Single‑parent families are among the most vulnerable household types, with an OECD average poverty rate (32.5%) more than three times higher than that of households with children and two or more adults (9.8%). Numerous factors contribute to the vulnerability of single‑parent households, including difficult access to the labour market and an adequate income, multiple caring responsibilities, and lack of practical or emotional support. This chapter analyses different policies aimed to support single parents in OECD countries. These policies include social assistance, universal or targeted economic benefits, and policies designed to facilitate access to the labour market and to promote work-family balance. This chapter also provides an overview of child support (or child maintenance) systems in OECD countries, as well as the implementation of family mediation as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism.
Evolving Family Models in Spain
6. Supporting single‑parent families
Abstract
Single parents and their children are at high risk of poverty
Regardless of the diverse causes for single parenthood, single‑parent families are among the most vulnerable household types, along with large families (European Commission, 2019[1]). On average across OECD countries, 32.5% of single adult households with at least one child live in poverty, compared to 9.8% among households with two or more adults and at least one child (Figure 6.1). In Spain, the shares are respectively 40.2% and 19.0%.
While data collection and country demographics should include single parents in order to better understand how to support them through policy measures, definitions tend to vary from country to country. Not all separated parents may fall into the single parent category depending on their partnership status and family structure. Single parenthood can result from separation, divorce or death of a parent, but also from the absence of a parent for prolonged periods (e.g. due to migration, incarceration or illness), unintended pregnancy, or the choice to raise a child alone. Since family structures evolve over time and single parenthood is not necessarily a permanent status, defining single‑parent families as a social category raises multiple difficulties. Moreover, many definitions for the status of single parents fail to recognise situations of de facto single parenthood, such as situations where a parent is severely ill or living abroad.
Single parents need a wide range of support
Several factors contribute to the vulnerability of single‑parent households, including difficult access to the labour market and an adequate income, multiple caring responsibilities, and, for some, lack of practical or emotional support from a partner (European Commission, 2019[1]). Many single parents face combined vulnerabilities. As such, policies to support single parents typically aim to accomplish two goals: balancing work and family and ensuring the economic well-being of these families. Such policies can include social assistance, universal or targeted economic benefits, and policies facilitating access to the labour market and promoting work-family balance.
Social assistance
Policies providing various forms of social assistance to support single parents include higher rates of general social assistance based on income; housing assistance; acknowledging the additional vulnerability of single parents as well as addressing parental obligations in case of separation/ divorce such as ensuring financial support from second parents or by the state. For instance, Austria, France and Ireland provide a special benefit or tax credit for single parents, on top of other allowances (European Commission, 2019[1]). In the United Kingdom, single‑parent families may be eligible for other forms of benefits based on income, rather than specific to their status as single‑parent families. In most countries, payment of child maintenance is a legal obligation and non-payment is usually sanctioned, ranging from enforced payment or salary deductions to imprisonment (see also the section on Obligations and support to the non-custodial parent below for a more detailed discussion on this topic).
Universal or targeted economic benefits
Single parents rely on various sources of income. Even though earnings from employment are the main source of single parents’ income, their earnings can be supplemented by targeted benefits. Family benefits targeted to single‑parent families top up their income from work and therefore pull them above the poverty line, while this is not necessarily the case for coupled-parent families (Nieuwenhuis, 2020[2]). Universal or targeted economic benefits accessed by single parents may include, cash transfers (income tested family benefits and non-income‑tested cash benefits); child tax benefits or other tax benefits for families; specific benefits or assistance for single‑parent households (special allowances, additional benefits or tax credit for single parents, in addition to other allowances); and higher rates of family allowance for single‑parent households (receive higher amounts of family allowances than two‑parent families, and sometimes of other related benefits). In some EU Member States, for instance in Italy and Portugal, single parents may not have any special benefit, but instead receive higher amounts of family allowances than two‑parent families, and sometimes of other related benefits (European Commission, 2019[1]).
Access to the labour market
Labour force participation of a single parent offers the best protection against poverty for children. Policies facilitating access to the labour market and promoting work-family balance include access to early childhood education; access to after school care and extra-curricular activities represent a similar support mechanism for single parents struggling to combine work and care responsibilities; maternity and parental leave schemes; in-work benefits; and flexible working hours and access to part-time work. For single‑parent families, ECEC can be particularly helpful, and flexible opening hours may make it easier to combine work and care responsibilities for young children without external support. Some Member States offer special leave provisions for single parents to help them combine parenthood and labour market participation. For instance, the Slovak Republic offers an extended period of maternity leave for single mothers, whereas in Greece, the period of parental leave is double for single parents. The Czech Republic offers longer periods of long-term care leave for children under the age of 10 to single‑parent families (European Commission, 2019[1]).
Combination of support
In practice, mechanisms implemented by countries may include a combination of universal benefits for families in precarious situations, and targeted policies to support the specific needs of single‑parent families. Many countries are “targeting within universalism” when, for example, there is a universal family allowance supplemented by specific assistance for specific groups, particularly single‑parent families. Transfers and benefits are often indispensable for single parents, even when they are working. Child support (i.e. transfers between households) are associated with modest poverty reductions, whereas family benefits reduces poverty among single parents much more (in some countries, substantially more) (Nieuwenhuis, 2020[2]).
OECD countries support single‑parent families in various ways
In the OECD area, almost all countries (except Turkey) provide support for low-income single‑parent families, and that through a range of social policy measures, including family benefits, social assistance, housing benefits, in-work benefits and tax breaks (Figure 6.2). Spain is the only country that supports low-income single‑parent through tax breaks only, without any additional income support. The main components of transfer income in other countries are income‑tested family benefits and non-income‑tested cash benefits; the latter are usually paid in respect of children. In ten OECD countries (Denmark, Finland, France, Lithuania, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and Sweden) transfers exceed 30% of the net income of low-income single‑parent families. Seventeen countries have cash housing benefits for rented accommodations and 11 countries offer in-work benefits. Most of the financial support is means tested and the support is reduced at higher wages. It should be noted that subsidies and the cost of childcare are not taken into account in these simulations, which are likely to be of particular importance to single parents.
Analysis by Bradshaw, Keung and Chzhen (2018[3]) shows that child poverty in single‑parent families is reduced by social transfers in every EU country. Denmark, Finland and the United Kingdom reduced the poverty rate (i.e. the share in poverty) among children in single‑parent households by over 65% thanks to transfers, whereas Ireland and the United Kingdom reduced the poverty gap (i.e. how far they are below the poverty threshold) among children in single‑parent households by over 80%. In addition, Morissens (2018[4]) shows that countries that combine (generous) universal benefits with supplementary family benefits towards single parents – based on their status, not their income – have the best results in terms of reducing poverty (i.e. Denmark, Finland and Norway). However, employment is equally important, and the countries with the best outcomes for single parents are also those with sufficient and affordable day-care provisions in place. Without these provisions, single parents’ employment becomes a true challenge.
Bradshaw, Keung and Chzhen (2018[3]) also discuss the importance to verify whether taxes and benefits do not offset each other. Some countries (Austria, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Luxembourg, Norway and the United Kingdom) have higher cash benefits for single parents, but then undermine that advantage by taking those benefits into account when assessing housing benefits.
Box 6.1 provides further details about the range of support measures that are provided to single parent households in France.
Box 6.1. Support for single parents in France
In France, parents are considered as single parents when they are single, divorced, separated or widowed with dependent children who are already born or who are due to be born, do not live in a couple, and do not share their income and costs with a partner, cohabitee or civil partner. The simple geographic separation of a couple does not constitute a situation of single parenthood.
Single parenthood is determined in the same way across all benefits and parents are responsible to register any changes with the family allowance fund (caisse d’allocations familiales, CAF). The family allowance fund calculates the family quotient based on the family situation, the number of people and household income (see Box 4.1 in Chapter 4 for more details). This family quotient then determines the taxes and costs of child services for parents. Overall, single parents in France mainly benefit from higher universal family and child benefits rather than through tax treatments.
Birth/Adoption grants are means-tested and intend to help cover the expenses related to the birth or adoption of a child. The income ceiling depends on the number of children in the family and the number of babies expected. As of 1 January 2021, the family’s annual income for 2019 must not exceed to EUR 42 892 for a dual-income household or a single parent and EUR 32 455 for a single‑income family expecting one child.
Family support allowance is provided for children whose guardian is not receiving any support from one or both parents or as a top-up to a low child support award. EUR 155.40 is provided for any child who has lost both parents or is in a comparable situation, and EUR 116.57 is provided for a child who has lost one parent or is in a comparable situation. This allowance can also be paid as an advance if the other parent is behind on child support payments.
The supplement for free choice of childcare intends to offset childcare costs for children under the age of 6 and can be paid on top of the basic allowance (if the parent meets the income‑related eligibility requirements) or independently. The allowance covers partial coverage (up to 85%) of childcare costs. The rate varies depending on the number and age of children and household income, and the income ceilings are increased by 40% for single parents.
The shared child education benefit allows one or both parents to reduce or cease their professional activity to take care of their child under 3 years of age. The free choice of childcare supplement allows parents who continue to work to offset the cost of childcare in the event of employment of a childminder, home childcare or micro-crèche. Couples may take 6 months each and single parents may have one year until the child’s first birthday. The duration of payment varies according to the number of dependent child(ren) and the family situation.
The education allowance for a disabled child is a non-means tested allowance paid to those with a dependent child under age 20. The basic amount for the allowance is EUR 132.21 per month. This amount may be increased for a single parent, or according to the need for assistance, or the extent of the child’s handicap.
Daily parental attendance allowance is paid to a person looking after a child with disability and is higher if the beneficiary is a single parent (EUR 52.34 per day) than if the person is part of a couple (EUR 44.05 per day).
Social assistance is intended to ensure unemployed people who have a low income or a minimum level of income, which varies according to the number of people in their household. The support is broken down depending on the number of people in the home: single parents receive EUR 958.37 for one child, EUR 1 197.97 for two children, and EUR 239.59 per additional child, while couples receive EUR 1 007.53 for one child, EUR 1 175.45 for two children, and EUR 223.90 per additional child.
Obligations and support to the non-custodial parent
Child support (or child maintenance) is a regular money payment made by the non-resident parent to the resident parent following the end of a relationship, or if a relationship has not formed. In theory, child support payments should mitigate some of the lower earning opportunities that many single parents face, and most OECD countries have formal child-support systems that aim to ensure compliance of non-resident parents with their payment obligations. In reality, however, parents often breach their child support obligations, and the enforcement of support orders is frequently ineffective. Strengthening the enforcement of child maintenance obligations is a particularly important policy tool for improving the situation of single‑parent households. It is relatively easy to implement, at a relatively low cost for the government.
Child support payments make up for an important source of the income of single parent families: they represent on average 14% of the available income of the receiving household in the OECD (OECD, 2011[5]; Beaumont, Mason and Schulze, 2014[6]). This share would even be higher if the full amount of child support due was paid. Child support tends to be more important for lower income parents. For example, among American custodial parents below the poverty line who receive full payments, the mean annual child support received in 2015 represented 58% of their mean personal income (Grall, 2018[7]). Child support payments are therefore key to prevent poverty in families with separated parents.
Non-payment (or delayed payment) of child support is common and pose significant challenges in all OECD countries, also in Spain. In France, between 30% and 40% of alimony payments due to families with children are unpaid or partially paid, and re‑partnering and/or break-up with new partners are frequently the cause of the (temporary) suspension of child support payments (Favrat and Fernandez, 2016[8]). In the United States, only 43% of custodial parents receive the full amount that is due to them, whereas about 30% of them receive nothing at all (Grall, 2018[7]). On average, custodial parents with a child support order receive roughly 60% of their order amount.
As described in a recent report by the European Parliament (2020[9]), child support policies are generally complex and involve multiple parties. In most countries, the parents, court, and in about half of the countries public agencies are involved in determining the level of child support payments (Table 6.1). The final responsibility for determining the support payments often lies with the court, either directly or in case the parents cannot come to a satisfactory agreement. There is a lot of cross-country variation in the determination of the payment levels, ranging from parental discretion based on informal guidelines in the Netherlands to a rigid formula in Denmark. Support generally ends when the child turns 18 or 21, with some exceptions for continued support for children in education (e.g. Czech Republic, Greece, Estonia) or children with a disability (Czech Republic and Poland). Most countries have the same child support arrangements irrespective whether parents have been married or not.
Table 6.1. Child support policies are complex and involve multiple parties
Child support policies in selected EU Member States
Country |
Involvement in the determination of child support |
Responsibility for determining support payments |
Rules for determining amount of payments |
Responsibility for enforcement of payments |
Advance on support payments |
||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Parents |
Courts |
Agency |
|||||
Austria |
Yes – ratified by court |
Yes |
No |
Parents with court approval |
Formal guidelines and rules/rigid formula |
Court |
Yes |
Belgium |
Yes – ratified by court |
Yes |
No |
Court |
Mostly discretion, no fixed rules or methods |
Court |
Yes |
Czech Republic |
Yes – entry into formal system if parents cannot agree. |
Yes |
Yes – Sociolegal protection authorities |
District and Regional Courts |
Guidelines given by law |
Court and Office for International Legal Protection of Children in foreign matters |
Yes |
Denmark |
Yes – ratified by Country Governor’s Office |
No |
Yes – Country Governor’s Office |
Parents or State County’s Agency if parental disagreement |
Rules/ rigid formula |
State County’s Agency |
Yes |
Estonia |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes – if child is on state maintenance |
Court if parental disagreement |
Minimum stated by the state, additional amount according to parental income |
Enforcement Service |
Yes |
Finland |
Yes – mediated and confirmed by Social Welfare Bond |
Yes (residual role) |
Yes – Social Welfare Board |
Parents or Social Welfare Board and court if parental disagreement |
Mostly discretion, informal guidelines |
Municipal Social Welfare Board |
Yes |
France |
Yes – ratified by court |
Yes |
No |
Court |
Mostly discretion, no fixed rules or methods |
Courts and Social Security Agency |
Yes |
Germany |
Yes |
Yes |
No |
Parents or Court if parental disagreement |
Mostly discretion, using ‘support tables’ |
Court |
Yes |
Greece |
Yes |
Parents or Court |
Rules based on parents’ income |
Court |
No |
||
Ireland |
Yes – ratified by court |
Yes |
No |
Parents or Court if parental disagreement |
Legal guidelines but high level of court discretion |
Court |
No |
Latvia |
Yes |
Yes |
No |
Parents or Court if parental disagreement |
Mostly discretion, no fixed rules or methods |
Law enforcement office |
Yes |
Netherlands |
Yes – ratified by court |
Yes |
No |
Parents with supervision of lawyers; Court if parental disagreement or parents receiving social assistance |
Mostly discretion, informal guidelines |
National Collection and Support Agency;. Enforcement through a bail off; If enforcement is contested, court. |
No |
Poland |
Yes |
No |
Yes – Welfare office |
Parents, Local Government – Welfare Office |
Formal guidelines, Family Benefit Act of 28 November 2003 |
Yes |
|
Portugal |
Yes – entry into formal system if parents cannot agree |
Yes |
No |
Parents with supervision of lawyers or Court if parental disagreement |
Informal guidelines for private agreements or rules defined by Court if parental disagreement |
Court |
No |
Slovak Republic |
Yes – confirmed by Social Welfare Bond |
Yes |
No |
Court |
Mostly discretion, informal guidelines |
Enforcement Service |
Yes |
Spain |
Yes |
Yes |
No |
Court |
Mostly discretion, using ‘support tables |
Court |
Yes |
Sweden |
Yes – confirmed by Social Welfare Bond |
Yes |
No |
Court |
Mostly discretion, informal guidelines |
Enforcement Service |
Yes |
Source: European Parliament (2020[9]), The situation of single parents in the EU, Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/659870/IPOL_STU(2020)659870_EN.pdf
Box 6.2. Examples of child support payment amounts and adjustment rules
Germany
In Germany, parents may have to pay maintenance to their children and an unmarried parent may have to pay maintenance to the other parent, if a child is in their care. In principle, maintenance must be paid monthly in advance to the party entitled to maintenance or, in the case of minors, to the parent looking after them or to the party otherwise entitled to receive payment. There is no age limit for child maintenance: it must be paid as long as the child is dependent on it. The level of the payment is determined by the requirements and needs of the party entitled to maintenance and the ability to pay of the party liable for maintenance. The higher regional courts have developed tables and guidelines in this respect which assist in determining a flat rate for the items to be taken into account. The Düsseldorf table is regularly used as a basis for calculating the level of child maintenance.
If there is a change in the actual circumstances on which court orders are based, these orders can be modified at the request of the party entitled to maintenance or the party liable for maintenance. In the case of a minor, child maintenance can also be index-linked, in which case it is stated as a percentage of the minimum level of maintenance in force at any given time. The minimum level of maintenance is regulated in the Civil Code and increases on a three‑bracket scale as the child gets older. If a court order contains an index-linked maintenance payment, the order does not have to be modified whenever the child reaches a new age bracket.
Norway
Child maintenance is payable by the parent who does not live with his/her child. Parents have a duty to pay for their children irrespective of whether or not they live with them. Both parents are obliged to pay the costs of the child’s upbringing and education according to their financial ability.
Child maintenance in Norway is a private‑law concern and parents can agree on and pay it without the authorities being involved. They are free to agree on the size of the amount and adjust this to their personal circumstances. The Labour and Welfare Administration has a child support calculator in case parents need guidance. If the parents do not agree on the child maintenance, either of them can ask the Labour and Welfare Administration to determine the amount. The Labour and Welfare Administration bases its determination of the child maintenance on what it costs to rear a child. The rearing cost is to be divided between the parents according to their incomes and the parent who is best off financially is to pay for a larger share of the costs of having the child.
All fixed maintenance payments to children shall be index-linked unless otherwise determined in the decision or the agreement. Indexation is linked to changes in the consumer price index issued by Statistics Norway.
The duty to pay child maintenance normally lasts until the end of the month when the child has his/her 18th birthday. If the child attends upper secondary school, the parent may also be ordered to pay child maintenance after the child reaches the age of 18 years.
Czech Republic
Czech law does not recognise what is referred to as objectivised maintenance using tables, percentages etc. and neither is it bound by minimum or maximum maintenance. When making its decision the court will take into account the uniqueness of each specific case, such as the possibility of more than one maintenance obligation, increased costs for a handicapped child, etc. The Ministry of Justice only issues a table of recommended amounts. Court decisions on maintenance are issued subject to changes in the situation. They can therefore be modified if the situation of the creditor or the liable party changes significantly.
Maintenance may be granted if the beneficiary is not realistically able to support him/herself. The ability to support oneself is traditionally interpreted exclusively as the ability to satisfactorily meet all one’s needs (material, cultural, etc.). If a child is not able to support him/herself and is reliant on support from the maintenance payer, the maintenance obligation will not lapse even when he/she reaches adulthood (e.g. if the child continues with his/her studies), and in exceptional cases the maintenance obligation may continue throughout the life of the child and the parents (e.g. if a child is fully disabled and will never be able to support him/herself). In contrast, the maintenance obligation may lapse even before the child reaches adulthood if the child becomes able to support him/herself earlier. There is no specific age limit.
Repercussions for the non-payment of child maintenance by the non-custodial parent can range from enforced payment, salary deductions, seizure of assets and bank accounts, and, in some countries, imprisonment (Miho and Thévenon, 2020[10]). Child support can be guaranteed in some countries by the state (in Austria, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Italy and Sweden); by local authorities (in the Czech Republic and Finland); by special funds (in Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland and Portugal); or by a special administrative agency (in Denmark, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom). Several countries, including Australia, Estonia (see Box 6.3), New Zealand, the United Kingdom and more recently France (see Box 6.4), have strengthened their systems to assist parents pursuing their claims and to help them take the appropriate administrative and/or legal steps. A similar reform is highly needed in Spain, to better support parents and ensure that they receive the monetary support they are entitled to.
Box 6.3. Reform of the child maintenance support system in Estonia
In Estonia, approximately a quarter of single parents did not pay child maintenance as ordered by the court in 2014. In January 2017, a new Family Benefits Act entered into force to extend maintenance support to single parents when the other parent does not fulfil their legal obligation to provide financial support. Under this scheme, maintenance support is guaranteed by the state, which claims back maintenance costs from the debtor parent through various measures. These include rescinding driving licences, restricting entrepreneurial support and publishing the names of debtors. Maintenance support paid by the state covers support paid during court proceedings for 150 days, as well as during enforcement proceedings, which consists of EUR 100 a month until the child turns 18, or 21 if the child goes to university.
Source: European Commission (2019[1]), Mechanisms supporting single parents across the European Union, https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/3ade5c22-b4d7-11e9-9d01-01aa75ed71a1/language-en
Box 6.4. A new public service for the financial intermediation of alimony in France
A report on family breakdowns in France (Haut Conseil de la Famille, 2014[11]) indicated that the non-payment of alimony, which is estimated to be around 35% in France, contributes to the fragility of families in France. In order to peruse missing payments, families had to rely on lengthy court procedures or getting support from their family allowance fund. These limited options proved difficult and resulted in many families experiencing poverty.
In response, a new public service for the financial intermediation of alimony (IFPA) was created in 2020, managed by Agency for the Recovery and Intermediation of Alimony (ARIPA). Since January 2021, the service is open to all separated parents who would like to make use of the service.
The “debtor” parent (the parent who owes support) pays the support each month to ARIPA, which is responsible for paying it immediately to the parent who receives the support (the “creditor” parent). If the debtor parent fails to pay, the agency immediately initiates a procedure to recover the unpaid amount from the debtor parent and pays the eligible creditor parent the family support allowance (EUR 116.57 per month and per child; see Box 6.1). The objective is to secure each month the alimony payment to the creditor parents, by preventing the risk of unpaid alimony. Financial intermediation also aims to ease tensions related to financial issues between separated parents, so that they can focus on the education and development of their child(ren). Any failure by the debtor parent to meet his or her obligations is subject to penalties and leads, from the first unpaid amount, to the triggering of the family support allowance when the parent receiving the support is a single parent and has applied for it.
While it is necessary to strengthen the enforcement of child maintenance obligations, helping non-custodial parents be self-sufficient is key to enabling them to fulfil their obligations regarding child support payments in the long-run (Berger, 2017[12]). Non-custodial parents may lack stable employment, work for low wages, or have a new family to support, which hampers their ability to comply with child support payments (Ha, Cancian and Meyer, 2018[13]). Providing vulnerable non-custodial parents with the employment and/or social supports they need to be self-sufficient reduces the risk of non-payment (Miho and Thévenon, 2020[10]). The provision of such self-sufficiency supports should be conditional on the payment of child support. Another option to strengthen support to non-custodial parents is to include non-resident children in the calculation of means-tested benefits and/or to child related tax allowances (Berger, 2017[12]). Evidence suggests that arrangements to facilitate the payment of child support arrears work as incentives to enter and remain in employment, enhancing the ability to comply with child alimony payment obligations (Heinrich, Burkhardt and Shager, 2011[14]).
Self-sufficiency can also be enhanced by ensuring that the child-related costs of children born by the non-custodial parents are taken into account when setting up eligibility criteria for welfare benefits and that changes in child support payments do not lead to drastic reductions in social assistance payment (Skinner et al., 2017[15]). Social protection in some countries has taken a step in this direction. For instance, in France, following a decision by the Conseil d’Etat in 2017, each parent can now receive a housing allowance in cases of shared custody. The amount granted is calculated based on the period during which each parent has the child in his or her own home during the year (Miho and Thévenon, 2020[10]).
Family mediation
As a result of more disputes being brought to court there are typically longer waiting periods for disputes to be resolved and higher legal costs. Mediation can provide a faster alternative to families and is usually cheaper than ordinary court proceedings. Family mediation has become a common method of assisting separated parents who find it hard to establish mutually acceptable co-parenting arrangements (Morris and Halford, 2014[16]). Family mediation involves a professional who assists in the process of resolving disputes and drafting a family settlement agreement. There is an assumption that an agreement negotiated by the co-parents will be implemented more effectively than a parenting agreement imposed by the courts (Morris et al., 2018[17]; Emery, 2011[18]).
The European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice published a handbook for mediation law-making in Europe in 2019 which includes examples of best practices, recommendations on the drafting of laws on mediation, guidelines and methods of efficiently implementing mediation into practice (European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice, 2019[19]). For example, in order to ensure the high quality of mediation some EU countries have implemented basic requirements and training in order to introduce a systematic approach towards the profession of mediators. An increasing number of legislators have introduced official lists of mediators to their respective national laws (Austria, Croatia, Lithuania, Turkey) and other countries choose to maintain at least a list limited to the scope of court-related mediations (Czech Republic, Poland and Slovenia). The initiation process of mediation differs in EU countries, participants may join the process voluntarily or be mandated by the court as a condition of the legal proceedings. In addition, the cost of mediation for families differ country to country. In many countries mediation is offered to families free of charge or subsidies through legal aid (Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Poland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, England, Wales and Scotland).
In Spain, some regional authorities started providing family mediation services in addition to other related services such as meeting points for highly conflictive divorces, court orders naming a parenting co‑ordinator for shared custody and even compulsory family therapy orders. In all regions, with the exception of Asturias and Galicia, mediation services are listed as services used to prevent and resolve family conflicts without recourse to the justice system. For example, the Catalonian region has a law on family mediation dating from 2001, and 12 other Autonomous Communities have approved their family mediation laws since then. However, the uptake of family mediation services remains low in Spain.
To incentivise the use of mediation and increase the uptake, mandatory mediation elements in the judicial system like in Italy (see Box 6.5) might be useful. The country experienced a significant increase in the use of these services when mediation became a condition precedent to trial in certain categories of cases (De Palo et al., 2014[20]).
Box 6.5. Family mediation in Italy and France
Italy
In Italy, parties are required to attend an introductory mediation session as a condition precedent to judicial proceedings to promote the use of mediation in their national jurisdictions. It has significantly raised the numbers of mediations conducted to approximately 150 000 a year while managing to keep the success rate as high as almost 50% in cases where parties have decided to continue with mediation after the first meeting (European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice, 2019[48]). The requirement of mediation is fulfilled when the parties participate in the first meeting with a mediator, which can be transformed into a full mediation process if the parties so agree (in other words, an opt-out model). In Italy mediation information sessions are compulsory in disputes related to family agreements. The criteria that determine the mediation fee (indennità di mediazione), comprising the fee for initiating the procedure and the fee for mediation proper, are outlined in the Ministerial Order No 180/2010.
France
In France, families may contact the family mediator directly or else the judge may order mediation for the relevant parties within family matters such as exercise of parental authority, provisional measures in divorce matters, determining the place of habitual residence of the child(ren), the right of access and accommodation, the contribution to the education and maintenance of minor children, or a request to modify a decision of the family court. In all cases, mediation can only begin if both people concerned are present and have given their agreement however if violence was committed by a parent on the other parent or on the child mediation will not be required.
For families initiating the mediation the first information interview is free with the cost being covered by Caisse nationale des Allocations familiales, the Ministry of Justice, the ministry in charge of the Family, the MSA and certain local authorities after that the cost is defined on the basis of a participation scale and financial participation will be calculated according to the families income. If the judge orders family mediation with the agreement, parties can benefit from legal aid according to their resources (total or partial coverage of the cost by the State). A specific aid has been created by the Caissenationale des allocations familiales (CAF) and the Caisse centrale de mutualité agricole in order to alleviate the participation of individuals. The Ministry of Justice, the Departmental Directorates of Social Cohesion (Ddass) and certain local authorities have also committed themselves to supporting the development of family mediation.
In addition to family mediation, alternative dispute resolution can play a crucial role in family disputes, it may reduce psychological harm, help the parties to start talking again and thereby, in particular, help ensure the protection of children (European Parliament, 2011[21]). Alternative dispute resolution may also include the larger family unit or support systems in the process of creating an agreement.
For those who have been victims of intimate partner violence, the fear and intimidation they feel towards the other co-parent may make it difficult for a meaningful participating in mediation. While there is more need for research on the impacts of intimate partner violence on the mediation process, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe considers that issues concerning violence among couples or families should not be dealt in the mediation process (like in France, for instance – see Box 6.5), as they could constitute criminal offences and in these circumstances the use of the mediation process would not be the most appropriate way of resolving family disputes (Council of Europe, 2004[22]). The concept of the mediation requires that there is no power imbalance between the positions of the participants as in for example, in domestic violence cases. The handbook on mediation law-making from the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice encourages that disputes of a sensitive nature (such as family mediation in cases of domestic violence or victims-offender mediation) are not excluded in their entirety (European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice, 2019[19]). The handbook suggests to introduce safeguards instead (through the duties of the mediator or criteria based on which the judge can recommend or order parties to try mediation) in order to protect the weaker party.
Overall, it is important to highlight that there is still limited data availability on the use of mediation in EU countries (ChildONEurope Secretariat, 2005[23]). Most available data come from the judicial system and refers to separating couples which already started court proceedings, either consensual or contended. These data therefore do not cover requests addressed to other institutions, agencies and organisations dealing with divorce such as independent social workers, family mediation bodies, and other legal and consultancy services, which are often contracted extra-court.
References
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