication of high-level corruption to specialised bodies, units, or groups of staff that have the necessary expertise and clearly establish their mandate and the responsibility to deal with high-level corruption cases as their main focus of activity.
Ensure that guarantees for the independence of the anti-corruption institutions provided in the law are aligned with anti-corruption international standards and best practices.
Ensure that experts from civil society and/or international experts play an important role in creating such specialised anti-corruption institutions and that the work of those institutions is subject to functioning mechanisms of public oversight.
Ensure that the mandate of such specialised anti-corruption institutions is precisely formulated to avoid misallocation of their resources towards mid-level or petty corruption and provide for the possibility of transferring proceedings not related to high-level corruption to other institutions.
Implement a policy of prioritising the work of these institutions on detecting, investigating, and prosecuting the most serious high-level corruption offences, such as those involving PEPs, incumbent members of parliament and government, their deputies, high-level judges and prosecutors and law enforcement officials, as well as other top-level public officials.
Ensure that the exclusive jurisdiction of specialised anti-corruption bodies over high-level corruption cases is respected and that their cases are transferred to other entities only in exceptional circumstances, based on legally established reasons, and following clear criteria.
3.3.3. Ensuring greater independence and autonomy of specialised anti-corruption institutions through safeguards for their leadership.
The independence of the anti-corruption infrastructure should be ensured not only by the existence of special legislation on the status and guarantees of independence of anti-corruption institutions but also by the permanence of such legislation. Transparent and fair procedures for the appointment and dismissal of the leadership of specialised anti-corruption bodies are among the key factors in the context of providing these authorities with the necessary level of independence.
Appointment of the leadership of specialised anti-corruption institutions
As practice shows, not all EaP countries adhere to international standards or follow best practices when appointing the leadership of specialised anti-corruption institutions and do not always provide for competitive or transparent procedures for appointing the heads of their specialised anti-corruption institutions.
In Armenia, the competitive selection of the head of the Anti-Corruption Committee is regulated by Law, which sets out the main steps of the process, including setting up the Competition Board and its operation, the announcement of the open competition for the position, assessment of candidates in several stages, and the proposal to the Government of two or three candidates for the position, and finally the appointment by the Cabinet of Ministers (OECD, 2024[7]). However, there is no special procedure for appointing the Head of the Prosecutor General’s Office Department for Supervision over Legality of Pre-Trial Proceedings in the Anti-Corruption Committee to whom only the general procedures for promotion within the Prosecutor General’s Office would apply despite special promotion lists being used for candidates for other comparable senior positions within the Prosecutor General’s Office (OECD, 2024[7]).
In Azerbaijan, the Head of the Anti-Corruption Directorate of the Prosecutor General's Office is appointed without a competitive procedure, which is absent in Azerbaijani legislation (OECD, 2024, p. 134[13]).
In Moldova, the Head of the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (APO) was selected in June 2022 through a competitive process. The selection undertaken in 2022 for the position of the Chief Prosecutor of APO was based on the assessment of candidates’ merits (experience, skills, integrity) as required in legislation. A Special Commission (set up by the Superior Council of Prosecutors and comprising one candidate proposed by the President, one by the Minister of Justice, and three candidates proposed by the Council itself) first verified, in a closed session, that the candidates met the eligibility criteria and invited the eligible candidates to the interviews. The candidates have also been reviewed regarding their irreproachable reputation and whether there had been any reasonable suspicion of committing acts of corruption or related acts within the meaning of the Law on Integrity (OECD, 2024[11]). At the same time, the head of the National Anti-Corruption Center, another specialised anti-corruption investigative body in Moldova, was appointed in February 2022 without competitive procedures, which resulted in criticism from experts.
In Georgia, the IAP’s Pilot 5th round of monitoring noted that at the time it appeared that the head of the Anti-Corruption Unit of the Prosecutors’ Service and the head of the Special Security Service’s Anti-Corruption Agency were not appointed to the respective administrative positions through a transparent and competitive selection procedure, using clear criteria based on merit (OECD, 2022[14]). The Georgian authorities disagreed with this conclusion and stressed that for such an evaluation, the procedure and practice for the appointment of the heads of the respective institutions rather than managers of structural units should be taken into account. In 2024, amendments to the Law on the Fight Against Corruption were introduced, providing for the immunity of the head of the Anti-Corruption Bureau, accountability of the Bureau to Parliament and the power to dispose of and determine its own budget, staffing list and salary of its staff independently of other agencies. However, civil society has raised concerns that these recent amendments do not address key recommendations of the European Commission and the Venice Commission, for example, in relation to the appointment of the head of the Anti-Corruption Bureau by Parliament10.
In Ukraine, the processes of appointing the heads of the NABU and SAPO in 2015 and in 2021-22 were long but considered transparent and held with the involvement of civil society and international experts. One example of a successful competitive and transparent procedure is the selection of judges of the High Anti-Corruption Court of Ukraine (see Box 3.2).
Established in 2018, the High Anti-Corruption Court of Ukraine (HACC) has been widely seen as a successful model and an example of high professionalism and independence both nationally and internationally.
The judges of the HACC were selected through an independent and transparent process based on objective criteria clearly defined by law with international experts – members of the Public Council of International Experts (PCIE) who were nominated by international organisations, including the OECD.
The PCIE scrutinised all 113 candidates and vetoed 42 of them. Decisions on the integrity of the candidates were taken under the “reasonable doubt” standard, which, according to a former international member of PCIE, was the key to the success of the whole process.
The selection included anonymous written tests and a case study, testing of personal, integrity and psychological qualities and general abilities. Under the Law “On the High Anti-Corruption Court”, the moral, ethical and professional requirements should ensure the selection of competent judges with impeccable reputations.
In April 2019, the President of Ukraine signed a decree to appoint selected judges to the new anti-corruption court.
In April 2024, the High Qualification Commission of Judges selected a new PCIE composition based on a joint proposal by the OECD, the EU Delegation to Ukraine and OLAF. This PCIE is supposed to provide assistance to the Commission with the ongoing selection of new HACC judges.
Note: Public Council of International Experts (PCIE) is a temporary subsidiary body of HQCJ that assists it with checking the judge candidates’ compliance with the integrity criteria (in particular, regarding the legal origins of the candidate’s property and the correspondence of the candidate’s or his/her family members’ lifestyle to the declared income and status), as well as their knowledge and practical skills to deal with respective cases. The tenure of each PCIE composition is six years.
Sources: OECD (2022), Anti-corruption reforms in Ukraine: Pilot fifth round of monitoring under the OECD Istanbul Anti-Corruption Action Plan, https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/anti-corruption-reforms-in-ukraine_b1901b8c-en; https://www.vkksu.gov.ua/en/page/somposition-pcie-0
Another more negative example is the selection of the members of the National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption (NACP) in Ukraine in 2015-16. The selection was associated with a number of scandals related to the presence of government-affiliated NGOs and other members of the NACP selection committee.11 As a result, a second competition was announced, which lasted almost 6 months and resulted in the election of only four out of five NACP executive members, which subsequently led to the blocking of the NACP's operations and later - to its ineffective work and accusations of political persecution.12 Only three years after the unsuccessful competition to select the NACP leadership, in 2019, the Agency was relaunched, and a new NACP head was appointed with the co-operation of civil society experts. However, these initial setbacks impacted the work of NACP for its first four years.
Whilst some other Eastern European countries employ competitive procedures for selecting the leadership of their anti-corruption agencies, this remains an area for improvement in the region.
The OECD Recommendation of the Council on Public Integrity underlines the importance of promoting a merit-based, professional public sector (OECD, 2017[15]). This can be done by ensuring that human resource management in the public sector consistently applies basic principles, such as merit and transparency, to support the professionalism of the public service, prevents favouritism and nepotism, protects against undue political interference and mitigates risks for abuse of position and misconduct and also by ensuring a fair and open system for recruitment, selection and promotion, based on objective criteria and a formalised procedure, and an appraisal system that supports accountability and a public-service ethos.
Ensuring that the appointment to leadership positions within specialised anti-corruption bodies is conducted through competitive procedures promotes a merit-based approach and helps to minimise political influence over the appointment process. Accordingly, it is crucial that the main steps of the process are provided in legislation and that selection is based on the assessment of the candidates’ merits, including their experience, skills and integrity. The transparency of the process is also important in order to ensure that all eligible candidates can apply by advertising the vacancies online and that all relevant stakeholders, including the public, are aware of the outcomes of the main steps in the process.
Dismissal of leadership of specialised anti-corruption institutions
The appointment of a professional head of the anti-corruption agency who is compliant with high standards of ethics and integrity must be mirrored by his or her protection from unlawful dismissal before the end of the term of office.
The legislation of the EaP countries in this area differs quite significantly. Ukraine and Moldova provide for fairly high guarantees against unlawful dismissal of heads of specialised anti-corruption pre-trial investigation bodies. However, the recent IAP evaluation found that some grounds for the dismissal of the NABU director are vague or lack a clear and transparent procedure (OECD, 2024[3]).
The recent legislative amendments in Ukraine introduced additional guarantees against undue dismissal of the Chief Anti-Corruption Prosecutor in the framework of the disciplinary procedure, which now requires a recommendation on dismissal from an external audit commission composed of experts suggested by international organisations.
In Moldova, the law regulates the main steps of the dismissal procedure with respect to the Chief Anti-Corruption Prosecutor. For cases of resignation, the dismissal is issued by the Order of the Prosecutor General on receipt of a written resignation. The dismissal on other grounds shall be made within five working days from the occurrence or the knowledge of the grounds warranting dismissal. The dismissal based on grounds other than resignation is also issued by the Order of the Prosecutor General. However, there is no requirement in the law to publish information about the steps or outcomes of the dismissal procedure (OECD, 2024[11]).
Armenia sets out a certain level of guarantees against unlawful or pre-term dismissal of the head of the Anti-Corruption Committee.
The IAP’s Pilot 5th round of monitoring noted that Georgian legislation did not provide for a clear and transparent procedure for the dismissal of the head of the Prosecutor's Office's Anti-Corruption Unit and the head of the Special Security Service's Anti-Corruption Agency (OECD, 2022[14]). The Georgian authorities disagreed with this conclusion and stressed that for such an evaluation, the procedure and practice for the dismissal of the heads of the respective institutions rather than managers of structural units should be taken into account.
The situation in Azerbaijan is similar in the context of guarantees for the management of the Anti-Corruption Department of the Prosecutor General's Office.
In its judgement of 05.05.2020, the European Court of Human Rights concluded that Romania violated the rights of the DNA Chief Prosecutor when dismissing her before the end of her mandate.
The Court found in particular that there had been no way for the applicant to bring a claim in court against her dismissal as such proceedings would only have been able to examine the formal aspects of the presidential decree for her removal and not her substantive argument that she had been incorrectly removed for criticising the legislative changes in corruption law.
According to the judgement, her right to freedom of expression had been violated because she had been dismissed for those criticisms, which she had made in the exercise of her duties on a matter of great public interest. One of her duties as anti-corruption chief prosecutor had been to express her opinion on legislative reforms which could have an impact on the judiciary and its independence, and on the fight against corruption.
The Court also emphasised that her premature removal had defeated the very purpose of maintaining judicial independence and must have had a chilling effect on her and other prosecutors and judges in taking part in public debate on legislative reforms affecting the judiciary and judicial independence.
Source: Press Release of the European Court of Human Rights, https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng-press?i=003-6689193-8900232.
Ensure that the leadership of specialised anti-corruption institutions is appointed transparently and based on merits, with their tenure in office protected by law and respected in practice.
Ensure that the procedure for pre-term dismissal of the leadership of specialised anti-corruption institutions is clear, transparent, and objective. Envisage in the law special guarantees to protect the leadership of such bodies from arbitrary pre-term dismissal.
The use of public relations strategies of anti-corruption institutions in Eastern European countries (media strategies) is essential not only for the promotion of anti-corruption initiatives, but also for the survival of the institutions themselves in the face of severe pressure from high-ranking defendants or suspects who often own or influence media resources or can exert pressure through social media networks that can destroy the reputation and public trust in anti-corruption institutions.
There are several main reasons why external communications are critical for anti-corruption institutions. In the event of controversies, crises, or unfavourable situations, or when faced with misinformation, a robust media strategy of anti-corruption institutions is indispensable for crisis management and essential for managing public perception. Clear and timely communication helps in dispelling false narratives and mitigating the impact of misinformation.
In addition, countering misinformation is vital for anti-corruption institutions to maintain legitimacy and credibility with the public. For example, the report on the results of the technical assessment of the NABU links the relatively low level of public trust in the NABU to the need to improve its external communications. The NABU also confirms that it is a subject of constant massive media attacks by suspects in NABU cases, which undermine public trust in the institution (National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, 2023[2]).
Media strategies are important tools to strengthen public awareness, ensuring the accurate dissemination of information regarding the existence, mandate, and achievements of anti-corruption institutions. This awareness is essential to garner public support for sustaining anti-corruption efforts. Nevertheless, the success and efficacy of media strategies deployed by anti-corruption institutions are contingent on the existence of a free press and safeguards to freedom of expression, freedom of association, freedom of peaceful assembly, and the freedom to participate in public affairs (OECD, 2020, pp. 228-229[16]).
It is the responsibility of anti-corruption agencies to periodically inform society about the most high-profile investigations they are conducting. In accordance with the Council of Europe’s Recommendation Rec(2003)13 on the provision of information through the media in connection with criminal proceedings, anti-corruption agencies should ensure that "in the context of criminal proceedings of public interest or other criminal proceedings which have gained the particular attention of the public” that they inform the media about "their essential acts, so long as this does not prejudice the secrecy of investigations and police inquiries or delay or impede the outcome of the proceedings. In cases of criminal proceedings which continue for a long period, this information should be provided regularly".13
In the EaP countries, the practice of specialised anti-corruption institutions using external communications to inform the public about the activities is still being developed.
In Armenia, civil society has recommended that the newly formed Anti-Corruption Committee (ACC) improve its communication on high-profile cases, as "often, after announcing an investigation, the ACC does not follow up and inform the public about the outcome of the investigation" (OECD, 2024[7]). The IAP’s Pilot 5th round of monitoring report of Georgia noted that the progress of the review and investigation of high-level corruption cases, or decisions to not open a criminal investigation, were not routinely communicated to the public (OECD, 2022[14]). The Georgian authorities stressed, however, that the country’s State Security Service depending on the nature of information in terms of containing the signs of crime and credibility of the respective facts, makes the decision about starting an investigation immediately or reviewing the information through the law enforcement intelligence and open source data and then, deciding on opening an investigation, and that the feedbacks are routinely provided to the public.
In Azerbaijan, some information about investigations into high-level corruption is disclosed to the public, such as information about opening cases, the detention of the suspected or accused individual(s) and the seizure of assets. However, most of the information is not publicly shared, such as information on indictments, the use of non-trial resolutions to conclude the case, submissions of cases to the court or the cancellation of any of these decisions. Most importantly, there is no practice of routine communication on decisions to not open an investigation into high-level corruption cases (OECD, 2022[17]).
The Anti-corruption Prosecutor’s Office (APO) in Moldova faces significant challenges in public relations and communication. The APO lacks a dedicated official website, and its communication with the public heavily relies on the General Prosecutor's Office Press Service. The APO has not fulfilled the legal requirement to establish an information and media relations division. Furthermore, there is a notable absence of a comprehensive public relations strategy and internal communication plan. The APO's communication practices are criticised for their limited transparency, especially regarding the outcomes of high-profile cases (IPRE, 2022[18]).
In Ukraine, the NABU’s approach should be underlined given that it has been paying very serious attention to public relations since the very beginning of the Bureau's establishment. NABU has been committed to transparency and regularly communicates its activities to the public through various media channels, press releases, media briefings, and official statements are among the common tools used by NABU to disseminate information on ongoing investigations, arrests, and achievements. NABU maintains an official website with comprehensive information about its structure, functions, ongoing investigations, and annual reports and maintains active profiles on social media platforms, including Facebook and Twitter, to connect with a broader audience. Social media is often used to share updates and educational content about corruption and engage with the public through comments and discussions. NABU collaborates with journalists to ensure accurate reporting on its activities. This includes providing timely responses to media inquiries and organising press conferences. In times of crisis or increased public scrutiny, NABU has a strategy for crisis communication. This involves addressing concerns, dispelling misinformation, and maintaining public trust. NABU is mindful of public perception and actively works to manage its image. This includes addressing any negative publicity, clarifying misconceptions, and emphasising the positive impact of its anti-corruption efforts.
However, despite the serious resources invested in its media strategy, media attacks by both procedural opponents and government elites were so powerful that they undermined public trust in the NABU. A recent technical assessment of NABU recommended that the agency take a more proactive approach to communications with the public, anticipate public reaction to NABU investigations, improve the crafting of its messages and co-ordinate communications with SAPO to show how investigations start, progress, and culminate in a HACC verdict and better highlight the impact of its investigations (National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, 2023[2]).
This example emphasises the importance of having an effective media strategy and professional media specialists to ensure that public trust in anti-corruption institutions and their work is not compromised.
The EaP countries sometimes face problems with a restrictive approach to communicating information on the progress of investigations to the public due to the legal provisions prohibiting the disclosure of pre-trial investigation secrecy, a problem which was identified in Moldova, for example.
In such cases, it is necessary to eliminate discrepancies in the law that allow for a restrictive interpretation or to provide guidance to investigators or prosecutors on how to communicate with the public about the status of high-profile investigations to ensure a balance between the public's rights to be informed and the need to protect the secrecy of pre-trial investigations.
Encourage the cultivation of professional relationships with journalists and media outlets by responding promptly to media inquiries, providing accurate information, and organising regular press conferences to address queries and concerns.
Ensure the creation of public relations departments, or at least the appointment of individual specialists responsible for public relations in specialised anti-corruption institutions, and provide them with sufficient resources. Invest in the training of communication professionals within those agencies and provide staff with the skills necessary for effective media relations, crisis communication, and public engagement.
Develop and implement an external communications strategy, which would provide for the proactive and regular dissemination of information on the main procedural acts carried out in all high-level corruption cases of public interest through press releases, briefings, and official statements, and by designing a robust crisis communication plan to effectively manage challenges during times of increased scrutiny or controversy, and by establishing mechanisms for public feedback and engagement, and conduct regular evaluations of their media strategy.
Develop a user-friendly and informative official website and ensure that it contains up-to-date information on the institution’s structure, ongoing investigations, reports, and contact details. Consider offering resources in multiple languages for broader accessibility.
Establish active profiles on prominent social media platforms to share updates, educational content, and engage with the public, and fully use social media platforms to reach a wider audience.
Monitor public perception regularly through surveys, focus groups, and social media analytics, using the insights gained to adjust communication strategies, address misconceptions, and enhance public trust.
3.5.1. Privileging the quality of staff over the quantity
Anti-corruption institutions, even when provided with a robust legal framework, will not be able to function efficiently unless they are staffed by specialised professionals who can properly use the instruments at their disposal. Accordingly, the quality of their staff will always remain the most valuable resource to these institutions. Ensuring that anti-corruption institutions can attract and retain motivated, professional, and honest staff is vital to anti-corruption efforts, particularly in relation to efforts to curb high-level corruption.
In Eastern Europe, the staff of law enforcement and judicial authorities can become the targets of threats, or physical attacks (OECD, 2020, pp. 122-125[19]), which not only highlights the need to ensure their protection from physical harm but also underscores the dangerous and high-stakes nature of law enforcement work, including anti-corruption investigations, which may affect the attractiveness of the position within law enforcement authorities, including anti-corruption institutions.
The murders of journalists Daphne Caruana Galizia, assassinated in a car bombing in 2017, and Slovak journalist Ján Kuciak, who was killed with his fiancée at their home in 2018, once again emphasise how dangerous retaliation by individuals associated with high-level corruption can be. Therefore, it is not so much the quantity as the quality of the staff composing the anti-corruption infrastructure that matters. The IAP’s fifth round of monitoring underlined that anti-corruption institutions in EaP countries suffer from significant caseloads, which may overload them and significantly reduce their effectiveness.
At first glance, the reason for this is that the legislation or organisational charts do not provide for a sufficient number of staff in these institutions, which leads to an increase in the caseload per detective, investigator or prosecutor. However, on closer inspection, it appears that anti-corruption institutions have challenges in attracting staff, given that vacant positions in anti-corruption institutions are not fully filled, for example, in Moldova, up to one-third of the positions of prosecutors in the APO have not been filled; similarly, there are still vacancies in the Anti-Corruption Committee in Armenia and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office in Ukraine.
Moreover, the significant caseload of prosecutors or investigators is often caused by the fact that specialised anti-corruption agencies are overloaded with minor cases. For example, in 2023, the Ukrainian Parliament adopted a law to increase the number of staff available to NABU (The Kyiv Independent, 2024[20]), however, NABU’s technical assessment report, conducted in 2023, noted that "NABU has a significant workload that is not matched by the human resources available to it. Even an increase in the NABU staff number and redistributing staff from support units to the core detective units will not solve the workload issue. NABU needs to optimise the use of available resources by setting a clear prioritisation policy to focus on the high-impact cases and cases that address systemic corruption" (National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, 2023[2]). The same situation existed within Moldova's APO before the legislation was amended in 2023, and minor corruption cases were transferred to the ANI. Accordingly, this underlines that the lack of a clear prioritisation policy targeting high-level corruption can result in the improper allocation of resources in the investigation of high-level corruption cases.
The lack of human resources in prosecuting high-level corruption is not unique to the EaP countries, and similar problems exist in EU member states. However, the difference with the situation in the EaP jurisdictions is that specialised law enforcement agencies mostly lack employees with special expertise, such as accountants, analysts, and forensic and IT experts. In France, the special police and prosecutors services for the investigation and prosecution of economic crimes, the Central Office for Combatting Corruption and Tax Offences (OCLICIFF) and the National Financial Prosecutor (PNF), reported difficulty in recruiting and retaining human resources, particularly financial data analysts, experienced investigators and prosecutors specialised in financial and economic crimes (OECD, 2021[21]). Similar concerns were noted, for example, regarding Luxembourg, Ireland, Poland, Portugal, and Sweden.14
Other Eastern European countries experience similar issues. For example, in Croatia, both USKOK and the State Attorney’s Office are facing difficulties finding sufficient staff, with the State Attorney’s Office operating with only 52 out of the 82 positions filled (European Commission, 2023[22]). In Latvia, the lack of qualified investigators has impacted the efficiency of pre-trial and criminal proceedings. In addition, the low number of high-level corruption cases between 2021-2023 was explained by investigators’ lack of capacity to identify specific elements of criminal conduct, namely in relation to bribery, during covert operations (e.g. wiretapping) in view of their importance to criminal proceedings. To mitigate this, the Prosecutor’s Office introduced new guidelines for conducting covert operations, which require a more active involvement of prosecutors in both organising these operations and analysing their results.15
Human resources of the Montenegrin Special Prosecution Office were found largely insufficient to cope with a workload of up to 100 cases per Special Prosecutor, and the country was urged to address the lack of expertise available in the justice system on financial investigations.16 Similarly, the Prosecutor’s Office for Organised Crime, which has jurisdiction over high-level corruption in Serbia, was found understaffed (European Commission, 2023[23]). Bulgaria also indicated the serious problem of insufficient resources, which impedes the Prosecution Service's expert capacity. Bosnia and Herzegovina, in its replies to the study questionnaire, stressed the insufficient number of prosecutors, professional associates, and economic advisors in certain prosecutor's offices, which, due to their local and substantive jurisdiction, bear the greatest burden of solving high-level corruption.
As for the recruitment and selection of staff, it is recommended that talent management be implemented - a set of approaches, methods, and tools for identifying, engaging, developing, motivating, and retaining talented employees. In anti-corruption institutions, it refers to the strategic process of attracting, developing, and retaining skilled and motivated individuals to effectively carry out the mission of the institution. This involves identifying and cultivating individuals with the right skills, competencies, and values to fight corruption. This approach should include the selection of specialists on a transparent competitive basis. The inclusion of experts from civil society and academia in the selection panels will ensure the credibility of such a process.
In addition, opportunities for finding suitable specialists should be expanded, for example, by analysing the possibilities and identifying a list of additional sources for finding candidates for positions in institutions (social networks, job search sites, etc.), creating a profile of the institution on selected job search sites and social networks, posting current vacancies on selected sites and social networks.
There is also an important need for specialists who help prosecutors and detectives perform their direct duties in supporting criminal proceedings, such as in-house auditors, financial analysts, forensic accounting, IT or technical specialists. Such specialists support detectives and prosecutors in their functions and increase the overall efficiency of the institution.
An important aspect is not only recruiting staff but also maintaining a favourable internal work culture in the team. One option would be to create an independent ombudsman to review employee and outside groups' concerns about institutional workplace culture and organisational concerns. Establishing such a position could provide a confidential communication route for employees and other stakeholders to report workplace concerns, alleged improprieties, and systemic problems and serve as a feedback mechanism for work-related issues.
Ensure specialised anti-corruption institutions are allocated sufficient human, financial, technical, material, and other resources and, in particular, that the human resource demand for detectives, investigators, prosecutors, and experts supporting criminal proceedings is considered in alignment with the institution's priorities.
Introduce best practices in merit-based recruitment and talent management to attract, develop, and retain skilled staff motivated to effectively carry out the anti-corruption institution's mission.
Consider introducing an independent ombudsman to review employee and external groups' concerns about institutional workplace culture and organisational concerns occurring within anti-corruption institutions.
3.5.2. Cultivating dedicated human resources
Given the challenging work environment, the motivation of employees of anti-corruption institutions is an essential factor in their success. Therefore, one of the key priorities for an anti-corruption institution is to ensure the high morale and dedication of its employees.
Dedicated and motivated employees serve as a highly valuable asset to the institution. They consistently strive to contribute to the realisation of the organisation's strategic objectives, demonstrating robust efficiency and successfully executing their assigned tasks. Their commitment enhances the institution's reputation in society, and they stand ready to assist their colleagues in overcoming challenges. It is impossible to provide a universal approach on how to ensure an adequate level of motivation for the staff of anti-corruption institutions, but regular staff surveys can provide answers to key questions and help to identify how to respond to possible challenges affecting morale.
Conducting regular staff surveys, a common practice among many organisations, can be a tool for evaluating morale and the level of engagement of staff, and for identifying areas of concern for staff in the institution and maintaining an open dialogue between employees and the institution's management to address emerging issues affecting the motivation of the staff. Such surveys should be anonymous and specialised IT solutions can and should be used for their implementation. For example, in the 2019 survey of employees of the Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine, the motivation index was determined by 12 questions, including questions on whether staff were satisfied in their roles or wanted to leave the Office of the Prosecutor General.
Conducting an institutional employee survey is an additional motivating factor because it makes an employee feel valued within an organisation by having the opportunity to express his or her personal opinion on important organisational matters. It is important to provide feedback on the results of the survey to employees of institutions, for example, follow-up initiatives, staff suggestions and the reasoning behind decisions to not implement certain suggestions made by staff, as this is part of internal communications, which also affects employee motivation.
There are many factors that contribute to the decline in the motivation of anti-corruption institutions. For example, the NABU, which has always had a highly motivated staff with a clear sense of the NABU's mission, has shown signs of gradual burnout and deterioration in the seven years since its establishment. According to the experts who conducted the technical assessment of NABU, the factors that led to the deterioration of motivation among NABU employees include "too many levels of managers, excessive bureaucratisation of some processes, lack of prospects for professional development through promotion or salary increase, imperfect working conditions, menial work that takes a lot of detective time” (National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, 2023[2]).
Surveys of Ukrainian prosecutors in 2019 showed that the main motivating factors for them were financial remuneration, successes and achievements of the prosecution service to which they contributed, and the opportunity to gain new knowledge and professional development.
Note: Middle and Senior Level positions refer to heads of units and heads of departments.
Leadership positions refer to heads of agencies and deputies, if there is no specialised agency – heads and deputy heads of those agencies to which specialised anti-corruption units belong.
Source: Information collected from ACN countries
The information provided by certain countries within the region indicates that in all these jurisdictions, the salaries of anti-corruption law enforcement officials generally surpass the average national salaries (see Figure 3.1, Figure 3.2 and Table 3.3). However, this correlation varies across different jurisdictions. For instance, the entry-level salaries of anti-corruption investigators range from 151 to 425 % of the average national salary, with the exception of Lithuania, where such investigators receive 89 % of the national average. In most of these countries, the salaries of anti-corruption prosecutors usually exceed those of investigators, although this is not the case in Ukraine at the middle and top levels and in Armenia at the leadership level. Also, it is important to note that certain jurisdictions with higher ratios have a lower average annual national salary.
The data underscores these respective countries' emphasis on remunerating their anti-corruption officials, a crucial factor in attracting highly motivated and skilled personnel, which might require further improvements within certain jurisdictions.
Note: Middle and Senior Level positions refer to heads of units and heads of departments.
Leadership positions refer to heads of agencies and deputies, if there is no specialised agency – heads and deputy heads of those agencies to which specialised anti-corruption units belong.
Source: Information collected from ACN countries
Source: Information collected from ACN member countries.
Another vital factor that impacts the motivation of employees of anti-corruption institutions is their security (legal and physical), as well as the protection of their family members. The fight against high-level corruption is always associated with conflicts and retaliation by the persons being prosecuted and the narrow interest groups to which they are affiliated. The staff of anti-corruption agencies may be persecuted by other law enforcement agencies, as was, for example, the case in Ukraine, where pressure on the NABU was exerted by opening criminal proceedings against NABU employees by another law enforcement agency, the State Bureau of Investigation. They may also receive threats of physical violence or destruction of property.17
Therefore, legislation should provide sufficient guarantees of protection for the staff of anti-corruption agencies, including adequate remuneration, legal protection by the institution, and, if necessary, physical protection of the staff of the anti-corruption institution and their family members by the anti-corruption institution itself, instead of by other law enforcement agencies.
Recommendations
Introduce periodic surveys of anti-corruption institution employees to monitor changes in personnel morale and level of engagement, identify areas of employee concern within the institution, and maintain an open dialogue between employees and the institution's leadership.
Regularly review the policies and practices of anti-corruption institutions aimed at maintaining high morale and employee motivation.
Ensure that the remuneration of specialised anti-corruption staff is established by the law and proportionate to the importance of their functions.
Ensure that the law provides for physical protection measures for the staff of anti-corruption institutions and their family members and that these protection measures are to be provided by the anti-corruption institution itself and not by a different body.
References
[6] Council of Europe, Group of States against Corruption (2024), Armenia evaluation report: Fifth evaluation round - Preventing corruption and promoting integrity in central governments (top executive functions) and law enforcement agencies, https://rm.coe.int/fifth-evaluation-round-preventing-corruption-and-promoting-integrity-i/1680af5d35.
[10] Council of Europe, Group of States against Corruption (2022), Bulgaria evaluation report: Fifth evaluation round – Preventing corruption and promoting integrity in central governments (top executive functions) and law enforcement agencies, https://rm.coe.int/fifth-evaluation-round-preventing-corruption-and-promoting-integrity-i/1680a9cab7.
[22] European Commission (2023), Country chapter on the rule of law situation in Croatia, https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2023-07/27_1_52610_coun_chap_croatia_en.pdf.
[12] European Commission (2023), North Macedonia 2023 Report, https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/28a9322a-3f18-434e-89d2-0890c90b2f96_en?filename=SWD_2023_693%20North%20Macedonia%20report.pdf.
[23] European Commission (2023), Serbia 2023 report, https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/9198cd1a-c8c9-4973-90ac-b6ba6bd72b53_en?filename=SWD_2023_695_Serbia.pdf.
[18] IPRE (2022), Functional analysis of the Anticorruption Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Moldova: Recommendations for increasing the efficiency of fighting high-level corruption, https://ipre.md/2022/11/23/analiza-functionala-a-procuraturii-anticoruptie-a-republicii-moldova/?lang=en.
[2] National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (2023), Technical assessment of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine 2023, https://nabu.gov.ua/site/assets/files/47003/tekhnichna_otcinka_nabu_2023_en-1.pdf.
[7] OECD (2024), Baseline Report of the Fifth Round of Monitoring of Anti-Corruption Reforms in Armenia: The Istanbul Anti-Corruption Action Plan, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/fb158bf9-en.
[13] OECD (2024), Baseline Report of the Fifth Round of Monitoring of Anti-Corruption Reforms in Azerbaijan: The Istanbul Anti-Corruption Action Plan, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/a17aca4c-en.
[11] OECD (2024), Baseline Report of the Fifth Round of Monitoring of Anti-Corruption Reforms in Moldova: The Istanbul Anti-Corruption Action Plan, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/25fc47ac-en.
[3] OECD (2024), Review of Anti-Corruption Reforms in Ukraine under the Fifth Round of Monitoring: The Istanbul Anti-Corruption Action Plan, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9e03ebb6-en.
[17] OECD (2022), Anti-Corruption Reforms in Azerbaijan: Pilot 5th Round of Monitoring Under the Istanbul Anti-Corruption Action Plan, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/3ae2406b-en.
[24] OECD (2022), Anti-Corruption Reforms in Azerbaijan: Pilot 5th Round of Monitoring Under the Istanbul Anti-Corruption Action Plan, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/3ae2406b-en.
[14] OECD (2022), Anti-Corruption Reforms in Georgia: Pilot 5th Round of Monitoring Under the Istanbul Anti-Corruption Action Plan, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/d709c349-en.
[4] OECD (2022), Anti-Corruption Reforms in Ukraine: Pilot 5th Round of Monitoring Under the Istanbul Anti-Corruption Action Plan, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/b1901b8c-en.
[21] OECD (2021), Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention Phase 4 report: France, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/2c7d8500-en.
[16] OECD (2020), OECD Public Integrity Handbook, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/ac8ed8e8-en.
[19] OECD (2020), The Independence of Prosecutors in Eastern Europe, Central Asia and Asia Pacific, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/3341b41f-en.
[9] OECD (2017), Preventing Policy Capture: Integrity in Public Decision Making, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264065239-en.
[15] OECD (2017), Recommendation of the Council on Public Integrity, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0435.
[5] Pravda (2023), New building, weak basement: How systemic problems affect the HACC, https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/columns/2023/09/5/7418480/.
[20] The Kyiv Independent (2024), Parliament passes bill to increase anti-corruption bureau staff in first reading, https://kyivindependent.com/parliament-approves-draft-law-to-increase-anti-corruption-bureau-staff-by-more-than-40/.
[1] Transparency International (2023), Tackling grand corruption impunity: Proposals for a definition and special measures, https://images.transparencycdn.org/images/2023-Working-paper-Tackling-grand-corruption-impunity.pdf.
[8] U4 (2022), Specialised anti-corruption courts – A comparative mapping, https://www.u4.no/publications/specialised-anti-corruption-courts.pdf.
← 1. https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-nabu-imf-world-bank-anti-corruption-efforts-thwarted/28902554.html
← 2. https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/-/fight-against-corruption-in-ukraine-venice-commission-says-constitutional-court-decision-regrettable-
← 3. In its report on the results of the fifth round of monitoring of Ukraine, the OECD noted in the context of pressure from narrow interest groups on the NABU and the SAPO that “…political and other undue interference in investigation and prosecution and adjudication of high-level corruption cases have been noted as a major impediment, according to the pilot report”. p.101
← 4. European Commission Opinion on Ukraine’s application for membership of the European Union, Brussels, 17.6.2022 COM (2022) 407 final, p.10. https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2022-06/Ukraine%20Opinion%20and%20Annex.pdf
← 6. Please see the Joint Opinion of the Venice Commission and the Directorate General of Human Rights and Rule of Law (DGI) of the Council of Europe on the Draft Law on the Anti-Corruption Judicial System and on Amending Some Normative Acts Adopted by the Venice Commission at its 136th Plenary Session (Venice, 6-7 October 2023). https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2023)032-e
← 7. Ibid
← 8. The investigation of corruption offences is split between the Police and Border Guard Board (PBGB) and the Internal Security Service
← 9. Ukraine 2023 Report, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Brussels, 8.11.2023 SWD(2023) 699 final, p.6, https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-11/SWD_2023_699%20Ukraine%20report.pdf
← 10. Civil Georgia, “TI Georgia: Adopted Amendments to the Anti-Corruption Law Worsen Existing Practice”, https://civil.ge/archives/612161
← 11. Kyiv Post (2017), Scandal plagues agency to prevent corruption
← 12. The joint statement from the international anti-corruption NGO Transparency International Ukraine, the anti-corruption group the Reanimation Package of Reform, the Anti-corruption Action Center, the All-Ukrainian Union AutoMaidan, and Bihus.Info, https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/civil-society-urges-the-government-to-change-the-nacp-management/
← 13. Council of Europe, Recommendation Rec(2003)13 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the provision of information through the media in relation to criminal proceedings (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 10 July 2003 at the 848th meeting of the Ministers' Deputies), https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectId=09000016805df617.
← 14. OECD, Country monitoring of the Anti-Bribery Convention, https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/fighting-foreign-bribery.html.
← 15. Latvian State Audit Office, Conceptual report "On the improvement of the education system of law enforcement officials"
← 16. European Commission (2023), Montenegro Report 2023, p.37 https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/montenegro-report-2023_en