This chapter summarises the results from the OECD project on the economics of space sustainability so far, including the most recent findings from the academic community and the latest policy developments. It provides an overview of the degree and types of collision risk in different orbital regions, of the known value of space infrastructure at risk and of ways to better assess this value. Finally, it then discusses available policy options, their effectiveness and potential socio-economic effects.
The Economics of Space Sustainability
Delivering Economic Evidence to Guide Government Action
2. Informing government action on space debris mitigation
Abstract
Introduction
In the last five years, space sustainability has become a hot topic in the space community and beyond, in conferences and at high-level space policy meetings. In 2023, the G7 leaders’ communiqué from the Hiroshima summit included an entire section dedicated to space sustainability (The White House, 2023[1]). The same year, the European Space Agency introduced its Zero Debris Approach, while the US National Aeronautics Administration (NASA) launched the first part of its integrated Space Sustainability Strategy in 2024 (ESA, 2023[2]; NASA, 2024[3]).
Space sustainability covers many different dimensions, several of which will be explored by the OECD in the coming years, but the focus of this publication is on space debris. This chapter summarises the results from the OECD project on the economics of space sustainability so far, including the most recent findings from the academic community and the latest policy developments as of early 2024.
The following questions are explored in more detail in the different sections:
How does growing traffic in Earth's orbits affect long-term space sustainability?
Which space activities are the most exposed to debris and collision risk?
How to assess the value of space infrastructure and the costs of space debris?
Is compliance with existing debris mitigation measures insufficient to stabilise the orbital environment?
How to formulate effective policy responses to address space debris issues?
How to assess the effects of policy options aimed at improving the orbital environment?
What are the next steps?
How does growing traffic in Earth's orbits affect long-term space sustainability?
Earth’s orbits are busier than ever. Orbital regions, such as the low-earth (LEO), medium- (MEO) and geostationary (GEO) orbits, have specific physical attributes that cater to different types of space applications (Table 2.1). Some orbits are used much more intensively than others because of these differences. For instance, a satellite in geostationary orbit rotates at the same speed as Earth, always hovering above the same spot at its allocated longitude over the equator. One satellite in geostationary orbit can cover about one-third of the earth's surface (Peterson, 2003[4]), which makes this orbit ideally suited for telecommunications and certain meteorological observations.
Table 2.1. Selected Earth’s orbits and their characteristics
Sources: Building on Riebeek (2009[5]), “Catalogue of earth satellite orbits”, https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/features/OrbitsCatalog and UCS (2024[6]), UCS satellite database, update 1 May 2023, https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/satellite-database.
However, reductions in the costs of access to space are profoundly changing the use of the orbital environment. Since the early 2010s, LEO has been the most popular destination for satellites, currently accounting for some 90% of all operational satellites. Within this orbital region, sun-synchronous orbits play an important role, because observations from this orbit are performed with a consistent angle of sunlight on the surface area, making it possible to track changes over time (Riebeek, 2009[5]). This is highly valuable for science, military intelligence and other earth observation applications. According to the Union of Concerned Scientists, more than 1 200 satellites, some 22% of all operational satellites and about 75% of LEO earth observation satellites, are in a sun-synchronous orbit (UCS, 2024[6]). Satellite broadband constellations in LEO now account for most operational satellites, with the biggest constellation consisting of seve ral thousand satellites organised in multiple orbital shells in mostly non-polar orbits at around 550 km altitude (UCS, 2024[6]).
The increased space activity since 2019 creates new challenges when analysing statistics on satellites and space launches. This report uses data from two complementary sources for active satellites: the database of the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) (2024[6]) and Jonathan McDowell’s Space Report (2024[7]), both reliable resources relying on original and non-classified sources. Of the two sources, the UCS database has more data categories allowing for richer analysis, but updates are less frequent. This can be a challenge with the current accelerating launch frequency (more than 1 500 satellites have been launched yearly since 2020). In this chapter, data on active satellites and orbit occupancy refer to either 2023 or 2024, depending on the subject.
Which space activities are the most exposed to debris and collision risk?
Satellites and orbital debris are unequally distributed across Earth’s orbits, leading to high variation in the levels of congestion and risk of collision with debris, as well as in the expected magnitude of the potential economic impact of such events. There are debris in all of Earth’s orbits. But most attention is directed to the LEO region because of the recent increase in space traffic, the higher density of debris objects and the overall higher risk and impact of collisions from a debris-creation perspective (objects have high velocity and many have high mass).
LEO has traditionally been used mainly by government and military actors. But miniaturisation, launcher reusability and the relative proximity of LEO orbits to Earth have lowered the costs of access to space in general and increased the number of commercial actors operating in this orbital region since the early 2010s (OECD, 2019[8])). Early commercial applications included earth observations for geospatial and signal intelligence, but the recent considerable upswing in launch activity is mainly associated with the deployment of several “mega constellations” consisting of hundreds or even thousands of satellites for satellite broadband in LEO (see Box 2.1).
Commercial operators are now dominant in LEO, accounting for more than 85% of satellites in 2023 (UCS, 2024[6]). There is a notable concentration of commercial satellites in the 500-600 km and 1 150-1 250 km altitude ranges (Figure 2.1), which are the respective locations of the Starlink and OneWeb mega constellations for satellite broadband. Other commercial activity, earth observation in particular, is generally concentrated in lower-altitude orbits. The only orbital altitudes with a majority of civilian government and defence operators are those between 600-900 km altitude, mainly for earth observation satellites. This includes about 25% of the satellites recorded by the Committee on Earth Observation Satellites, which collect data on Earth’s weather and climate (CEOS, 2023[10]). These are also the orbits with the highest debris concentrations (ESA, 2023[11]).
Box 2.1. Mega constellations for satellite broadband
As of early 2024, there were more than 6 000 satellites in low-earth orbits from two mega constellation operators – SpaceX (US) and OneWeb (UK) – but this will drastically change in the coming years. Filings for permits for radio spectrum with the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) between 2017 and 2022 suggest future launches of more than 300 constellations and a million satellites, including the Cinnamon constellation of some 330 000 satellites (Falle et al., 2023[9]). This number of planned satellites is exaggerated by duplicative and speculative filing applications and multiple projects are likely to fail due to technological problems and lack of finance. But it also reflects the growing strategic and economic importance of satellite broadband and the ongoing race between companies and countries to exploit orbital space and radio spectrum. Table 2.2 presents a non-exhaustive list of currently operational and planned constellations, several of which are backed by governments.
Table 2.2. Selected projects for mega constellations
Standing as of February 2024
1. Government system, 2. Supported by national governments via loans and/or equity finance.
Notes: n.a.: Not available.
Source: Expanding on McDowell (2024[7]), “Jonathan's Space Report”, https://planet4589.org/space/index.html.
Figure 2.1 shows the distribution of manoeuvrable and non-manoeuvrable satellites and different types of debris. Manoeuvrability requires the existence of some kind of propulsion system and an on-board computer and allows the satellite to carry out collision-avoidance manoeuvres or clear the orbit at the end of the mission.
The Inter-Agency Debris Co-Ordination Committee defines space debris as “all manmade objects including fragments and elements thereof, in Earth orbit or re-entering the atmosphere, that are non-functional” (IADC, 2007[12]). Debris results from routine space operations, accidents, collisions and explosions and have been accumulating since the first orbital launch in 1957. There were more than 640 confirmed so-called “fragmentation events” between the late 1950s and 2022 (ESA, 2023[11]). These events - in addition to the presence of derelict rocket bodies, mission-related debris and spacecraft - have created (as of February 2024) a debris population of more than 18 000 catalogued and tracked objects (NASA, 2024[13]) to which can be added millions more untracked objects of various sizes (ESA, 2023[11]).
Figure 2.1. Satellites are concentrated in a small number of orbits
Distribution of satellites and debris objects across low-earth orbits, data as of 2022
Notes: Payloads refer to space objects (e.g. satellites, space probes) designed to perform a specific function in space, excluding launch functionality. Manoeuvrable payloads typically have an orbit control system (i.e. propulsion system).
Source: ESA (2023[11]), Annual Space Environment Report 2023, https://www.sdo.esoc.esa.int/environment_report/Space_Environment_Report_latest.pdf.
In lower orbits below about 650 km altitude, atmospheric drag and other natural phenomena pull debris objects closer to Earth until they mostly burn up upon entering the atmosphere. This process can take days, months or years, depending on the distance to Earth. But in higher LEO orbits, this “natural decay” time is counted in centuries or even thousands of years if above 1 000 km, hence the concentration of objects at these altitudes.
The risk of collision is determined by multiple factors. For example, the density of objects in orbit by both altitude and latitude carries greater risks closer to the poles because of the high number of satellites in sun-synchronous and polar orbits (see Table 2.1). An object’s ability or inability to carry out avoidance manoeuvres also determines the risk of collision, making it necessary to distinguish between operational (active) satellites, non-manoeuvrable active satellites and debris objects. Finally, objects’ velocity and mass play a role. These latter two factors also affect the number of additional debris objects generated by a collision.
Figure 2.2 shows a 2019 mapping of annual collision risk in LEO, based on modelled accidental close approaches (conjunctions) between active objects; active objects and debris; and between debris objects. Oltrogge and Alfano (2019[14]) estimate the highest accumulated risk at 775 km altitude, with an estimated annual collision rate surpassing 6% and dominated by debris versus debris. The authors note that the analysis covers catalogued objects only (some 4% of the total estimated debris population) and that the actual risk is much higher. Furthermore, this analysis describes the situation at the beginning of the massive deployment of satellite broadband satellites. Between the end of 2019 and 2023, the number of spacecraft tracked by the US Space Force has practically doubled (NASA, 2023[15]).
Figure 2.2. High variation in estimated collision risk in low-earth orbits
Modelled annual collision rates as a function of altitude and types of close approaches, data as of 2019
Note: CHBR (combined hard body radius) values are assumed to be 4 metres for non-geostationary (GEO) satellites-on-satellites, 2.5 metres for non-GEO satellites-on-debris and 1.5 metres for non-GEO debris-on-debris.
Source: Oltrogge and Alfano (2019[14]), “The technical challenges of better space situational awareness and space traffic management”, Journal of Space Safety Engineering, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jsse.2019.05.004.
Zooming in on high-impact collision risk in LEO (from a debris-generating perspective), McKnight (2021[16]) estimates that the peak risk for future debris generation is situated at 840-975 km and notes that collision risk between active objects in the 500-600 km regions is increasing. This assessment expands on an international effort to statistically identify the most concerning debris objects in LEO which could be good candidates for active debris removal (McKnight et al., 2021[17]).
Researchers at the ESA Space Debris Office have developed a risk metric that combines the probability and severity of an event. This space debris index can be used to compare objects or missions and assess the cumulative risk taken by all objects in space at a given time as well as their behaviour in the future (ESA, 2023[11]; Letizia et al., 2019[18]). Areas with a high risk concentration can be observed at around 850 km of mean altitude and 70-80 degrees inclination (corresponding to a polar orbit). Practically all the risk (97%) is associated with defunct objects, with two-thirds (65%) coming from spent rocket bodies.
Based on the above risk assessments and the database of the Union of Concerned Scientists of operational satellites, some 66% of LEO commercial satellites and 27% of government and military LEO satellites are found in the increasingly congested orbits at 500-600 km altitude. The main risk in these orbits is collisions between active satellites. Only 4% of military LEO satellites and 0.2% of commercial LEO satellites are found in the orbits with peak collision risk, in this case constituted by collisions between debris objects. It is worth noting that the effects of a collision in these orbits can spill over into neighbouring and further afield orbits.
From a traffic management perspective, the 500-600 km orbital region poses considerable co-ordination challenges, with its more than 4 000 satellites and 265 public, private and amateur/university operators from 51 countries. Table 2.3 gives an overview of how the LEO orbits with the highest collision risk exposures are used. Commercial telecommunications dominates in the lower orbits with the highest satellite traffic. Government and military earth observations are more present at higher altitudes, which have the highest debris density including high-risk objects such as multiple derelict rocket bodies (McKnight et al., 2021[17]).
Table 2.3. Operational satellites in orbits at high risk of future debris generation
Data as of 1 May 2023
1. Refers to academic and other “amateur” operators (e.g. amateur radio).
Note: All categories include a small number of dual-use missions (e.g. government-military).
Sources: Based on Oltrogge and Alfano (2019[14]), McKnight (2021[16]) and Union of Concerned Scientists (2024[6]), UCS satellite database, update 1 May 2023, https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/satellite-database.
How to assess the value of space infrastructure and the costs of space debris?
How is society affected by existing space debris and the growing risk of collisions that will generate even more of it? This is the key focus of the OECD project on the economics of space sustainability, which aims to improve decision makers’ understanding of the societal value of space infrastructure and the current and future costs imposed by space debris. This evidence is needed to assess the need for debris mitigation and remediation and formulate adequate policy responses.
The negative effects of space debris include costs faced by space operators, such as additional operational costs, loss of spacecraft and foregone opportunities, as well as the costs incurred on society more broadly through a temporary interruption or permanent loss of satellite services due to Kessler’s Syndrome (a self-generating chain reaction of collisions between debris objects, see Kessler and Cour-Palais (1978[19])). The total value of the costs of space debris will change according to the level of orbital deterioration.
These two broad categories of negative effects and the different methods used to value their costs monetarily included in this report are presented in Table 2.4. Overall, current operational costs associated with space debris are considered to be “minimal” in the literature. The major share of costs is linked to replacing spacecraft in case of a collision and loss of service revenues. There are furthermore extensive non-market costs, due to the many government and military space missions located in exposed orbital regions.
Table 2.4. Valuation of the costs of space debris
Lee, Kim and Hong (2022[27]), in a study conducted during the 2021-22 phase of the OECD project on the economics of space sustainability, provide a comprehensive and useful framework for measuring the costs of space debris. They cover for instance the additional development and operational costs faced by operators due to space debris, such as constellation design, shielding and collision-avoidance manoeuvres; and the direct and indirect costs of interrupted services, loss of research data, etc. This framework importantly incorporates the effects of introducing an additional satellite in the orbital environment, thus increasing the overall collision risk with debris and changing the cost/benefit profile of a mission.
A 2023 NASA cost-benefit analysis for active debris removal (Colvin, Karcz and Wusk, 2023[19]) takes a comprehensive look at the costs of space debris imposed on US operators of different types of missions (ranging from commercial cubesats to government science satellites and large commercial constellations). These costs include the increasing necessity to conduct risk assessments at conjunction (accidental close encounter) warnings, costs generated by avoidance manoeuvres (propellant, labour, temporary loss of services), and the replacement costs and lost services (“operations”) in case of a collision. The study finds that the bulk of costs are incurred by collisions (lost vehicle and services), which for most operator categories are caused by small debris objects (1-10 cm). It is worth noting that the study focuses exclusively on the costs potentially incurred by existing space debris, not other active satellites, meaning that the additional traffic management costs in orbits with many active satellites are not included in the calculations.
Following the above, Colvin, Karcz and Wusk (2023[19]) estimate cumulated costs at USD 58 million annually, mainly borne by military and civilian government operators in LEO. The study only counts budgeted operations and programme support costs for these missions, not accounting for other types of “technical, educational, political, and social value” associated with them. This raises a crucial point about the valuation of market and non-market space goods and services (depending on whether or not they are traded in the market), for which market prices do not reflect the full societal value of their use or, as in the case of some public space goods and services, do not exist. These concepts will be further explained in the next paragraphs.
Market goods and services such as satellites, launch services, telecommunications services, etc. are traded in formal markets for prices that are often recorded Assessing the total value of transactions in space market goods and services can be challenging, because of the limited availability of accurate price and quantity statistics, undisclosed transactions and a high level of product customisation in general. Adilov et al. (2023[20]) use available data on insured value to estimate the replacement cost of satellites from collisions with orbital debris. Most of such expected losses were found in LEO, representing some USD 79-102 million annually or 0.16% of the insured value of operational satellites in this orbital region. The study suggests that 70% of losses would occur in orbits at 600-900 km altitude, in line with risk profiles elaborated in the previous section. Rao, Burgess and Kaffine (2020[21]) calculate average annual profits per satellite (USD 2.1 million in 2015), based on estimated revenues from industry-led surveys of establishments in space manufacturing, launch services and multiple “downstream” services, i.e. services that rely on the exploitation of satellite data and signals (see OECD (2022[28]) for space activity definitions and categories).
Non-market goods and services are not traded in markets or do not have an economically significant price – a typical example is public goods provided by the government. In the space economy, such goods are very common. Indeed they are often the key objective of space activities and include for instance military systems; science and exploration missions; meteorology and climate observations; and civilian-military navigation systems, also covering the civilian government and military missions identified by Colvin, Karcz and Wusk above. These activities contribute among other things to improved security, improved public health, and a better managed environment. Focusing on earth observation, Table 2.5 lists some of the most mature applications, most of which come from satellites in sun-synchronous LEO orbits and some that represent the only data source available (OECD, 2023[29]).
Table 2.5. Selected mature earth observation applications and their benefits
Source: OECD (2023[35]), The Space Economy in Figures: Responding to Global Challenges, https://doi.org/10.1787/fa5494aa-en.
By not accounting for the monetary value of non-market goods and services, one underestimates the full societal value of space-based infrastructure. While not yet very common in the space sector, several initiatives, such as the GEOValue community, the NASA-funded VALUABLES Consortium and the Sentinel Benefits studies funded by the European Space Agency and the European Union, are providing more evidence in this area (GeoValue, 2024[36]; Valuables Consortium, 2024[37]; EARSC, 2023[26]). An international community of practitioners is forming, with the support of the Group on Earth Observations and the OECD Space Forum, which hosted a GEOValue workshop in 2016 together with NASA and the US Geological Survey.
Common methodologies include revealed preference techniques that take advantage of the fact that such goods and services sometimes affect consumer preferences for market products and are therefore implicitly traded in markets; techniques for estimating avoided and replacement costs that indirectly rely on market valuation; stated preference techniques such as willingness-to-pay surveys; estimates of the value of statistical lives saved and/or improved; and growth accounting methods that attempt to estimate the contribution of inputs of space goods and services to the final output of a marketed product.
The value of public earth observation satellites at risk from space debris is studied within the Korean context, in Chapter 3 authored by Lee et al. Using contingent valuation to assess the potential lost value of Korean earth observation satellites in LEO due to space debris incidents, the study identifies an aggregated value loss of EUR 369.6 million (USD 388.7 million) over ten years, indicating not only the importance of the societal services provided by these satellites but also broad popular support for space debris mitigation.
Eumetsat (2014[22]) estimates a minimum of EUR 1.3 billion yearly in avoided costs to property and infrastructure due to improved warning lead times to better prepare for floods, storms and other severe weather phenomena. In North America, a 2018 Resources for the Future study suggests that the information provided by satellite-derived air pollution monitoring systems in the United States could save roughly 2 700 lives annually over and above an alternative scenario where monitoring does not occur. This represents some USD 24.5 billion in avoided social costs, based on a standard value of statistical life (Sullivan and Krupnick, 2018[23]).
It is important to have a thorough understanding of the effects of space services on enabling economic production more broadly. Nozawa et al. (2023[24]) use an economic growth model, augmented with a satellite sector and collision possibility, to model the long-term effects of space debris on global gross domestic product (GDP). The study estimates a 1.95% difference in GDP levels in 2020 between the “business-as-usual” baseline scenario and the most optimistic scenario with a 90% debris removal rate. In Chapter 4, Nakama et al. formulate an aggregate production function to demonstrate the direct and indirect effects of satellite telecommunications and GNSS on society. They explore the link between the penetration and utilisation of space-enabled information and communication services and economic growth in sparsely populated Japanese prefectures with less than 1 million inhabitants.
The total global value of economic activity at risk is estimated to be USD 191 billion with the bulk of the value at risk concentrated in orbits at 500-600 km altitude, by Vittori et al. (2022[25]). They identify economic activities that are fully or partially supported and/or enabled by space-based infrastructure, in a contribution to Phase 1 of the OECD project on the economics of space sustainability. In the second step, they estimate the economic activity at risk from an irreversible deterioration of orbits by combining data on gross value added with estimated dependencies on satellite data and signals and the probability of orbital deterioration.
More qualitative approaches also support this analysis. In Chapter 5, Catalano and Morretta survey Italian (mainly public) end users of earth observation services to better understand these services’ penetration in the economy, how they are used and how they contribute to economic performance. A similar survey of Italian firms from Phase 1 of the OECD project found that earth observation services contributed to firms’ process and output innovation (e.g. new and improved quality of products and services) and translated into higher turnover and employment (Lupi and Morretta, 2022[38]). This research is supported by numerous case studies on satellite data value chains, such as those conducted within the framework of the Sentinel Benefit Study (EARSC, 2023[26]).
Finally, although it is important not to underestimate the value of space-based infrastructure and services, neither should it be overestimated. In Chapter 6, Paravano et al. study commercial end users in potentially high-value markets such as insurance and finance and energy and utility. They find that these users recognise the potential of satellite data, but face difficulties in realising the expected value over the long term. This could be due to a lack of access to the competencies required to operate specialised technology, interpret satellite data and integrate them into products.
Is compliance with existing debris mitigation measures insufficient to stabilise the orbital environment?
From an economic perspective, Earth’s orbital environment is a “common pool resource” (Ostrom, 2009[39]), characterised by a low level of excludability and high subtractability. The use of Earth’s orbits by one actor does not prevent others from accessing the same orbits, but the creation of debris could negatively affect future access to space. This is the economic rationale for government intervention in this policy domain.
The first such measures, consisting of voluntary guidelines for debris limitation and mitigation, were introduced at the national level in the 1980s and 1990s. International space debris mitigation measures were first formulated in 2001 and later updated in 2007, with the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the Inter-Agency Debris Coordination Committee (IADC, 2007[12]). These have later been complemented by the Guidelines for the Long-Term Sustainability of Space Activities (UN COPUOS, 2018[40]), and other efforts, e.g. the ISO standard 24113:2023 and International Telecommunications Union recommendation ITU-R S.1003.2 for the geostationary orbit (ITU, 1993[41]).
Countries adapt debris mitigation guidelines to their own national frameworks in different ways (the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs provides a non-exhaustive compendium of national provisions) (UNOOSA, 2021[42]). Measures are often voluntary, but in some countries, debris mitigation measures are built into satellite licensing processes (e.g. Canada, France, Korea, United Kingdom, United States). Furthermore, national provisions may be performance-based (e.g. New Zealand) or technology-based (France).
Debris mitigation measures address the most common and harmful sources of debris creation. They focus on several issues: limiting debris during routine operations; minimising the potential for in-orbit break-ups; and conjunction analysis and warning to operators to avoid collisions. They also recommend clearing orbits after the operational end-of-mission within a specific time frame, namely 25 years at the international level (IADC, 2007[12]). However, several organisations are considering shortening it to five years, as is the case for example with the European Space Agency in its Zero Debris Approach (2023[2]).
Studying operator compliance with debris mitigation guidelines since 2000 suggests a positive trend in post-mission disposal both for satellites and rocket bodies. Figure 2.3 breaks down compliance with post-mission disposal guidelines by type of operator: amateur (universities), public (civilian and defence) and commercial actors. Commercial operators have performed significantly better since 2010, mostly because of a surge in commercial activities in orbital regions where satellites decay naturally within the recommended time limit (ESA, 2023[11]). The European Space Agency (ESA) estimates that in 2022, some 55% of satellites and 85% of rocket bodies cleared their orbit 25 years or earlier after their end-of-mission. This is a clear improvement compared with previous years – in 2012, the equivalent figures were 15% for satellites and 10% for rocket bodies – but is still not good enough. Operator compliance would need to approach 100% in order to slow down the ongoing chain reaction of collisions (ESA, 2023[11]).
Figure 2.3. Orbit clearance trends by type of operator and over time
1. Refers to academic and other “amateur” operators (e.g. of amateur radio satellites).2. “Civil” refers to non-military government operators.
Source: ESA (2023[11]), Annual Space Environment Report 2023,
https://www.sdo.esoc.esa.int/environment_report/Space_Environment_Report_latest.pdf.
What explains operators’ non-compliance? Debris mitigation provisions are generally voluntary, providing few incentives for compliant behaviour. At 650 km altitudes and above, orbit clearance requires dedicated equipment and fuel to actively deorbit the satellite within the stipulated time limit and therefore represents a significant cost to operators. Furthermore, post-mission disposal can also be technologically challenging, with several attempts resulting in failure every year (ESA, 2023[11]). In view of the necessity to clear close to 100% of satellites and rocket bodies from orbits, there is much room for improvement and additional policy efforts. This is the focus of the next section.
How to formulate effective policy responses to address space debris issues?
Governments will need to take a multi-pronged approach to tackle space debris and address changes in the risk landscape. Steps should include reinforcing technological capabilities, reviewing and updating existing policies and, potentially, formulating new policy responses. In parallel, several industry-led initiatives are underway. Table 2.6 presents some of the most common types of policy options for environmental management, including voluntary approaches, command-and-control regulations (e.g. mandatory technological standards) and incentive-based mechanisms (e.g. taxes and subsidies).
Table 2.6. Selected types of environmental policy instruments
Sources: Based on OECD (2024[43]), “Policy Instruments for the Environment Database”, https://www.oecd.org/environment/indicators-modelling-outlooks/policy-instruments-for-environment-database/ and Jack, Kousky and Sims (2008[44]), “Designing payments for ecosystem services: Lessons from previous experience with incentive-based mechanisms”, https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0705503104.
Supporting technological solutions for tracking, mitigation and remediation
First and foremost, technological capabilities need to be strengthened to better assess and manage risks. Potential measures range from improving public and commercial capabilities to detect and track very small orbital objects, to developing more reliable and affordable deorbiting systems for satellites, and maturing capabilities to actively remove specific debris objects (e.g. the high-mass/high-risk objects discussed in previous sections). Improved technological solutions for space situational awareness (SSA) and traffic management are also required, including for example the development of systems to consolidate and share information from multiple sources. Several new initiatives have been launched or are underway. The importance of technological solutions is highlighted for instance in the US National Orbital Debris Implementation Plan (NSTC, 2022[45]).
The orbital environment is monitored by public and private terrestrial and space-based radars and telescopes. In the OECD area, the US Space Force has the strongest public capabilities with more than 170 data-sharing agreements with other countries and private and academic actors in 2023 (US Space Command, 2023[46]). Still, the catalogue covers only a fraction of potentially harmful objects and the extent of information shared remains restricted. This is creating demand for more civil-military joint structures and commercial SSA data and services.
Technical solutions are required for combining different types of data and information and making them available to operators. In the United States, the Office of Space Commerce is developing a Traffic Coordination System for Space (TraCSS) that will provide basic SSA and space traffic co-ordination services to commercial civilian space operators. Contracts have been awarded to commercial firms for providing and testing data products (Office of Space Commerce, 2024[47]). In Europe, the European Union Space Surveillance and Tracking (EU SST) Partnership entered into force in 2022 and consolidates the capabilities of 15 EU member states. It is operated by the European Union Agency for the Space Programme. The United Kingdom will establish a civil-military National Space Operations Centre in 2024 and has announced contracts with several commercial SSA service providers.
From a space traffic management perspective, research is carried out to develop assignment systems in LEO. These are similar to existing slots in the geostationary orbit that are governed internationally by the International Telecommunications Union. Slotting in LEO is complex, as it must allow for “multiple altitudes, eccentricities and overlapping orbits” (Arnas et al., 2021[48]). Arnas et al. (2021[48]) propose a slotting system that preserves a minimum separation distance between satellites.
More progress is also needed on designing more sustainable spacecraft, missions and developing safe and affordable satellite debris removal services. A 2024 NASA study reviewing the costs and benefits of capabilities for mitigating, tracking and remediating orbital debris found that several remediation capabilities (e.g. using lasers to “nudge” large debris off course) compare favourably to capabilities for mitigation and tracking (Locke et al., 2024[49]). Furthermore, the use of lightweight drag devices for deorbit manoeuvres could be particularly cost-efficient (with benefits up to 1 000 times greater than costs), but it was also associated with an increased probability of collision (Locke et al., 2024[49]).
In Europe, ESA has been championing debris-mitigative technologies since 2009. Efforts are directed at research and development (R&D) for environmentally-friendly satellite design, end-of-life technologies, active debris removal and in-orbit servicing. The agency is funding a Swiss-led consortium to actively remove a 112 kg defunct upper-stage rocket currently located in the 664-801 km altitude range, with a planned mission in 2026 (ESA, 2024[50]). Japan’s Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) is also supporting commercial active debris solutions. In early 2024 it launched the ADRAS-J satellite to survey a three-tonne Japanese rocket stage through rendezvous and proximity operations. The ultimate aim of the project is to capture and deorbit a large object in the 2025-26 timeframe. Finally, the UK Space Agency has procured active debris removal services for two UK satellites, with the mission planned for 2026 (Astroscale, 2023[51]). Governments are also supporting in-orbit servicing solutions for mission extensions (e.g. the United Kingdom and France and previously the United States). Work is ongoing to normalise in-orbit servicing through industry guidelines (in the consortium for Execution of Rendezvous and Servicing Operations (CONFERS)) and through standards, such as the ISO 24330:2022.
These activities are examples of catalytic procurement, where government actors “kickstart” markets for active debris removal. As discussed in Toussaint and Dumez (2022[52]), these markets suffer from a chicken-and-egg problem and need some kind of public intervention to get started including R&D support, service buys and potentially also government missions to develop and demonstrate technologies. Overall, there is an increased focus on the demand for “green” space technologies, although a consensus on this term’s precise meaning does not yet exist (see Box 2.2).
Box 2.2. Understanding “green” space applications and technologies
There is growing use of the term “green” space technologies, but there is no unified understanding of its meaning.
First, it refers to space-based contributions to “green” research, i.e. research that contributes to the green transition such as sustainable energy technologies and food production, circular economy, etc. The Danish Agency for Higher Education and Science defines space-based green research as “a subset of green research conducted in space or based on data and observations from space - either entirely or partly […]” (Danish Agency for Higher Education and Science, 2022[53]). The same type of observations can be used to support metrics for the emerging fields of “green” finance and investment (see for instance OECD, (2023[35]).
Another meaning of “green” space technologies focuses on the space industry’s environmental footprint vis-à-vis terrestrial pollution. For instance, hydrazine is appreciated as a relatively simple and reliable monopropellant for space rockets. It is also highly toxic and is categorised by the European Chemical Agency as a “substance of very high concern”, requiring high precaution during storage and use. The industry is searching for less toxic alternatives. Other aspects of this strand of work look at resource depletion, land and water use, carbon emissions and effects on the ozone layer (ESA, 2024[54]).
Finally, the state of the orbital environment adds another dimension to “green” space technologies. This element includes the design of satellites and missions that minimise the chances of accidental explosions and the release of debris. It also includes features that facilitate active removal, such as identifying markers or grappling hooks; in-orbit servicing solutions that extend a satellite’s mission life such as refuelling or simple repairs; and, finally, active debris removal services.
Participants in the OECD project on the economics of space sustainability have tried to clarify the concepts of green space technologies and use bibliometrics to provide insights and policy guidance (Dos Santos Paulino and Pulsiri, 2022[55]). The resulting analysis divides green space technology into two domains, space and earth, with the space domain further separated into four types: green energy and propulsion, green material (e.g. nanotube or green-coating materials); green method (e.g. life-cycle assessments); and green service (e.g. in-orbit servicing).
Reinforcing existing policies
Faced with the combined challenges of orbital congestion from active spacecraft and growth in the debris population, debris mitigation policies are evolving. In the United States, the Federal Communications Commission updated its satellite debris mitigation rules in 2020, its first update since 2004. It introduces new disclosure requirements for satellite applicants, for instance to assign numerical values to collision risk and to provide detailed information on the spacecraft’s manoeuvrability and trackability. Moreover, in 2022 the Commission voted to reduce the post-mission disposal period for new satellite applications from 25 to 5 years (FCC, 2020[56]; 2022[57]).
In Europe, the European Space Agency has launched a Zero Debris policy aiming for a considerable reduction of debris generation by 2030. The new policy includes updated space debris mitigation requirements for the agency’s programmes and projects (ESA, 2023[58]). These provisions also reduce the time limit for post-mission disposal from 25 to 5 years. Furthermore, spacecraft without recurrent manoeuvre capability are proscribed from higher-risk orbital regions (where natural decay durations are much longer). The European Space Agency also tries to “retrofit” older missions to adhere to updated environmental standards. For example, the assisted re-entry of the earth observation satellite Aeolus over the ocean in 2023 was a technological feat because the spacecraft (originally designed in the 1990s and finally launched in 2018) was not designed for such manoeuvres (ESA, 2023[59]). The objective was to reduce the risk of harmful terrestrial debris in case some pieces of the spacecraft did not burn up when re-entering the atmosphere.
Governments are also strengthening oversight and enforcement. In 2019 the New Zealand Space Agency entered a multi-year agreement with commercial space situational awareness service provider LeoLabs for a Space Regulatory and Sustainability Platform, to track New-Zealand licensed satellites. The UK Space Agency and other agencies also purchase commercial services to track satellites under their jurisdiction. In 2023, the US Federal Communications Commission issued its first-ever fine, amounting to USD 150 000, for non-compliance with post-mission disposal rules, when satellite TV provider Dish Network failed to move a geostationary satellite to an assigned “graveyard” orbit due to insufficient fuel (FCC, 2023[60]). The European Commission is drafting a first-ever European space law, where space sustainability is one of the important elements.
Finally, government policy is complemented by several emerging industry-led measures, mainly covering voluntary guidelines and standards as well as information- and data-sharing networks. Organisations such as the Space Data Association, created in 2009, facilitate the sharing of operational data and best practices among satellite operators and work to improve the accuracy and timeliness of collision warning notifications. Other initiatives include the Space Safety Coalition, established in 2019, and the Net Zero Space Initiative, launched in 2021.
Several environmental labels are also emerging. The most mature label is the Space Sustainability Rating (SSR), designed and supported by multiple actors including the World Economic Forum, the European Space Agency and the Space Enabled research group at Massachusetts Institute of Technology and hosted by the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Lausanne (EPFL). It provides a composite indicator that aggregates and weights different aspects of mission design and operation and translates ratings into four labels (bronze, silver, gold and platinum) (SSR, 2024[61]). In Chapter 8, Yap and David explore the demand for such labels under different future scenarios. In the United Kingdom, the UK Space Agency supports work to create an earth and space sustainability Kitemark for insurance underwriting and environmental social and governance investment (UKSA, 2023[62]). The Kitemark is a quality and reliability label of the British Standards Institution.
Exploring incentive-based policies
The existing and projected growth in space traffic, the insufficient level of compliance with existing policy frameworks and the current high cost of debris removal and remediation options constitute a considerable challenge for policy makers. Possible solutions that have been proposed include incentive-based policies such as in-orbit third-party liability insurance, marketable permits, regulatory fees, and performance bonds.
For example, the US Federal Communications Commission has expressed an interest in exploring the use of performance bonds to incentivise operators to clear satellites from orbit (FCC, 2020[56]). Such initiatives address two different but interrelated issues: pollution (accidental and intentional space debris creation including non-compliance with post-mission disposal rules) and congestion (orbit occupancy).
Various measures have been proposed to address pollution. First, in-orbit third-party liability insurance holds operators responsible for the pollution that they cause while in orbit and is compulsory in some countries such as France, Japan and the United Kingdom. The objective is to incentivise operators to avoid harmful practices in the first place and to ensure that polluters, not taxpayers, cover clean-up costs. The United Kingdom introduced a sliding-scale policy in 2018 aimed at addressing the various levels of severity of space risks by offering the possibility to reduce or even waive insurance requirements for low-orbit/low-risk missions (UK Space Agency, 2018[63]). This is an interesting approach to lowering the barriers to access for more sustainable activities. Critics of in-orbit liability insurance schemes argue that the actual risk of collision is not reflected in insurance pricing and that the insurance market is not set up to tackle an actual claim (Samson, Wolny and Christensen, 2018[64]). Furthermore, there are the problems of insufficient SSA to enable enforcement and the difficulties in attributing actions and debris to specific operators, as well as in determining what constitutes actionable standards of behaviour. Responses to some of these challenges are starting to emerge, as described in the previous sections on industry voluntary standards such as the Space Sustainability Index or the proposed Kitemark for space sustainability.
Then there are deposit-refund schemes as proposed for instance by Macauley (2015[65]) which are commonly used in other domains to facilitate waste collection and reduce littering. Operators first pay a tax that is subsequently refunded upon evidence of compliance with a specific action (a space-related example would be the satellite clearing orbit). The performance bonds that interest the US Federal Communications Commission work in a similar fashion in terms of their incentive effect, but they also create tradeable, interest-bearing assets (Adilov, Alexander and Cunningham, 2023[66]). However, great attention would have to be paid to the design and pricing of the measure – experiences from the mining industry in Australia, Canada and the United States show that the level of securities obtained often only partially covers the estimated environmental liabilities – and enforcement can also be a problem (Undseth, Jolly and Olivari, 2020[67]).
Several options are also proposed in the literature for regulating congestion in orbit, notably launch and satellite taxes and cap-and-trade systems. Examples of such proposals include Adilov, Alexander and Cunningham (2015[68]), Rao, Burgess and Kaffine (2020[69]) and Rouillon (2020[70]). (See also Ateca-Amestoy et al. (2022[71]), which was a contribution to the OECD project on space sustainability in 2021-22). All authors work on the assumption that insufficient government regulation will lead to unsustainable growth in the number of satellites, increasing the collision risk between two active satellites and between active satellites and debris. thereby generating an escalation in economic costs. According to Rao, Burgess and Kaffine (2020[69]), the introduction of orbital-use fees would ensure more efficient use of Earth’s orbits and quadruple the long-run value of the space industry by 2040.
Appropriate design will be important for the incentive-based policy options, in terms of the intended objectives (e.g. post-mission disposal or reduced congestion), timing and pricing of the measure. In Chapter 7, Scuderi discusses the design issues of fiscal instruments in greater detail.
How to assess the effects of policy options aimed at improving the orbital environment?
The assessment of policy options needs to be based on their expected effects on the orbital environment and the economy, as well as on their feasibility from a legal and political perspective. So what steps are required for their successful implementation and over which time horizon?
Econometric analysis of policy options for debris mitigation and orbital use is increasingly sophisticated, involving physical-economic models that account for the orbital environment on the one hand and economic behaviour on the other (as applied in for example Rouillon (2020[70]), Rao, Burgess and Kaffine (2020[69]), Rao and Letizia (2021[72]) and Guyot, Rao and Rouillon (2022[73])).
More recently, at the 2023 OECD Space Forum workshop on space sustainability, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology released the beta version of an open-source tool to model the long-term future space environment (MIT Orbital Capacity Assessment Tool - MOCAT) and assess the effects of debris mitigation policy options. The tool provides access to modelling capacities previously reserved for government agencies (Liberty, 2024[74]), as mentioned in Box 1.2. This type of analysis makes it possible to model the relative medium- and long-term effects of policy measures on the orbital environment, albeit under simplified and simulated conditions.
The econometric studies suggest that existing standard-based guidelines on post-mission disposal and satellite/mission design would in some cases be less effective than incentive-based options. Sometimes they may even be counterproductive for stabilising the orbital environment. The following reasons are given:
Full compliance with existing guidelines may have unintended consequences, such as a higher concentration of objects in lower-altitude orbits with natural debris decay (Rao and Letizia, 2021[72]).
Furthermore, active debris removal may encourage higher launch activity and therefore more congestion (similar to a rebound effect) (Rao, Burgess and Kaffine, 2020[69]; Rouillon, 2020[70]).
An imposition of technological standards could lead to economic efficiency losses, for example reducing incentives to innovative (Adilov, Alexander and Cunningham, 2015[68]).
Explicit taxes that directly target a desired outcome may encourage innovative substitution strategies and also raise revenue (Rao et al., 2023[75]).
This aligns with other environmental research that suggests that incentive-based approaches have proven effective in the regulation of common pool resources such as fish stocks or ground water and in pollution abatement. For example, OECD research on the effects of the European Union cap-and-trade programme to reduce carbon emissions shows that the programme reduced emissions by 10% on average in the 2005-10 period, with no significant impact on the jobs and profits of regulated firms, while simultaneously stimulating “green” innovation to reduce costs (Dechezleprêtre, Nachtigall and Venmans, 2018[76]; Calel and Dechezleprêtre, 2016[77]).
There are, however, several concerns associated with increased stringency of environmental regulation in the space sector, whether such measures are command-and-control or incentive-based.
The first concern is linked to the competitiveness of the space sector and the risk of leakage (towards “pollution havens”) if policies are not universally applied. The risk of such leakage is affected by the ability of space activity to relocate and the degree of change in the relative costs for operators. Concerning relocation, the number of space launch providers offering launch services to non-domestic clients is growing. There are six economies with demonstrated commercial services to non-domestic clients: the People’s Republic of China, India, Europe (in French Guiana), New Zealand, the Russian Federation (through its spaceport in Kazakhstan) and the United States. There are also recently established spaceports in Norway and the United Kingdom and several others currently under development (OECD, 2023[35]), However, the choice of a launch location and licensing organisation is limited by other factors, such as the distance to orbit, launch slot availability and timeliness as well as rockets’ flight histories. The limiting factors only apply to purely commercial and civilian missions that are unaffected by trade regulations. Concerning the change in relative costs for operators, these still need to be determined and would largely depend on the type of mission and the nature of the environmental regulation.
The second concern relates to the technological, legal and geopolitical feasibility of introducing binding regulations. As above, this varies according to the type of measure, with the enforcement of in-orbit third-party liability rules reliant on precise monitoring capabilities and insurance pricing policies that reflect the collision risk. Neither of these currently exist. Other policy options may be easier to implement at the national level, as illustrated by existing mandatory debris mitigation provisions in several OECD member countries. In the absence of full international consensus, the effects of unilateral action or policy convergence among like-minded countries have been explored in the literature (e.g. in Percy and Landrum (2014[78]) and Jain and Rao (2022[79])). A research project at the University College London, which has participated in the OECD project on the economics of space sustainability (see Box 2.3), is looking at the possibility of introducing space sustainability as a Sustainable Development Goal. This would raise further awareness about the importance of space sustainability at decision maker level and may result in the development of comprehensive metrics to assess country performance and monitor change over time.
Box 2.3. Building metrics for an 18th Sustainable Development Goal for space sustainability
A multi-disciplinary team of students and researchers at University College London in the United Kingdom has explored the use of the framework of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) to catalyse international discourse, action, and commitment towards maintaining the long-term viability of the near-earth environment.
The essence of effective SDGs lies in their measurability. Hence, the incorporation of straightforward and user-friendly metrics is of utmost importance (Table 2.7). These metrics should enable a comprehensive evaluation of various sustainability facets, ensuring the reliability and accessibility of the requisite data. Furthermore, they should be capable of conveying the issue at hand succinctly to a diverse audience.
Table 2.7. Suggested metrics for an 18th Sustainable Development Goal for space sustainability
Source: Ziebart et al. (2023[80]), “The 18th Set of UN Sustainable Development Goals for Space Sustainability: An initial consideration”.
The proposed metrics collectively constitute a global space situational awareness dashboard, serving as a real-time snapshot of the status of the space domain. There are four main categories. Firstly, the category of “operational resident space objects and launches” provides a measure of active engagement in space and allows for an evaluation of the potential impact on the orbital environment. Secondly, “space debris” serves as a crucial indicator of space sustainability, directly impacting the safety and viability of current and future space operations. Thirdly, “participation of countries in space activities” is a valuable proxy for the global democratisation of space access, a critical aspect in achieving the inclusive nature of SDGs. Finally, “internet connectivity” has been included given its growing reliance on space-based infrastructure and its paramount importance for economic activity, societal development, and access to crucial services such as food security information.
Source: Ziebart et al. (2023[80]), “The 18th Set of UN Sustainable Development Goals for Space Sustainability: An initial consideration”.
The broader effects on the composition and growth of the space innovation ecosystem should also be considered. Do some measures (e.g. launch taxes or caps on the number of satellites in orbit) give undue advantages to incumbents? Are some measures more conducive to promoting innovation? In any case, more stringent environmental regulation in the space sector must not be introduced in isolation but be part of a holistic and mutually reinforcing space policy framework without competing policy goals.
The best policies will most likely include elements of several instrument types, with certain combinations more compatible than others (Gunningham and Sinclair, 2017[81]). Judging by experience in other domains, Gunningham and Sinclair (2017[81]) suggest that voluntarism combines well with command-and-control minimum performance benchmarks, but less well with prescriptive technological standards which give no or little room for manoeuvre. Meanwhile, superimposing command-and-control regulation on incentive-based options that target the same behaviour would limit the opportunity to exploit differences in the marginal cost of abatement between firms.
Similarly, to increase effectiveness, the design and implementation of policy measures would need to be tailored to specific sectoral, national, and international contexts, including different legal frameworks and administrative roles and capabilities.
Next steps
This chapter has summarised key findings on the economics of space sustainability so far, with a focus on space debris issues. The following chapters add to an increasingly well-equipped toolbox for addressing space debris at the government level by providing new evidence on the valuation of space-based infrastructure and policy option assessments.
Future avenues of OECD-led research could involve delving deeper into the effects of different policy options (command-and-control, incentive-based and voluntary) and exploring how specific objectives affect policy design. Other items would include the interaction and effects of policy mixes for space sustainability and how international and domestic administrative and legal arrangements may affect outcomes.
The long-term uses of our space environment are at risk and the OECD work on the economics of space sustainability will continue to support the creation of more evidence to underpin needed corporate and policy decisions at all levels.
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