Xiao-Shan Yap
Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Lausanne, Switzerland
Emmanuelle David
Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Lausanne, Switzerland
The Economics of Space Sustainability
Delivering Economic Evidence to Guide Government Action
8. Addressing earth-space sustainability: An incentive-based mechanism for satellite infrastructure under three scenarios by 2030
Abstract
This chapter focuses on challenges related to the socio-economic dimension of the “earth-space sustainability” concept, more specifically the safety of the orbital environment for the long-term operation of space infrastructure and how it might affect technological competition in the orbital region and the diffusion of sectoral services on Earth. It further explores the role of an industry certification programme – the Space Sustainability Rating – in contributing to earth-space sustainability in three future scenarios and uses the findings to formulate policy recommendations.
Introduction
Space infrastructure has gained increasing socio-economic importance in recent years due to the capabilities of satellite services in shaping manifold earth-bound sectors. However, the exponential rise in space activities has exacerbated space congestion and the generation of space debris that results in the increasing risks of collision in space (ESA, 2022[1]). An increasingly congested orbital environment might eventually prohibit access to critical space-based infrastructure and the socio-economic benefits it might offer.
Research scholars have recently proposed the concept of “earth-space sustainability” as a guiding notion for managing the uses of space in a sustainable manner while addressing earth-bound challenges (Yap and Truffer, 2022[2]). More specifically, this concept calls for addressing earth-bound and space-related sustainability challenges in an integrative manner so that developments in space do not bring negative consequences to earth-bound developments, and vice versa (Yap and Truffer, 2022[2]). Implementing this goal is, however, challenging and there is only a limited set of policy options available that can potentially address earth-space sustainability in a simultaneous manner. While the meaning of sustainability becomes vague due to increasingly complex developments in space, this chapter is among the first attempts to add clarification to the concept by focusing on earth-space interdependencies. In this chapter, the authors delimit the empirical scope of sustainability to the long-term provision of satellite services for sustainable development purposes on Earth (i.e., in terms of socio-economic benefits and green sectoral transitions), as well as the environmental conditions for Earth’s orbit including space safety for satellite operations in the geostationary (GEO) and non-geostationary (NGSO) orbits (Yap et al., 2023[3]).
Against this background, the “Space Sustainability Rating” (SSR) is a potential policy option to help address earth-space sustainability. The SSR aims to ensure that increasing space missions worldwide will be managed safely and sustainably by assigning tiered ratings to satellite operators based on a series of technical metrics. It is the result of a multi-stakeholder effort initiated by the World Economic Forum Global Council on Space in 2016 in collaboration with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the European Space Agency (ESA) Space Debris Office, Bryce Tech and the University of Texas at Austin, and is currently implemented at the Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne Space Center. As an incentive-based mechanism, SSR encourages space operators to adopt practices deemed more sustainable for the orbital environment (Rathnasabapathy and David, 2023[4]). The SSR is a potential policy option considering the lack of a strong, legally binding governance regime at the international level (IRGC, 2021[5]; Buchs and Bernauer, 2023[6]).
However, empirical analysis is needed to better understand under which conditions stakeholders, policy makers, and satellite operators will be driven to adopt the SSR, in particular within the next several years during which the number of satellites in the NGSO is expected to grow tremendously (United Nations, 2023[7]). To understand these conditions, the authors constructed three plausible scenarios by 2030 based on how global space governance might evolve. The authors specified the contextual factors that might shape each of these scenarios and analysed under which conditions (national and international institutional environments, market conditions, geopolitical situations) the SSR should be adapted or configured and in which forms (e.g. integrated with financial and economic incentives, creating business legitimacy in terms of corporate reputation) in order to safeguard the long-term socio-economic benefits that space infrastructure can provide. The authors first elaborate on their research methodology and subsequently present the results, including the narratives used to construct the three plausible scenarios. The authors then discuss the potential implications of these scenarios on future earth-space sustainability and derive policy implications in terms of the role of SSR.
Research methodology
In foresight studies, scenarios act as mental models that offer a structured and practical avenue for analysis, communication and learning, by revealing alternative possibilities about the future of the problem studied. The fundamental use of scenarios is a way of navigating times of uncertainty (Bohensky, Reyers and van Jaarsveld, 2006[8]), particularly in terms of proactive policy making (Wright et al., 2019[9]; van Dorsser et al., 2020[10]). Several scenario exercises have been conducted for the space sector in the past, including on the future of space applications (OECD, 2004[11]), the associated opportunities and challenges to policy (OECD, 2005[12]), space traffic management (Secure World Foundation, 2017[13]), and the futures of governing space as a commons (Yap et al., 2023[3]). In this chapter, the authors construct the future scenarios of global space governance by following the analytical steps described below.
Discourse analysis: identification of contextual factors
As a first step, the authors conducted a discourse analysis to identify the contextual factors that could shape global space governance by 2030. This was used to distil the set of policy, regulatory and business strategies pursued by key actors (i.e. state actors, private actors, and intergovernmental organisations) in three space infrastructure sectors critical for enabling socio-economic development and green sectoral transitions. The three space infrastructure sectors are satellite navigation (e.g. efficient navigation of transport, shipping, and agriculture systems), earth observation (e.g. industry application services using carbon monitoring data), and broadband satellite constellations (e.g. connectivity services across industries).
Over the last decade, there has been growing global competition in navigation, earth observation and broadband satellite sectors. In the navigation satellite sector, the Chinese BeiDou system came into full operation in 2020, and the European Union (EU) Galileo system began operation in 2016 and is expected to fully operate by 2024. In addition, the EU earth observation programme Copernicus began operation in 2014. The internet satellite sector, meanwhile, observed the installations of large satellite constellations by companies such as OneWeb, Starlink and Amazon Kuiper. Taken together, the three space infrastructure sectors provide a comprehensive view of policy, regulatory and business strategies pursued by key actors. This allows us to anticipate the set of factors that will shape global space governance in the near future, particularly with regard to the development of space infrastructure.
The secondary data used in the discourse analysis was sourced from a reliable database system - Lexis Nexis - which is a database that provides legal, governmental, business and technical information from newspapers, journals and magazines in English. The selection of the period was based on “critical moments” during which major shifts in development were observed. This was indicated by the sudden increase in news articles reporting on the development of specific sectors. Based on preliminary studies, the authors identified the few years after the introduction of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (UN SDGs) to have played a crucial role in boosting the development of the three selected space infrastructure sectors. For instance, some key actors promoted the potential of the satellite broadband constellations sector in closing the digital divide by offering global connectivity services. News data therefore reported on how actors expressed their opinions on the values of satellite infrastructure in terms of sustainable development, and their respective strategies to promote, develop and regulate the space infrastructure sector. The final selection period fell mostly within 2016 – 2020, with slight variations for the broadband satellites sector which only began to increase from 2018 following the rapid launch of satellites by companies such as Starlink. The latest development trends (from 2021 to early 2024) were identified through a scenarios workshop and in-depth interviews.
Actor statements in the news were coded based on a systematic coding scheme using Nvivo. The coding scheme was derived abductively, based on the conceptual framework of “institutional logics” (Thornton, Ocasio and Lounsbury, 2012[14]) while inductively identifying new elements based on the empirical data analysed (see Yap, Heiberg, and Truffer (2023[15]) for an application on the case of space debris management). Institutional logics, a concept derived from the field of institutional sociology, – allows actors to subscribe to a finite number of alternative but internally coherent combinations of value positions like the state, market, or community logics (Thornton, Ocasio and Lounsbury, 2012[14]). Each of these logics is associated with specific interpretations of fairness, success, collaboration or competition, which in this case operate in relation to the value of satellite infrastructure for sustainable development. The coding of actor statements for the navigation satellite and earth observation sectors was extracted from an earlier study by Bandau (2021[16]), whereas the one for the satellite broadband constellations sector was extracted from Coyle (2021[17]).The coded data was subsequently reorganised and compiled by the authors of the present chapter based on the major actor types (i.e. international organisations, state, and private actors) as well as their geographical regions. This discourse analysis overall derived a comprehensive view of the different strategies (e.g. state and/or geopolitically-oriented, market-oriented, or global community-oriented) pursued by different actor types.
Scenario building with experts and stakeholders
The exploration of alternative futures of global space governance was based on contextual factors identified from the discourse analysis above. More specifically, the aggregated groups of coded concepts based on the three key actor types informed us about the major logics that delineate the different scenarios in this chapter. Accordingly, the authors identified three plausible scenarios of global space governance by 2030: (i) one that is state-led and strongly driven by geopolitics; (ii) one that is led by private actors and strongly driven by market values; and (iii) one that is led by international fora driven by sustainability concerns and global community interest. Corporate stakeholders, policy experts, and technical engineers were invited to a scenario workshop in collaboration with the Politecnico di Milano on 8 June 2023.
The scenarios were jointly discussed and validated with the workshop participants. A total of 24 participants were divided into three break-out groups, each of which focused on one scenario. Individual visions and expectations were discussed and collected, which were aggregated to become collective expectations. Within each group, an expert on the topic led the discussion on how the different scenarios “perform” (Truffer, Voß and Konrad, 2008[18]). In the context of this study, this means the potential implications of those scenarios on future earth-space sustainability, e.g. the state of the orbital environment (e.g. highly congested, well maintained, under strict regulations) and the long-term use as well as the diffusion potentials of space infrastructure for socio-economic development and sectoral transitions on Earth. Subsequently, the authors discussed the opportunities and challenges for SSR to contribute to earth-space sustainability under each of these scenarios.
Triangulation through in-depth semi-structured interviews
The authors conducted ten in-depth semi-structured interviews with selected stakeholders to triangulate the above results. More specifically, this step ensured the study captured the latest development trends and asked focused questions in terms of how they perceive the value of space infrastructure for sustainable development and which configurations of SSR might be effective in the different scenarios. Examples of SSR configuration include the provision of financial and economic incentives, supporting existing and potential regulations, altering procurement processes, benefiting corporate reputation and public perception, as well as supporting environmental, social, and governance corporate reporting (Rathnasabapathy and David, 2023[4]). Table 8.1 lists the interviewees, including their respective areas of expertise in relation to the scenario building.
Table 8.1. List of interviewees
Results
Discourse analysis on global space infrastructure sectors
In this subsection, the authors present the results of the discourse analysis of the three global space infrastructure sectors. For each sector, the authors show in Figures 8.1-8.3 the relative distribution of institutional logics subscribed by different actor types, i.e. the percentage of one logic over all the other logics that the same actor type refers to.
In the navigation satellite sector (Figure 8.1), actors adhered to the logic of “market development” as they referred to the role of governments and private players in growing the markets for navigation services (Bandau, 2021[16]). Meanwhile, actors referred to “market competition” when discussing competition between state and non-state actors to gain higher market shares in potential service segments. In the field of satellite navigation, “national self-interest” appears to be a prominent logic, as they expressed the importance for nations to gain independence and technology supremacy in these critical services for national security, power and welfare purposes. Some actors would mention the importance of bilateral agreements with other states due to geopolitical, geo-economic, or geostrategic reasoning (coded as “geopolitical [bilateral]”). Here, states seek partners with, for instance, other states with complementary technological capabilities or infrastructure components. There are also actors adhering to the logic of multilateral co-operation (coded as “promote multilateralism”) as they emphasise the importance of having multilateral co-operation (including scientific collaborations) among powerful space actors in order to have appropriate institutions to address collective action problems. Actors also adhered to the importance of “co-operation for sustainable development”, in particular when referring to the potential of space infrastructure services in facilitating sustainable development on Earth. The “science (professional)” logic was coded when actors mentioned the importance of scientific competence and reputation as well as new technologies. Finally, “governance and regulation” refers to the need for legal mechanisms and appropriate political institutions as space intertwines with peace, security and social and economic development.
After the compilation according to actor type and geographical region, Figure 8.1 shows that international organisations, in particular the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA), emphasised the importance of promoting multilateralism in view of the rising potential of space infrastructure in promoting sustainable development on an international level. The authors see that state actors highly value national self-interest when associating with the development of satellite navigation infrastructure, particularly in the United States, the People’s Republic of China [hereafter ‘China’], India, the Russian Federation [hereafter ‘Russia’] and to a certain extent Europe. State actors of Russia, China and India tend to strongly mobilise their bilateral relationships with allied nations to reach geopolitical goals. In the context of developing countries, states tend to also form bilateral agreements with states that offer satellite navigation services to ensure the continued diffusion of those services in their nation-states. Adherence to market-oriented values among private actors was particularly high in China, possibly induced by the introduction of the Chinese BeiDou services in this period. Here, discussion in the media hovers around the importance of creating market competition between state and non-state actors, as well as the need for the Chinese government to promote market development especially also within the nation itself.
Figure 8.1. Relative distribution of logics over actors: navigation satellites sector 2016-20
Notes: The number above each bar indicates the absolute number of coded logics. Although the category of state actors from developed East Asian economies has a 100% subscription to the logic of promoting multilateralism, it is insignificant when compared to other bars that have a higher frequency of coded logics.
Source: Author’s compilation based on Bandau (2021[16]), “Emerging Institutions in the Global Space Sector: An Institutional Logics Approach”, Master’s thesis at Utrecht University.
For the earth observation sector (Figure 8.2), the code “government supports market development” refers to actors emphasising the role of government in shaping the market development of the sector through monetary and fiscal policies, subsidies and taxes. “Private players drive market development” was coded when actors referred to the role of business entrepreneurs and small-medium enterprises in growing the space industry via upstream and downstream services. The codes for “national self-interest”, “promote multilateralism”, “bilateralism” (or geopolitical and/or bilateral), “multilateral collaboration for sustainable development” (or co-operation for sustainable development), “science (professional)”, as well as “governance and regulation” share similar interpretations as in the case above (Bandau, 2021[16]). The logic for “societal development” refers to using space technologies for sustainable development that can help address social challenges. Meanwhile, “sustainability (ecology)” refers to using space technologies for sustainable development that address ecological challenges. Finally, the logic of “community” mainly refers to unity as well as community-based values and arrangements in the context of diffusing earth observation services.
Figure 8.2. Relative distribution of logics over actors: earth observation satellites sector 2016-20
Note: The number above each bar indicates the absolute number of coded logics.
Source: Author’s compilation based on Bandau (2021[16]), “Emerging Institutions in the Global Space Sector: An Institutional Logics Approach”, Master’s thesis at Utrecht University.
As shown in Figure 8.2, there was a strong push from international organisations such as the UN COPUOS in the earth observation sector in this period to use observation services for sustainable development purposes through multilateral collaboration. In this context, the pursuit of a multilateral agreement was also emphasised. Similarly, the authors see state actors in developing countries resonated with the idea of diffusing earth observation infrastructure through multilateral collaboration for sustainable development. European state actors own a sharp rise in the number of coded statements in this period, potentially following the roll-out of the Copernicus – the European earth observation programme. Most of the state actors in Europe pointed to the importance of government support for market development but also how earth observation capabilities may bring advantages to European countries such as technological supremacy. State actors in the United States also emphasised the role of both governments and private actors in driving market development. Private actors in the United States, Europe and Australia heavily emphasised the role of private industries in driving market development in the sector, such as in terms of rolling out different application services through observation data. Private actors in the United States and Europe shared similar opinions and emphasised the potential of the private sector, with the latter also pointing to the importance of government support.
For the satellite broadband constellations sector (Figure 8.3), the code “governing orbital sustainability” refers to actor concerns for orbital governance in particular in relation to spectrum frequencies and physical orbital slots (Coyle, 2021[17]). “International co-operation” refers to states balancing different needs and striving for co-operation with other nations. The logic for “diplomatic tool or international relations” was coded when actors referred to the importance of states maintaining or increasing their national power including by having their own satellite broadband constellations as a strategic asset. “National economic gains” refers to the potential of satellite broadband constellations in fuelling the national economy, including by supporting a nation’s rural residents as well as by collaborating with private actors in commercialising services. In addition, the code for “societal development” refers specifically to the potential of satellite broadband in bridging the digital divide and addressing global connectivity. Meanwhile, “profit” was a prominent logic that actors refer to in the satellite broadband constellations sector, including discussions about market segments, industry competition, cost and prices, as well as financial support from the state. Looking at the rapid development, actors also adhere to the logic of “space as a common resource”, arguing for democratising space access and space governance so that all nations including developing countries will have access to space and more actors have a say in how it is governed. Meanwhile, there were also actors adhering to the logic of “science and innovation”, which argued for not just more science and innovation, but the need for less regulation to ensure quicker commercialisation of products and services.
Figure 8.3. Relative distribution of logics over actors: satellite broadband sector 2018- early 2021
Note: The number above each bar indicates the absolute number of coded logics.
Source: Authors’ compilation based on Coyle (2021[17]), “The rise of the global internet satellite mega-constellation sector: Opportunities and challenges for a sustainable transition”, Master’s thesis at University of Utrecht.
As shown in Figure 8.3, international organisations such as the UN COPUOS and the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) emphasised the importance of ensuring orbital sustainability through more effective governance while also mentioning the enormous market and economic values the satellite broadband constellations sector could bring. State actors in general value the potential of the sector in generating economic gains within individual nations, particularly in terms of how connectivity services might stimulate the growth in other sectors. Market values are significantly high among private actors in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe, and North America (Canada), with the latter two also valuing highly the national economic gains this sector could bring.
Three plausible scenarios for global governance by 2030
The discourse analysis above identified the set of contextual factors (or logics of the key actors) in terms of policy, regulatory and business strategies that could shape global space governance by 2030. Informed by the analysis, the derivation of the scenarios is based on two major dimensions identified as most critical in delineating future development trends, i.e. between state-led and private-led (non-state) governance on the horizontal axis, and between highly internationalised or highly nationalised on the vertical axis (see Figure 8.4). Accordingly, the authors derived three scenarios each of which is dominated by a different rationale: Scenario A is dominated by a state rationale; scenario B is dominated by an economic and market rationale; and scenario C is dominated by a global community rationale. Each of these scenarios consists of a mixture of state and non-state actors but may be primarily driven or led by certain actor types operating in a national or an international regime.
In this subsection, the authors will present the narratives constructed for the three identified scenarios, which were further developed and validated during the scenario workshop and through follow-up interviews to incorporate the latest developments.
Figure 8.4. Scoping of scenarios on space governance by 2030
Source: Adapted from Secure World Foundation (2017[13]), “Summary of the 2017 AMOS Dialogue”, https://swfound.org/media/206083/2017-amos-dialogue-report.pdf.
Scenario A: state governments take control and compete to lead space governance
This future in 2030 is strongly dominated by geopolitics (i.e. the state logic), as state governments compete for hegemony and technological supremacy in the orbital environment in the absence of new international agreements. While still operating under the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST), groups of state governments have gained leadership in controlling the environment of low-earth-orbit (LEO).
Within individual countries, national policies and regulations are powerful and effective in this scenario. The United States (Federal Communications Commission - FCC) further imposed its five-year post-mission disposal rule on all operational satellites launched from the United States and received strong compliance from all operators. However, given the intense geopolitical competition in space, there are also states that pursue contradicting national strategies, such as allowing leniency for companies in their respective countries in terms of the disposal rule to accelerate the accumulation of national technological capabilities and induce industry growth (e.g. by having their nationally-owned satellite constellations).
The environment of LEO therefore becomes unsustainable in this scenario as strict policies pursued by the United States are offset by the strategies of other nation-states, allowing longer post-mission disposals (e.g. the typical 25-year rule). Meanwhile, leading spacefaring states also take on the leadership role of further developing active debris removal technologies and continue to fund space debris cleaning missions. These missions, however, remain expensive and debated among countries and stakeholders in terms of financial feasibility and cost distribution.
Geopolitical interests intensify in particular in the medium-earth orbit as the major global navigation satellite systems (GNSS), i.e. GPS (owned by the United States), Galileo (owned by the EU), BeiDou (owned by China), and GLONASS (owned by Russia), compete in technological development to strengthen their state military power while at the same time aiming to diffuse their respective navigation systems widely to economic sectors on Earth. Due to rising geopolitical tension, states in major spacefaring nations also substantially upgrade and effectively manage their tracking, cataloguing and response to space debris in particular through their military facilities, potentially also with support from private actors that have strong capabilities in tracking space objects. However, rival countries tend to operate based on their own set of tracking systems, leading to different versions of the status of the orbital environment.
In line with the duty of due regard under Article IX of the OST, anti-satellite testing (ASAT) is effectively banned by certain leading states such as the United States, EU, Canada and Australia in this scenario. However, certain nation-states continue demonstrating their space capabilities through ASATs. This leads to certain regions in the orbital environment being left with debris clouds. In this scenario, the authors might see more alliances forming among nations with similar values and interests, such as between Russia and China, or between the United States and the EU. This scenario therefore observes increased examples of minilateralism that define technological and system inter-operabilities among like-minded countries, causing global institutional fragmentation.
Scenario B: state governments take control and lead space governance
This scenario in 2030 is dominated by the market logic, mostly driven by actors in the private sector in interaction with state actors. The private actors take the lead in governing LEO in the form of self-co-ordinated activities or setting strong influences on the state actors in terms of the interpretation of treaties and/or the implementation of policies and regulations.
In this future, LEO becomes an area open for market competition with commercial companies competing for low costs and high service performances. Following a first-come-first-served principle in the occupation of orbital slots, satellites of large satellite broadband constellation projects such as Starlink, Eutelsat OneWeb and Project Kuiper proliferate LEO by 2030. These large private actors are however required to undergo more scrutiny and meet more debris mitigation requirements imposed by government agencies such as the FCC in the case of the United States, in accordance with Article VI of the OST which asserts that states are responsible for the actions of their nationals including the commercial industries. Despite so, constellation companies that have become strategic space assets for their respective state such as Starlink tend to have high bargaining power when negotiating with their government agencies by 2030, e.g. the United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and are particularly effective in influencing policies and regulations.
Certain technological implementations become effective, as private actors have developed their own market-based instruments to incentivise sustainability-oriented behaviour in space to ensure the safety of their own operations. This has induced rapid technological innovations and cost efficiency in the realm of active debris removal and other on-orbit servicing that help address the issue of space debris. This scenario also observes alliances among satellite companies that share similar interests and values to co-maintain orbital sustainability by incorporating disposal rules into their satellite missions. As a result, technologies such as passivation and de-orbiting technologies become well-developed among these companies.
However, there are private companies that disregard the importance of orbital sustainability and only aim for short-term profits in this scenario. Certain private actors self-co-ordinate their satellite activities and their interactions with the others in LEO in terms of physical manoeuvres and system compatibilities. In line with Article VI of the OST, state actors in this context generally seek to enact regulations to ensure their national commercial actors are still in compliance with the OST.
Overall, given that the OST is a set of general principles leaving room for the interpretation of the states, large private actors in this scenario have a strong influence on the state actors when negotiating with them and international bodies, such as the ITU on radio spectrum allocation or the International Astronomical Union (IAU) on satellite manoeuvres. This scenario therefore observes effective strategies pursued by different private actors operating in national and/or international regimes.
Scenario C: international fora succeed in global space governance
This 2030 scenario is dominated by a global community rationale that places the interests of all nations at the forefront, such as in the recent case of the High Seas Treaty (UN News, 2023[19]). Scenario C in this present study is most actively led by international fora or international organisations advocating for the benefits of inclusivity and multilateralism, as well as having a powerful say in defining international norms for space activities with support from state and non-state actors operating in the international regime.
The Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines became effective as the IADC member agencies conform to the principle of due regard (pursuant to Article IX of the OST) by preventing explosive and collisional on-orbit break-ups and ensuring post-mission disposals. The Guidelines for the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities of the UN COPUOS are also adopted at the national level across spacefaring countries due to their interest in showing good behaviour in space to foster their international co-operation with others. The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs and the UNIDIR become more inclusive and effective platforms through which national representatives from developing and less developed countries provide their suggestions on peaceful uses of orbital resources and equitable socio-economic development.
Moreover, the UN Space 2030 Agenda – “a forward-looking policy document for reaffirming and strengthening the contribution of space activities and space tools to the achievement of global agendas” and “to reach the Sustainable Development Goals” was successfully implemented (UNOOSA, 2024[20]). In particular, the adoption and implementation of the Space 2030 Agenda involved the international adoption of principles that space is a global commons, explored and used for the purposes of the global community, especially among less developed countries. Here, intergovernmental partnerships such as Group on Earth Observations (GEO) become instrumental in maximising the potential of space infrastructure for sustainability transitions across multiple sectors on Earth, such as transportation and agriculture (Group on Earth Observations, 2024[21]).
Other international organisations also play a decisive role in this future scenario. The ITU works closely with the national delegates from different countries to re-strategise the allocation of radio spectrum in the NGSO to ensure equitable access for countries across all developmental stages. In addition, international initiatives that place the interests of the global community at the forefront become influential in this scenario. The International Dark-Sky Association (IDA) and the IAU become influential platforms for advocating and negotiating for dark and quiet skies. For instance, the IDA becomes powerful when negotiating with satellite constellation companies for satellite manoeuvres to adhere to the IDA principles, including maintaining satellite brightness to “below the threshold for detection by the unaided eye”, in the interests of indigenous communities and the biodiversity that depends on natural light cycles (Scorzafava, 2022[22]). For more details on the scenarios, please refer to Annex 8.A.
Discussion: Potential impact on earth-space sustainability
Participants of the workshop jointly discussed how each of the different scenarios may pose opportunities and challenges to future earth-space sustainability. They discussed whether the physical environment in space would be stable (i.e., the collision risk is controlled, satellites can be operated without significant risks in the orbits); how the different scenarios impact the diffusion of space infrastructure; and whether a scenario is desirable and for whom (which actor types while taking into account less developed countries).
Intensified geopolitics in scenario A will potentially lead to weaponry tests and installations by states that do not adhere to the principle of Article IX of the OST, causing more space debris in the orbital region. This scenario is deemed the least desirable, particularly for commercial actors as their operations in the orbital region will be impacted. There would be fewer private investments in new satellite constellation projects due to higher collision risks as a result of more geopolitically induced activities such as ASATs. In addition, a state-led logic also reduces the likelihood of a commercially efficient diffusion of active debris removal technologies and other on-orbit servicing. Overall, this scenario can be desirable for individual nation-states that prefer higher global institutional fragmentation and therefore prevent the likelihood of, or, delay the progress in creating effective multilateralism. This scenario is deemed highly undesirable for less developed countries as they rely heavily on space infrastructure services provided by the powerful spacefaring countries and more intense geopolitical battles between the space powers may lead to disrupted access to their respective services.
Similarly, scenario B is expected to lead to a less sustainable orbital region, in particular in LEO, as the increase in satellite operators does not guarantee all operators would follow sustainable practices. For instance, participants drew the example that 5,000 satellites of large private players could pose fewer risks than other 2 000 satellites of smaller private players that do not have the technological maturity to implement best practices. In addition, smaller private actors may not be able to invest in additional technological development, e.g. adding propulsion to their small satellites, as they have limited funding enough to only prove their short-term business plan. At the same time, the first-come-first-served principle currently favouring the larger companies in terms of occupying orbital slots is limiting fairness for smaller players or latecomers from developing or less developed countries, as orbital slots already occupied by the larger companies are de-facto not usable by others in the future.
Considering the lack of effective international regulations at the moment, participants in this break-out group still believe that scenario B – a scenario primarily led by private actors – is perhaps capable of inducing sustainability-oriented behaviour among operators in LEO. This is because private actors reach decisions based on cost-benefit analyses – in this case collectively ensuring orbital sustainability is critical for the long-term functioning of their own satellite operations. Therefore, scenario B could lead to two opposing outcomes in terms of the distribution of socio-economic benefits: (i) competition among private actors in more advanced countries prohibits the participation of companies from developing and less developed countries that might enter the market in the future; and (ii) advanced private actors could offer satellite infrastructure services that bring high socio-economic benefits to developing and less developed countries (such as global connectivity as an enabling technology), while effectively managing orbital sustainability among themselves.
The NGSO environment is deemed to be relatively sustainable by 2030 under scenario C, as space traffic management rules and practices are well co-ordinated at the international level. Meanwhile, the ITU continues to review and revise its regulatory framework through the World Radiocommunication Conference. The distribution of space infrastructure services is likely to be more equitable under this scenario; these space infrastructure services facilitate sectoral transitions while some of them become critical space assets that countries and economies will heavily rely on. Despite scenario C being deemed the most desirable for the global community among a majority of the workshop participants and interviewees, it is also discussed as being rather unrealistic or progressing too slowly given the current state of international affairs. The challenge therefore lies in navigating between the two probable futures (scenarios A and B) in order to move towards scenario C.
Policy derivation: the role of SSR
In this section, the authors discuss the opportunities and challenges for SSR under each scenario. Some guiding questions during the workshop and follow-up interviews include what might be a potential incentive package that SSR could offer (e.g. integrating SSR into the licensing process at the national and international level, integrating SSR into the procurement policies for space infrastructure). For instance, national procurement policies of space infrastructure can incorporate earth-space sustainability considerations, and SSR can be used to help assess the performance criteria of those infrastructure service providers.
High geopolitical tension in scenario A is likely to prohibit any international governing body from taking on an active role in advocating for the adoption of an incentive-based option such as the SSR. Given that individual nation-states might be competing or pushing forward their own set of policy and regulatory frameworks, the formulation of SSR in this scenario will have to be adaptable to fit the policy context and settings of different countries. In addition, given that this scenario might see a higher level of global institutional fragmentation, the rating assessments carried out by the SSR have to be made transparent and shared among the global space community so that comparisons can be made across countries in terms of the performance of different operators.
In the event that private actors become more influential by 2030 as described in scenario B, the SSR assessment criteria and procedure will have to be strengthened in order to prevent data manipulation by private actors. It is also anticipated that, under this scenario, the SSR should work together with space agencies in order to incorporate the rating system as a requirement for satellite operators. In both scenarios A and B, ensuring more transparency in SSR assessments would incentivise state and private actors to adopt the best practices in space, therefore presenting an opportunity for SSR to facilitate the space community transition from scenarios A and B towards scenario C. In scenario B, however, it is crucial for the SSR to improve on the value it could provide to the operators that adopt the rating system. A better quantification or measurement of economic value is critical here.
Effective international fora under scenario C will provide a solid ground for the SSR to be implemented, as it is more likely for member states to reach a consensus on sustainability-oriented behaviour in this scenario following the global community rationale. Besides transitioning the space community towards scenario C, the challenge for SSR here is to develop a first set of understandable operational rules and guidelines based on the standards of the SSR, while incorporating the best guidelines available on an international level (e.g. the recent introduction of the five-year disposal rule by the US FCC). These rules and guidelines should then be clearly communicated to international bodies such as UNOOSA to gain institutional endorsement. In addition, the technical standardisation by SSR has to proactively consider that the rules and guidelines are fair to all new spacefaring nations (including less developed countries). Transparency in SSR assessments is therefore also important here to facilitate cross-country comparisons. In this scenario, SSR should also initiate communications with the public (i.e. users and consumers of space services) about the importance of knowing the sustainability performance of infrastructure service providers in space.
The discussion furthermore derived general implications for the SSR, crosscutting the three alternative scenarios. Here, participants of the study (both workshop and interviewees) raised their opinion that SSR as an incentive-based policy option is encouraging given that SSR can serve as a transparent and credible third party. Improving the transparency of SSR assessments may moreover entail combining objective facts from publicly verifiable tracking data. This could facilitate credible and effective comparisons, which might foster competition among states to gain national pride by becoming leading exemplars that keep space sustainable for future generations (such as by deploying advanced technologies). A similar trend is observable among private actors, with Starlink’s automated on-board collision avoidance system being held in high regard among satellite operators.
A few participants, however, raised the concern that companies might be conservative in adopting the SSR as they are unsure whether the rating system would impact their corporate reputation. This could happen if an operator overlooked certain operational aspects despite the heavy financial investment a company has put in place to improve the sustainability aspects of its operations. In this context, participants consistently emphasised the importance of incorporating an insurance model into the SSR package as well as creating more financial incentives such as access to corporate loans or other public funding. Table 8.2 provides a summary of the three scenarios in terms of desirability and the opportunities and challenges for SSR.
Table 8.2. Summary of policy implications from the different scenarios
Note: SSR=space sustainability rating.
Conclusions
Addressing earth-space sustainability is a rapidly growing challenge (Yap and Truffer, 2022[2]). In view of the exponential rise in satellite activities by the end of this decade, the international space community is confronted with a narrowing policy window to find practical solutions for the long-term provision of satellite infrastructure services on Earth, while ensuring safe and environmentally sustainable conditions in Earth’s orbit. In this chapter, the authors presented three plausible future scenarios on how global space governance might evolve by 2030 in order to explore how an incentive-based mechanism like the SSR may serve as a policy option to help address the growing challenge.
Drawing from a discourse analysis of three different critical satellite infrastructure sectors, a scenario workshop and in-depth semi-structured interviews, the authors derived clear narratives for the three alternative futures driven by: strong geopolitics; market values; and the logic of multilateralism in the interests of the global community. Such distinguishable scenarios can serve as a basis for further learning, in particular aiding different actors in anticipating major development trends to navigate their policy, regulatory and business strategies. In addition, the authors derived concrete policy implications concerning the opportunities and challenges for the SSR under the different scenarios, including the provision of financial and economic incentives, support for existing and potential regulations, altering the procurement processes for space infrastructure, and the association with corporate reputation and public perception (Rathnasabapathy and David, 2023[4]).
As mentioned in the introduction, the present chapter delimited the empirical and analytical scope of “sustainability” to focus on socio-economic development, sectoral transitions and the safety of the orbital environment. Follow-up studies should however be more comprehensive when addressing earth-space sustainability to take into account a broader set of environmental and social challenges, especially when considering space as a commons (Yap et al., 2023[3]; Janssen and Yap, 2024[23]).
Annex 8.A. Scenario development
Indications that Scenario A is underway
Signs of individual states taking a proactive role in governing orbital sustainability: The new five-year post-mission disposal rule recently imposed by the US FCC.
Signs of intensified geopolitical competition in space include the set-up of the US Space Force. The US Space Force has announced plans to invest in an ambitious effort to build a new “integrated operations network”, through which the US Space Command could mobilise the data gathered through this network to update space domain awareness to conduct on-orbit operations (Gill, 2023[24]).
Signs of differing values and interests among nations: The US government declared in 2020 that space is not a global commons while the EU Council recently declared in May 2023 to recognise space as a global commons (Council of the European Union, 2023[25]).
Signs of more fragmented governance through alliances: The Artemis Accords led by the US government is an example of minilateralism, although this was intended for activities on foreign celestial bodies. In addition, Russia and China are finding increasing technological interoperability in their satellite navigation systems (GLONASS and BeiDou).
Indications that Scenario B is underway
Signs of large private companies becoming important strategic assets for the states: The use of Starlink services to aid the Ukrainian warfare; competition between satellite projects in monitoring (Humpert, 2022[26]) and connecting the Arctic (Roulette, 2021[27]).
Signs of large private companies gaining high bargaining power when negotiating with the states: The US FCC dismissed claims from several companies against Starlink’s placement of satellites in a lower orbit. The FAA was also sued for allowing SpaceX to launch its Starship Super Heavy in April 2023, without a comprehensive environmental review (Kolodny, 2023[28]).
The ADR industry is progressing and innovating steadily, driven by companies such as ClearSpace and Astroscale. New companies for space logistics services also entered the field. More private services for Space Situational Awareness services also emerged in the last years, e.g. LeoLab, Privateer Space, etc.
Leading consultancy companies such as McKinsey & Company released positive market outlooks on the satellite sector, potentially incentivising more business investments into the satellite sector (Brukardt et al., 2023[29]).
Indications that Scenario C is underway
The ITU revises its policy agenda every four years, for instance through the World Radiocommunication Conferences (WRC). The ITU is actively working towards deriving allocation policies that are fair and equitable for all nations.
Signs that multilateral formal agreements might still be effective: The recent agreement reached by delegates of the Intergovernmental Conference on Marine Biodiversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction – referred to as the High Seas Treaty - builds on the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UN News, 2023[19]).
International initiatives centring the interest of the global community are increasingly active: The IDA lodged an appeal with the US Court of Appeals in response to the FCC authorisation approving SpaceX to deploy 7 500 satellites in LEO (Hartley, 2023[30]).
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