This chapter focuses on the role the centre of government (CoG) plays in public communication. The CoG can drive good public communication practices across the whole of the public administration. This chapter presents practical examples of the CoG driving good two-way communication between government and stakeholders, first, by leading by example from the centre and, second, by acting as an enabling force to elevate communication capacities across the entire public administration. It further details practical examples of the CoG enabling communication to reach diverse stakeholders through contemporary approaches such as behavioural insights. This chapter further details tackling mis- and disinformation and crisis response through steering and co-ordinating whole-of-government communication from the CoG. Finally, it turns its attention to good internal communication practices throughout institutional arrangements.
Steering from the Centre of Government in Times of Complexity
8. Communication from the centre
Abstract
Key messages
Centres of government (CoGs) play a key role in public communication. This includes undertaking communication activities to support more responsive and effective policymaking (including crisis communications), combatting mis- and disinformation, co‑ordinating cross-government messages and guiding good communication practices across the government.
Providing accurate and trustworthy information is seen as a critical factor in fostering trust in government institutions. Yet this is becoming harder for CoGs due to fast-evolving crises, a complex information ecosystem and challenges in reaching their diverse audiences. Leveraging public communication effectively requires dedicated reform and capability-building efforts to seize the latest innovations to cope with a very dynamic field and disseminate their use across government, which CoGs are well positioned to steer.
Tackling mis- and disinformation is considered a top priority for CoGs. However, most CoGs do not yet seem to have a whole-of-government strategy in place on how to tackle it systemically. Many have established specialised units to tackle the immediate impacts of mis- and disinformation whilst trying to build longer-term resilience.
CoGs play a larger role in communication during times of crisis. Ensuring that the government speaks with one voice can help reinforce key messages and prevent the spread of inconsistent information, which might hinder the general support for the collective action required.
Considerations for CoGs include clearly establishing their steering role with regard to line ministries in public communication. This is relevant for broader communication, sector-specific communication and communication in crises. Additionally, CoGs could consider building the capacity of the administration to use new technologies and approaches.
1. Introduction
Democracies around the world are finding themselves at a critical juncture with ongoing pressure from crises, global challenges and increasing expectations from citizens. Governments’ ability to rise to the test is being undermined by weak public trust in key democratic institutions, growing political polarisation and disengagement with traditional democratic processes. The OECD Building Trust and Reinforcing Democracy Initiative emphasises the importance of the information ecosystem in governments, where public discourse, the media and political rhetoric are becoming fragmented.
Public communication refers to the government’s function to deliver information, listen and respond to citizens in the service of the common good. This includes fostering an informed public, using communications to better policy design and building trust in public institutions more broadly. Public communication is a core government function but one that is still often not leveraged to its full potential, as noted in the OECD Report on Public Communication: The Global Context and the Way Forward (OECD, 2021[1]). However, the transformation of the information ecosystem and the demands from citizens for transparency, greater dialogue and more responsiveness are prompting significant rethinking and reform of this function (see, for instance, OECD (2023[2])). The CoG has a central role in steering this change and leading to a more purposeful and strategic use of public communication.
This chapter will discuss the CoGs role in public communication through the following structure:
Key responsibilities at the centre for public communication.
Stewarding effective two-way communication.
Tackling mis- and disinformation and crisis response.
Guiding good internal communication.
2. Key responsibilities at the centre for public communication
Effective and strategic communication requires a whole-of-government approach and the CoG is well positioned to guide good communication practices across the public administration. For example, it ensures that communication through line ministries is fit for purpose and aligned with a broader strategy. This can help citizens to see the administration as a single entity rather than a siloed structure. CoGs can also facilitate the adoption of good practices for communication across the administration.
CoGs carry out internal (across the public service) communication and external communication and engagement. In recent years, their roles, responsibilities and demands have increased (see Figure 8.1), yet this can manifest differently. For example, depending on the political system and the composition of the CoG, the communication function can either directly and institutionally form part of the presidency, chancellery or prime minister’s office, have the status of a separate ministry or a mix of both. In the current global context, CoGs are being called upon for a more prominent role in public communication actions.
3. Stewarding effective two-way communication
The CoG is well positioned at the centre to lead by example, particularly in view of line ministries, advancing more purposeful communication that builds trust and supports policy design and delivery. An effective, sustained, two-way communication with the public and stakeholders is crucial to foster trust. Not only must governments be able to transmit information effectively but effective two-way communication also requires the ability to listen. One of the key sources of low trust, according to the 2021 OECD Survey on the Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions, are perceptions that citizens are not listened to and that their feedback goes unheeded (OECD, 2022[3]). Many CoGs lead or are involved with external communications to some extent (Figure 8.2), also making them well-placed to serve as a driving force for elevated communication practices and building communication capabilities.
Leading by example to drive more purposeful communication
While the CoG is never responsible for all external communication, it leads some communication efforts. This is particularly important for policies or programmes that involve several stakeholders in the administration or refer to cross-cutting topics. In Belgium, the Federal Public Service Chancellery led a communication campaign to renew Belgium’s attractivity following the 2016 terrorist attacks (Box 8.1).
Furthermore, several CoGs expanded their role in managing government communication activities during the COVID-19 pandemic (OECD, 2021[1]). For example, the Government Offices of Sweden crafted a multi-channel communication strategy to facilitate interactions with all stakeholders. The strategy utilised various communication media, including an institutional website, live broadcasts and social media, to engage in direct and indirect dialogue with the Swedish population (OECD, 2021[4]).
Box 8.1. Leading external communications from the centre in Belgium
“Belgium, uniquely phenomenal” communication campaign, 2017-21
Following the 2016 terrorist attacks in Belgium, a study carried out by the Federal Public Service of Foreign Affairs showed that the general perceptions about the country were:
Negative: the tone used to talk about Belgium was critical, mostly factual and correct, but often sharp and rather negative.
Positive: there was an enormous outpouring of compassion and solidarity towards Belgium after the attacks and respect for the serenity with which the Belgian government (and people) reacted to the attacks.
Enhancing the image of a country faced with “Belgium bashing” and in a context of uncertainty and fear was a real challenge. The study helped the CoG understand better what needs to be communicated. Thanks to this study, the CoG decided to highlight Belgium’s positive image and assets (openness, multilingualism, tolerance and collaboration). This first campaign highlighted Belgium’s many attractions in a humorous and modest way. The campaign concept was based on “99 reasons why Belgium is ‘otherwise phenomenal’ (because 100 would be an exaggeration)”. The target audiences/countries were strategically chosen based on the abovementioned analysis and included citizens, tourists and the press. This campaign lasted from 2017 to 2021 and helped drive tourism back to normal levels. Joining forces with regions, other federal institutions and a wide range of stakeholders was crucial for the success of the campaign.
Source: Information provided by representatives of the Federal Public Service Chancellery of the Prime Minister, Belgium.
The CoG can also lead by example on strong public communication methods through capacity-building approaches, with Chile’s Digital Kit as an example (Box 8.2).
Box 8.2. Chile’s Digital Kit: Illustrated guidelines for communication without gender stereotypes
The CoG in the Chilean government has developed a digital kit that consists of a series of periodically updated digital communication, design and development tools to facilitate the creation of digital and printed government material. As part of the tools provided, the government published an illustrated guide on public communication without gender stereotypes in 2016. The guide not only aims to create awareness about existing gender stereotypes by highlighting diversity but also illustrates the existing problems with the visualisation and depiction of women. This helps to reach all audience segments from the administration while working towards the objective of improving gender equality.
Note: The Digital Kit can be accessed at www.kitdigital.gob.cl.
Source: Government of Chile (2016[5]), Guía ilustrada para una comunicación sin estereotipos de género, https://kitdigital.gob.cl/archivos/160302_ManualPpctvaGeneroTRAZADO_baja.pdf (accessed on 22 August 2023).
Elevating communication capabilities across government
The CoG can also serve as a driving force to elevate communication capabilities across government. From its unique position in the centre, it can work to build better whole-of-government communication methodologies and means. Box 8.3 describes a UK example of the CoG steering advanced communication methods throughout government.
Box 8.3. Steering communications from the centre: The UK Government Communication Service
In the United Kingdom, the Government Communication Service (GCS), created in 2013 within the CoG’s Cabinet Office, supports whole-of-government communication and guidance for the rest of the civil service. Its goal is to provide an exceptional standard of professional practice to support the government, implementing the Prime Minister and Cabinet’s priorities to build a stronger economy, a fairer society, a United Kingdom and a global Britain. The GCS multi-annual reform strategy has five goals:
1. Improve the ability of communicators to work together to address top challenges.
2. Grow capabilities to leverage technological transformation for the public good.
3. Improve efficiency and effectiveness of the GCS.
4. Build public trust.
5. Grow and develop the function’s talent pool.
The GCS works under the public communication mandate represented by the Functional Standards document, which sets out the purpose for public communication and expectations for its consistent management in any given public institution. It uses a range of practices and frameworks to support its enhancement of public communications, including in the fight against mis- and disinformation.
Co‑ordinating with the communication unit within the Prime Minister’s Office, the GCS ensures that the UK government speaks with one voice. In doing so, it complements the development and update of the aforementioned common frameworks and guidance with support on capacity, collaboration and training. A strong steering function in the centre of government can be an asset to support better policy cohesion and alignment with the executive agenda (OECD, 2021[1]).
The GCS utilises a range of activities to support whole-of-government communication, including frequent meetings, weekly media moment grids, guidance on messaging, sharing of monitoring data, contributions to whole-of-government strategies and the use of protocols or the provision of direct guidance and support to departments or the Cabinet Office. The reform strategy seeks to strengthen the GCS’ capacity for strategic planning with the goal of creating a common, annual framework for delivering communication campaigns across ministries. Departmental campaigns may be required to appoint a “senior responsible owner” who would receive direct support from the GCS.
Source: GCS (2020[6]), What We Do, United Kingdom Government Communication Service, https://gcs.civilservice.gov.uk/about-us/what-we-do/ (accessed on 18 September 2023); GCS (2022[7]), Performance with Purpose: Government Communication Service Strategy, https://strategy.gcs.civilservice.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/gcs-strategy-2022-25.pdf (accessed on 18 September 2023).
Audience insights and diverse reach
The CoG can help consolidate and drive better practices in helping consolidate and build capabilities to reach the right audiences and gain insights from these audiences. Transparency, integrity, accountability and stakeholder participation, as described in the OECD Recommendation of the Council on Open Government, are essential to building trust and achieving good policy outcomes (OECD, 2017[8]). Delivering accessible and inclusive approaches to two-way communication is essential to ensure diverse groups are included in this stakeholder participation (Cazenave and Bellantoni, 2022[9]).
Reaching all groups in society can prove difficult as no single approach is best when it comes to communication activities. Different groups tend to have dissimilar reactions or needs around communication and thus, inclusive and accessible communication is crucial (Alfonsi et al., 2022[10]; Cazenave and Bellantoni, 2022[9]). In fact, data from the OECD survey show that approximately 35% of countries reported that reaching all groups in society is among the top 3 most challenging communication-related responsibilities (OECD, 2023[2]).
Using communication across the policy lifecycle can help administrations gather insights for the deployment of policies and those who are users or impacted by policies (OECD, 2021[1]). This is important for the role of the CoG in improving responsiveness both when setting the agenda and designing policy. Communications can support government efforts in engaging stakeholders during policy development (see Chapter 3). Conversely, communication campaigns are commonly used to support the effective implementation of policy, where they can help increase awareness, compliance and acceptability. The application of behavioural approaches in public communication, prominent, for example, during the COVID-19 pandemic, is a growing practice at the policy implementation stage that supports better outcomes.
The CoG can support governments in ensuring they intentionally reach the right audiences, including those more difficult to reach. The OECD survey shows that reaching all groups in society (including young people, ethnic or linguistic minorities, offline groups, etc.) can prove difficult, even with the CoGs convening power (see Figure 8.3).
Recently, some CoGs have been utilising newer and more sophisticated approaches to communication, including real-time data and behavioural insights. Primarily, this is to gain insights to help decision-making, better tailor policies and promote compliance and adoption of policies. For instance, the expansion in the use of social media and other digital platforms for communication has facilitated the use of social listening to understand the needs and experiences of stakeholders. On the other hand, many are using widespread surveys to gain insights from different audiences, for example in Australia.
Another technique that CoGs are using to hone their communication efforts is behavioural insights (BI). CoGs can target their communication by taking into consideration people’s existing biases and social norms. There are several examples of BI units in CoGs, including in Canada, German and the United Kingdom, or hub-and-spoke models with a central unit with expertise that supports departmental activities, such as in Australia. Box 8.4 describes how the United Kingdom’s centre of government supports policymakers and communicators in using BI approaches, while Box 8.5 describes Canada’s Impact and Innovation Unit which feeds BI into policymaking.
Box 8.4. IN CASE: A behavioural approach to anticipating unintended consequences in the United Kingdom
The United Kingdom’s IN CASE framework is a tool designed to support policymakers and communicators in anticipating potential unintended behavioural consequences of a campaign or intervention. It was designed by the Cabinet Office’s Behavioural Science Team and puts forward a set of prompting questions to help policymakers guide their discussions and identify which potential impacts could arise (i.e. intended behaviours, non-target audiences, compensatory behaviours, additional behaviours, signalling, emotional impact). The framework also includes elements to help mitigate undesirable consequences.
Source: GCS (2021[11]), IN CASE: A Behavioural Approach to Anticipating Unintended Consequences, https://gcs.civilservice.gov.uk/publications/in-case-a-behavioural-approach-to-anticipating-unintended-consequences/ (accessed on 30 June 2023).
Box 8.5. Building and scaling behaviourally informed strategies for government to earn trust, counteract stressors and optimise policy implementation in Canada
The Impact and Innovation Unit (IIU) in the Privy Council Office was established to help bridge the gap between policy development and implementation. The IIU applies methods such as behavioural science to promote better outcomes for Canadians, which include public health, environmental protection and climate action, agriculture, immigration and innovation in the Canadian economy.
Across its distinct public health and climate behavioural research programmes, the IIU identified public trust in government and related public institutions as a critical and cross-cutting factor with strong links to key outcomes, such as COVID-19 vaccine uptake and support for climate action. This data-driven insight gave rise to a programme of applied behavioural science research dedicated to broadening and deepening our understanding of public trust in government. This programme, driven by the national-scale Trust, Information, and Digital Ecosystem Study (TIDES), is generating robust evidence to understand individual- and system-level factors shaping trust in institutions. Such factors include information consumption in challenging information environments, social cohesion and polarisation, democratic outlook, online harms and their links to trust in the government at various levels and in various policy areas. A key goal of TIDES is to guide potential evidence-based actions the government can take to both respond to external stressors on trust, such as mis/disinformation proliferating on line, and better earn trust by designing for trustworthiness in the government’s own behaviours and processes.
The IIU has learned that decision-makers in multiple domains are finding public trust – and its behavioural antecedents and consequences – to be key to achieving policy objectives and are finding value in data-driven insights on this topic.
Source: Information provided by representatives from the government of Canada.
4. Tackling mis- and disinformation and crisis response
One of the most pertinent topics for CoGs is the fight against mis- and disinformation. Mis- and disinformation can distort the public’s perception of government competency and values, and as such can harm trust in government. Disinformation campaigns pose a wide range of threats, including public health conspiracy theories and foreign information manipulation and interference operations, as seen in Russia’s efforts to undermine international support for Ukraine. These threats have reinforced the need for CoGs to play an active role in responding to disinformation, as well as to reinforce information integrity more broadly by fostering an enabling environment for accurate, reliable and plural information to thrive. The challenge from a governance standpoint is significant, as governments find themselves in a complex position. Policy measures are required to counteract disinformation and reinforce information integrity, and yet these actions should not result in undue control over publicly available content.
According to data from the OECD survey, tackling mis- and disinformation is a top or significant priority for 50% of the countries surveyed (OECD, 2023[2]). The CoG has an important role to play in combatting mis- and disinformation by building central expertise and capabilities to support line ministries and agencies from the centre.
Forty-six percent of countries surveyed by the OECD reported that their role in tackling mis- and disinformation has increased over the last three years (OECD, 2023[2]). Countries such as New Zealand (Box 8.6), the United Kingdom and the United States have centralised functions to co‑ordinate and provide guidance on mis and disinformation. Many are utilising the practices outlined in the “Good practice principles for public communication responses to mis- and disinformation” (OECD, 2022[12]).
Box 8.6. New Zealand’s approach to strengthening resilience to disinformation
The CoG is driving a whole-of-society approach after acknowledging New Zealanders’ concerns about the effects of mis- and disinformation. Results from public engagement and the 2022 National Security Public Survey (as reported in the draft National Security Long Term Insights Briefing) showed misinformation (which here covers both mis- and disinformation) was high on the list of national security threats people felt would likely occur in both the short and long terms.
The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet is co‑ordinating a civil society-led group to look at long-term resilience approaches, supporting community programmes to society and commissioning specific research on the effects of disinformation.
Source: New Zealand Government (2023[13]), Strengthening Resilience to Disinformation, https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/our-programmes/national-security/strengthening-resilience-disinformation (accessed on 31 October 2023).
Nonetheless, the complexity of this evolving phenomenon means that most of the countries surveyed by the OECD (62%) report countering mis- and disinformation as one of the top 3 most challenging communication-related functions of the CoG (see Figure 8.5) (OECD, 2023[2]).
Counteracting this phenomenon also calls for monitoring actions so governments can identify and stop its spread. CoGs can track communication channels and narratives to understand the spread of false information in real time. Based on such insights, they can aim to mitigate the reach and effects of such narratives by filling voids in reliable information with factual, clear and relevant information. According to the responses to the 2023 survey, 35% of CoGs collaborate with other departments in this task and 19% track mis- and disinformation for the whole of government (OECD, 2023[2]). Box 8.7 provides an example of Estonia’s communication during the COVID-19 crisis and Box 8.8 details approaches in Japan, Latvia and the United Kingdom.
Box 8.7. Fostering coherent messages during the COVID-19 crisis in Estonia
In Estonia, the CoG co‑ordinates public communication, including external and internal communication and fighting mis- and disinformation. During the COVID-19 crisis, the Government Communication Unit formed a special working group to discuss and disseminate the government’s messages and receive feedback. Weekly meetings were complemented with written overviews on both communication plans and the media picture, and included social media monitoring to tackle mis- and disinformation. The format of the group went well beyond the line ministries, including the Police and Customs Board, European Commission representation in Estonia and independent constitutional institutions.
Moreover, the government also disseminated the information developed by the Scientific Advisory Body created at the beginning of the pandemic. This allowed the administration to communicate the importance of the situation to the public and helped increase trust in the actions carried out by the government.
Source: Information provided by representatives of the Ministry of Environment; Raudla, R. (2021[14]), “Estonian response to COVID-19 pandemic: Learning, cooperation, and the advantages of beign a small country”, https://www.redalyc.org/journal/2410/241066211008/html/ (accessed on 30 June 2023).
Box 8.8. Tackling mis- and disinformation
United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom, the Rapid Response Unit (RRU) was launched in 2018 within the Cabinet Office to monitor how the public was receiving government announcements. The proliferation of mis- and disinformation brought on by the COVID-19 pandemic brought expanded responsibilities to the RRU, including direct rebuttals of harmful social media content in co‑operation with the government’s larger public health campaign.
Canada
In Canada, the Privy Council Office’s COVID-19 Digital Communications Coordination Unit co‑ordinated whole-of-government communication through mechanisms such as the Canada.ca crisis communications content design checklist, which encouraged public communicators to refer to big data to support the evolving information needs of citizens throughout the pandemic.
Japan
In Japan, the Government established its new structure, which is composed of Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office, Cabinet Public Affairs Office, and National Security Secretariat, to counter disinformation originated abroad in 2023. This structure collects, aggregates and analyses open-source information as well as conducts external communications in a prompt and accurate manner.
Latvia
In 2022, the State Chancellery of Latvia published “A Handbook against disinformation: to recognise and to counter.” The manual presents practical recommendations for civil servants and civil society to identify and counter digital disinformation campaigns. In 2023, based on the handbook, the State Chancellery of Latvia launched long-term communication project Black on White (www.melnsuzbalta.lv) with an aim to increase societal resilience against mis- and disinformation. It includes weekly podcasts, analytical articles and know-how videos with practical recommendations, including how to identify deep-fakes, talk to a relative who trusts conspiracy theories or spot fraudulent ad campaigns on social media. Based on the whole-of-society approach, the platform also has a functionality for users to rapidly report suspected mis- and disinformation directly to the State Chancellery of Latvia.
Sources: Alfonsi, C. et al. (2022[10]), “Public communication trends after COVID-19: Innovative practices across the OECD and in four Southeast Asian countries”, https://doi.org/10.1787/cb4de393-en; Banerjee, S. (2020[15]), “How we are fighting the spread of false coronavirus information online”, https://gcs.civilservice.gov.uk/blog/how-we-are-fighting-the-spread-of-false-coronavirus-information-online/; OECD (2020[16]), “Transparency, communication and trust: The role of public communication in responding to the wave of disinformation about the new coronavirus”, https://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/transparency-communication-and-trust-the-role-of-public-communication-in-responding-to-the-wave-of-disinformation-about-the-new-coronavirus-bef7ad6e/; Government of Canada (2022[17]), Best Practices for Communicating in a Digital World, https://www.canada.ca/en/privy-council/services/communications-community-office/articles/best-practices-communicating-digital-world.html; LSM News (2022[18]), “Latvia’s State Chancery issues guidebook against disinformation”, https://eng.lsm.lv/article/features/media-literacy/latvias-state-chancery-issues-guidebook-against-disinformation.a478655/; Narakazi, T. (2023[19]), “Japan setting up rapid-response unit to counter disinformation”, https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/14824434; State Chancellery of Latvia (n.d.[20]), Black on White, https://melnsuzbalta.lv/ (accessed on 4 December 2023); Bambals, R. et al. (2022[21]), Rokasgrāmata pret dezinformāciju: atpazīt un pretoties, https://www.mk.gov.lv/lv/media/14255/download?attachment.
Moving forward, the OECD will continue to work with countries to identify a range of governance responses to counter disinformation and build information integrity. Notably, the OECD DIS/MIS Resource Hub,1 launched at the 2022 Global Forum and Ministerial on Building Trust and Reinforcing Democracy, is a peer learning platform for sharing knowledge, data and analysis of government approaches to tackle mis- and disinformation. Drawing on good practices identified in the expert group, the resource hub is developing a framework to aggregate countries’ ongoing efforts and provide a comprehensive picture of efforts to strengthen information integrity.
5. Guiding good internal communication
There is often a centralised function to lead internal communication across public sector organisations (OECD, 2021[1]). When adequate, internal communication can foster information dissemination, increase staff engagement and strengthen its support for the government’s strategic priorities. Given the CoG’s role in supporting the cabinet and in articulating the government’s agenda, it can ensure consistent, clear and correct information across the government. In 2023, 19% of the countries reported that their CoG communicates the government’s agenda to public servants for the whole of government. This role is essential to strengthen internal cohesion of the public sector and to engage and build support for government direction among public employees.
Given the different institutional arrangements that underpin the communication activities, some CoGs consider internal communication as part of their core activities. The 2023 survey shows a heterogeneous landscape across surveyed countries. Approximately 12% of CoGs reported internal communications as a top priority, while 46% considered it somewhat a priority (OECD, 2023[2]) (Figure 8.6).
6. Common challenges and enablers
Through a synthesis of information collected through country practices, desk research, interviews and the experiences shared by participants of the OECD informal Expert Group on Strategic Decision Making at the Centre of Government, the following key considerations can be identified.
Common challenges
Countering mis- and disinformation is seen as a major challenge by a wide range of CoGs. Recent crises and evolving technologies, such as artificial intelligence, exacerbate this. Many CoGs are grappling with how to proactively respond to this phenomenon and stay ahead of malicious actors.
Balancing the need for a quick government response with accurate, impartial and trusted information can be particularly difficult in highly politicised situations. The CoG is often called to safeguard the quality of the information. Yet, CoGs’ proximity to the top elected officials can create a risk for politicisation. Public communication can only be effective if it is perceived as trustworthy by the public, rather than biased or polemical, which calls for checks and balances.
Embedding communication activities in all policy cycle stages can prove difficult if staff do not understand or see its value or if accountability lines are not clearly defined. The CoG’s role in driving a culture of good communication requires adequate leadership, support and resources.
Reaching all groups in society can be challenging, particularly as patterns of news and information consumption grow more diverse and trust in media and official sources dwindles.
Key enablers
Clear roles of line ministries on in relation to communication activities are important to avoid duplication of messaging or over-engagement with certain stakeholders.
CoGs can play a key role in leveraging citizen and stakeholder insights for more inclusive and responsive policymaking and decision processes. A two-way dialogue between the administration and external stakeholders can be further fostered by integrating insights from consultations and broader participatory processes into final policy decisions.
Whether it sits specifically in the CoG institution or not, a systemic approach to public communications can support consistent information to the public about the existence of participation opportunities and digital platforms for dialogue and exchange on key policy issues.
Facilitating the availability of data in user-friendly formats, including, for example, promoting the use of clear, plain and understandable language, can help increase transparency, accountability and trust. The CoG’s position in the administration can be leveraged to aggregate information and define standards for presenting it.
References
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Note
← 1. For more information, see https://www.oecd.org/stories/dis-misinformation-hub/.