Combatting High-level Corruption in Eastern Europe

4. Detection, investigation and confiscation tools

Abstract

High-level corruption is particularly challenging to detect and investigate. The assets used in high-level corruption schemes are often hidden abroad, making financial investigations and other investigative activities and efforts to confiscate and recover these assets more difficult. This chapter highlights key sources for detecting high-level corruption, such as whistleblowers, investigative journalists and information collected from asset declarations of public officials. This chapter also examines key areas and mechanisms where specialised anti-corruption agencies could adopt more modern approaches to combat high-level corruption more effectively, particularly by strengthening and making full use of their corporate liability regimes, by reinforcing confiscation and asset recovery procedures, by bolstering their existing interagency and international cooperation mechanisms or by adopting modern analytical tools within these institutions.

4.1. Key sources of detecting high-level corruption

Certain economic crimes, such as bribery and corruption, are complex and recognised as particularly challenging to detect (OECD, 2017, p. 14[1]). Due to insufficient capacity to obtain information on high-level corruption, anti-corruption bodies have limited opportunities to hold those responsible for corruption accountable. The lack of capacity to effectively detect corruption directly correlates with evading accountability, especially considering the limited statute of limitations.

Law enforcement authorities can make use of a diverse range of detection sources to identify corruption schemes (OECD, 2017, p. 14[1]), including those related to high-level corruption. The nature of high-level corruption, usually involving high-level officials and complex corruption schemes, underlines the key role which can be played by information collected from whistleblowers, the press and asset declarations of high-level officials in uncovering high-level corruption in ACN countries.

4.1.1. Whistleblowers

In cases of corruption, especially at high levels, it is increasingly difficult to detect the crime because it is hidden and neither party involved has any interest in revealing it. Contrary to many other offences, there is rarely an easily identifiable, direct victim who would be willing to come forward.

Therefore, exposing high-level corruption is very challenging without the assistance of whistleblowers for several critical reasons.

Firstly, access to inside information is crucial. High-level corruption is frequently concealed behind intricate structures, forged documents, and covert deals. Whistleblowers working within these systems have direct access to vital information that is otherwise difficult to obtain.

Moreover, the complexity of high-level corruption schemes can be overwhelming. Such schemes often involve offshore accounts, shell companies, and various money laundering techniques. Whistleblowers can provide crucial insights into the mechanisms of these elaborate schemes. For instance, the Panama Papers were leaked by an anonymous source who provided journalists with a vast number of documents revealing offshore schemes used by politicians and businessmen to hide assets.

In addition, fear and repression are significant factors. High-level corruption frequently entails intimidation, retaliation, and the misuse of power to suppress information. Whistleblowers often provide information anonymously or under protection, enabling them to come forward without immediate retribution. Sergei Magnitsky, a Russian lawyer, exposed a massive tax fraud scheme involving high-ranking officials who embezzled hundreds of millions of dollars from the Russian government. Following his revelations, Magnitsky was arrested, tortured, and ultimately died in pre-trial detention in 2009. His case underscores the severe risks faced by whistleblowers in authoritarian regimes and led to the creation of the "Magnitsky Act" in the United States, which imposes sanctions on those involved in corruption and human rights abuses.

Furthermore, the lack of independence among investigative bodies can hinder the fight against corruption. In some countries, these bodies may be influenced or controlled by senior officials, rendering them ineffective. Whistleblowers can offer independent information that prompts action from international organisations and other independent bodies.

Lastly, external investigators and journalists may lack the necessary resources or expertise to tackle complex corruption cases. Whistleblowers from within organisations can supply critical information and guidance that significantly eases the investigative process.

Therefore, whistleblowers remain among the valuable sources of information about high-level corruption and creating an encouraging culture for exposing corruption is a necessary precondition for effectively combatting high-level corruption (OECD, 2017[1]).

The OECD Recommendation of the Council on Public Integrity underlines the importance of providing clear rules and procedures for reporting suspected violations of integrity standards, and ensure, in accordance with fundamental principles of domestic law, protection in law and practice against all types of unjustified treatments as a result of reporting in good faith and on reasonable grounds. Alternative channels for reporting suspected violations of integrity standards, including when appropriate the possibility of confidentially reporting to a body with the mandate and capacity to conduct an independent investigation should also be provided for (OECD, 2017[2]).

Box 4.1. OECD Anti-Bribery Recommendation 2021 – Protection of Reporting Persons (Recommendation XXII)

Member countries are recommended, in view of the essential role that reporting persons can play as a source of detection of foreign bribery cases, that member countries establish, in accordance with their jurisdictional and other basic legal principles, strong and effective legal and institutional frameworks to protect and/or to provide remedy against any retaliatory action to persons working in the private or public sector who report on reasonable grounds suspected acts of bribery of foreign public officials in international business transactions and related offences in a work-related context, and in particular:

i. Ensure that sufficiently-resourced and well-trained competent authorities implement the legal framework for the protection of reporting persons, and receive, investigate or otherwise process complaints of retaliation.

ii. Afford protection to the broadest possible range of reporting persons in a work-related context, including as appropriate to those whose work-based relationship has ended, to persons who acquire information on suspected acts of foreign bribery during advanced stages of the recruitment process or the contractual negotiations, and who could suffer retaliation, for instance in the form of negative employment references or blacklisting, and consider extending protection to third persons connected to the reporting person who could suffer retaliation in a work-related context.

iii. Ensure appropriate measures are in place to provide for the confidentiality of the identity of the reporting person and the content of the report, in a manner consistent with national laws, in particular on investigations by competent authorities or judicial proceedings.

iv. Consider allowing for anonymous reports, and ensure that all relevant protections are available to those who are subsequently identified and may suffer retaliation.

v. Ensure appropriate measures are in place to prohibit or render invalid any contractual provisions designed or intended to waive, terminate, diminish, or modify the claims and legal protections of persons who make reports that qualify for protection to competent authorities.

vi. Provide a broad definition of retaliation against reporting persons that is not limited to workplace retaliation and can also include actions that can result in reputational, professional, financial, social, psychological, and physical harm.

vii. Ensure appropriate remedies are available to reporting persons to compensate direct and indirect consequences of retaliatory action following a report that qualifies for protection, including financial compensation, and interim relief pending the resolution of legal proceedings.

viii. Provide for effective, proportionate, and dissuasive sanctions for those who retaliate against reporting persons.

ix. In administrative, civil, or labour proceedings, shift the burden of proof on retaliating natural and legal persons and entities to prove that such allegedly adverse action against a reporting person was not in retaliation for the report.

x. Ensure that reporting persons are not subject to disciplinary proceedings and liability based on the making of reports that qualify for protection.

xi. Consider introducing incentives for making reports that qualify for protection.

xii. Raise awareness and provide training on the design and implementation of the legal and institutional frameworks to protect reporting persons and protections and remedies available.

xiii. Periodically review the effectiveness of the legal and institutional frameworks for the protection of reporting persons and consider making publicly available the results of these periodical reviews.

xiv. With due regard to data protection rules and privacy rights, ensure that such rules and laws that prohibit transmission of economic or commercial information do not unduly impede reports by and protection of reporting persons.

Source: OECD (2021[3]), Recommendation of the OECD Council for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0378.

The study “Citizens' attitudes towards corruption in the EU in 2023” indicated that among those who have experienced or witnessed corruption, the ratio who reported is about one in seven. More than half of the respondents (54%) indicated that they are uncertain where to report corruption should they encounter it. Approximately three out of ten respondents assume corruption goes unreported because those accountable will not face punishment, or due to the absence of protection measures for those who expose corruption1.

Shortcomings in the reporting mechanisms in place are recognised as key enablers of the low rate of prosecution and conviction of high-profile corruption cases in ten EU Member States, including Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania and Slovenia (European Commission, 2023[4]). More recently, Bulgaria and Slovenia have transposed the EU Whistleblower Protection Directive through the adoption of dedicated whistleblower protection laws. Slovenia’s recent Whistleblower Protection Law, which entered into force in February 2023, broadens the scope of protection provided to whistleblowers and is expected to improve the detection of corruption.2 In Bulgaria, civil society raised concerns that the Whistleblower Protection Law did not provide for anonymous reporting.3

In contrast, in the United States, whistleblower reports constitute a very significant source of all corruption reports and cases. The United States Phase 4 Two-year Follow-up Report, conducted by the OECD Working Group on Bribery, noted that from 2020 to 2022, 40% of the cases in which the U.S. Department of Justice imposed sanctions for foreign bribery were initiated by whistleblowers (OECD, 2022[5]).

The IAP’s fifth round of monitoring reports underline that whistleblowers could present an important potential detection source for high-level corruption in the EaP countries, and that this source of detection is not yet fully used.

Special legislation on whistleblower protection exists in all EaP countries except Azerbaijan. However, in 2022, the Anti-Corruption Directorate developed a draft Law concerning the encouragement and protection of whistleblowers who are involved in corruption-related investigations and submitted it to the relevant competent authority for consideration.

Armenia has a special law on whistleblower protection that presents a solid basis for protecting persons reporting corruption.

In 2023, Moldova adopted a new law on whistleblowers reporting corruption violations, which incorporates the standards of the EU Whistleblower Protection Directive,4 which have already been transposed in 25 of the 27 EU member states.5 The law addressed many of the previous shortcomings identified in the IAP’s reports, including the possibility of anonymous reporting, the clarification of the whistleblower's status, and the provision of increased protection measures.

Georgia included some provisions on whistleblower protection in its legislation, at the same time, there are substantial limitations, and the system does not appear to function in practice. The law limits protected disclosure with conditions of good faith, public interest, and lack of self-interest and protection measures do not cover private-sector whistleblowing. In addition, significant categories of public officials are excluded from the scope of the law and the protections it provides, namely employees of the Ministry of Defence, and of the Ministry of Internal Affairs are not covered. The reversal of the burden of proof on the employer in judicial proceedings related to retaliation measures against whistleblowers is not fully provided. The protection of personal safety is limited to the protection of participants in criminal proceedings and, therefore, may not cover all whistleblowers. In addition, pre- and post-retaliation protection measures are not provided in law (OECD, 2022[6]).

In the IAP’s fifth round of monitoring, it was noted that Ukraine has a comprehensive legal framework for the protection of whistleblowers reporting corruption based primarily on the law on Prevention of Corruption and the Criminal Procedural Code. Diverse protection measures are in place, and most of them are applied in practice. There is a dedicated authority in Ukraine for whistleblower protection. Ukraine’s other innovations include the NACP’s legal aid regime to represent whistleblowers in court, the extension of protections to the whistleblowers’ family members, allowing the whistleblower’s full discretion in choosing among reporting channels and financial incentives for whistleblowers in criminal corruption cases (OECD, 2022[7]).

The situation is more complicated when it comes to the implementation of whistleblower protection laws in the EaP countries. The IAP’s monitoring reports underline that the perception towards whistleblowers or reporting persons is generally not positive. This is still due to the historical considerations, namely the legacy left by the Soviet Union, when the practice of informing on neighbours or colleagues (so called "donos") was widespread, which was a central element in the Soviet government's policy of political repression. Overcoming this factor requires governments to focus on creating a positive culture and perception towards whistleblowing, and by introducing different types of incentives to disclose corruption, including financial incentives.

In some countries another common key issue that hinders the active use of whistleblowing is that the level of trust in government institutions that deal with co-operation and protection of whistleblowers is still limited.

An increase in the number of corruption reports, like the one found in Ukraine, may be one of the key signs of growing confidence in the state and its anti-corruption institutions. This public confidence is only possible through the daily honest and effective enforcement of the law and by ensuring that protection measures in the law are actually provided to whistleblowers in practice. Achieving this is much more difficult than simply adopting a robust law on whistleblower protection.

With regard to the implementation of whistleblower protection legislation in the EaP countries, it is worth noting the lack of resources, especially human resources, in the institutions responsible for creating a whistleblower protection framework.

The situation with the collection of statistical information on whistleblowers in the EaP states, except for Ukraine, is also noteworthy, given that without clear and verified information, it is impossible to properly monitor, analyse and adjust state policy in this area.

In addition, many of the obstacles to encouraging the reporting of corruption can be solved by establishing centralized online reporting platforms, provided that they allow for anonymous reporting and are administered by institutions that are trusted by citizens. Moldova and Azerbaijan do not yet have such platforms, while in Armenia and Georgia, such online platforms have been created (OECD, 2024[8]).6

Most European countries, with some exceptions, have chosen not to provide a reward to whistleblowers who report corruption. For example, the EU Directive on the Protection of Whistleblowers only provides a mechanism for the victims of retaliation for legal remedies and compensation (para 94 of the EU Directive).7

In contrast, the United States' approach envisages not only protection and compensation but also rewards for whistleblowers.8 The 2010 Dodd-Frank Act authorises awards, ranging between 10% and 30% of the total amount resulting from the enforcement action, to whistleblowers whose voluntary disclosures lead to Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) enforcement actions resulting in a recovery exceeding USD 1 million (OECD, 2020[9]). The SEC Whistleblower Program has resulted in more than USD 6.3 billion in total monetary sanctions, including more than USD 4.0 billion in disgorgement of ill-gotten gains and interest.9 Recently the US Department of Justice launched a Corporate Whistleblower Awards Pilot Program to uncover and prosecute corporate crime including corruption involving misconduct by companies10.

The negative perception of whistleblowers in Eastern European countries could be addressed by creating an ecosystem within civil society that encourages support for whistleblowers. Such an ecosystem is critical to overcoming the isolation faced by whistleblowers and supporting their efforts. In addition to ensuring that whistleblowers are not ostracised, it is necessary to provide whistleblowers with the right to be rewarded in order to recover damages caused by the loss of employment and, at times, the destruction of entire careers. This could also take the form of support for whistleblowers while they seek new employment, or in assisting them in rebuilding their lives in another country or region.

Recommendations

• Introduce an effective whistleblower protection framework, in particular, by promoting a favourable environment for whistleblowing, protecting whistleblowers in practice, and providing them with a broad range of remedies to compensate consequences of retaliation, including financial compensation for economic and social losses incurred by whistleblowers.

• Establish or strengthen the institutional framework for whistleblower protection and provide it with adequate resources and specialised staff.

• Create online channels for reporting corruption, and consider allowing, where appropriate, anonymous reporting.

• Consider introducing incentives for reporting corruption.

4.1.2. The role of free media in detecting and fighting against corruption

Investigative journalism is another one of the most effective sources of uncovering corruption, particularly high-level corruption. The media can create or change the agenda for anti-corruption reforms, forcing these narrow interest groups to respond to public demand (OECD, 2017[1]).

The unprecedented worldwide investigation into the "Panama Papers" in 2016, conducted by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ), and its 109 media partners at the time, attracted worldwide attention. It revealed the secret assets of heads of state, billionaires and criminals hidden in tax havens behind the cloak of shell companies. Following a six-month investigation, two major media outlets reported on the Unaoil scandal, an alleged transnational bribery scheme involving bribes paid on behalf of companies in countries across the globe, including those from Parties to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention (OECD, 2018[10]).

Despite the extremely high potential of using investigative journalism as a source to detect corruption, it is not fully exploited in the EaP countries.

In Armenia, the IAP’s Pilot 5^th round monitoring report found that there is no statistical information or reporting on investigations into public allegations of high-level corruption, and that it is doubtful that all public allegations of high-level corruption result in criminal investigations. In this context, the country’s Criminal Procedure Code envisages a requirement for the media to provide at the request of the head of the investigating body, investigator or prosecutor, the materials in their possession confirming the report about the crime they published. The Armenian authorities also informed that the Prosecutor General’s Office monitors the publications in mass media and social networks, and in case of publications about, inter alia, high-level corruption, they are sent to the investigative body for discussing the issue of initiation of criminal proceedings. In case the grounds are not sufficient for the initiation of criminal proceedings, such publications are checked according to the Law on Operational Intelligence Activities.

In Azerbaijan, provisions for launching formal investigations based on media publications raise serious concerns. A legal requirement for the media to submit documents supporting published corruption allegations might be a significant impediment to detecting corruption and undermine the role of media in this respect. Corruption allegations published in the foreign media were not investigated due to national legislation regulating the grounds for opening an investigation. Public allegations are not sufficient grounds to start an investigation in Azerbaijan. Pursuant to the Criminal Procedure Code, mass media representatives shall send the available information on alleged crimes in writing to the investigative authorities. There were no investigations initiated based on the available public allegations of high-level corruption or on the information received from the mass media in 2020 (OECD, 2024[11]). Cases of persecution of journalists who report on corruption in the government are even more worrying.11 Such a policy of the narrow interest groups significantly reduces the opportunities for exposing high-level corruption.

In Moldova, civil society expressed concerns that the investigation in many high-level corruption cases opened in previous years, including those regarding the theft of billions, was stalling, while other corruption scandals were not given proper judicial follow-up.

The study on Public Authorities’ Reaction to the Facts on Public Officials’ Integrity, reported by Investigative Journalists (July 2017 – July 2019), conducted by the Association of Independent Press of Moldova, found that in 11 out of 26 alleged corruption cases, uncovered by investigative journalists, the state authorities did not react.12

The situation improved to some extent in recent years; in particular, the APO opened two cases of high-level corruption based on media reports involving the investigation against two Members of the Parliament for corruption offences. In one case, the MP and a former director of the state-owned International Airport Chisinau were accused of abuse of office in relation to the fraudulent award of a concession contract of the International Airport Chisinau in 2013, the case was sent to court in May 2021. The second case is part of the complex case opened in 2014 by the APO, known as the “theft of the billion” case. In March 2021, a member of parliament was accused of participating in an organised group that contributed to the theft of funds from the banking system of the Republic of Moldova. In 2022, the investigation in this case was still ongoing, and the immunity of both members of parliament was lifted in 2021 (OECD, 2022[12]).

In Georgia, during the OECD pilot monitoring visit, some NGOs made numerous public allegations of high-level corruption, but according to the authorities, some of them were under preliminary review or criminal investigation initiated immediately after the information was made public, while other allegations had been verified and found no evidence of a crime, and no investigation had been initiated (OECD, 2022[6]).

There are problems in Georgia that significantly affect the free operation of the media, including the exposure of high-level corruption. Thus, while the media environment is largely pluralistic, it is also highly polaried and operates in a hostile environment. The intersection of business and political interests continues to impede media independence. Constant public attacks and defamatory rhetoric against journalists and media workers by high-ranking officials and politicians, both from the government and the opposition, as well as by aggressive far-right groups, have created a somewhat hostile environment that threatens media freedom and pluralism. In this regard, the European Commission recommended that Georgia ensure the safety of journalists and provide prompt, impartial and due legal follow-up in cases of attacks against and intimidation of journalists, including as regards the instigators of the 5 July 2021 violence against over 50 journalists and improve the independence of the national media regulator (Communication Commission) in line with the principles of Audiovisual Media Service Directive and European standards.13

The situation with media freedom has further deteriorated with the recent adoption of the controversial Law “On Transparency of Foreign Influence”. According to an urgent opinion by the Venice Commission the Law, under the alleged aim of ensuring transparency, has the objective effect of risking the stigmatising, silencing and eventually elimination of associations and media which receive even a low part of their funds from abroad. A strong risk is created that the associations and media which come to be affected will be those who are critical of the government, so that their removal would adversely affect open, informed public debate, pluralism and democracy14.

Ukraine, despite the war and the imposition of martial law, maintains a quite high level of media pluralism and freedom of the media. Investigative media continue to be active in exposing corruption. However, media concentration has been observed due to the collapse of the media and advertising market, particularly in the television segment. This has reduced people's access to pluralistic media in Ukraine. The situation of journalists remains precarious, both economically and, since the start of the full-scale invasion, also physically. Ukraine needs to envisage new ways to ensure a post-war structure for pluralistic and independent non-online media (in particular television).15 The recent attacks on an established investigative media outlet in 2024, in order to discredit their investigative team, illustrate the kinds of pressure that investigative journalists are still subject to.16

Common problems for the EaP states continue to be the concentration of media ownership and a lack of transparency regarding media ownership, abusive lawsuits for defamation and the protection of honour and dignity of public persons, or physical violence against journalists, which can threaten media pluralism and the marketplace of ideas in the public debate. Media pluralism and media freedom are among the key elements for the functioning of a democratic state and for the detection of high-level corruption. Investigative journalism contributes to the anti-corruption agenda of states by promoting the prosecution of corruption and the implementation of integrity standards.

In this context, countries in the region should prioritise creating a favourable environment for free and independent media to facilitate the exposure of corruption in the media and ensure that their law enforcement authorities respond appropriately to media reports of high-level corruption.

Recommendations

• Provide a favourable environment for journalists, by ensuring their safety and pro-actively promoting media freedom and media pluralism.

• Ensure that all media and investigative journalists' reports on corruption are among the formally envisaged sources for detecting corruption requiring an official reaction from law enforcement authorities.

• Ensure that no public allegations of high-level corruption are left without a formal reaction and that all such allegations are investigated or justified decisions are made not to open an investigation.

• Implement systematic and thorough media monitoring to promptly identify and investigate potential high-level corruption cases.

4.1.3. Asset declarations

By promoting transparency, asset and interest disclosure helps to strengthen accountability mechanisms and safeguards against undue influence on policy makers and policy-making processes. Moreover, implementation of asset and interest disclosure mechanisms can help detect and prevent unethical behaviours and abuse of power in the public service, as well as risks of money laundering and corruption (OECD, 2020[13]).

In addition to its preventative potential, public officials' disclosure of assets may function as a reliable mechanism to uncover conflicts of interest and unexplained assets, which can potentially lead to confiscation or prompt an investigation into illicit enrichment or another offence.

Electronic asset declarations, combined with the automatic processing of information available in digital registries, represent a modern, advanced and potentially extremely effective tool for fighting high-level corruption. Most countries in the region have introduced some form of asset declaration system for their public officials.

The introduction of e-declarations for public officials in Ukraine in 2016 required public officials to disclose the assets they controlled. The extent and value of the assets declared by high-level officials attracted the attention of civil society and triggered a reaction from law enforcement authorities who opened many investigations into illicit enrichment.17

E-declarations are also a tool for anti-corruption actors to combat high-level corruption. A huge array of data on the assets, business and political connections of high-ranking officials, combined with the possibility of automated processing, can be a powerful weapon tool in curbing high-level corruption. However, due to the aggressive political environment, the lack of qualified specialists understanding how to use such valuable data, and the lack of inter-agency and international co-operation, this tool has so far had only a limited effect on deterring high-level corruption in the region, particularly in the case of EaP countries.

Despite the large resources that have been invested in the development and functioning of electronic asset declaration registers, this tool has not been fully deployed in many countries in the region. For the most part, asset declaration registers are used to prosecute rather trivial cases of concealment of assets by officials or submission of false information in declarations. It is quite rare that the analysis of e-declarations evolves into serious cases of high-level corruption. And this is the main challenge for anti-corruption agencies that operate the asset declarations registers. Such cases require complex analysis and effective co-operation between national anti-corruption agencies, financial monitoring services, asset recovery agencies, tax authorities, and also at the international level.

Consequently, anti-corruption agencies need appropriate resources, primarily in terms of specialised human resources. Subsequently, despite the high level of automation of declaration verification processes, the analysis of e-declarations transforms into actual criminal cases only with the participation of professionally trained and motivated specialists who are able to fully analyse the data and conduct their own financial investigations. Therefore, one of the most important priorities for the authorities responsible for e-declarations is to attract, train, motivate and retain professional staff.

In addition, the methods of concealing assets are constantly evolving and advancing - from rather primitive methods such as fictitious divorces, lottery winnings or gifts from relatives to the use of complex ownership structures in non-cooperative jurisdictions or the use of cryptocurrencies. This requires an adequate and rapid response from anti-corruption agencies - specialised guidelines should be periodically developed or updated, and specialised training should be provided to staff, or even preferably joint training with prosecutors, investigators, and anti-money laundering specialists. It is advisable to prepare typologies of various possible ways of concealing assets and update them regularly.

Co-operation with foreign institutions and interagency co-operation is another way to improve asset declaration work. For example, political influence on the National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption in 2016-2019 prevented it from establishing effective co-operation with other anti-corruption agencies, such as the NABU and the SAPO, and from exchanging information with foreign counterparts.

Unfortunately, the sheer number of declarations and the complexity of their analysis require a large number of resources, which are often scarce. Therefore, it is important to prioritise efforts aimed at in-depth processing of declarations of persons holding high-risk positions and using the results of such analysis in the detection and investigation of criminal proceedings on high-level corruption.

Armenia has an advanced legal framework for asset declarations with a wide coverage of public officials and a broad content of disclosure. However, members of management or supervisory bodies of SOEs are yet to be covered. The online declaration system is accessible to the public, and the scope of restricted data is limited. The verification process is based on checking technical compliance, consistency of data, cross-checks with external databases, mathematical analysis of declared data, and analysis of high-level functions. An automated cross-check and risk-based analysis mechanism is also being developed. Verification of asset and interest declarations and routine application of administrative sanctions was ensured in practice. The creation of the Corruption Prevention Commission can be seen as significant progress. However, the agency significantly lacks human and operational resources.

In Azerbaijan, while the scope of officials required to disclose their assets is quite limited the disclosure system is not yet operational due to the lack of bylaws. Consequently, an asset declaration system still is not operational in practice.

The system of asset declarations for public officials in Georgia is in place. However, the scope of the law related to asset declaration and its implementation and monitoring requires improvement. The 2022 asset declaration monitoring results by the Civil Service Bureau detected violations in 52% of verified declarations (181 out of 346 asset declarations). The Civil Service Bureau actively applied administrative penalties for violations related to asset declarations. However, Georgia’s asset declaration system does not appear to be used to detect high-level corruption, given that no case was referred for criminal investigation, and the asset declaration monitoring did not detect any cases of illicit wealth or high-level corruption. In 2023, the parliament adopted amendments to the Law on conflict of interest and corruption which extended the asset declaration regime to cover all prosecutors.18 The responsibility for Georgia’s asset declaration system has since been transferred to the newly established Anti-Corruption Bureau. Within the Anti-Corruption Bureau, the Department for Ensuring the Declarations of Assets of Officials is responsible for the implementation and monitoring of the asset declaration system and carried out an analysis of challenges within the existing asset declaration system in view of improving the system and adopting legislative amendments to this effect. In addition, the financial activities of political parties are collected, analysed and monitored by the Bureau’s Department of Political Finance Monitoring. However, concerns were raised in relation to the independence of this agency.19

Moldova has a comprehensive system of asset declarations covering all relevant categories of public officials (and their family members) and covers a broad range of types of assets and interests. The declarations are filed through a centralised electronic system and are accessible to the general public. But information is not published in a machine-readable format and some information is withheld. Verification of asset declarations is performed by the National Integrity Authority's (NIA) integrity inspectors and includes examination of truthfulness and completeness of disclosure, as well as review for signs of conflict of interest and illicit enrichment. At the same time, there is no systematic practice of risk-based verifications, and the detection rate of violations is low. In addition, APO has only limited access to the information maintained in ANI’s database on asset declarations, which could prove to be an obstacle in efforts to combat high-level corruption.20

Ukraine’s asset declarations system is among the most advanced in the region and is highly transparent and digitized. It also applies to a broad category of public officials and covers a wide scope of assets. It uses a risk-based verification system for declarations, which is primarily focused on high-level officials. The NACP has powers to access registers and databases and the resources to conduct verifications, but the track record of sanctions for violations is relatively low, and the effectiveness of the end-to-end process of this complex, multi-phased framework is questionable. The Constitutional Court issued a decision in 2020 partially rendering unconstitutional the provisions on control and full verification of declarations as well as the criminal responsibility related to a false declaration. The immediate result was that many ongoing criminal cases were terminated. Despite the subsequent restoration of the powers of the NACP and the Criminal Code article on false declaration by the Parliament in accordance with Venice Commission recommendations, the non-retroactive effect of criminal law provisions caused an accountability gap. During the first half of 2023, the NACP did not conduct comprehensive verifications of asset declarations due to the application of martial law in March 2022, which suspended the obligation for public officials to submit asset declarations. In addition, access to a number of state registries, such as ProZorro, were also restricted by martial law.

In September 2023, the Parliament adopted a law restoring the e-asset declaration system and its verification functions by the NACP. The adopted law included some provisions that limited the verification powers of the NACP and closed the e-asset declarations to the public. However, the President vetoed the adopted law due to restricted public access to the declarations. At the end of September 2023, the Parliament re-adopted the law addressing the President’s request, however the law still included the provisions which limited the verification powers of the NACP.21

Authorities responsible for the verification of anti-corruption asset declarations frequently encounter challenges in securing information from foreign jurisdictions regarding the overseas assets of public officials. These difficulties arise from the absence of requisite international agreements and established mechanisms for information exchange and negatively affects the effectiveness of financial disclosure in combatting corruption, particularly in identifying unexplained wealth of corrupt high-ranking officials with the means to obscure their assets.

The global expert community is currently engaged in deliberations concerning effective international data exchange mechanisms for the verification of asset declarations. A notable initiative aiming to address this need is the International Treaty on Exchange of Data for the Verification of Asset Declarations. This tool was developed by the Regional Anti-Corruption Initiative (RAI), a South East Europe intergovernmental regional organisation, in 2021 and for now signed by Serbia, North Macedonia, Montenegro and Moldova22.

Recommendations

• Prioritise verification of asset declarations of high-ranking officials to identify evidence of high-level corruption and focus on investigating high-level corruption based on the findings.

• Ensure that necessary resources are provided to anti-corruption institutions responsible for processing asset declarations.

• Enhance the specialised training for staff involved in processing asset declarations and develop guidelines describing typologies of concealing assets methods and procedures for their investigation. Additionally, develop special guidelines for processing asset declarations to uncover high-level corruption.

• Enhance co-operation between specialists of anti-corruption institutions responsible for asset declarations and their counterparts from other anti-corruption, financial monitoring, asset recovery and asset management agencies, for example, through secondment to other agencies, appointing liaison officers, and conducting joint training.

• Establish formal and informal co-operation with foreign counterparts to acquire information about the assets of public officials from foreign jurisdictions.

4.2. Reinforcing confiscation and asset recovery mechanisms in high-level corruption cases

Confiscation of the proceeds derived from corruption is one of the most effective measures to combat corruption offences and stop the laundering of the proceeds of corruption since it represents a tool that deprives perpetrators of illicit and unjust gains. Confiscation of the proceeds from offences establishes the principle that nobody must obtain gains from committing an offence (OECD, 2018[14]).However, IAP monitoring reports have shown that despite significant progress in the EaP countries, the asset confiscation tool remains significantly undervalued, and progress needs to be made in applying it effectively. This problem is complex and seems to have historical roots. The criminal justice system in these countries was primarily intended to bring an individual to justice.

Across the EaP countries, several common challenges have recently emerged regarding confiscating assets derived from corruption crimes. Namely that modern confiscation measures, such as indirect proceeds, value-based confiscation, mixed proceeds, and non-conviction based or extended confiscation measures, are rarely applied or completely absent from the legal frameworks of these countries (OECD, 2020[15]). This deficiency suggests a gap in legislative provisions and enforcement mechanisms necessary for effective asset recovery.

In Georgia and Moldova, seizure and confiscation are routinely applied to instrumentalities and proceeds of corruption, while in Armenia, such measures are only applied to corruption proceeds. Nevertheless, Armenia has introduced a modern instrument of civil confiscation of property of illicit origin. The high number of cases submitted to courts is a promising sign that this new instrument could be effectively enforced and result in the confiscation of significant amounts of unexplained wealth of public officials (OECD, 2024[8]).

Moldova made progress in combatting financial crime and asset recovery. The country adopted a mechanism for extended confiscation, amendments to the law on combatting money laundering and approved a national asset recovery programme. As a result of these regulations, it is now possible to confiscate assets that have been transferred from convicted to third parties, as well as to confiscate assets in the absence of the convicted person. Thanks to these regulations and their enforcement, assets belonging to prominent oligarchs were able to be seized. Moldova also showed significant progress in seizing and confiscating assets linked to organised crime.23

The IAP’s fifth round monitoring report of Azerbaijan found insufficient evidence that seizure and confiscation are routinely applied to the instrumentalities and proceeds of corruption crimes and that there was no track record of cases where modern confiscation measures were applied in practice (indirect proceeds, value-based confiscation, mixed proceeds confiscation) (OECD, 2024[11]).

Ukraine’s legal framework includes confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds of corruption crimes (special confiscation), and civil confiscation of unjustified assets of public officials. At the same time, confiscation as a sanction for a criminal offence - a byproduct of its Soviet legacy - is also provided by law and applied in practice in Ukraine. In practice, the authorities tend to use confiscation as a sanction as a key tool. The main reason is the simplicity of the procedure: no need for prosecution to prove the illicit origin of assets. However, this approach raises a question of the proportionality of such confiscation and obstacles to effective mutual legal assistance. Accordingly, the fifth IAP monitoring round encouraged Ukraine to ensure effective special confiscation instead of applying confiscation as a sanction.24

Furthermore, while high-level corruption schemes frequently involve subsequent money laundering endeavours aimed at concealing illicit gains in foreign jurisdictions, the current level of international co-operation in pursuing and returning such assets remains inadequate. While some countries report sending requests abroad for information on property linked to corruption, the actual execution of asset recovery from foreign jurisdictions is minimal in Ukraine and Moldova, or non-existent in Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia. This indicates the need for enhanced collaboration and informal cooperation with international partners to build trust and overcome legal and procedural hurdles in cross-border asset recovery efforts, such as the lack of a robust legal framework for mutual legal assistance (MLA) in criminal matters, dual criminality, differences in evidentiary thresholds or procedural delays caused by imprecise MLA requests which do not meet the legal requirements of the country to whom the request is sent (OECD, 2016[16]) (OECD, 2018[14]). As mentioned above, some countries, including Armenia, Lithuania and Ukraine, have adopted non-criminal extended confiscation of unjustified assets. This approach is deemed more practical than criminal law measures as it requires a lower standard of proof and/or a reversed burden of proof. At the same time, some countries address unexplained assets through the illicit enrichment offence. For instance, Ukraine applies it to more valuable assets, while assets valued at less than EUR 225 thousand are confiscated through civil proceedings. Regardless of the specific approach taken, increased international cooperation efforts may be necessary in cases requiring legal assistance from foreign jurisdictions. This need can arise due to the absence of corresponding international agreements or the lack of a similar illicit enrichment offence in the countries from which assistance is being sought. Careful consideration and wording are also required for the illicit enrichment offence to avoid legal challenges related to the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof.

Another significant challenge is the absence or underdevelopment of specialised bodies or units mandated to identify, trace, and manage seized and confiscated assets. This deficiency underscores a broader institutional capacity gap in asset recovery processes.

In Georgia, the Asset Recovery Office is set up within the Public Prosecution Office, and the National Agency of State Property is responsible for managing confiscated assets. In Azerbaijan, there is no dedicated body, unit, or group of specialised officials dealing with the identification, tracing, and return of criminal proceeds, including those from corruption. To this end, Azerbaijan is planning to transform the Department for the Co-ordination of Special Confiscation Issues of the Prosecutor General Office into a fully-fledged asset recovery office. In Armenia, a Department for Confiscation of Property of Illicit Origin was set up in 2020 within the Prosecutor General’s Office, with competence in the recovery of assets in civil proceedings, which is a good development. However, there is no dedicated agency, unit, or staff mandated to identify and trace criminal proceeds and manage seized and confiscated assets in criminal corruption cases. In 2018, Moldova established a dedicated subdivision within the NAC to deal with identification, tracing and return of corruption proceeds, as well as with the management of seized and confiscated assets in corruption cases – the Criminal Asset Recovery Agency (CARA). It now has the staff of 32 persons and a mandate covering all relevant functions. CARA has a quite good track record of the use of parallel financial investigations in corruption cases. However, the number of cases of assets recovered from abroad in the past three years is still relatively low and the effectiveness of this body still remains rather limited.

Since its establishment, the Asset Recovery and Management Agency (ARMA) of Ukraine has suffered from non-transparent management.25 This, in turn, has resulted in very limited engagement of the institution's potential. Thus, a comprehensive reform of ARMA should be considered, including a system for the transparent selection of the head of ARMA, provisions to establish fully-fledged pre-seizure planning, the prioritisation of the seizure of assets by criminal courts, transparent procedures for the management, sale and evaluation of assets and unblocking the possibility to manage corporate property rights.

Finally, there is a consistent lack of comprehensive statistics and analysis on the application of seizure and confiscation measures in corruption cases in all the EaP countries.

Box 4.2. Recommendations

• Continue enhancing confiscation regimes by introducing and applying all confiscation measures with respect to instrumentalities and proceeds of corruption in line with international anti-corruption standards and best practices, including, confiscation of derivative (indirect) proceeds of corruption offences, confiscation of the assets transferred to informed third parties, value-based confiscation, and confiscation of converted or mixed proceeds and profits therefrom.

• Consider introducing non-conviction-based confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds of corruption offences and autonomous extended confiscation of unjustified assets.

• Build the capacities of investigators, prosecutors, and judges to efficiently apply modern and more sophisticated confiscation tools and asset recovery measures.

• Ensure the collection of comprehensive statistics on assets seized and confiscated in corruption cases, in particular those related to high-level corruption cases, and ensure that such statistics are collected by types of crimes; by mandate; by form of confiscation; by beneficial owners; by confiscation orders issued by final court decisions and by confiscation orders which were executed in practice; and specify whether the assets were seized or confiscated domestically or in a foreign jurisdiction.

• Ensure prompt and efficient actual enforcement of confiscation orders, particularly in cases of high-level corruption and related money laundering of corrupt proceeds.

• Consider introducing post-conviction investigations for purposes of tracing, seizing and further confiscation of proceeds from high-level corruption.

4.3. The untapped potential of corporate liability regimes in combatting high-level corruption

Today’s economy, both at the national and international level, is mainly driven by legal persons. It is not self-employed entrepreneurs but mostly commercial entities that compete for public procurement contracts, apply for different licences and contest government authorities’ regulations or determinations in various supervision procedures. Large corporations, often having global operations, typically dominate transportation, construction, telecommunication, mining, energy, production of chemicals, and many other sectors of the economy. Therefore, it is a reality that high-level corruption, in most cases, serves the interests of legal persons. In such a world, it is not adequate for criminal law to only reach the wrongdoing of natural persons. Punishing only natural persons, even the top managers of a legal entity, is not a sufficient deterrent for corporations willing to break the rules. Furthermore, complex governance structures and collective decision-making processes in corporate entities make it difficult to uncover and prosecute such offences. Perpetrators and instigators can hide behind the corporate veil to evade liability (OECD, 2015[17]).

The OECD’s Anti-Bribery Convention calls on Parties to the Convention to “take such measures as may be necessary, in accordance with its legal principles, to establish the liability of legal persons for the bribery of a foreign public official” and to ensure that effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal or non-criminal penalties and monetary sanctions are applied to legal persons for foreign bribery.26 These provision are supplemented by the 2021 Recommendation of the Council for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions.27 The implementation of an effective corporate liability regime sends a strong message that corruption will not be tolerated and provides governments with a key instrument in combatting economic crimes, including high-level corruption (OECD, 2016, p. 9[18]). The prospect of legal consequences encourages companies to adopt robust anti-corruption measures, thus deterring corrupt practices.

Box 4.3. Responsibility of legal persons – Article 2 of the OECD Anti Bribery Convention and Annex I.B of the 2021 Recommendation

1. Member countries should ensure that state-owned enterprises can be held liable for the bribery of foreign public officials in international business transactions.

2. Member countries systems for the liability of legal persons for the bribery of foreign public officials in international business transactions should not restrict the liability to cases where the natural person or persons who perpetrated the offence are prosecuted or convicted.

3. Member countries systems for the liability of legal persons for the bribery of foreign public officials in international business transactions should take one of the following approaches:

a. the level of authority of the person whose conduct triggers the liability of the legal person is flexible and reflects the wide variety of decision-making systems in legal persons; or

b. the approach is functionally equivalent to the foregoing even though it is only triggered by acts of persons with the highest level managerial authority, because the following cases are covered:

i. a person with the highest level managerial authority offers, promises, or gives a bribe to a foreign public official;

ii. a person with the highest level managerial authority directs or authorises a lower level person to offer, promise, or give a bribe to a foreign public official; and

iii. a person with the highest level managerial authority fails to prevent a lower level person from bribing a foreign public official, including through a failure to supervise him or her or through a failure to implement adequate internal controls, ethics, and compliance programmes or measures.

4. Consistent with Articles 2 and 4 of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and related Commentary, member countries should:

b. explore all jurisdictional bases available under their law when investigating and prosecuting legal persons for foreign bribery offences, including to establish territoriality and nationality jurisdiction;

c. in asserting nationality jurisdiction over legal persons for the purpose of investigating and prosecuting bribery of foreign public officials, consider criteria such as, but not limited to, the laws under which the legal person was formed or is organised, or the legal person’s headquarters or effective management and control;

d. ensure that they are able to exercise appropriate jurisdiction over legal persons regardless of whether they have jurisdiction over the natural person who committed the bribery of a foreign public official.

5. Member countries should have appropriate rules or other measures to ensure that legal persons cannot avoid liability or sanctions for foreign bribery and related offences by restructuring, merging, being acquired, or otherwise altering their corporate identity.

Source: Anne I.B of OECD (2021[3]), Recommendation of the Council for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, Annex I.B, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0378.

Despite the great potential that a criminal liability regime for legal entities can play in fighting high-level corruption, this tool is not yet widely employed in the EaP and other Eastern European countries (OECD, 2020[15]). Enforcement of corporate liability for corruption offences is low with statistics showing that it has been applied in only a few cases in all EaP countries (OECD, 2022[6]).

There are several key reasons which may account for this, in particular, the historical peculiarities of the criminal law doctrine in the EaP countries, which in the past were developed conjointly and according to which it was believed that only a natural person could be subject to criminal liability. The process of convincing legislators to change this approach has been lengthy, and discussions on the topic are still ongoing. For example, the 5^th IAP round of monitoring report of Ukraine noted that the authorities continued to underline that the principle of criminal liability of legal persons is still considered a "new concept" outside the framework of the traditional legal system, despite having introduced such measures into their legislation 9 years ago (OECD, 2024[19]).

Another reason for the lack of enforcement actions targeting legal persons is also that corporate liability legislation in these countries is still far from perfect. In this sense, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, and Ukraine share common challenges, such as the lack of autonomous liability for legal persons, dissuasive sanctions, and the availability of a due diligence defence to legal persons.

Georgia demonstrated a higher level of compliance with international standards. In particular, Georgia’s legislation, in general, provides an effective framework for the liability of legal persons, including its autonomous nature and broad scope. Corporate liability provisions cover all corruption offences that could reasonably be applied to legal entities. Sanctions are proportionate and dissuasive, and confiscation covers instrumentalities and proceeds of the crime.

The lack of expertise and experience among prosecutors and detectives in identifying, documenting, and investigating crimes involving corporations in high-level corruption cases, along with the absence of judicial precedent and priority in these matters, may contribute to the ineffective enforcement of corporate liability laws. For instance, this issue was highlighted in the Functional Analysis of the Moldovan APO (IPRE, 2022[20]).

Nevertheless, the EaP countries are showing progress. The concept of corporate liability is gradually becoming better understood, and new legislation has been adopted to strengthen existing corporate liability regimes. However, the main challenge is the enforcement in practice, which proves the need for more training of investigators, prosecutors and judges in existing or newly amended corporate liability regimes. At the same time, it is necessary to ensure that the liability of legal persons is not used to exert illicit pressure on businesses but is implemented in accordance with the rule of law principles and the requisite standards of integrity.

Recommendations

• Ensure that national legislation on corporate liability regimes is aligned with international instruments and best practices.

• Ensure the effective enforcement of legal persons' liability for corruption offences, in particular, in relation to high-level corruption cases, including by providing training, ensuring such cases are dealt with as a priority by law enforcement bodies and are included in the individual KPIs of prosecutors and investigators, and enhancing knowledge sharing and peer exchanges with foreign counterparts.

• Develop or update guidelines for investigating crimes committed by legal persons to address the most challenging issues related to enforcing corporate liability for corruption offences.

4.4. Reinforcing interagency and international co-operation

4.4.1. Promoting interagency co-operation

Co-operation of anti-corruption institutions with counterparts at the national and international levels remains one of the most relevant issues in the fight against grand corruption.

With regard to co-operation at the national level, two specific issues can be identified, namely co-operation between investigators and prosecutors, and co-operation with other law enforcement agencies or other institutions involved in combatting corruption.

When it comes to interagency co-operation in combatting high-level corruption, the emphasis should be placed not so much on the fact that such co-operation is critical - this is not in doubt - but on the forms such co-operation should take.

In Ukraine and Armenia, concluding memorandums of understanding (MoUs) is common practice, which serve as the basis for interagency co-operation. For example, NABU has identified the conclusion of such memorandums as one of its key priorities since its establishment. Currently, such memorandums have been signed with key partners. Similarly, In Armenia, interagency co-operation in anti-corruption is formally established by MoUs between the relevant stakeholders. The MoUs aim to develop co-operation mechanisms, particularly within the AML/CFT framework. These usually touch upon three main areas of co-operation, namely the exchange of information, discussion and formulation of legal acts, as well as the implementation of joint training seminars.

At the same time, in Azerbaijan and Moldova, co-operation in practice still sometimes consists of requests from anti-corruption institutions and ad hoc communication. No other forms of communication that could be assessed as systematic and regular are used.

In practice, this means that the co-operation is carried out through written procedures (on paper), physically signed and sometimes stamped, through which it is requested to perform some actions or to provide some information.

The current era of digital technologies requires and enables more active use of modern methods of communication and co-operation. Moreover, the world of crime actively uses such technologies, so anti-corruption institutions must actively create a culture of co-operation and trust among their colleagues from other law enforcement and other government agencies.

Current experience shows that forms of co-operation such as, joint bilateral and multilateral meetings; the designation of contact points; secondments; interagency intelligence and investigative teams (regular and ad hoc); co-ordinated parallel investigations; interagency data exchange platforms; interagency working groups and task forces, the exchange of intelligence and investigative information in real-time; sharing of experience and joint training events; exchange of information on disciplinary or administrative violations committed by an official from another agency, whenever expedient and applicable should be proactively applied by anti-corruption institutions.

Having an effective framework for domestic inter-agency co-operation is particularly important and beneficial given that various agencies may each have unique information or investigative and enforcement powers that can enhance another agency’s investigation of a particular crime. This makes co-operation amongst the relevant agencies particularly important and beneficial (OECD, 2022[21]). Thus, the array of forms and methods of cooperation should not be limited with a wide variety of inter-agency cooperation mechanisms and partners accessible to specialized anti-corruption authorities and other governmental bodies.

At the same time, it is essential to consider the potential challenge of securing co-operation from certain, at times, less independent institutions, a predicament faced by certain anti-corruption bodies in the region in the course of their high-level corruption investigations. Such scenarios may necessitate the adoption of alternative strategies for collecting evidence.

Recommendations

• While respecting the independence of specialised anti-corruption bodies, ensure horizontal “the whole of government” mechanisms are in place to facilitate coherent decision-making, communication and information sharing among all the relevant institutions.

• Ensure that there are no legal obstacles to concluding interagency memorandums for co-operation in the field of criminal investigation, particularly, high-level corruption, and encourage their effective implementation by including the signing of such memorandums within criminal policy priorities.

4.4.2. International legal co-operation

The monitoring process of the OECD Istanbul Action Plan has revealed several challenges of the EaP member countries related to international co-operation in investigating high-level corruption cases (OECD, 2020[15]).

One of these key challenges is the capacity of specialised anti-corruption institutions to conduct international legal co-operation autonomously. In Ukraine, due to ambiguous interpretations of the legislation, the NABU, which, according to the CPC and the Law on the NABU, has the right to independently carry out international legal co-operation activities independently, in practice is forced in some cases to request approval from the Prosecutor General’s Office (PGO). In 2020, the PGO received 13 extradition requests from NABU, of which nine were accepted, while four requests concerning two individuals were rejected. Consequently, approximately one third of requests for extradition submitted by the NABU were rejected in 2020. Stakeholders also emphasised the importance of full autonomy in requesting and securing extradition in the course of international co-operation in criminal proceedings under their jurisdiction. In a high-profile case, the NABU raised a concern over the Prosecutor General's Office blocking a request for the extradition of the beneficial owner of VAB Bank in December 2020 (OECD, 2022[7]). The problem of NABU’s investigations being obstructed by the requirements to use the PGO to send and receive certain MLA requests was also stressed by the Bureau’s Technical Assessment (National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, 2023[22]).

In Moldova, in practice the PGO tries to keep complete control over the international relations of the prosecutor's office. According to the Anti-corruption Prosecutor’s Office (APO), all its co-operation at international and inter-institutional levels takes place only through the intermediary and upon co-ordination of the Legal Assistance and International Cooperation Section within the PGO. APO does not have any of its own interagency agreements with its foreign counterparts, not even with the Romanian DNA. Every trip of APO prosecutors abroad for networking or in criminal cases within their competence must be formally approved by the PGO and go through a complicated bureaucratic process (IPRE, 2022[20]).

Such a lack of autonomous international co-operation functions may create possibilities for improper influence and obstruction on high-level corruption investigations.

Another problem mentioned by the anti-corruption institutions of Ukraine, Armenia, Moldova, and Azerbaijan is the lengthy time it takes to receive responses from foreign counterparts. One of the reasons for this state of play might be that requests for mutual legal assistance are sometimes prepared without prior use of informal co-operation mechanisms (interagency, police-to-police to benefit from timely and accurate information on the legal and institutional frameworks and requirements in the requested country, and thus on how to best prepare a high-quality MLA request. As a result, prosecutors complain that MLA is lengthy or sometimes that MLA requests may go unfulfilled in their cases altogether.

Box 4.4. Case study – Azerbaijan – Effective methods for requesting asset recovery in corruption cases

In 2020, the former ambassador of Azerbaijan to the Republic of Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina was indicted for abuse of power and misappropriation of the state budget. Initial charges were changed during the investigation to misappropriation and money laundering. The value of illegal benefits for which the accused was prosecuted was AZN 18 million (EUR 9.8 million). For the purposes of the investigation, MLA requests were sent to Serbia (four requests), Montenegro (four requests), Bosnia and Herzegovina (four requests), Romania (two requests), Turkey (three requests), and Moldova (one request) through official channels. Alongside the requests for legal assistance, requests for identification of the property of the accused and his close associates were also sent.

Extensive informal discussions were held with colleagues from the requested countries prior to sending these MLA requests. All the logistical information on the investigation team's participation and possibilities of MLA execution within each country's legislative frameworks were discussed prior to submitting the MLAs to the competent foreign counterparts. Thus, the informal consultations helped to save time and facilitated the execution of these MLA requests.

In parallel, these MLA requests were sent electronically and directly to the investigative bodies of the foreign countries in question. The agreements on the digital transmission of data also helped to avoid possible delays caused by postal issues during the COVID-19 pandemic period.

Source: (OECD, 2022[23])

Joint investigative teams, another proactive co-operation tool, have been used by Moldova and Ukraine quite successfully in corruption cases (OECD, 2022[12]).28 Georgia has also successfully used JITs in cases related to organised crime, fraud and money laundering.29 Albania, Georgia, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia and Ukraine delegated their liaison prosecutors to Eurojust to facilitate international legal co-operation with EU members30. Many Eastern European countries participate actively in the OECD Global Law Enforcement Network against Transnational Bribery (GLEN) and regional anti-corruption law enforcement networks for Eastern Europe and Central Asia and for Asia-Pacific, as well as other global and regional law enforcement networks.

Direct communication channels, interrogations via video and telephone conferencing, and spontaneous information sharing are among the other co-operation tools applied in the region.

At the same time, while some EaP countries use electronic means of communication to send requests for co-operation and mutual legal assistance, many continue to use written requests, with signatures and stamps, rather than using more these more modern electronic tools where permitted. The use of such new methods and tools of co-operation requires the development of internal capacities in anti-corruption institutions, primarily through the selection and regular training of relevant professionals.

Moldova and Armenia mentioned the length required for translating materials into the language of the country to which they were sending a request and the lack of translators in the respective agencies' staff as significant obstacles to timely international legal co-operation. This seemingly technical issue, which needs to be addressed, is the capacity of anti-corruption institutions.

Recommendations

• Consider mandating relevant specialised anti-corruption institutions to undertake international legal co-operation measures independently. Where such a possibility already exists in legislation, remove any obstacles to the proper implementation of these functions by specialised anti-corruption bodies and eliminate any unnecessary formal requirements.

• Build the capacity of specialised anti-corruption institutions and their staff to carry out international co-operation with foreign counterparts directly, including by providing them with sufficiently specialised human resources such as prosecutors assigned to deal with international co-operation, staffed specialists and translators, and sufficient financial resources for carrying out foreign missions, expenses for international mail, and high-quality and confidential communication equipment.

• Consider organising English learning courses for staff and defining fluency in foreign language(s) as an advantage in the selection procedures for prosecutors and investigators who are supposed to work on cases involving co-operation with foreign jurisdictions. Organise training activities for prosecutors and investigators on international co-operation, including best practices of using modern co-operation tools and asset recovery mechanisms.

• Analyse which foreign jurisdictions would be the most relevant for cases falling within the mandate of specialised anti-corruption institutions and conclude interagency co-operation agreements with the foreign authorities on the exchange of data, experience, information, and other types of non-MLA related co-operation. Encourage greater co-operation with foreign counterparts in practice, including consultations, onsite visits, and networking with foreign liaison officers and contact points.

• Elaborate and adopt the guidelines on international co-operation for prosecutors and investigators and develop and adopt templates for interagency (police-to-police) requests for co-operation as well as for MLA requests in high-level corruption cases.

• Make full use of a general policy of informal co-operation (interagency, police-to-police), including through FIUs where appropriate, prior to sending a formal MLA request. Introduce the regular practice of consultations with foreign counterparts regarding the preparation and execution of requests in the most complex cases of high-profile corruption, as well as an automatic system for monitoring the deadlines for the execution of requests and follow-up.

• Ensure the implementation in practice of relevant modern international legal co-operation practices and tools, including but not limited to direct channels of communications; JITSs; interviews via video and telephone conference; the spontaneous exchange of information; the use of electronic tools for sending co-operation or MLA requests; cross-border surveillance, controlled delivery, covert investigations; asset recovery.

4.5. Analytical work

4.5.1. Access to state electronic databases and registries.

In today's digital world, access to information in state registries and databases is one of the key tools for determining the capability of anti-corruption institutions to detect and investigate high-level corruption effectively. Full, direct and free access to information resources allows for collecting information that may be used as intelligence or evidence in criminal proceedings and prevents its destruction or concealment. This is particularly useful in tracing the flow of assets, uncovering hidden assets, identifying financial irregularities, identifying individuals and legal persons involved in corrupt practices through beneficial ownership registries, and discovering patterns indicative of money laundering.

IAP monitoring has found that anti-corruption institutions in the EaP countries do not have full, direct and free access to state registers and databases.

A unified register of bank accounts can also be an extremely effective tool for detecting signs of high-level corruption. The need to create a unified bank account register to address high-level corruption was mentioned by Azerbaijan in its response to the questionnaire used to prepare this study, and the relevant discussion has been ongoing in Ukraine for many years. A bank account register has been created and maintained, but not used to combat high-level corruption in Moldova, as prosecutors in the APO lack awareness of this tool. The creation of bank account registers is a relatively new development in the region and it remains important for countries deploying these registers to educate anti-corruption professionals on how to use the information from collected from them effectively.

In Moldova, while many state registries exist,31 APO has direct access to only three databases that provide little for the need for effective detection and investigation of high-level corruption and tracing of assets and proceeds resulting from it. The access of prosecutors responsible for high-level investigations to other relevant state databases is ensured in practice mostly through co-operation with the specialised services within different state agencies (border, tax, customs, CARA, National Bank, financial and banking institutions etc.) or as a result of interoperable co-operation and forming mixed investigative and prosecution groups (IPRE, 2022[20]).

In Ukraine, NABU enjoys broad powers of direct and full access to databases and state registers but it still does not have full capacity to use all of these information resources. The NABU does not have full access to tax information and effective access to certain types of information held by private sector entities, including notaries, insurers, banks, and other essential sources of information. The NABU has only basic remote access to the register of asset declarations. This access should be improved to provide simultaneous access to the entire data set using a private API (National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, 2023[22]).

In Armenia, the Anti-Corruption Committee has access to electronic databases managed by other government agencies, but access to some is mediated. That is why some data is either not received at all or received with delays. Armenia also faced the same problem as Ukraine in its time, namely that different state registries and databases were developed on different platforms and often unsuitable for mutual information exchange. Therefore, Armenia envisaged taking measures to combine information databases managed by various state and non-state bodies on one platform to ensure their direct and immediate access.

Azerbaijan informed that the Anti-Corruption Directorate of the Prosecutor General's Office only has access to the databases of the relevant state authorities upon request.

In Georgia, anti-corruption investigative bodies have direct access to all databases that are necessary for the investigation of corruption offences and asset recovery, including databases (registers) of credit records, asset declarations of public officials, legal entities, real estate, criminal records, vehicle registration, personal ID, border crossings, tax. For all databases that are not public, PGO and the State Security Service of Georgia have direct access where authorised officials use their credentials to log in and obtain access to data (OECD, 2022[6]).

Limited direct access to public registries or the lack of updated digital registries is also challenging in other Eastern European countries. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, prosecutors only have direct access to registries of personal ID documents and records but not to land registries or criminal records, for example, which must still be requested. In Romania, digital land registries are not always up to date, which impacts the practical use of these registries for investigations.

Recommendations

• Ensure in practice the full, direct, and free access of anti-corruption institutions to all state-owned registers and databases necessary for the effective detection and investigation of corruption. Provide organisational, human, IT, expert, and financial capacity to use these databases effectively. Provide regular training for relevant staff of anti-corruption bodies on the effective use of databases and state registries for the purposes of analytical work and investigation of high-level corruption.

• Take measures to create the register of bank accounts and give anti-corruption institutions investigating high-level corruption direct access to it.

• Consider implementing tools that allow the anti-corruption institutions that investigate or prosecute high-level corruption to conceal data searches and access to registers and databases.

4.5.2. Reinforce the analytical capacity of anti-corruption agencies

The capacity of anti-corruption agencies to conduct analytical work plays a pivotal role in the effective fight against high-level corruption. Analytical capabilities empower these agencies to delve deeply into complex financial transactions, identify patterns of corruption, and trace illicitly acquired assets. Through rigorous analysis, anti-corruption bodies can uncover hidden connections, expose corrupt networks, and gather evidence crucial for successful prosecutions. Analytical insights enable agencies to anticipate and respond to evolving corruption schemes, contributing to a proactive approach to combatting high-level corruption. Furthermore, robust analytical capabilities enhance the overall efficiency and efficacy of the detection investigation functions, ensuring that anti-corruption efforts are well-informed, targeted, and aligned with the evolving nature of corrupt practices.

The IAP’s pilot fifth round of monitoring showed that the capacity of anti-corruption institutions to conduct analytical work needs further enhancement. For example, the units responsible for analytical work on detecting corruption and analytical support of criminal proceedings did not exist in Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Since 2022, Moldova has demonstrated progress in strengthening the analytical function of the NAC. In 2023, NAC prepared 6 strategic analysis reports and 250 operational analysis reports on the typologies of corruption identified in investigated cases and socioeconomic areas. Also, analytical support was provided in the framework of 48 other requests received from the NAC’s subdivisions and from the APO, in connection with the investigation of corruption and other related offences.

In Georgia, the Anti-Corruption Unit of the Prosecutor General’s Office has three analysts responsible for analytical work on detecting corruption and providing analytical support in criminal proceedings. The Anti-Corruption Agency of the State Security Service’s analytical division, accounting for 20% of the Anti-Corruption Agency’s total staff, is composed of specialised analysts whose exclusive function is to identify, examine, and trace assets of natural and legal persons involved in alleged criminal activity. In addition, the analytical division develops a corruption risk analysis of the public sector, analyses existing legislation and draft laws in the context of corruption risks, conducts risk assessments in relation to public spending and also issues recommendations to mitigate the aforementioned risks.

In Ukraine, NABU has a wide range of statutory powers to conduct quality analytical work, financial investigations and covert operations (Law on NABU, Code of Criminal Procedure, Law on Operative and Investigative Activities). Over time, NABU achieved important results in proactively detecting corruption. NABU is staffed with detectives who combine the functions of intelligence officers (operatives) and investigators and analytical officers (analysts) working within NABU’s Department on analytics and information processing. Both detectives and analysts have access to and use state registries and databases in the course of their work.

Nevertheless, the technical audit conducted by independent experts showed that the analytical work in NABU requires improvement. In particular, the report recommends that NABU consider organisational and structural changes to better integrate analytical functions with the core investigative activities of NABU detectives, which requires greater integration of NABU's Analytical Department with detective units. In addition, the report recommends strengthening NABU's capacity to support investigative work with strategic analysis targeting sectors and institutions, corruption trends, uncovering hot spots of corruption, and systemic vulnerabilities that could lead to the detection of new corruption schemes and their investigation (National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, 2023[22]). The Analytical Department was replaced with a new and larger Department of Criminal Analysis and Financial Investigations in the recent NABU reorganisation.

The use of in-house analytical departments in other Eastern European countries varies widely. For example, in 2015, the Romanian DNA created a separate financial investigation unit within its structure. However, the unit has been lacking sufficient human resources. Due to a priority focus on confiscation and asset recovery, the DNA decided to strengthen the capacities of the unit by recruiting experienced specialists and developing an up-to-date methodology for financial investigations.

In Latvia, targeting high-level corruption is a priority task for analysts of the Corruption Prevention and Combatting Bureau (KNAB). For these purposes, high-level corruption is understood as political corruption and corruptive actions by PEPs, heads of public institutions and municipalities and other high-level public officials. The agency also developed informative material on typologies of corruption that contains a separate section on political or high-level corruption32.

KNAB has also established the Analytical Department, which consists of the Strategical and Tactical Analysis Divisions, with the former dealing with statistics analysis, developing the institution’s strategy and reports, while the latter carries our risk analysis, provides analytical support in individual intelligence and criminal cases, and conducts financial investigations,

Lithuania has taken measures to equip its specialised investigative body with an analytical department with modern IT tools to support ongoing investigations and strengthen their detection efforts (see Box 4.5).

Box 4.5. Special Investigation Service of Lithuania (STT) - Analytical anti-corruption intelligence

In 2018, a new function within the STT was established: the analytical anti-corruption intelligence. This function focuses on strategic, tactical and operational levels. Whereas the STT analytical activities previously focused on providing operational support to criminal intelligence and investigations, the new function took a more preventive approach. Knowing that investigations are time-intensive and often costly, the function aims to detect corruption risks before crimes and damages occur.

To serve this purpose, the STT purchased and adapted several IT systems and trained its staff in their use and programming. The overall objective is to strengthen data-driven corruption risk management by developing a big data analytics model that provides a more effective and timely identification and analysis of corruption risks to prevent the manifestation of corruption-related offences. It enables the analysis of the huge amount of data available to the STT in various formats and more efficiently and qualitatively.

The developed system first collects data from more than 60 different state-owned and non-public databases (registers and information systems), including, for instance, information on public procurement contracts and procedures, land registers or from the EU Structural Support Computerized Information Management and Supervision System where all the financial data and administrative data relating to EU funded projects is stored. The data can then be analysed by the STT using different software programs that allow visual, geographic or text analyses and, thus, allow for the detection of corruption risks and possible schemes more quickly and effectively.

The data is not screened regularly for red flags. Instead, the employees of the STT each have their specific area of competence they look into, e.g. health care, public procurement, territorial planning and construction, transport and communication sector, municipalities or others. The employees analyse the provided data to identify relationships that present corruption risks, test hypotheses, or check for fraudulent activities previously detected in other national cases, in different countries, or identified by integrating multiple data sources. If they notice a certain modus operandi, they analyse further whether it represents an ad hoc occurrence or a systematic phenomenon that also appears in other cases. The STT can also demand financial information from banks about specific legal persons if it suspects illegal activities. This information can be demanded even without an official investigation ongoing. However, financial information relating to natural persons can only be obtained once an investigation has been opened.

The STT was able to create a dashboard with aggregated data about the number of funds involved in projects administered by different public institutions. This allowed to see that in some institutions the majority of projects went to only a few companies and informed law enforcement and policy responses on a sectoral and national level.

Source: European Commission, Anti-Fraud Knowledge Centre, STT

Recommendations

• Establish specialised units within anti-corruption agencies specifically tasked with analytical work and ensure that these units are comprised of specialised staff proficient in data analysis, financial forensics, and intelligence gathering. Actively recruit professionals with backgrounds in data science, criminology, finance, and other relevant fields to enhance the diversity of in-house expertise.

• Ensure that these specialised units conduct proactive analysis focusing on the detection of specific cases of corruption through analytical methods, including big data analysis, other advanced analytics methods, Open-source intelligence (OSINT), and provide analytical support for criminal investigations, including by conducting or supporting financial investigations.

• Ensure anti-corruption agencies are provided with modern IT infrastructure, modern analytical tools and technologies that facilitate data mining, pattern recognition, and visualisation, empowering investigators to uncover complex corruption networks.

• Provide ongoing comprehensive training programs for anti-corruption personnel, focusing on analytical techniques, financial investigation, and the use of advanced tools and technologies.

• Foster collaboration between anti-corruption institutions, law enforcement agencies, and relevant stakeholders to share best practices, methodologies, and intelligence and establish platforms for knowledge sharing.

• Strengthen partnerships with international organisations, agencies, and anti-corruption bodies to leverage global expertise, receive training support, and stay informed about the latest and most advanced analytical tools and methods.

4.5.3. Modern digital technologies in the domain of criminal case management

As already noted above, the effectiveness of investigations of high-level corruption cases can be enhanced by the use of modern digital technologies and increased access to databases, including direct access to registers and databases. Overall, all anti-corruption institutions suffer from understaffing and heavy workloads, which prevent them from performing their functions effectively. One of the effective solutions to these problems is the introduction of electronic criminal justice systems.

The added value of an electronic criminal case management system in terms of the administration of criminal justice can be illustrated by the experience of the Prosecutor's Office of England and Wales. In 2003, the Prosecution Service implemented a new criminal case management system called Compass. The program provides a national IT network, desktop hardware and case management software for about 7 700 prosecutors in 42 districts across England and Wales and improved the quality and timeliness of casework of the Crown Prosecution Service.33

In Ukraine, the e-Case Management System, an interagency system for electronic criminal proceedings, has great potential and would bring significant benefits to the work of the NABU when it is fully operational. It would allow detectives, prosecutors, and judges to process procedural documents electronically, saving significant resources and time and limiting the use of paper.

NABU's e-Case Management System has already been connected with SAPO. However, this system is not integrated with the Unified Register of Pre-trial Investigations and the Unified Judicial Information and Telecommunication System. Other Ukrainian law enforcement institutions do not use it for pre-trial investigations. As of mid-2023, the e-Case Management System was still under development, and only some of the possible functions were used, so the mandatory use of the system has become an additional burden for detectives (National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, 2023[22]). Starting in December 2023, the HACC began using the system to manage search warrants.34

Among the other EaP countries, only Georgia has experience in effectively implementing an electronic criminal justice system.

In Moldova, the APO does not have a modern e-case-management system. The only electronic management system is the E-file operational system. According to APO, E-file, in essence, does not make the APO work easier, it is not even able to generate statistical reports and works very slowly. In Armenia, in 2023, a criminal case management system was developed for the law enforcement agencies of Armenia, including the General Prosecutor's Office, and other investigative bodies. This reform will digitise manual workflows, allowing data related to pre-trial proceedings to be transferred between prosecutors' offices in different regions. The full implementation of this digital case management system will make it possible to significantly unload the work of anti-corruption institutions, improve communication between law enforcement agencies, and improve the maintenance of criminal statistics.

While many other Eastern European countries have increased the speed of their transition to digital case and court management systems since the COVID-19 pandemic, the systems in place in Estonia and Latvia are the most advanced in the region and among the most advanced in the EU.35

Box 4.6. Estonian E-File Court System and e-CMS System

Estonia’s e-File system provides data to the court information system as well as to the information systems of the police, jails, prosecutors and criminal case management. Since data is digitally entered only once, the e-File saves time and resources. All communication between parties is electronic, including workflow, creating and sending summons, minutes of hearings, and decisions. All parties to proceedings can electronically follow the different stages of proceedings and their outcomes. Signing the decisions is possible both electronically and physically. It is also possible to make queries in the criminal records database using the e-File system.

The Prosecutor’s Office also uses an e-CMS and Estonia took a pivotal step by amending the Code of Criminal Procedure to accommodate electronic criminal files as an alternative to traditional paper-based files, which has been in force since 1 May 2023. This strategic shift aims to modernise documentation practices and enhance efficiency. However, it is noteworthy that both paper-based and electronic files maintain a parallel existence with equal legal standing.

Source: E-Estonia, Justice & public safety; CCPE (2023), Thematic study of the CCPE on digitalisation in the work of prosecution services

and international co-operation, p.6.

Recommendation

• Develop and implement electronic case management systems for criminal proceedings.

References

[4] European Commission (2023), Strengthening the fight against corruption: Assessing the EU legislative and policy framework, https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/d7a6cfdb-8fcb-11ed-b508-01aa75ed71a1/language-en.

[20] IPRE (2022), Functional analysis of the Anticorruption Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Moldova: Recommendations for increasing the efficiency of fighting high-level corruption, https://ipre.md/2022/11/23/analiza-functionala-a-procuraturii-anticoruptie-a-republicii-moldova/?lang=en.

[22] National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (2023), Technical assessment of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine 2023, https://nabu.gov.ua/site/assets/files/47003/tekhnichna_otcinka_nabu_2023_en-1.pdf.

[8] OECD (2024), Baseline Report of the Fifth Round of Monitoring of Anti-Corruption Reforms in Armenia: The Istanbul Anti-Corruption Action Plan, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/fb158bf9-en.

[11] OECD (2024), Baseline Report of the Fifth Round of Monitoring of Anti-Corruption Reforms in Azerbaijan: The Istanbul Anti-Corruption Action Plan, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/a17aca4c-en.

[19] OECD (2024), Review of Anti-Corruption Reforms in Ukraine under the Fifth Round of Monitoring: The Istanbul Anti-Corruption Action Plan, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9e03ebb6-en.

[23] OECD (2022), Anti-Corruption Reforms in Azerbaijan: Pilot 5th Round of Monitoring Under the Istanbul Anti-Corruption Action Plan, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/3ae2406b-en.

[6] OECD (2022), Anti-Corruption Reforms in Georgia: Pilot 5th Round of Monitoring Under the Istanbul Anti-Corruption Action Plan, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/d709c349-en.

[12] OECD (2022), Anti-Corruption Reforms in Moldova: Pilot 5th Round of Monitoring Under the Istanbul Anti-Corruption Action Plan, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9bb0367e-en.

[7] OECD (2022), Anti-Corruption Reforms in Ukraine: Pilot 5th Round of Monitoring Under the Istanbul Anti-Corruption Action Plan, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/b1901b8c-en.

[21] OECD (2022), Recommendation of the Council on the Ten Global Principles for Fighting Tax Crime, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0469#mainText (accessed on  2024).

[5] OECD (2022), United States Phase 4: Summary and conclusions for the two-year written follow-up, https://doi.org/10.1787/d994f92a-en.

[3] OECD (2021), Recommendation of the OECD Council for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0378 (accessed on  2024).

[15] OECD (2020), Anti-corruption Reforms in Eastern Europe and Central Asia: Progress and Challenges, 2016-2019, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9e621f2f-en.

[9] OECD (2020), Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention Phase 4 Report: United States, Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/0cd34e9f-en.

[13] OECD (2020), OECD Public Integrity Handbook.

[14] OECD (2018), Confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds of corruption crimes in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/78637cac-en.

[10] OECD (2018), The role of the media and investigative journalism in combatting corruption, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/7590ec9d-en.

[2] OECD (2017), Recommendation of the Council on Public Integrity, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0435.

[1] OECD (2017), The Detection of Foreign Bribery, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/8ab65bd4-en.

[16] OECD (2016), International co-operation in corruption cases, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/e6694029-en.

[18] OECD (2016), The Liability of Legal Persons for Foreign Bribery: A Stocktaking Report, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/983cba50-en.

[17] OECD (2015), Liability of Legal Persons for Corruption in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/365e6926-en.

Notes

← 1.  https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2968

← 2.  European Commission (2023), Rule of Law Report of Slovenia, p.18-19. https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/1afb03d4-f026-4b31-bfae-c569944ab48f_en?filename=54_1_52632_coun_chap_slovenia_en.pdf

← 3.  European Commission (2023), Rule of Law Report of Bulgaria, p.23-24. https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/024961fd-ea86-4cbf-bf5f-5478bae406a3_en?filename=10_1_52568_coun_chap_bulgaria_en.pdf

← 4.  Directive (EU) 2019/1937 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2019 on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019L1937

← 5.  EU Whistleblowing Monitor, https://www.whistleblowingmonitor.eu/

← 6.  European Commission (2023), Communication on EU Enlargement Policy, Georgia 2023 Report, p.26, https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-11/SWD_2023_697%20Georgia%20report.pdf

← 7.  Directive (EU) 2019/1937 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2019 on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019L1937

← 8.  In the United States, there are four main whistleblower reward programmes, namely the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) programme which rewards reporting violations of federal securities laws, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) programme which rewards reporting violations of the Commodity Exchange Act, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) programme which rewards reporting tax fraud or underpayments and finally the False Claims Act programme which rewards reporting fraud against the government.

← 9.  https://www.sec.gov/files/2022_ow_ar.pdf

← 10.  https://www.justice.gov/criminal/criminal-division-corporate-whistleblower-awards-pilot-program

← 11.  https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/11/21/azerbaijan-arrests-two-journalists-investigating-political-corruption

← 12.  API (2020), Public Authorities’ Reaction to the Facts on Public Officials’ Integrity, reported by Investigative Journalists (July 2017 – July 2019); API (2020), Conclusions and Recommendations of the Study on Public Authorities’ Reaction to the Facts on Public Officials’ Integrity, reported by Investigative Journalists (July 2017 – July 2019)

← 13.  European Commission (2023), Communication on EU Enlargement Policy, Georgia 2023 Report, p.35, https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-11/SWD_2023_697%20Georgia%20report.pdf

← 14.  Council of Europe, Venice Commission (2024), Urgent Opinion on the Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence, p. 23, https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-PI(2024)013-e

← 15.  Ukraine 2023 Report, https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-11/SWD_2023_699%20Ukraine%20report.pdf

← 16.  Antac (2024), The journalists of BIHUS.info were surveilled to discredit them. Together with the attack on Yuriy Nikolov, this reminiscents intimidation of Yanukovych era

← 17.  Reuters (2016), Ukrainians shocked as politicians declare vast wealth

← 18.  European Commission (2023), Communication on EU Enlargement policy, Georgia 2023 Report, p.23. https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/georgia-report-2023_en

← 19. https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-1/SWD_2023_697%20Georgia%20report.pdf

← 20. https://ipre.md/2022/11/23/analiza-functionala-a-procuraturii-anticoruptie-a-republicii-moldova/?lang=en

← 21. European Commission (2023), Communication on EU Enlargement policy, Ukraine 2023 Report, p.35, https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/ukraine-report-2023_en.

← 22.  https://rai-see.org/what-we-do/regional-data-exchange-on-asset-disclosure-and-conflict-of-interest/

← 23.  European Commission (2023), Republic of Moldova 2023 EU Enlargement Report, p.10.

← 24.  Ibid, p.98.

← 25.  European Commission (2023), Ukraine 2023 EU Enlargement Report, p.58; Transparency International (2023), The Arma’s Effectiveness: Why Does The Agency Have The Lowest Score?

← 26.  Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, Articles 2 and 3, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0293.

← 27.  Recommendation of the Council for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0378

← 28.  For example, in Moldova, prosecutors from the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office are currently members of several Joint Investigation Teams. One of them is concluded with Latvia and concerns a bank fraud case. The other JIT was established with Romania at the initiative of the Romanian DNA. NABU and SAPO have cooperated with foreign authorities in the JIT format in at least two high-profile cases. Another joint investigative team of French and Moldovan authorities set up at Eurojust in a high-level corruption case of a multi-million euro bribery scheme to help fugitives evade international justice.

← 29.  Since 2021, in cooperation with Eurojust, Georgia has participated in seven JITs with other jurisdictions including, Estonia, France, Germany, Israel, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Switzerland, Spain, Sweden and Ukraine. These JITs led to a significant number of arrests and seizure of assets in both Georgia and abroad.

← 30.  https://www.eurojust.europa.eu/states-and-partners/third-countries/liaison-prosecutors

← 31.  Moldova has more than 20 relevant state-owned registers and databases, including register for immovable assets, register of Fiscal State Service, Customs register, databases of traffic police and border service, database of assets and interests’ declarations, etc.

← 32.  https://www.knab.gov.lv/en/media/3780/download?attachment

← 33.  Crown Prosecution Service (2006), Service Inspectorate, Report on the Review of the use of the Case Management System in the CPS, pp. 9 and 17.

https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/crown-prosecution-service/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2014/04/CompassNov06Rep.pdf

← 34.  https://euaci.eu/news/studenti-pravniki-pokrashhuyut-svoji-navichki-na-vseukrajinskomu-antikorupczijnomu-mutkorti-3-0

← 35.  European judicial systems - CEPEJ Evaluation Report – 2022 Evaluation cycle (2020 data), p.118. https://rm.coe.int/cepej-report-2020-22-e-web/1680a86279