Governments are advancing in implementing participatory processes at all levels to ensure civil society engagement, improving access to information, and enhancing representation in elected bodies and the public service. However, challenges remain in making participation fully compatible with and fully meaningful in representative democracy. The institutionalisation of impactful and transparent participatory mechanisms has been slow. Strengthening citizens' civic skills and civil servants' capacity to implement and evaluate participatory processes is thus essential to get to the next level. Countries are working to remove barriers to women’s participation in electoral and policymaking mechanisms, adopting gender mainstreaming and budgeting. While some progress has been made regarding women and young people, gender gaps persist and barriers to representation remain for other under-represented groups. In addition, challenges such as tech-facilitated gender-based violence must be tackled and countries need to work together to develop gender-based policies using more granular data.
The OECD Reinforcing Democracy Initiative
Abstract
Enhancing representation, participation and openness in public life is at the core of the Reinforcing Democracy Initiative and is key to improving policy effectiveness, equity and trust. Many OECD countries are witnessing trends in low voter turnout, greater political polarisation and larger groups of citizens distancing themselves from traditional democratic processes. To meet citizens’ evolving expectations, governments must do better in giving all people a voice, in responding to those voices and following up with concrete and visible actions. Furthermore, global disruptions, such as the Russian aggression against Ukraine, inflation and climate change, have underscored the importance of strengthening the governance of democracies – and citizens’ trust in them.
Overall, trust in government has slightly fallen since 2021, by around 2 percentage points, although levels are still higher than after the global financial crisis (Figure 2.1). Whether people have a say in what the government does remains one of the key drivers of trust in government, as trust in public institutions varies more depending on individual’ sense of political agency and partisanship than on their socio-economic and demographic characteristics. Among those who report they have a say in what the government does, 69% report high or moderately high trust in the national government, in contrast to only 22% among those who feel they do not have a say, which is the largest trust gap. The new 2024 trust results also point to the importance as to whether people are confident in one’s ability to participate in politics, with a 25-percentage point trust gap between those who are confident in their ability to participate in politics and those who are not (Figure 2.2). This points to the importance of ensuring participation through broader engagement, as well as specifically through elections, as pointed out through the action plan and discussed below.
Finally, while there was only a slight overall decrease of trust in government, this average decrease can largely be attributed to women and people with lower education, whose level of trust in national governments have both decreased by 5-percentage points. Young people also have less trust in government than the average, although while the gender gap has increased since 2021, the age gap has narrowed. On average the gender trust gap has seen a fourfold increase since the 2021 Trust Survey, from 2 percentage points to 8 percentage points and is pretty significant (Figure 2.3), which underscores the importance and relevance of the gender dimension, addressed in this report through the Gender Action Plan.
Share of population who indicate different levels of trust in their national government (on a 0-10 scale), 2021 and 2023
Note: The figure presents the within-country distributions across two survey waves of responses to the question “On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is not at all and 10 is completely, how much do you trust the national government?”. A 0-4 response corresponds to ‘low or no trust’, a 5 to ‘neutral’ and a 6-10 to ‘high or moderately high trust’. “OECD” presents the unweighted average across countries, for the listed countries for which the variable was available in 2021 and 2023. Mexico and New Zealand participated in 2021, but the survey for this year did not include the question about trust in the national government for these countries
Source: OECD (2024[1]), OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions – 2024 Results: Building Trust in a Complex Policy Environment, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9a20554b-en.
Share of population with high or moderately high trust in the national government by feeling they have a say in what the government does (blue) and confident to participate in politics (yellow), 2023
Note: The figure presents the within-country distributions of responses to the question “On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is not at all and 10 is completely, how much do you trust the national government?” by respondents’ feeling of having a say (blue) and confidence to participate in politics (yellow). Shown here is the proportion of respondents that have “high or moderately high trust’’ based on the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the 0-10 response scale, grouped by whether people feel they have a say (blue): ‘’How much would you say the political system in [COUNTRY] allows people like you to have a say in what the government does?’’ and feel confident to be able to participate in politics (yellow): ‘’How confident are you in your own ability to participate in politics?’’. “OECD” presents the unweighted average across countries
Source: OECD (2024[1]), OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions – 2024 Results: Building Trust in a Complex Policy Environment, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9a20554b-en.
Share of population with high or moderately high trust in the national government by gender, 2023
Note: The figure presents the within-country distributions of responses to the question “On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is not at all and 10 is completely, how much do you trust the national government?” by respondents’ gender. Shown here is the proportion of respondents that have “high or moderately high trust” based on the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the 0-10 response scale, grouped by respondents’ self-identified genders. “OECD” presents the unweighted average across countries
Source: OECD (2024[1]), OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions – 2024 Results: Building Trust in a Complex Policy Environment, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9a20554b-en.
In light of the very significant trends and gaps highlighted above in terms of trust, this chapter focuses on the key areas included in the Action Plan on Enhancing Representation, Participation and Openness in Public Life welcomed in the 2022 Luxembourg Public Governance Ministerial meeting, namely in terms of:
Creating opportunities for inclusive public participation and deliberation
Strengthening democratic representation
As well as the follow up to the additional Action Plan on Gender Equality.
Recent examples of country initiatives and progress have been collected through the OECD's ongoing work on Open Government, on citizen engagement, civic space, and youth lens. The section on strengthening democratic representation draws on recent work on public sector integrity, as well as youth, gender equality, and inclusion. Results of the Working Party on Gender Mainstreaming and Governance have also helped to inform the review of progress on the additional Action Plan on Gender Equality.
2.2.1. Promote a more structured and institutionalised approach to participation and deliberation
The OECD 2022 RDI report acknowledged both the importance of inclusive and well governed stakeholder participation in rulemaking as well as the need for taking the next step from consultation to engagement, through participatory policymaking. While consultation is usually addressed as part of official procedures for developing government regulations, much of the substance under the bullet of the action plan refers to taking participatory and deliberative processes to the next level. Participation is understood here as a tool that allows citizens and stakeholders to influence the activities and decisions of public authorities at different stages of the policy cycle, and at all levels of government. The analysis is conducted in the framework of the OECD Recommendation of the Council on Open Government (2017) (OECD, 2017[2]) which frames it under three key aspects: information, consultation and engagement. The recent Monitoring report (OECD, 2023[3]) prepared to reflect progress in implementing the recommendation also provides a wealth of information that was not available for the OECD 2022 RDI report.
Implement participatory and deliberative processes at all levels of government in policymaking, public decision making, and service design and delivery
Against this backdrop, countries have been actively implementing participatory and deliberative processes at all levels of government in recent years: from more traditional mechanisms such as public meetings, in-person consultations, roundtables and workshops, to more innovative approaches like digital platforms and, more recently, representative deliberative processes. The OECD has actively engaged with countries to collect information. Between September 2021 and September 2023, the OECD collected 160 new cases of representative deliberative processes (such as citizens’ assemblies, councils, and juries) where randomly selected citizens are invited by a public authority to learn, deliberate, and come up with informed recommendations to address a concrete public problem. In the past years, the “deliberative wave” has been expanding across the OECD membership and beyond. The OECD Database now includes data from 34 countries. Examples include Colombia, New Zealand, and in Korea – where a Children’s Assembly, convening on a yearly basis since 2005, is tasked with identifying issues, contributing to the legislative agenda and writing proposals, some of which have been integrated into laws. The OECD also issued a Call for submissions of Innovative Democratic Processes in early 2024 to complement the data collection with contributions from countries.
National governments have been using methods such as open innovation mechanisms to solve public problems through hackathons or public challenges, with such initiatives progressively diffusing beyond OECD and European countries, such as the Desafios platform recently implemented in Brazil (OECD, 2022[4]). They have also used “Trust Dialogues” in Finland and Latvia as illustrated through the recent call on innovative democratic processes (Box 2.1).
The National Dialogues is a new way of carrying out societal dialogue in co-operation between citizens, communities, and authorities. The goal is to provide all people with opportunities to gather together and discuss important issues in a constructive manner. This methodology aims at empowering citizens by offering them low-threshold opportunities to participate in social debate and especially involve those groups whose voice is not normally heard and to develop the ability of different actors in society to handle matters through dialogue. Participation in National Dialogues is open to any interested individual and can be organised by any interested organisation on topics that matter to the community. The Dialogues are summarised in a publicly accessible report to inform policymaking and society on key issues.
In 2020, Finland implemented this methodology as a rapid and creative response to the COVID-19 crisis and since then it has developed into a permanent model with Dialogues organised every 6 months.
In August 2023, Latvia’s State Chancellery in co-operation with non-governmental organisation "Latvian Rural Forum" launched the Trust Dialogues – a series of discussions with citizens on the issue of trust. The discussions focus on social trust (among citizens), trust towards state institutions, municipalities and political officials. The dialogues took place in Autumn 2023 across Latvia. Altogether 26 discussions took place across the country. The main conclusions from discussions with citizens were presented to the decision makers, in particular during a “Conference on Social Trust and Trust in Public Institutions” organised on 27 October 2023 in the Parliament.
Source: OECD (2024) Call for Democratic Innovations.
Deliberative and participatory processes are organised to tackle very diverse public problems from policy challenges such as environment and climate, as presented in Chapters 2 and 3, to examining the impact of digital technologies on society. They also take place at different levels of government. The subnational level of government is at the forefront with a high number of innovative practices. More than 80% of the deliberative cases collected by the OECD have occurred at either the local or the regional level and the most advanced forms of digital participation are implemented by cities such as Barcelona (Spain), Reykjavik (Iceland), and Amsterdam (Netherlands). Nonetheless, citizens’ assemblies also take place at the national level, as in Canada where more than 120 randomly selected citizens served on one of three national Citizens’ Assemblies on Democratic Expression. Such initiatives often aim to involve citizens in addressing the climate crisis, such as in the Klima-Biergerrot (Citizens’ Assembly on the Climate) organised in Luxembourg in 2022 where 100 citizens where tasked with discussing Luxembourg’s current commitments for tackling climate change, and with developing possible additional measures or proposals. Similar initiatives were held in France, Belgium, Spain and the United Kingdom. Some deliberative processes have also interacted with multiple levels of government. This was the case for the Citizens’ Assembly on Sustainable Consumption, in 2023, in Denmark, that gathered citizens across the country to develop recommendations delivered to the regional level, the Capital Region of Denmark, and the Region of Southern Denmark as well as selected municipalities. There are also some recent examples of mobilising some participatory mechanisms in times of crisis, for example in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, or recent conflicts and wars (Box 2.2).
Representative deliberative processes have also been organised by public authorities at the transnational level. The European Commission conducted a dozen citizens' panels in the context of the Conference on the Future of Europe. Among these panels, the most recent were the Citizens’ Panel on Food Waste, which took place over 2022 and 2023, and the Citizens' Panel on Energy Efficiency, concluding in April 2024. In 2021, a first instance of a Global Citizens' Assembly was organised by a group of civil society organisations from several regions around the world with the short-term goal of delivering recommendations in view of the COP 26 in Glasgow, and the long-term vision of establishing a permanent Global Citizens' Assembly to be part of the global governance framework.
Deliberative processes are often used to tackle long-standing complex policy issues but can also be applied in times of crises and urgent responses, particularly during or in the aftermath of major disasters or catastrophic events.
During the COVID pandemic, some regions around the world turned to citizens' councils to manage the health crisis. In Germany, one local and three state-level citizens' councils were organised. In South Korean cities, online petitions were the main medium to gather citizens' concerns and requests on topics such as the mask mandate, social distancing policies, or even travel routes of individuals who tested positive for COVID-19.
Public authorities have also organised participatory processes as part of a “healing post disaster process”, whether due to catastrophic events, war or terrorist attacks. Another recent example is the "ReStart Ukraine", a platform of citizens, practitioners and researchers reunited to write a recovery plan for rural and urban communities that have been greatly affected by the ongoing war with Russia.
Make efforts to ensure citizens’ contributions are transparent, impactful and that participatory processes are evaluated
The quality of a participatory process is of great importance to ensure impact and citizen satisfaction (OECD, 2022[9]). The results from the 2024 Trust Survey (OECD, 2024[1]) show that the most impactful variable on trust in the national civil service, is the likelihood that government would adopt the opinions expressed in a public consultation on reforming a policy area. A positive perception of this dimension of openness is associated with a 2.6 percentage point increase in the likelihood of high or moderately high trust in the national civil service. In participatory processes, “closing the feedback loop”1 is not yet common practice which risks discouraging people from participating another time and potentially diminish the benefits of participation.
A notable exception are representative deliberative processes as public authorities tend to be more responsive and accountable to participants. In most cases, they respond to participants and implement at least half of the input received. Further data demonstrates that when responding to participants, in 54% of cases public authorities favoured a face-to-face setting showing commitment and respect to the engagement of citizens (OECD, 2023[7]).
While evaluation of participatory processes has become increasingly common, as evidenced in Box 2.3, the question of a deliberative process’s impact deserves further research and consideration. Increasingly, experts have pointed to other equally important outcomes of a deliberative process that could be used to measure their impact. For example, the learning aspect of a deliberative process is usually highlighted by both participants and observers as a key outcome. It not only allows for better results, but also informs participants about the policy issue at stake and the role of public authorities in addressing the problem. Other positive spillover effects include reduced mis and disinformation, a potential decrease in polarisation through informed deliberation, and increased empathy among citizens.
The Permanent Climate Assembly of Brussels (2023) is a deliberative process, which aims to mobilise the experience of Brussels’ citizens and enable them to feed into the government policies and strategies developed to achieve the climate objectives set by the Region. In this case, the public authority commissioned an independent evaluation by a qualified third party to assess the process’s quality and outcomes.
The Itinerant Citizens’ Assembly of the Bogotá Council (2020 – 2023) is a permanent deliberative and citizen participation space that rotates its members and specific objectives for each iteration. Given this characteristic, organisers chose a process reflection evaluation, in which they delved into the different stages of the process, what were the lessons learned, the results achieved and what could be improved upon.
The Krakow Transport Panel (2023) is a deliberative process convened to address how to optimise transport in the city and lower transport-related emissions. The evaluation method selected centred on participants, through the application of a participant exit survey and a participants’ feedback session, where direct input from the participants is collected to gather their experience and impressions of the process.
Source: OECD (2023[10]), OECD Deliberative Democracy Database.
Move from ad-hoc processes to institutionalised and permanent participatory and deliberative mechanisms
Embedding a deliberative process within institutional frameworks refers to establishing a form of recurrence to go beyond one-off processes and embed such mechanisms into existing decision-making structures such as local councils or bringing the results to bear in Parliaments. There are different ways to embed representative deliberation into public decision making, as shown by the OECD’s eight ways to institutionalise deliberative democracy (OECD, 2021[11]).
Embedding deliberative processes into existing representative institutions (such as Parliaments or Local Councils) can help reduce friction between representative and deliberative democracy and support a move towards a systemic or continuous approach to democratic decision making that combines different forms of participation to complement electoral processes (OECD, 2021[11]). Indeed, this is a trend which is gathering momentum, as evidenced in the doubling in the number of cases collected by the OECD (2023[10]) between 2020 and 2023, which went from 22 to 41 cases - the majority of which have been implemented at the local or regional levels. Other approaches involve giving people the right to demand a deliberative process, as is the case in Austria. France has been home to a variety of embedded deliberative processes dating back several years, as outlined in Box 2.4. Most recently, France's President Emmanuel Macron announced in September 2023 a ‘Citizen’s Convention on the end of life’2 managed by the Social Economic and Environmental Council. This involved 150 randomly selected citizens convening between December 2022 and April 2023, leading to the French government presenting a draft law on assisted dying in April 2024. In Italy, such deliberative processes are evident within the Open Government Forum, which brings together open government stakeholders from 15 public institutions (both at central and regional level) and 29 civil society organisations. Its mission is to foster peer-to-peer discussion and co-creation processes between organised civil society and institutional actors (Department of Public Service, 2024[12]).
The National Public Debate Commission has served as an independent commission, organising nation-wide public consultations and promoting citizen participation, since 1995.
Between 2019 and 2020, 150 French citizens were selected at random to take part in the Citizens Convention for Climate, which discussed ways to reduce France’s carbon emission by 40% from its 1990 levels.
In January 2021, The Social Economic and Environmental Council (CESE) received a legal mandate to include citizen participation and deliberation in its decision making (methods that are not integrated into its foundational texts). This can include online consultations, and the integration of citizens into the Council’s work.
In October 2021, the Council of Paris created the Paris Citizen’s Assembly, which can submit requests and proposals for deliberation to the Council. It is currently deliberating on how to support individuals experiencing homelessness.
Participatory mechanisms embedding public deliberation in Parliament have also been experimented in Ireland, Belgium and some of its regional governments, as well as in Germany (see Box 2.5).
The Irish Citizen Assembly
In 2016, Ireland established a permanent citizens' assembly of 100 members, following a parliamentary resolution. Since then, the Assembly has met on a yearly basis, with the task of providing recommendations to the Irish Parliament on topics including climate change, gender equality, drug regulation, and constitutional amendments. The recommendations are systematically reviewed by a committee representative of the two Irish Houses (the Assembly of Ireland and the Irish legislature) and in some cases the recommendations have been submitted to the electorate through a referendum. This model has proven to be an effective tool to find consensus on contentious issues such as abortion and same sex marriage but has recently found certain challenges that can be of inspiration for other OECD countries. In March 2024, Irish voters rejected a referendum for constitutional changes relating to family roles and the duties of women, with 67% voting against the family referendum, which proposed widening the definition of a family, and 74% against the care referendum, which proposed replacing a legal reference to “mother’s duties in the home” with a clause recognising care provided by other family members. Even if time will be needed to fully analyse this outcome, one immediate lesson can be drawn. The two questions ultimately put to referendum did not mirror the recommendations that had been produced by the Citizens’ Assembly. This in turn created confusion among voters and failed to rally supporters (Sortition Foundation, 2024[16]). Commitment to the results of the Assembly is important to build trust not only on the process, but in the democratic system itself.
Belgium’s mixed deliberative committees
In February 2024, the Belgian Senate adopted legislation to enable the participation of citizens through random selection in the legislative work. In particular, the legislation enacted the possibility to create “mixed deliberative committees” where 15 parliamentarians and 45 randomly selected citizens jointly deliberate and suggest recommendations for the House’s Plenary. Similar deliberative processes have been tested in the parliament of the region of Brussels and the French-speaking parliament in Brussels (officially called the French- speaking Community Commission – Cocof), the body responsible for regulating the French-speaking Community in the Brussels-Capital Region.
German Parliament’s Citizen Assembly on Nutrition
In May 2023, the German Parliament established a Citizens’ Assembly for the first time. In the course of eight sessions, 160 members worked to develop recommendations on the topic of nutrition. In January 2024, nine recommendations were presented in a final meeting with the members, the Scientific Advisory Board and the Parliament President. The recommendations were summarised into a Citizens’ Report, which was presented in Parliament to representatives of all parliamentary groups in February 2024. They included: free lunches for children in kindergarten, mandatory redistribution of leftover edible foods by food retailers and making the animal welfare conditions transparent. The recommendations are now being discussed in plenary sessions to be integrated in legislation.
Source: OECD (2020[17]), Innovative Citizen Participation and New Democratic Institutions: Catching the Deliberative Wave, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/339306da-en; Sortition Foundation (2024[16]), “Ireland referendum embarrassment for politicians shows what happens if you don’t listen to citizens”, https://www.sortitionfoundation.org/embarrassment_for_irish_politicians; German Bundestag (2024[18]), “Final Recommendations of the Citizens’ Assembly on Nutrition”, https://www.bundestag.de/en/parliament/recommendations-nutrition-995916.
Design citizen participation and deliberation processes in a way that lowers barriers to participation and encourages people to take part
As suggested by the OECD Good Practice Principles for innovative citizen participation, participation and deliberation can make decision making more inclusive by opening the door to more representative groups of people. Through participatory processes, public authorities can include the voice of the "silent majority" and strengthen the representation of minorities and often excluded groups like informal workers, migrants, women, indigenous populations (where applicable) and LGBTI communities3 (OECD, 2022[9]). However, for participatory practices to foster inclusion, public authorities have to take the necessary actions to reach out and involve those traditionally marginalised groups4 as well as take into consideration any special needs and verify that individuals with disabilities are able to exercise their right to participate in comfort (OECD, 2022[9]).
Data collected by the OECD (2023[3]) suggest that countries are gradually increasing their efforts to increase inclusion but there is room for further actions in particular to support the representation of minorities and usually excluded voices. For example, 67.6% of surveyed countries have a strategy. For example, only two OECD OGP countries are involving the LGBTI community5 in their multi-stakeholder forum (OECD, 2023[3]).
Representative deliberative processes can solve the inclusion problems usually faced by other forms of participation such as open consultations. For example, in deliberative processes participation is often encouraged and supported through remuneration, coverage of expenses, and by providing or paying for childcare. In 74% of the cases collected, participants received a form of compensation to support their participation, but OECD countries do not usually provide any specific support for people to attend in-person meetings.
Breaking down barriers to participation also requires a specific focus on engaging with young people, as highlighted in the OECD Recommendation on Creating Better Opportunities for Young People, and children. In fact, countries are increasing their efforts to promote inclusion in participation opportunities: for instance, 67.6% of respondents to the OECD Open Government Survey have a strategy or policy to specifically foster the inclusion of young people in participatory processes (OECD, 2023[3]). Some administrations, such as Ireland and the European Union, have made efforts to strengthen children and young people’s participation in a coherent way, such as by developing targeted whole-of-government frameworks and by creating new platforms for participatory opportunities (Box 2.6).
Ireland: National Framework for Children and Young People’s Participation in Decision-making
In 2023, Ireland’s Department of Children, Equality, Disability, Integration and Youth (DCEDIY) and Ireland’s national centre of excellence on child and youth participation, Hub Na nÓg, published the National Framework for Children and Young People’s Participation in Decision-making. The Framework supports government departments and agencies to enhance child and youth participation in decision making by providing accessible training and guidance. The Framework provides guidance for the development of advisory groups, refers to existing sources to involve seldom-heard children in decision making, and discusses the importance of closing the loop and setting realistic expectations on impact. The Framework further outlines principles to guide child and youth consultation processes, provides practical advice to capture their views without undue adult influence, outlines levels of participation, and includes checklists to guide decision makers in planning, conducting and evaluating child and youth participation processes. Finally, the Framework includes a feedback form for children and young people to evaluate the engagement process to which they took part.
European Union: EU Children’s Participation Platform
In 2022, the European Union launched the EU Children’s Participation Platform as a hub of child participation mechanisms with the aim of promoting a more systematic, safe, meaningful and inclusive approach to enable children to participate in decision making in line with the EU Strategy on the Rights of the Child. The Platform includes 58 organisations from 22 EU member states and its work and activities are co-created by children, notably through the Children’s Panel and children’s representatives in the Advisory Board steering the work of the Platform. The first consultation conducted by the Platform focused on what children need to feel safe, involving 1 095 children from 21 countries through an online survey, interviews and focus group discussions. The results contributed to the European Commission’s policy work on integrated child protection systems. The 2023-2024 Work Plan envisages activities to gather the perspectives of child stakeholders on democracy, voting and fake news, among others.
Source: (Government of Ireland, 2023[19]; European Union, 2022[20]); OECD Call for Innovative Democratic Practices.
Public institutions can also partner with civil society organisations, notably youth-led ones, to promote opportunities for inclusive youth participation. These organisations can help inform the design of participation opportunities based on the needs and interests of young people, and promote awareness and interest among them, helping to bridge access barriers that notably young people from marginalised background are facing. They can also help implement the initiatives. For instance, with the support of the European Parliament, the civil society organisations Make.org and JEF Europe ran a large-scale youth consultation in 2023 (Box 2.7).
The EurHope initiative was launched in 2023 with the support of the European Parliament and in collaboration with 50 organisations, including civil society organisations, cities, regions and transnational institutions. The initiative established a multi-lingual voting support tool through which young people could submit, vote for and comment proposals in different languages. In five months, the initiative gathered the voices of 1.5 million young people in the 27 EU countries as well as 5 000 proposals in response to the question “What are your ideas for building together a Europe that can respond to future challenges?". The votes and proposals were analysed by a team of sociologists, consolidating inputs into 15 consensual ideas across 7 dimensions under the “Agenda of Hope.” The campaign was accompanied by online communication campaigns, reaching almost 4 million young people. Additional events and actions are planned to disseminate and discuss the consultation outcomes ahead of the 2024 elections of the European Parliament in order to inform the general public and gather reactions from European political parties.
Source: (Make.org, n.d.[21]); OECD OPSI Call for Innovative Democratic Practices.
Foster a culture of, and building capacities for, participation and deliberation in the civil service and in society at large
To increase the quality of participation, countries should invest in boosting internal capacities and skills to ensure civil servants are trained to involve citizens and stakeholders. Almost 80% of surveyed countries6 already have toolkits and guidelines for civil servants regarding citizen and stakeholder participation, and almost 64% of them also offer trainings on the subject (OECD, 2023[3]). To support this, the OECD recently published the OECD Guidelines on Citizen Participation Processes (OECD, 2022[9]).
Building skills and capacity is particularly important to support youth participatory initiatives and move towards more structured and institutionalised approaches to young people’s participation. Countries such as New Zealand, Germany and Finland have been taking important steps recently to develop and apply practical guidelines and providing online training courses for policymakers at national and subnational level (Box 2.8). Similarly, Italy’s Opengov initiative includes the implementation of Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs), with 12 editions of 4 MOOCs organised between June 2022 and July 2023, providing the 5 376 participants with theoretical and practical tools on digital participation practices, open data, accountability and quality in digital services (Department of Public Service, 2023[22]).
New Zealand: Best practice guidelines for engagement with children and young people
In 2022, the Child Wellbeing and Poverty Reduction Group (CWPRG) under the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC) developed and published a series of practical guidance resources to support policymakers to consult and engage with children and young people across government bodies. These guidelines were developed in consultation with other departments, children and young people and the Office of the Children’s Commissioner. They place specific emphasis on participation of Māori and seldom heard population groups. They include detailed guidance for different steps of participation processes as well as links to resources for policymakers.
Germany: Updated quality standards for child and youth participation
In 2023, the Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth in Germany published an update of its “Quality standards for child and youth participation” from 2015. The update was prepared jointly with the German National Youth Councils, experts and practitioners, and encourages organisations and political decision makers to enable child and youth participation in all relevant areas.
It sets out general quality standards as well as more specific guidelines in the field of family education, counselling, and work; child day care; (full-time) school; children and youth work; open child and youth work; children’s and youth organisations; children and youth work in sport; cultural education for children and young people; extracurricular political youth education; international youth work; youth social work and in facilities and services for educational support. Another important development is the provision of participation guidelines at the state, federal and European level, and a new chapter on quality standards in the context of digital participation formats.
Finland: Online training courses
In 2023, Finland’s Ministry of Justice developed a ten-modules online training course open to any policymakers wishing to enhance their skills to enable the participation and consultation of children and young people in their work. It was accompanied by a training package on children’s rights for policymakers as part of Finland’s National Child Strategy, which includes a module on children’s right to participate and be involved in policymaking and decisions that impact their lives. The training package is available to all government bodies in Finland at national and subnational level and has received strong uptake among municipalities.
In addition, countries are starting to close the gap between citizen participation and the broader open government or democracy agendas. An analysis of commitments included in OECD countries that are part of the OGP reveals that the number of commitments on citizen and stakeholder participation has progressively increased. For instance, France’s 2023 Action Plan includes a pillar on deliberation and citizen empowerment. Some OECD countries have recently mandated the same public institutions with both the participation and democracy agendas to increase co-ordination and synergies and treat them as the same agenda. This is the case, for example, in the Netherlands and France.
The challenge for countries is to help nurture a participatory and democratic culture beyond the administration. A citizenry that is democratically fit has the mandate, but also the skills and competences needed to play an active part in a democratic system (OECD, 2022[9]). This is an area in which a whole of government approach is needed to align the efforts of ministries and agencies responsible for education, youth and lifelong learning to help citizens of all ages build and exercise skills for democracy.
Communicating with and listening to citizens through online and offline channels, while using the same channels to foster dialogue
OECD countries are making use of digital tools to communicate about their open government agenda. For example, social media is the most used channel to communicate among OECD countries that are part of the OGP. Governments are also increasingly developing dedicated mobile applications to establish direct communication channels with the public. In 2023, France launched AGORA - a mobile application developed and deployed by the government meant to encourage regular and direct dialogue with the public institutions through online public consultations or citizens’ requests. While it is too early to provide an assessment of the real results, over 10 000 questions were asked and answers have been provided by the Members of the Government. Beyond OECD countries, the Egyptian app Hewar supports government decision by running public opinion polls and enabling a direct communication channel.
Countries are also increasingly creating digital spaces for citizen and stakeholder participation. All OECD countries are using digital portals to participatory processes, a good practice highlighted by the OECD as centralised participation platforms have the advantage of providing a “one-stop shop” portal for citizens and stakeholders to learn about past, current and future opportunities for participation (OECD, 2022[9]). For example, in Bogotá, Colombia, a chatbot is used to encourage citizen participation (see Box 2.9).
The City of Bogotá has designed Chatico, a conversational chatbot that informs citizens in a clear, simple, and user-friendly way to encourage active citizen participation in local governance issues, in particular the design of Bogotá’s development plan for the next four years. The chatbot is anchored in Colombia’s most used instant messaging application (WhatsApp) to promote broader usage, and gives citizens three ways to engage: 1) “short route”, which offers the option to participate by selecting one of the five priority objectives; 2) “intermediate route”, where citizens can choose both an objective and a solution; and 3) “long route”, which allows citizens to leave specific comments addressed to the mayor. In average, it takes citizens 5 minutes to participate, and so far, Chatico has attracted more than 10 000 interactions and gathered 22 000 proposals.
Protect and promote civic space as a precondition for public participation and deliberation
The OECD 2022 RDI report identified a healthy civic space as precondition for effective and inclusive public participation in policymaking, including deliberation. It is about creating the necessary environment within which people can exercise their democratic rights. There are several elements of healthy civic space in OECD countries, such as constitutions guaranteeing human rights, independent oversight mechanisms over government decisions, autonomous and independent news organisations, protection programmes for human rights defenders, portals responding to freedom of information requests, strategies supporting civil society organisations, and online fora to provide feedback on public services. In recent years, progress has been achieved in five areas:
Clear policy frameworks enabling civil society engagement in policymaking
According to the OECD Open Government Survey results (OECD, 2022[26]), as of 2020 the majority of OECD countries (68% of the 32 OECD respondents) had developed overarching policy frameworks to improve or promote the enabling environment for civil society (Figure 2.4). Through these strategies, governments are striving to develop robust and independent civil society organisations (CSO), build strong CSO-state relationships, and enhance inclusion and social cohesion, among other objectives. These strategies typically include a definition of civil society, an assessment of the current state of play for the CSO sector and a high-level vision for state engagement with CSOs. Other crucial components for well-rounded CSO strategies are the setting of coherent, feasible and ambitious objectives to support the sector, including concrete steps on their implementation, and the establishment of oversight, monitoring, and evaluation mechanisms.
Note: n=31. This figure indicates responses to the question “Does the government have a policy or strategy to improve or promote the enabling environment for CSOs?”. Data on Türkiye are based on OECD desk research and were shared with them for validation.
Source: OECD (2022[26]), The Protection and Promotion of Civic Space: Strengthening Alignment with International Standards and Guidance, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/d234e975-en.
Countries have been active in these areas in recent years. France launched a new civil society and citizen engagement strategy in 2023 and Finland adopted a resolution in 2024, outlining the development of civic space in the Government Programme period 2023–2027. Romania launched a process to develop an open government strategy with a dedicated component on engaging civil society in public decision making in 2024. Other countries provided support to the CSO sector by introducing simplified reporting or accounting requirements for small associations. Finland, Ireland and Luxembourg are in the process of, or have already, introduced simplified procedures for small associations. Ireland has recognised the advancement of human rights as being a recognised “charitable purpose” in a new Charities Bill and Luxembourg introduced a funding stream for CSOs working to protect human rights and environmental defenders.
Implementation of civic freedoms and rights and independent oversight to counter and reduce violations of civic space rights
Freedoms of expression, association, peaceful assembly and the right to privacy are fundamental civic freedoms that enable effective civic participation. These basic rights are an essential precondition for the good governance and development of any democratic society. They are also necessary to ensure the empowerment and well-being of non-governmental actors. Freedom of expression for CSOs, journalists and activists is increasingly endangered by Strategic Lawsuits against Public Participation (SLAPPs) that aim to silence people who publicly criticise or investigate powerful individuals, companies or interest groups. The OECD 2022 report on civic space identified an opportunity for all countries to assess whether there are frequent cases of SLAPPs in their jurisdictions and to introduce legislation to counter them (OECD, 2022[26]).
Since 2022, there is a growing recognition of the negative impact of SLAPPs and Belgium, Croatia, Ireland, Italy and Slovenia are all in the process of, or have already, introduced related draft laws, focal points, and working groups. At the European level, there is also growing awareness of the threat. In 2022 the European Union Commission introduced a Recommendation on protecting journalists and human rights defenders from SLAPPs, urging Member States to establish national focal points. In addition, in 2023, the Commission proposed a legally binding Directive to provide procedural safeguards against cross-border SLAPPs in civil cases, which was adopted by the European Council in 2024.
Redress mechanisms to ensure protection of civic freedoms
Civic freedoms are protected by accessible redress mechanisms such as national human rights institutions (NHRI), ombudsman offices and national courts. As of 2020, the majority of OECD Members (84%) had publicly funded independent public institutions that address human rights complaints, such as an NHRI, including ombudsperson offices (OECD, 2022[26]). This is an area for further progress and consolidation across a number of OECD countries.
There are ongoing judicial reforms at national level to strengthen judicial independence and to facilitate access to justice in Bulgaria, Denmark, Greece, Poland, Romania and Spain. Some OECD Members such as Czechia and Croatia are strengthening the enabling environment for their NHRIs. Various national courts have also delivered judgements underscoring a commitment to safeguarding freedom of peaceful assembly – for example, in Finland a judgment condemned the disproportionate use of pepper spray by police officers against protesters (yle, 2023[27]).
Promote healthy online and offline information ecosystems by safeguarding and promoting the right to access data and information, supporting media and protecting journalists
In recent years, this area has seen significant progress. A number of OECD Members introduced measures to foster resourced and vibrant information ecosystems, focusing on access to information and protection for at-risk groups. Canada introduced guidelines to support public officials to proactively share information, in a new Directive on Proactive Publication under the Access to Information Act. Czechia amended its media law in 2023, with the aim of promoting diversity within the Czech Television Council and Radio Council. Members can now be elected from both chambers of parliament and be nominated by a broader range of entities. Sweden introduced a legal provision to protect journalists and their families, whereby offences committed against them due to their work carry increased penalties. Denmark adopted a national action plan agreed between government, the media industry, and other stakeholders to improve journalists’ safety. Austria and France introduced measures to protect journalists during peaceful assemblies. In Austria police deploy media contact officers during demonstrations to assist those who feel threatened, attacked or who want to report a suspicious incident. Bulgaria introduced a law to protect whistleblowers, creating internal and external reporting mechanisms for breaches of relevant Bulgarian or EU laws. Peru adopted a decree aimed at the prevention, protection, and recognition of women human rights defenders, following the establishment of an intersectoral mechanism in 2021 to protect human rights defenders more broadly.
Discrimination, exclusion, and marginalisation that disproportionately affect certain groups
Discrimination can affect citizens’ trust, in addition to their ability and willingness to engage with state institutions if they feel undervalued, excluded, unprotected or threatened. As such, all forms of discrimination can affect individuals’ ability or willingness to freely express themselves or to assemble and influence public decision making. As of 2020, strong legal frameworks were found in 91% of respondent OECD Members (OECD, 2022[26]). Such framework help to counter discrimination and to enable effective and equal participation and they can be supported by affirmative action to support disadvantaged groups.
Countries are making progress in this area. Overall, there is a trend towards making anti-discrimination legislation more comprehensive and in recognising different groups that are affected. In recent years, many EU member states have rendered their laws more comprehensive, in the field of ethnic or racial discrimination. Finland introduced a law on legal recognition of gender with self-identification as the sole requirement for it to be recognised. Luxembourg increased funding for NGOs working on integration and discrimination.
In keeping with an overwhelming trend in OECD Members to prohibit hate speech (97% of respondent OECD Members) as a widely recognised form of discrimination, Slovenia established a Strategic Council on the Prevention of Hate Speech, including representatives of relevant ministries, civil society and legal experts, and is mandated to monitor hate speech domestically and at EU level and to propose preventive actions. Germany extended protection to migrant victims of gender-based violence, following a decision not to renew reservations to articles 44 (on jurisdiction) and 59 (on residence status) of the Istanbul Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence.
2.3.1. Making elected bodies and executives more representative of the population
The OECD 2022 RDI report fully acknowledged the need for strengthening democratic representation, as many countries face significant challenges in this area. Certain demographics and societal groups, including women, young people, minorities, individuals with lower educational attainment, and those with lower incomes, remain notably underrepresented in elected bodies and executives (OECD, 2022[28]). Data from International IDEA on social equality, which measures aspects such as how civil liberties and political power vary across social groups, shows that while OECD countries generally do demonstrate high levels of equality, many are not as strong as they could be (Figure 2.5). Other gender equality data, including the power distribution by gender in civil society organisations as well as political representation and years of schooling, paints a similar picture (Figure 2.6).
Note: Five V-Dem expert-coded indicators that reflect social equality are used to measure social group equality with regard to civil liberties and political power distribution. These are supplemented by indicators of equality treatment and political equality from BTI and Freedom House. Upper and lower bounds are for the 68% confidence interval. See Annex A for full set of indicators.
Source: International IDEA (2023[29]), “Global State of Democracy Indices”, https://www.idea.int/democracytracker/gsod-indices/.
Note: The gender equality subcomponent is measured through two expert-coded indicators from V-Dem, on power distribution by gender and female participation in civil society organisations, and two observational indicators, on the ratio of female to male mean years of schooling (IHME), and the proportion of lower chamber legislators who are female (V-Dem), the gender disaggregated labour force participation rate (women-men, ILO), the share of managerial positions held by women (ILO), and gender disaggregated control of financial accounts (women-men, World Bank). To this was added an index of exclusion by gender (V-Dem), and in-house coded measures of women’s empowerment (Global Gender Gap Report), and women’s political and economic rights (both from CIRIGHTS). Upper and lower bounds are for the 68% confidence interval. See Annex A for full set of indicators.
Source: International IDEA (2023[29]), “Global State of Democracy Indices”, https://www.idea.int/democracytracker/gsod-indices/.
Addressing the gender dimension of elected representation
Since 2021, which serves as the most recent reference point for the 2022 RDI report, there has been a slight increase in women’s representation in parliaments across OECD countries, albeit with some variations. On average, the representation of women in the lower or single house of parliament in OECD countries has risen from 28.1% in 2015 to 32.0% in 2021, and further to 34.0% in 2024 (Figure 2.7). However, the level of women’s representation in parliament varies significantly among countries, ranging from over 45% in Denmark, Costa Rica, Finland, Iceland, Mexico, New Zealand, and Sweden, to less than 15% in Hungary and Japan (IPU Parline, 2024[30]). Furthermore, in some countries such as Italy, New Zealand, Portugal and Switzerland the proportion of women in parliament has decreased slightly between 2021 and 2024 – indicating the need for continued monitoring and concerted efforts. Additionally, evidence suggests that women in politics still represent a rather homogeneous group, with individuals from under-represented communities – such as young women, LBTI women, or women with disabilities – remaining less visible and encountering greater barriers to accessing leadership roles (Council of Europe, 2021[31]). For example, in the United Kingdom, a report prepared by the Women and Equalities Committee in 2022 highlighted that only 5.7% of all 650 MPs in the House of Commons are women from minority ethnic backgrounds (UK Parliament, 2022[32]).
Looking beyond elected bodies, less progress has been made in terms of the number of women in ministerial positions. While some OECD countries have achieved gender-balanced cabinets, women continue to be underrepresented in government on average. As of 2023, women’s average representation in cabinet ministerial positions stands at 35.7% across OECD countries (OECD, 2023[35]). However, the share of women in cabinet positions also varies significantly among countries (Figure 2.8). In 2023, 8 out of 38 OECD countries – Belgium, Chile, Colombia, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, and Spain – had 50% or more women in ministerial cabinet positions. On the other hand, four OECD countries – Czechia, Hungary, Japan, and Türkiye – had shares below 10% (UN Women, 2023[36]). Meanwhile, the distribution of women cabinet ministers within national governments globally highlights a trend where they primarily occupy roles related to social and cultural policy (OECD, 2023[35]). The ministerial portfolios most commonly held by women include women and gender equality, family and children’s affairs, social inclusion and development, social protection and social security, and indigenous and minority affairs (where applicable) (OECD, n.d.[37]). Conversely, very few women hold ministerial portfolios in areas such as transport, energy, defence, trade, and agriculture (OECD, n.d.[37]). In particular, the presence of women leaders in environment and energy sectors remains low (OECD, 2023[38]). Moreover, the European Investment Bank’s 2022-2023 climate survey highlights a gender gap in opinions on whether increased political involvement of women leaders would enhance efforts against climate change: 45% of men in the European Union believed it would make a difference compared to 60% of women (Lesi, 2023[39]). This underscores the importance of not only attaining gender-balanced representation in terms of numbers but also diversifying ministerial portfolios for both women and men to achieve gender equality in cabinets.
Source: OECD (2023[35]), Government at a Glance 2023, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/3d5c5d31-en.
Women also remain underrepresented in decision-making positions at sub-national levels of government (Figure 2.9). Recent estimates suggest that women make up less than approximately 15% of mayors and only about 34% of elected local deliberative bodies globally (National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 2023[40]). In the European Union, the share of women in local/municipal and regional assemblies is just over one-third of members (European Commission, 2023[41]).
Note: EU-27 and OECD-38 averages are unweighted. Data on members of national legislatures from September 2024. Data on the European Parliament cover the president and members of the European Parliament comprised of representatives elected by the EU Member States. This is a supranational legislative parliament, exercising powers similar to those of the national legislatures. Data on regional assemblies cover the representative assemblies of regions (i.e. regional authorities). The term region refers to regional authorities that are endowed with self-government acting as the territorial authorities between the central government and local authorities. Data on local councils cover the representative assemblies of municipalities, cities or towns. Data for the European Parliament is from Q1 and Q2 of 2024. Local and regional estimates are for 2024.
Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) Parline “Historical Data”, EIGE Indicator G1b “The proportion of women in the European Parliament” Indicator G3a “The proportion of women in local assemblies in the Member States [starting from 2011]”, and Indicator G2 “The proportion of women in the regional assemblies of the Member States, where appropriate”.
These modest but positive results reflect the progress across OECD countries in adopting measures to enhance gender equality in political leadership. These include, for example, legislated or voluntary gender quotas for parliaments, political parties, and executives. However, the effectiveness of quotas is not a given and their impact on women’s representation in public life depends upon several factors like their level, the effectiveness of incentives to comply, and the strength of penalties for non-compliance (OECD, 2019[42]). The characteristics of the electoral system can also have a role in shaping democratic representation and inclusivity. Indeed, evidence suggests that proportional representation systems tend to result in higher numbers of women being elected (Electoral Reform Society, 2023[43]; OECD, 2023[44]). In December 2023, Spain approved the Organic Law on Equal Representation and Balanced Presence of Women and Men. Regarding the political sphere, the new law aims to ensure effective representation of women by mandating the “zipper system” in electoral legislation (Ministerio de Igualdad, 2023[45]). This requires candidates of both sexes listed in an alternating order for various elections (Ministerio de Igualdad, 2023[45]). Additionally, the law applies the principle of balanced representation to the State’s highest executive body, the Council of Ministers, stipulating that no gender should have less than 40% representation (Ministerio de Igualdad, 2023[45]). To enhance women’s representation at the local level, Costa Rica’s Supreme Electoral Tribunal announced in February 2023 that the 2024 municipal elections would apply gender parity in single-nomination positions, namely the mayors (Molina, 2023[46]).
Beyond quotas, additional mechanisms can be envisaged to foster broader gender equality. OECD countries report implementing measures such as voluntary targets, mentorship and networking programmes, and initiatives to create female-friendly parliamentary workplaces (OECD, 2023[35]). For example, in November 2022, the Riksdag Board, which leads the Swedish Parliament (Riksdag) Administration, established a working group on gender equality. The working group subsequently proposed an action programme for gender equality for the electoral period 2022-2026, which aims to achieve gender balance in parliament and various roles. It integrates gender equality into all activities, fosters an internal culture of respect, and facilitates work-life balance. Both men and women are involved in the Riksdag’s gender equality efforts, ensuring equal participation and resources allocation (Swedish Parliament, 2022[47]).
Overall, data shows that women’s representation in elected bodies and executives continues to increase on average across OECD countries, albeit slowly. Globally, the current pace suggests that gender parity in national legislative bodies may not be achieved until 2063, with gender equality in the highest positions taking another 130 years (UN Women, 2023[36]). To make further progress, governments need to keep implementing a comprehensive policy including both mandatory and voluntary measures. These can include incentives and sanctions; gender audits of parliamentary practices and procedures; impact assessments of the electoral law and other relevant laws; addressing violence, both online and offline; tackling unconscious bias and gender stereotypes on women’s leadership; raising awareness; and fostering leadership skills. Particular attention should be paid to understanding the specific barriers that women from diverse backgrounds may face.
Considering a youth lens and age-related perspective in democratic representation
Addressing the current challenges of democratic representation and reinforcing democracy also requires consideration of a youth and age-related perspective. According to the recent OECD 2024 Trust survey, young people tend to trust the national government less compared to older generations (43% of people aged 50 and over report having high or moderately high trust against 36% for people aged 18-29, even though this age-related trust gap has decreased since the 2021 Trust survey. Despite showing a strong motivation for addressing global challenges, young people tend to join political parties and vote in elections less than older peers. On average young people tend to vote less in national (68%) and local (41%) election, even though younger people are more prone to taking part in a demonstration and posting or forwarding content on social media (OECD, 2024[1]).
Young people also remain underrepresented in elected and executive bodies. In 2022, even though 20–39-year-olds represented a third of the voting age population on average across OECD countries (34%), less than a quarter (23%) of members of parliament (MPs) on average were under 40, indicating a representation gap of 11 percentage points (Figure 2.10). The largest representation gaps are seen in Israel, Türkiye and the United States (all -29 p.p.), while the smallest ones are seen in Germany and Latvia (-1 p.p.), Denmark and Finland (-2 p.p.), suggesting that demographics are not destiny but that policies, institutions and practices matter (OECD, 2023[35]). Representation gaps also remain high in countries’ executive branches. In 2022, across OECD countries, only 56 out of 756 of cabinet members were under 40 (7%) and only 16 were aged 35 or under (2%) (Figure 2.11).
Note: OECD calculations based on OECD Demography and Population database (2021); and Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) Parline database on national parliaments (2022).
Source: OECD (2023[35]), Government at a Glance 2023, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/3d5c5d31-en.
Note: OECD calculations based on publicly available data on official government websites as of 20 December 2022.
Source: OECD (2023[35]), Government at a Glance 2023, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/3d5c5d31-en.
Several OECD countries are taking action in this area such as Sweden, Switzerland, for example through taking steps to strengthen civic and citizenship literacy among young people as well as promote reliable and non-partisan information tailored to young people (Box 2.10).
Sweden: Skolval, mock elections at school
In Sweden, the Skolval initiative includes the organisation of mock elections as part of school curriculums to help young people familiarise with the electoral system, raise awareness on policy issues and ultimately raise awareness of, and engagement in, democratic processes. In 2022, Dalarna University, Stockholm University and Mid Sweden University undertook an evaluation of the initiative, demonstrating that approximately 70% of participating students gained a better understanding of democratic processes and politics (Myndigheten för ungdomsoch civilsamhällesfragor, 2023[48]). The initiative was first developed by the Swedish Agency for Youth and Civil Society in 2002. It is implemented in junior high schools and upper secondary schools, with a focus on schools providing special education to students with disabilities, and schools in socio-economically marginalised regions. Through this initiative, students under the minimum voting age engage in a simulated voting process. Before the elections, politicians from different parties are invited to share their ideas and policy proposals in schools, helping young people in making an informed decision. The initiative also includes other activities, such as political newsrooms, conducting polls and drafting articles.
Switzerland: Easyvote
The Swiss Federation of Youth Parliaments has developed the web platform and app “Easyvote” (Easyvote, n.d.[49]). Easyvote aims to make information on politics and democratic processes accessible to young people by presenting political content in a clear and neutral format. The platform uses user-friendly interfaces and multimedia to capture the attention of young people. The algorithms of the app “Votenow” allow young users to find the candidates who best match their opinions based on a series of questions. Easyvote also provides content to promote civic and citizenship literacy, for instance on the separation of powers, federalism, climate change, Switzerland’s state structure and international politics. The initiative originated to address research findings documenting that overload of information and complexity of electoral documents pose significant barriers to young people’s participation in elections (Easyvote, n.d.[50]). A survey conducted by the University of Bern and the Swiss Research Institute gfs.bern demonstrates that 94% of the respondents consider Easyvote to be a comprehensible source of information on politics (Easyvote, n.d.[49]).
Voter registration rules and minimum age requirements to vote and to run as a candidate can also present specific barriers for young people. For instance, the discrepancy between the minimum age to vote and the minimum age to run as candidate can raise confusion among young people and fuel stereotypes against young people in public and political life who are considered “too young” and “lacking experience” to access positions of political influence. Since 2022, some OECD countries, such as Belgium, Germany or Lithuania, have reviewed their minimum age policies to remove access barriers to young people’s participation in elected bodies (Box 2.11).
Initiatives have also emerged to channel young people’s perspectives in the work of national parliaments, for instance through dedicated caucuses and committees. In Australia, the Parliamentary Friends of Young People group was established in 2022 as a non-partisan forum for members of both chambers to meet and interact with young people and youth organisations to discuss policy issues impacting their lives.
Minimum age to vote in elections
Belgium lowered the minimum age to vote in elections for the European Parliament to 16 in 2022. While initially voters aged 16 and 17 could vote only after submitting a request to their municipality of residence, this additional step was dropped in 2023 after a ruling of the Belgian Constitutional Court considering it unconstitutional. In Germany, a law adopted in early 2023 also lowered the voting age from 18 to 16 for the elections of the European Parliament (European Parliament, 2023[51]).
Minimum age to run as candidate
In 2022, Lithuania lowered the minimum age to run as parliamentary candidate from 25 to 21 years; however, still exceeding the voting age of 18. In 2023, Mexico unanimously passed a law aligning the minimum candidacy age with the minimum voting age, reducing it from 21 to 18 (IPU, 2023[52]).
While some degree of progress has been made with regard to women and young people, barriers to representation remain to be tackled for other under-represented groups such as visible minorities, second generation migrants and indigenous people (where applicable). Given the diversity of these groups and the paucity of available comparative data, this report does not include any analysis of the issue, while recognising that it remains a policy challenge for many countries.
2.3.2. Promote integrity in democratic institutions and elected officials
The OECD 2022 RDI report clearly identified the need to ensure the integrity of democratic institutions and elected officials. While many OECD countries were taking steps to improve integrity in these areas, data collected for the 2022 report showed that there was scope for countries to improve further. Furthermore, challenges to the integrity of democratic institutions and elected officials have developed with globalisation which, despite bringing benefits to people and societies across the world, has also introduced more threats to the establishment of a fair and competitive global market and the propagation of strong, healthy democratic governments (OECD, 2024[53]). This presents liberal democracies with new, dangerous and complex challenges, which will be also discussed to address progress as part of the last Action Plan on “Stronger Open Democracies in a Globalised World”.
Strengthen government integrity systems, including in electoral processes by increasing transparency of the financing of political parties and election campaigns
Sound regulations and implementation in practice ensure effective transparency and integrity in the financing of political parties and election campaigns. Evidence from the OECD Public Integrity Indicators (Figure 2.12) shows that the majority of OECD countries (31) have a regulatory framework in place that requires parties/and or candidates to report on their finances (funding and expenses) during electoral campaigns. However, in just 12 countries have all political parties submitted accounts related to elections within the timelines defined by national legislation for the past two election cycles. Additionally, in only 15 OECD countries have all political parties submitted annual accounts within the timelines defined by national legislation for the past five years. Moreover, while 30 OECD countries require political parties to make their financial reports public, including all contributions exceeding a fixed ceiling, only 25 countries have published the financial reports from all political parties, and only 22 countries have published all financial reports on one single online platform in a user-friendly format. Taken together, failure to uphold transparency requirements undermines scrutiny and the ability of responsible authorities to assess compliance and react where necessary.
Note: Countries marked with an asterisk (*) do not have centralised data on practice. For annual financial reports, regulations refer to the criterion “Political parties must make financial reports public, including all contributions exceeding a fixed ceiling” and practice refers to the criterion “All political parties have submitted annual accounts within the timelines defined by national legislation for the past five years”. For election campaign financial reports, regulation refers to the criterion “Parties and/or candidates must report their finances (funding and expenses) during electoral campaigns” and practice refers to the criterion “All political parties have submitted accounts related to elections within the timelines defined by national legislation for the past two election cycles.”
How to read: 79% of OECD countries have regulations requiring political parties to publish annual financial reports, 32% of OECD countries have both regulations requiring political parties to publish annual financial reports and all political parties published annual financial reports within the timelines defined by national legislation for the past five years, 42% of OECD countries have regulations requiring political parties to publish annual financial reports but not all political parties published their annual financial reports within the timelines defined by national legislation in the past five years.
Source: OECD (2024[53]), Anti-Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2024, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/968587cd-en.
Moreover, recent years have seen more OECD countries establish an independent body with a mandate to oversee the financing of political parties. However, only 60% of OECD countries have such a body. An independent body can improve co-ordination, information sharing, and responsiveness, and can ensure greater independence from the individuals and institutions it is responsible for regulating (OECD, 2016[54]; IDEA, 2014[55]).
Cultivating a culture of political integrity, in particular by setting clear standards, oversight and accountability mechanisms for elected and appointed officials
Corruption remains a significant concern for citizens across OECD countries as it remains in the top ten most significant issues perceived by citizens among the three most important ones facing their country (OECD, 2024[1]). Across the OECD, the political environment is becoming increasingly more complex, with heightened polarisation, reduced trust in public institutions and the rapid and global spread of information manipulation and interference from foreign interests (see also Chapter 1 on Mis and Disinformation). This challenging context has increased public scrutiny on elected and appointed officials, putting their reputations at increasing risk of misperceptions or misrepresentations.
Political integrity is one of the cornerstones of representative democracy. Political integrity is based on the expectation that elected and appointed officials will pursue policies designed to improve the economic and social well-being of individuals, and not pursue policies that prioritise their private interests, or the commercial or political demands of special interest groups who attempt to influence them. As the complexity of representation increases in the face of numerous challenges, including undue foreign influence, political integrity standards serve as an internal moral compass for elected officials, orienting them to act with integrity even when no one is watching.
Cultivating a culture of political integrity requires a strong institutional framework that covers all aspects of the political process. This includes the selection of candidates within political parties, the conduct and financing of elections, as well as the policymaking process, which are discussed below.
Setting clear standards of integrity for elected and appointed officials
Standards for integrity, that provide clear and common definitions and set high expectations of conduct have been in place for some time (OECD, 2017[56]). Such standards consist of both legislative elements and soft law elements, like codes of conduct, and cover areas concerning conflict of interest, engaging with lobbyists and other influence actors, and the revolving door.
Many OECD countries have strong regulatory frameworks in place addressing conflicts of interest. However, while the standards exist on paper, implementation remains a challenge, evidenced by the fact that a significant number of countries do not fully monitor whether these requirements are upheld in practice (see Figure 2.13). For example, among the 29 OECD countries that require members of government to provide interest declarations, full statistics to monitor compliance with disclosure regulations are available in only 22 countries. Members of parliament are legally required to disclose their private interests in 32 OECD countries, but only 21 countries collect sufficient data to assess whether all declarations were fully disclosed.
Note: Data does not include data from Belgium, Colombia, Germany, and Hungary, that are categorised as “Not validated by country”. Data for regulations is based on criteria values for “Any member of government / member of parliament must submit an interest declaration, as a minimum upon entry and any renewal or change in public office”. Data for monitoring and practice are based on statistics collected to calculate the criteria values for “The submission rate of interest declarations from: members of the Government is 100% for the past six years / members of parliament is at least 90% for the past six years.
How to read: Members of government (Ministers) are legally required to disclose private interests in 88% OECD countries. Among these 88% of countries, the disclosure of private interests is fully monitored in 76% of countries. Among these 76% of countries, the average submission rate of interest disclosures by members of government is 100%.
Source: Adapted from OECD (2024[53]), Anti-Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2024, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/968587cd-en.
More concerningly, the resolution of conflicts-of-interest remain ad hoc. In instances when responsible authorities with a mandate to oversee implementation of conflict-of-interest policies have detected a conflict, only seven OECD countries can demonstrate that those authorities have issued recommendations for resolution within 12 months for all cases of conflict-of-interest detected for the past three years. For the remaining countries, either the responsible authorities have not issued recommendations for resolution, suggesting conflicts may be going unresolved, or they do not have data to show that resolutions are being reached, meaning countries are unable to check whether conflicts are being resolved and the corruption risk they create is being mitigated. This raises questions regarding the effectiveness of the exercised oversight, but also the overall implementation of conflict-of-interest regulations in practice.
Another potential conflict-of-interest area that requires stronger standards concerns the movement in and out of the public sector. While such movement allows governments to benefit from a greater transfer of skills and knowledge (OECD, 2014[57]; OECD, 2021[58]), if left unchecked, the “revolving door” phenomenon can lead to conflicts-of-interest among public office holders, undue influence over public policymaking, and unfair commercial advantages (OECD, 2014[57]; OECD, 2021[58]; OECD, 2017[59]; Brezis and Cariolle, 2014[60]; Lee and You, 2023[61]; Strickland, 2023[62]). This is particularly the case when public office holders move into sectors they were formerly responsible for, or lobbyists take up positions in organisations they previously lobbied. While these risks have typically been domestic in nature, the risk of public office holders using their networks and knowledge for the benefit of foreign interests is an emerging challenge (Charon and Jeangène Vilmer, 2021[63]).
Yet across the OECD, standards on post-public employment for elected and appointed officials are lacking. Only 20 OECD countries have introduced mandatory cooling-off periods for public office holders, but only two have cooling off periods for both public officials and lobbyists (see Figure 2.14).
Note: The inner circle is based on whether post-employment integrity for ministers is tracked. The outer circle is based on whether post-employment integrity for top-officials is tracked. Countries marked with an asterisk (*) have mandatory cooling-off periods for public officials.
Source: OECD (2024[64]), OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database, https://data-explorer.oecd.org/.
Most OECD countries, including many with mandatory cooling-off periods, are not tracking the post-employment activities of public office holders in practice. Only nine OECD countries collect data on the frequency within the past five years with which ministers took up positions in a private sector organisation that operates in their former area of responsibility. This data does not necessarily need to be made public, but the lack of data makes it difficult for governments to assess whether their rules on revolving door are being observed, and therefore whether they are mitigating the risks of movement in and out of public office.
Cultivating a culture of integrity through oversight and accountability mechanisms
Effective oversight in integrity systems strengthens accountability within government, and enables public institutions to learn and improve, and ultimately better serve the public interest. For oversight to be effective, countries need to have clear institutional arrangements in place that can provide the appropriate scrutiny, while also respecting the separation of powers between the executive, judiciary and legislative branches. Several OECD countries have had such mechanisms independent accountability mechanisms for the legislature, such as Canada, or have recently introduced them, such as most recently the Netherlands (Box 2.12). These independent mechanisms are based on:
a clearly defined appointment process for members, as well as clarity on terms of independence
sufficient human, material and financial resources to perform their duties
clearly defined scope and mandate, providing guidance on how to comply with requirements, handling and adjudicating complaints, conducting investigations and publishing decisions
clearly defined roles for issuing sanctions, either by the oversight body itself or by a relevant authority. Sanctions should be applied consistently should be effective, timely and proportionate.
The Regulations on the Monitoring and Enforcement of the Code of Conduct for Members of the House of Representatives (2021) provide for the establishment of an Integrity Investigation Board responsible for receiving and investigating complaints regarding violations of the Code of Conduct by MPs. If after an investigation the Board establishes a violation of the Code of Conduct, the corresponding report is sent to the Presidium (executive committee of the House of Representatives) and to the MP under investigation. In these cases, the Board can also make a recommendation for a sanction in the report. The Presidium is obliged to make the report public no later than four weeks after receiving it, so that the complainant can see the report at that time. However, the Board can determine that parts of the report remain confidential in connection with serious reasons, and those cannot be published by the Presidium. The Presidium should also send a letter to the House of Representatives, simultaneously with the publication of the report, with a proposal to impose the recommended sanctions.
Source: Tweede Kamer (n.d.[65]), “Rules of Integrity”, https://www.houseofrepresentatives.nl/members-parliament/rules-integrity.
2.3.3. Address undue influence on government policy
The OECD 2022 RDI report clearly addressed the need to avert undue influence in public decision-making processes, promoting transparency and integrity in lobbying. More specifically, the Action Plan included commitments to:
Ensure transparency on who is influencing government policies through lobbying and all other forms of influence, including through digital means.
Strengthen integrity standards for public officials tailored to the risks of undue influence.
Engage with the private sector and civil society to promote their adherence to transparency and integrity standards in their relationship with government.
While lobbying and influence activities are a legitimate act of political participation, whereby different interest groups can provide governments with insights and data, if the proper safeguards are not put in place, it can also create unfair advantages for certain groups that lead to asymmetric or undue influence over policymaking. Lobbying and influence are also becoming more complex, with the rise of social media and a greater range of actors seeking to influence public policymaking.
This area clearly appears as a matter of concern in the results from the 2024 OECD Trust survey, as most people feel that decision making favours private sector interests over the public interests. 43% of respondents say it is likely that the national government would accept the demand of a corporation promoting a policy beneficial to their industry but harmful to the society as a whole, and only three in ten respondents believe that the government would refuse a corporation’s demands (OECD, 2024[1]). Moreover, nearly one in two citizens doubt that a high -level political official would refuse to grant a political favour in return for a well-paid private sector job.
Despite this background, OECD countries have adopted a range of tools to improve the transparency of lobbying and influence activities. These tools included public online registries where lobbyists and/or public officials disclose information on their interactions, government transparency measures where public office holders disclose information on their meetings with lobbyists, or ex post disclosures of how decisions were made. While since 2022, there has been ample scope for countries to take action in this area, progress has been relatively limited.
Ensuring transparency on who is influencing government policies through lobbying and all other forms of influence, including through digital means
Public Integrity Indicators from 2023 shows that lobbying and influence is a policy area with comparatively few regulatory safeguards in OECD countries (Figure 2.15). Countries’ safeguards to protect against undue influence in lobbying are much weaker than in areas such as political finance, conflict of interest, and access to information, in which countries scored substantially higher. The data shows a divide between OECD member countries with strong lobbying frameworks and OECD member countries with no lobbying safeguards at all. Top performers when it comes to promoting transparency and integrity in lobbying include Austria, Canada, Chile, France, Ireland, Slovenia, and the United States.
How to read: the values are calculated by analysing whether countries fulfil a standard set of criteria. The score for lobbying regulations is based on four criteria and the score for lobbying in practice is based on nine criteria. As measured against OECD standards on lobbying, OECD countries fulfil on average 38% of criteria for regulations and 35% for implementation.
Data not provided: BEL, COL, DEU, HUN, NZL.
Source: OECD (2024[53]), Anti-Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2024, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/968587cd-en.
The goal when regulating lobbying may not necessarily be to reduce lobbying, but rather to promote integrity and transparency in the influence of the policymaking process. Regulation establishes clear rules of the game and provides clarity on who is lobbying, how they are lobbying, and what they are lobbying for or against. A core element of any lobbying regulation therefore are clear definitions on what lobbying is, and who lobbyists are. Overall, 17 countries have established legal definitions of both lobbying and lobbyists (Figure 2.16).
Note: Data based on criterion “Lobbying activities are defined in the regulatory framework, including which actors are considered as lobbyists”. Data not provided: BEL, COL, DEU, HUN, ITA, NZL.
Source: OECD (2024[53]), Anti-Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2024, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/968587cd-en.
Beyond the legal framework, there are many steps that countries can take to increase the transparency of lobbying activities, with a usual first step of making publicly available information on lobbying, for example through lobbying registers, footprints of the public decision-making process footprint, or open agendas. While transparency alone is not the solution to increase integrity in lobbying (Bitonti and Mariotti, 2023[66]) it is a useful starting point because it invites scrutiny over the actions of lobbyists and public officials (OECD, 2021[58]).
An overview of the different transparency measures that were available in 2020 across the OECD shows piecemeal practices. Currently, 17 OECD member countries have established publicly available lobbying registers, although not all provide a clear picture of the actors influencing policymaking (OECD, 2021[58]). Out of the 17 countries with publicly available lobbying registers, only 13 include information about a lobbyist’s domain of intervention and type of lobbying activities in their registers. Only 8 countries include more detailed information on piece of legislation targeted and only four include information on the budget and expenses for lobbying. With such limited information available, lobbying registers in many countries are therefore unlikely to shed light how special interests are influencing policy. Some countries have recently either introduced a new lobbying regulation or strengthened their current system to improve transparency and enable better public scrutiny. For example, the Lobbying Register of Finland came into force on 1 January 2024 (Finnish Transparency Register (lobbyist register), 2024[67]). Germany recently introduced reforms to its lobbying register to extend its scope and require greater transparency (Box 2.13).
On 1 January 2022, Germany’s first lobbying register at the federal level entered into force. Building on this, the German Bundestag agreed on a reform of the Lobbying Register Act in 2023, which entered into force on 1 March 2024. The amendments aim at increasing transparency in interest representation and citizen’s trust in the integrity of democratic processes and institutions. The various amendments to the Lobby Register Act, while not a complete list, can be divided into four key areas:
Extension of the scope of the register: Registration is now mandatory for contacts up to the level of department heads in the federal ministries since draft legislation of the Federal Government is generally prepared at the department level. Obligations to register in the lobby register will apply to 30 (instead of 50) lobbying contacts in the last three months. Initiators of interest representations are now obligated to register themselves if compensation is received for the assignment.
Improvement of structural transparency: All persons and organisations included in the register are obligated, without exception, to disclose their financial expenditure related to interest representation activities. This includes details on grants and subsidies from the public sector and donations and other lifetime benefits from third parties. Regarding the revolving door, individuals listed must provide details of their current or previous affiliations with the German Bundestag or government offices as well as employment relationships in the federal administration. In the case of natural persons, it is now mandatory to provide the company name, if available, to ensure transparency regarding any potential economic motivations. Gifts with sponsoring benefits are now incorporated and the aggregate sum of donations received must be reported in EUR 10 000 increments. The naming of individual donors is only required if the donations of a donor exceed the total annual value of EUR 10 000 and at the same time 10% of the total donation amount.
Ensuring transparency of content: The key innovation of the reform is the inclusion of specific details regarding interest representation activities within the register. This involves specifying all current, planned or intended targeted regulatory projects and a required publication of fundamental opinions and expert reports related. The disclosed information will remain visible for eight years.
Clarifications and simplifications to further increase information value and control of the register entries. These include, for example, a strengthened legal position of the register-keeping body and simplified updating obligations and general register entry management.
Source: German Bundestag (2023[68]), “Lobby Register”, https://www.lobbyregister.bundestag.de/startseite?lang=de
Other transparency tools included publishing the agendas of ministers online. These “open agendas” can also give the public a better sense of which interest groups may be meeting with ministers, although they are most effective when they can be cross-referenced against a lobbying register (OECD, 2021[58]). While 10 countries publish ministers’ agendas either on a centralised portal or on the websites of the respective ministries, only four countries combine these open agendas with a publicly available lobbying register. Lastly, in addition to lobbying registers and open agendas, other countries provide transparency on lobbying by mandating ex post disclosures of how decisions were made. The information disclosed can be a table or a document listing the identity of lobbyists met, public officials involved, the object and outcome of their meetings, as well as an assessment of how the input received was factored into the final decision (OECD, 2021[58]). Germany has recently put in place such requirements: an amendment to the Joint Rules of Procedure of the Federal Ministries introduced in 2023 established a mandatory legislative footprint. From 1 June 2024, all draft legislation of the Federal Government must state “the extent to which interest representatives and commissioned third parties have made a significant contribution to the content of the draft legislation”. Making information public is only one side of the coin and more transparency is needed around the forms of lobbying and influence. Trends over the past decades have shown that lobbying and influence are increasingly targeted towards the upstream generation of ideas and evidence and undertaken by a greater range of actors, sometimes indirectly or by proxies, including NGOs, foundations, think tanks and research centres. While these groups can contribute expert opinions, evidence and data, and public mobilisation to the policymaking process, there is a risk of undue influence, and more transparency is needed around these forms of lobbying, especially as they are often excluded from the definition of “lobbyist” or are exempt from disclosure requirements (OECD, 2021[58]).
Using media, journalism or other public platforms is also an emergent way of shaping perceptions of the public and ultimately of influencing the policymaking process. Just as with funding research, think tanks and other organisations, the so-called “journo-lobbying” is often referred to as an indirect lobbying strategy used to influence story telling of a given policy issue. More transparency is needed on the use of social media in lobbying; the Canadian Register of Lobbyists and the EU Transparency Register are the only frameworks requiring lobbyists to declare awareness-raising, grassroots and social media campaigns as lobbying tools (OECD, 2021[58]).
In addition, more transparency around the interests of advisory groups providing advice to government is also required. Such groups are composed of academic and scientific experts, public and private sector members and/or representatives from civil society. While these groups help to strengthen evidence-informed decision making, the legitimacy of their advice is at risk when transparency and conflict-of-interest safeguards are not in place for their senior members (OECD, 2021[58]). OECD countries can mitigate these risks by implementing transparency and integrity frameworks for advisory groups, which include standards on integrity and conflict of interest, and provide for public disclosure on the funding and functioning of the groups, and disclosure of their members, including their private interests and past professional affiliations. Such provisions exist for well-developed advisory groups in some countries but are far from being the norm.
Finally, further tools are needed to determine the beneficial owners of companies influencing the policymaking process. The term “beneficial owner” refers to the natural person(s) who ultimately owns or controls a customer and/or the natural person on whose behalf a transaction is being conducted. It also includes those persons who exercise ultimate control over a legal person or arrangement. Even where a fair level of transparency exists as to who is influencing the policymaking process, the name of a legal entity may not reveal who is the beneficial owner, or who is ultimately benefiting from the lobbying activity. Transparency and scrutiny would necessitate that adequate, accurate, and up-to-date information on beneficial ownership can be obtained or accessed rapidly and efficiently by competent authorities, through either a register of beneficial ownership or an alternative mechanism.
While some countries have recently taken steps toward the creation of such a register, such as Canada, who in November 2023 passed legislation to this effect, the decision of the European Court of Justice in November 2022 that the publication of beneficial ownership information violates the right to privacy has had negative implications for the capacity to ensure transparency around beneficial ownership.
Strengthening integrity standards for public officials and lobbying and influence actors tailored to the risks of undue influence
Integrity standards have existed across OECD countries for some time, to regulate the way that public officials can engage with lobbyist (OECD, 2010[69]). While the great majority of public officials follow the spirit of these principles, few countries have specific integrity standards for public officials on lobbying and influence activities. Integrity standards and ethical obligations on lobbying and influence activities may be included in a specific lobbying law or lobbying code of conduct, or included in the general standards for public officials, such as laws or codes of conduct for public officials. As of 2020, few OECD countries, roughly a quarter, had developed such specific standards (OECD, 2021[58]). Further guidance is needed. Such guidance can include elements such as:
the duty to treat lobbying and influence actors equally by granting them fair and equitable access
the obligation to refuse meetings with unregistered lobbying and influence actors
the obligation to report violations to competent authorities
the duty to register their meetings with lobbying and influence actors (through a lobbying registry or open agendas)
guidance on how to assess the reliability of information provided by lobbying and influence actors.
Public officials across the OECD also require additional guidance to assess the reliability of information (OECD, 2021[58]). In their interactions with public officials, lobbying and influence actors share their expertise, legitimate needs and evidence about policy problems and how to address them. This provides public officials valuable information on which to base their decisions. At times, they may abuse this legitimate process to provide unreliable or inaccurate information. For example, lobbying and influence actors may highlight selective findings of scientific studies, dismissing any doubts or criticisms in these studies. They may also support and promote studies that challenge scientific arguments unfavourable to their interests or highlight the results of studies financed by their own centres and institutes and other organisations, such as think tanks. Few governments, however, provide concrete standards for public officials in assessing evidence provided by third parties. This is clearly an area where greater capacity for evidence-informed policymaking, through training and coaching, could also support public officials in asking the right questions and having a critical view on the quality of evidence.
Lobbying and influence actors also require clear standards and guidelines that clarify the expected rules and behaviour for engaging with public officials. This ensures integrity in the policymaking process. Canada recently updated its Code of Conduct for lobbyists, following three rounds of consultations with relevant stakeholders. The Code includes easy-to-understand rules that work to enhance transparent and ethical lobbying (Box 2.14).
The Code is a non-statutory tool that complements the Lobbying Act’s registration requirements and serves to reinforce transparent and ethical lobbying. It applies only to an individual who must be identified as a lobbyist in the Registry of Lobbyists.
It includes a list of four key expectations to guide lobbyists in complying with the rules in this Code:
Transparency
Respect for government institutions
Integrity, honesty and professionalism
Lobbyists must also follow the specific rules related to:
Disclosures
Trustworthiness
Gifts and hospitality
Sense of obligation
Effective oversight and enforcement of lobbying standards are essential for mitigating risks of undue and asymmetric influence
While action plans for effective oversight and enforcement exist in most cases, countries are not ensuring the standards set out in their regulatory frameworks are maintained in practice through effective enforcement and oversight. While such enforcement matters for compliance (OECD, 2021[58]), many countries, had not defined sanctions regimes within their lobbying rules as of 2020 when the last comparative data were available. Existing sanctions regimes may not be effective. Only just over a third of OECD countries have defined proportionate sanctions for breaches of standards for transparency and integrity in lobbying. Even among the 17 countries with a legal definition of lobbying, six have not prescribed sanctions. In countries where sanctions regimes do exist, their deterrent effect may be undermined because those subject to them are unaware of them (OECD, 2021[58]). A 2020 OECD survey of parliamentarians and lobbyists found that only 10% of parliamentarians and 11% of lobbyists knew of sanctions that had been applied in the previous 12 months, and that 42% of lobbyists were not even aware that sanctions existed (OECD, 2021[58]).
Effective oversight is also an area for potential improvement. However, according to the latest data from 2020, only 14 OECD countries had established a supervisory authority to oversee transparency and integrity in lobbying. Of the 12 countries with sanctions in place, ten had conducted an investigation for non-compliance with lobbying regulations within the past year. These results also highlight a strong contrast between a core group of OECD countries that has taken many steps to promote integrity and transparency in lobbying and the rest of the countries, where this is an area where further progress is needed.
Note: Data based on criterion “sanctions for breaches of standards for transparency and integrity in lobbying are defined and proportional to the severity of the offence” and “at least one investigation was carried out for non-compliance with the regulation of lobbying activities or incomplete or erroneous disclosure of information during the latest full calendar year”. Data not provided: BEL, COL, DEU, HUN, NZL.
Source: OECD (2024[64]), OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database.
Engaging with the private sector to promote their adherence to transparency and integrity standards in their engagement with government
To ensure transparency and integrity in lobbying and influence, governments need to engage proactively with the private sector and set clear standards on responsible corporate engagement. Getting corporate influence right – ensuring that business can engage with pressing policy challenges in a responsible, trustworthy, and problem-solving manner – is essential. Growing expectations on companies to engage more also come with growing expectations on how they engage. This comes with proportionate responsibilities attuned to global challenges to exercise political engagement transparently and constructively, so that companies can contribute to economic, environmental and social progress with a view to achieving sustainable development.
This is an area of significant progress. The relevance of corporate political engagement to both society and business success increasingly motivates a broader range of corporate stakeholders, including shareholders, investors, customers and employees, to pay more attention to the corporate political footprint of the firms that they own, transact with or work for – and how their engagement footprint aligns with their positioning on societal issues. For example, over the last two decades, shareholders have formally engaged with close to half of all S&P500 companies to improve their transparency and accountability on corporate political engagement (Center for Political Accountability, 2023[72]), and shareholder resolutions on these issues continue to feature among the top topics raised by investors (CERES, 2022[73]; Morningstar, 2023[74]; VBDO, 2023[75]).
A growing number of principles and reporting frameworks are also surfacing in the corporate stakeholder ecosystem that, while not always specifically targeted, provide key insights on what constitutes responsible corporate engagement. These include: (i) existing government regulations, guidelines and codes of conduct that frame interactions between government and businesses in democratic systems (lobbying regulations, lobbying codes of conduct, political finance rules); (ii) mandatory sustainability reporting standards, such as the European Commission’s Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD) and Sustainability Reporting Standards (ESRS) (also featured in the chapter on governing green) (European Commission, 2023[41]); and (iii) international initiatives and frameworks on responsible lobbying and corporate political engagement, including the latest Global Standard on Responsible Climate Lobbying (AP7, BNPP AM, Church of England Pensions Boad, 2022[76]).
Based on these initiatives and good practices in companies, the OECD has convened a community of government, business and civil society representatives to identify core principles of responsible lobbying and corporate political engagement with government. Current draft OECD Principles reflect evolving expectations and evidence for what constitutes responsible corporate political engagement, understood as the upholding of the highest standards of integrity, transparency, openness, and equity by businesses as they contribute to economic, environmental and social progress, and how to realise it effectively from setting business strategy all the way to everyday business operations. As such, the draft Principles seek to provide guidance for companies and corporate stakeholders to design and execute corporate political engagement that contributes responsibly to economic, environmental and social progress.
2.3.4. Foster a diverse, representative and responsive civil service
The OECD 2022 RDI report underlined the importance of fostering a diverse, representative, and responsive civil service as a way of improving decision making and building trust in government. The subsequent action plan calls on governments to strengthen diversity in the public sector workforce, as well as inter-generational learning between older and younger employees; providing training and skills, as well as developing concrete and applicable goals for an open and participatory civil service that would enable it to be more responsive; taking stock of barriers in the pipeline for senior management positions and horizontal segregation to enable balanced representation of diverse societal groups across all decision-making levels; and monitoring progress through concrete targets measured through more data collection and use.
Senior managers of the HR function in OECD countries are taking seriously the issues of ’creating a representative and diverse public service, particularly at senior leadership positions, and guaranteeing equitable opportunities for underrepresented employee groups. OECD indicators of diversity in the public sector helps monitor progress towards this aim. Traditionally, available data shows that Westminster countries tend to invest more in diversity initiatives, with the United Kingdom, New Zealand and Canada in top positions, alongside Israel. In continental Europe, France and the Netherlands are among the countries that invest in such initiatives the most (OECD, 2021[34]). Another key indicator focuses on gender balance at the top levels of the public service hierarchy. While many OECD countries have gender balance in the public service as a whole, very few achieve it at senior levels. OECD data on workforce composition shows just five countries had 50% or more women in senior management positions in central governments in recent years (OECD, 2021[34]).
Another area where representation can be ensured is through recruitment, which can be mobilised to support gender balance. For example, countries are linking specific occupations to gender by implementing targets or quotas for gender equality in public service recruitment. Of the OECD countries, 14 have set gender targets for the entire public service, while 7 specifically target senior-level public servants (OECD, 2023[38]).
Systems of learning and development matter to ensure a diverse representative and responsive civil service, particularly at senior level, as it matters to develop the pipeline of future leaders (OECD, 2023[77]). Some leading governments collect and analyse robust data to evaluate the effectiveness of training systems in reaching all staff and cultivating the necessary skill sets for responsive governance. For example, several countries collect data on participation on training programmes by gender and age (e.g., Belgium, Estonia, France, Luxembourg, and Latvia), which can be useful in undercovering unseen barriers to learning or reskilling uptake faced by women or older employees. However, more data could be collected by OECD countries on further diverse groups, as very few countries collect data on participation in training by people with disabilities, and none collect it on participation by employees of lower socio-economic backgrounds. Some best-practice governments, for example Canada, collect their data on learning and development at a central level as well as in more detail at ministry level, allowing for comparisons across departments and ministries in government, to ensure that success and best practices are shared and to inform decisions about using mobility as a tool for development.
The OECD 2023 report on Public Employment and Management (OECD, 2023[77]) has identified a critical gap in assessing participation and outcomes for training across diverse groups of employees. Notably, just over 30% of OECD countries track participation in training and development initiatives by gender, for central government public servants. This number drops for other groups that are important for creating a representative public service, standing at slightly more than 20% for participation across age groups, below 10% for people with disabilities, and 0% for people of different socioeconomic backgrounds. This leaves questions about whether all employees are reached by training initiatives and being given equal opportunities for growth and development. Ensuring that all employees have equal opportunity to learn, grow and reach their potential can be a significant factor in creating a broadly skilled workforce that also represents the population it serves, particularly at leadership levels.
Ireland is a leading example of work being done within a public service to increase the degree to which it represents the diverse population of the country. Ireland has taken significant strides in recent years in advancing diversity, equality, and inclusion (DE&I) through a dedicated strategy in its public service, spanning 2021-2023. This strategy is itself imbedded in the administration’s Corporate Statement of Strategy (“Nua 23”). Both Nua 23 and the ED&I Strategy 2021-2023 firmly position diversity and inclusion as central tenets guiding the organisation’s purpose, mission, and strategic priorities – making Ireland now among the leading OECD countries in diversity and inclusion work for its public service. Moreover, the strategy’s emphasis on data-driven decision-making underscores a commitment to transparency and accountability, laying the groundwork for evidence-based initiatives to drive diversity and inclusion forward.
2.3.5. Deliver on the promise of more inclusive policies
The OECD Action Plan on Enhancing Representation, Participation and Openness in Public Life calls OECD members to fulfil their commitment to fostering more inclusive public policies (OECD, 2022[78]). This entails the development of explicit provisions to support the integration of the needs of underrepresented groups into policymaking through strengthened mainstreaming processes. Additionally, the Plan emphasises the importance of improving both the availability and use of diversity-related data and evidence, as well as documenting the policy impacts of and lessons learned from their use.
Ensuring the inclusivity of public policies transcends mere considerations of the identity and background of those in positions of authority, whether they are elected or part of the civil service, which have been addressed in the previous sections. Rather, promoting inclusive policies requires proactively identifying and addressing both overt and implicit systemic barriers and biases that may perpetuate inequalities. In fact, policy instruments are not always neutral in their application and impact, and potential bias can hide in government decision making, with the risk of exacerbating inequality and discrimination, as highlighted in the gender area (OECD, 2023[38]) (see section focusing on gender equality).
Moreover, there is a growing recognition by policymakers in OECD countries that inequalities are the result of the interaction of various identity-based discriminations and that approaching them by considering only one identity factor (e.g., gender) may result in an incomplete picture of the advantages and disadvantages faced by different groups in society. Intersectional analysis takes these interactions into account, producing a more holistic picture of the various discriminations that can affect individuals (OECD, 2023[38]). The improved understanding of needs brought about through intersectional analysis can help support targeted policy action that is more effective at closing gender gaps.
Adopting a youth lens to support inclusion
Young people have been hit hard by the COVID-19 pandemic and the cost-of-living crisis and inter-generational challenges such as climate change, population ageing, and others are impacting and will continue to affect their and future generations’ wellbeing (OECD, 2022[28]). Delivering more inclusive policies can sustain well-being, people’s satisfaction with public institutions and ultimately strengthen their association with democracy. OECD data shows that respondents aged 18-29 are more likely to report financial insecurities (OECD, 2023[79]). Results from the 2023 OECD trust survey also show that in all countries, feelings of economic insecurity are associated with lower trust in the government. (OECD, 2024[1]). Younger respondents to the 2022 Risks That Matter Survey are also considerably more likely to be concerned about accessing adequate housing on average, with a 22-percentage point difference between people aged 18-29 and those aged 50-64 (OECD, 2023[79]). These challenges call countries to systematically consider, integrate and address young people’s needs and perspectives across all relevant policy and service areas.
Youth mainstreaming can be introduced across core functions of government including through (i) the systematic collection and use of age-disaggregated evidence; (ii) the elaboration and implementation of national and sub-national integrated youth strategies; (iii) the use of public management tools (e.g. regulatory impact assessments, budgeting); and (iv) the systematic and meaningful participation of young people in policymaking.
National youth strategies can promote an integrated approach to youth policymaking and service delivery by identifying strategic objectives, assigning clear responsibility for implementation across governmental and non-governmental stakeholders, and by establishing a monitoring and evaluation framework to track progress. As of April 2020, 76% of OECD countries had an operational national or federal multi-year youth strategy in place (OECD, 2020[80]). OECD countries have continued designing, implementing, monitoring, evaluating and updating national youth strategies (Box 2.15).
Mexico: National Youth Programme (Projuventud)
Mexico is finalising the implementation of its National Youth Programme 2019-2024 (Projuventud). The Programme aims to establish operational guidelines to shape youth policy, foster inter-institutional co-operation (notably across levels of government) and integrate young people’s needs and interests across policy and service areas (Instituto Mexicano de la Juventud, 2022[81]). The strategy’s design was informed by surveys, polls, and debates to gather young people’s perspectives, with targeted efforts to include under-represented groups in the process, such as girls, indigenous young people and LGBTIQ+ young people. As part of the Programme, Mexico established a System for Monitoring and Evaluation of Youth Policy aimed at monitoring and evaluate the impact and effectiveness of government actions and programmes for young people (Government of Mexico, n.d.[82]).
New Zealand: Youth Plan: Voice, Leadership, Action
In 2023, New Zealand reviewed and updated its Youth Plan: Voice, Leadership, Action (Youth Plan). The review was informed by engagements with over 1 400 young people through in-person and digital means. The participatory process paid specific attention to under-represented groups, including Rangatahi Māori, Pacific young people, rainbow young people, disabled young people, young women and young people from minority ethnic communities. The updated Youth Plan provides government agencies and youth stakeholders with a common vision, framework, tools and resources to promote change as part of the broader Child and Youth Wellbeing Strategy (CYWS) (The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet New Zealand, 2023[83]). The Youth Plan was first launched in 2020 with the aim of increasing opportunities for young people to lead their own lives, have their identities seen, valued, and respected, and have increasing influence in their communities and across government policy.
Policymakers can also leverage tools, such as ex-ante regulatory impact assessments (RIAs), to anticipate potential impacts on young people of new laws, policies and regulations. Using such tools also encourages the collection of age-disaggregated data and evidence and it can foster inter-ministerial co-ordination as well as transparency and accountability. For example, “youth checks” are increasingly being applied as tools to promote youth mainstreaming at different levels, in line with practices in Austria, France of Germany (since 2022, a “youth check” also exists at the state level in Thüringen) and the Flanders region in Belgium, as well as in other jurisdictions (3.20).
Parma, Italy: Generational impact evaluation
In January 2024, the city of Parma (Italy) adopted a generational impact evaluation (youth check) aimed at systematically analysing and evaluating the impact of the municipality’s policies, programmes and projects aimed, either directly or indirectly, at young people (City of Parma, 2024[84]). The introduction of the generational impact evaluation has been accompanied by the adoption of guidelines for its implementation, including areas of impact, outputs and outcomes indicators, steps to ensure a youth participatory approach and the overall process flow. The youth check is first applied to assess the potential impacts of the annual programme of the municipality, which is the municipality’s main strategic and operational document.
European Union: Youth mainstreaming
The European Union has been giving new impetus to promote youth mainstreaming as an approach to policymaking, starting from the work undertaken during the 2022 European Year of Youth. In 2023, the Council of the European Union adopted conclusions to promote youth mainstreaming in policy design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation in all areas affecting young people’s lives (European Council, 2023[85]). Building on these conclusions, in 2024, the European Commission committed to applying a youth check when designing EU policies (notably by leveraging the existing Better Regulation tools, including consultations and impact assessments) and outlined key actions to strengthen youth mainstreaming at European and national level going forward, including through co-operation with the OECD on strengthening the evidence base and lessons learnt (European Commission, 2024[86]).
Addressing data gaps for gender-sensitive and inclusive policymaking
High-quality, reliable, and easily accessible data serves as the cornerstone for evidence-informed policymaking as it facilitates the identification of the most effective and efficient ways to tackle social and economic challenges, including gender inequalities. However, the rigour of gender and intersectional analysis is still limited by the availability of adequate data, especially in areas traditionally considered as “gender neutral” (e.g., defence, trade, environment), which calls for strategies to expand the evidence base in view of strengthening inclusive policymaking. Against this backdrop, OECD countries are taking steps to improve the supply of gender-sensitive and intersectional data and evidence to foster inclusive policies. For instance, Women and Gender Equality Canada (WAGE), the country’s central gender equality institution, announced new research in 2023-24 to further understand and advance gender equality in Canada and expand on the availability of intersectional data. This will include research on identifying barriers for women and gender diverse individuals in politics, including the harassment of elected officials, as well as research on the pathways for women, youth, and 2SLGBTQI+ individuals in and out of homelessness (Government of Canada, 2023[87]). Ireland is also in the process of developing a National Equality Data Strategy to improve the collection of all equality data and the ability of public bodies to monitor the impact of policies and initiatives (Government of Ireland, 2022[88]). Looking at the whole OECD area, at least 19 OECD countries state having legal or binding requirements for the collection and dissemination of gender-disaggregated data (OECD, 2023[38]). In addition, in at least 7 OECD countries the strategic framework for data and statistics at the central/federal level explicitly includes commitments or actions on gender and/or intersectional data (OECD, 2023[38]).
Furthermore, emerging technologies and artificial intelligence (AI) are increasingly showing their potential to enhance inclusive and gender-sensitive policymaking, by facilitating the processing of large datasets, and using predictive modelling techniques to forecast the potential impact of policies on different societal groups. However, it is essential to ensure that AI systems are developed and deployed ethically and responsibly to mitigate the risk of reinforcing biases or perpetuating discrimination. For example, Canada adopted in 2019 a Directive on Automated Decision-Making as a framework to help institutions better understand and reduce the risks associated with the use of AI in supporting administrative decisions (Government of Canada, 2023[89]). The Directive’s safeguards against discriminatory outcomes for historically marginalised individuals or groups have been strengthened in April 2023 with a new requirement mandating the completion of a Gender Based Analysis Plus during the development of modification of an automated system (Government of Canada, 2023[89]). This intends to foster an intersectional approach to the design of automation projects, allowing departments to consider multiple identity factors such as sex, gender, geography, and language when assessing the potential impacts of a system on individuals.
These recent developments underscore the proactive measures OECD countries are undertaking to deliver on the promise of representation through more inclusive public policies. Capitalising on these advancements, there exist opportunities to further strengthen these processes in the future. OECD countries should enhance the use of tools and policy instruments to support inclusive policymaking and gender equality. For example, quality gender impact assessments (GIAs) should be conducted throughout the policymaking process, including policy evaluation, to understand gender-specific impacts. As a key prerequisite for GIAs and inclusive and gender-sensitive policymaking, OECD countries should continue improving the collection, accessibility and use of gender and intersectional data, taking into account the informational needs of policymakers at various stages of the policy process and expanding the types of data sources and methods to analyse them. These efforts would necessitate investments in staff capacity building, such as fostering co-ordination among government units and agencies to ensure data quality, interoperability, and privacy protection, thereby establishing a robust data governance ecosystem. Finally, while harnessing the potential of emerging technologies to foster inclusive policymaking, it would be important to ensure algorithms and other tools are free from bias and do not reinforce gender stereotypes, with the risk of inadvertently exacerbating inequalities and discrimination.
2.4.1. Working collectively through the OECD
Over the past two years, the OECD has been very active in supporting countries, facilitating peer learning and engaging with countries in all areas of the action plan:
Promoting inclusive public participation and deliberation. The OECD has monitored and evaluated participatory processes, in light of country progress in implementing the Open Government Recommendation (OECD, 2023[3]). The work has benefitted from the OECD Recommendation on Creating Better Opportunities for Young People and the OECD Recommendation on Gender Equality in Public Life. The OECD has also actively been supporting countries to assess, monitor, and protect and promote civic space following the 2022 global report (OECD, 2022[26]).
Strengthening Democratic Representation. The OECD has actively engaged with countries to update the 2010 Recommendation on Principles for Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying. It has also collected data also reflected in the 2024 Anticorruption and Integrity Outlook (OECD, 2024[53]). The OECD has also actively worked towards more inclusive policies for young people through the horizontal project “A Better Future for Young People in Ageing Societies” (2023-24)”, supporting the implementation of the OECD Recommendation on Creating Better Opportunities for Young People. The OECD has also developed an OECD Youth Policy Toolkit.
The (2023) report “Public Employment and Management: Towards a More Flexible Public Service” (OECD, 2023[77]) and the 2024 PEM composition survey and diversity inclusion indicators support a diverse, representative and responsive civil service. The OECD has engaged to close data gaps focusing on intersectional and inclusive policy analysis.
2.4.2. Conclusions and priorities for the future
Countries are making process in implementing participatory processes at all levels of government, including developing policy frameworks to ensure civil society engagement and improve access to information, and making efforts to enhance representation in elected bodies and the civil service. These processes complement well-established forms of participation characteristic of representative democracies, such the ballot box. In particular, many countries have taken action by:
Making public participation and deliberation more inclusive, using a wide range of mechanisms (public meetings, online and in-person consultations, roundtables, and representative deliberative processes), and lowering barriers for people whose voices are often overlooked, including children, young people, migrants, women, first nations, LGBTI communities7 and those with special needs. Many countries are also fostering a culture of dialogue, enabling greater engagement with government among citizens and civil servants alike while protecting and promoting vibrant civic spaces.
Strengthening democratic representation, particularly with regards to age and gender, as well as promoting integrity in democratic institutions. A number of countries are now taking steps to ensure greater transparency for political party and election campaign financing.
However, there is still a lack of clear understanding over how to make such participation fully compatible with, and fully meaningful in representative democracy. The institutionalisation of meaningful and transparent participation mechanisms remains slow. There is therefore a need to take citizen participation to the next level.
The new OECD citizen participation barometer will provide a concise, data-driven and internationally comparable overview of how governments provide information, protect civic space and promote citizen participation. Furthermore, the OECD aims to develop an OECD Observatory on Participatory and Deliberative Democracy to provide comparative analysis and expert support to countries undertaking participatory and deliberative processes, while also providing a strategic framework and guidance for countries.
In terms of investing in young people, the Reinforcing Democracy Initiative aims to provide new comparative analysis and practices to promote active citizenship among young people, strengthening engagement with the Youth Organisations’ Sounding Board for Governance (YOUNG).
The “Additional Focused Action Plan on Gender Equality” calls for building adequate capacities within the public sector for countries to meet their gender equality objectives, eliminating all barriers hindering the women and girls’ participation in public life, as well as collectively addressing the challenges through related OECD initiatives (e.g., through cross-Committee projects to enhance government capacities in utilising gender and intersectional data, the OECD Forum on Gender Equality as part of the OECD’s Gender Strategy, and other collaborative efforts).
In fact, recent empirical evidence shows that, although progress has been made in reducing some longstanding gender inequalities in OECD countries, gender gaps persist across various facets of life (OECD, 2022[90]; OECD, 2023[38]), stressing the need for continued and intensified efforts from a holistic and whole-of-government perspective.
2.5.1. Establish adequate capabilities, expertise and capacities within public institutions to close persistent gender gaps that hamper women from diverse backgrounds from fully participating in public life
Gender mainstreaming, as a strategy for integrating a gender equality perspective into decision making, can help governments make more inclusive policy decisions (OECD, 2023[38]) and enhance the fairness and responsiveness of public policy, which in turns contributes to increasing public trust (OECD, 2017[91]) and reinforcing democracy. Closing gender gaps can also bring dividends for society at large, with positive effects on economic growth, productivity, and fiscal sustainability (Nicol, 2022[92]).
Gender mainstreaming is increasingly taking ground in OECD countries, starting with strengthening the legal bases for its implementation. At least 9 OECD countries have introduced new legislation, regulations, or directives to promote gender mainstreaming since 2017 (OECD, 2023[38]). In total, 29 OECD countries report having some form of legal basis or binding decision underpinning gender mainstreaming (OECD, 2023[38]). However, the implementation of legal requirements for gender mainstreaming has been somewhat uneven, with lack of clear allocation of responsibilities, resources, and accountability mechanisms (OECD, 2023[38]). Therefore, while there is no one-size-fits-all solution, a robust institutional framework, strategic planning, and effective co-ordination mechanisms are deemed crucial for advancing governments’ gender equality agendas.
OECD countries have experimented with diverse government structures with entities tasked to strategically co-ordinate and implement gender equality at the central level (OECD, 2023[38]). Most recently, Colombia underwent reforms, including the commitment to strengthening the Presidential Council for Women’s Equality (CPEM) and the establishment of the Ministry of Equality and Equity in 2023, which is expected to further reinforce the country’s institutional framework for gender equality (OECD, 2023[93]). Nonetheless, OECD countries acknowledge substantial challenges, including insufficient resources, mandate, and capacities to effectively deliver their mandates (OECD, 2023[38]).
Some countries have put in place capacity-building initiatives targeting civil servants. For example, with a goal to enhance civil servants’ understanding of gender equality for more informed policy decisions, Chile’s National Civil Service Directorate organised a 6-month training in 2023 covering topics such as public policies with a gender perspective, violence prevention and reporting, inclusive diversity management, and gender-inclusive leadership for female directors (Director Nacional del Servicio Civil, 2024[94]).
OECD countries are progressively developing gender mainstreaming tools. A key instrument of gender-sensitive policymaking is gender impact assessment (GIA), which allows to identify and assess potential or actual gender-specific impacts of policy or budget decisions. A growing number of OECD countries (at least 26) currently have a formal requirement for GIAs in place, making it one of the most widely used tools for gender mainstreaming across the OECD area (OECD, 2023[38]). Australia, for example, in line with its renewed commitment to placing gender equality at the heart of policy and decision making, has recently taken steps to strengthen the implementation of GIA processes with a view to monitoring progress, assessing outcomes, and supporting better-targeted policy and spending decisions (OECD, 2023[95]). After a first GIA pilot undertaken on select cabinet submissions and new policy proposals for the October 2022-23 Budget in the areas of jobs, housing, and the care economy, it was announced as part of the May 2023-24 Budget that, going forward, all new policy proposals would be required to be accompanied by gender analysis (OECD, 2023[95]). In addition, the Council of Europe has developed guidelines for incorporating a gender perspective into legal initiative assessments.
OECD countries are also increasingly adopting gender budgeting, acknowledging its potential to promote more inclusive policies that generate social and economic gains. By ensuring greater consideration of how government budgets impact gender equality objectives, gender budgeting has become a key tool used to help close gender gaps in 61% (23 out of 38) of OECD countries. A further four countries are actively considering or have concrete plans to implement it (OECD, 2023[96]). Nevertheless, while some countries have a comprehensive and impactful practice, others – particularly more recent adopters – still have progress to make before their gender budgeting initiatives have the foundations needed to deliver impact (OECD, 2023[96]). Finland has taken steps to empower the authority for gender budgeting, building on administrative practices (i.e., Budget Circular) to implementing Ordinances/Regulations to strengthen their approach (OECD, 2023[96]). Similarly, gender-related considerations are increasingly included in public procurement and infrastructure decisions, although further efforts are needed to promote coherence among policies in these areas (OECD, 2023[38]).
One of the challenges to the implementation of gender equality policies lies in collecting sound and granular data. OECD countries are making efforts to enhance the availability of gender and intersectional data in support of more evidence-based and inclusive policies. For instance, Switzerland implemented a new provision in 2024, mandating public entities to consider gender implications in their studies and statistics (Confédération suisse, 2023[97]). Accordingly, the Swiss Federal Office for Gender Equality will provide a specialised tool for gender assessments. Besides, Finland, Slovenia, and Spain have also showed engagement in collecting gender-disaggregated data to enhance their environmental policymaking processes (OECD, 2023[38]).
To uphold the principles of equality enshrined in existing laws, policies and commitments, countries have continued their efforts to enhance accountability, monitoring and oversight. Within Parliaments, gender equality committees exercise their accountability and oversight function by providing a dedicated space for the discussion of those matters. Based on the most recent available evidence, 87% of OECD countries have parliamentary committees dealing with gender equality either as their exclusive portfolio or, more commonly, combined with other related matters such as family, human rights, welfare, and youth policies (IPU Parline, 2024[98]). Supreme audit institutions (SAIs) are taking on a more prominent role in overseeing the achievement of gender equality goals. Between 2017 and 2022, institutions in at least 10 OECD countries have undertaken audits of gender-related initiatives, a substantial increase from the mere three audits conducted in 2017 (OECD, 2022[90]). For instance, Canada conducted audits in 2022, with the latest audit revealing gaps in the Gender Results Framework (GRF). This led to seven recommendations, including improved gender-disaggregated data reporting. In response, Women and Gender Equality Canada (WAGE) developed a 2023 workplan, successfully meeting interim targets in the fiscal year (Government of Canada, 2023[99]). To promote accountability on the use of public resources for gender-related objectives, Colombia’s government has been mandated to submit a yearly report on expenditures targeted towards women’s equity to the Congress (OECD, 2023[93]).
2.5.2. Eliminate all barriers to women and girls’ full, equal and meaningful representation, leadership and participation in public life and potential bias and discrimination
In order to eliminate the obstacles hindering women and girls’ representation, leadership and participation in public life, the Action Plan on Gender Equality calls for fair pay and transparency, measures to tackle all forms of violence and harassment, and concrete steps to remove structural barriers and systemic disadvantage faced by women and girls.
Data shows that the public sector still experiences a gender pay gap, albeit to a lesser extent than the private sector, prompting countries to implement corrective measures such as pay reporting rules. A recent 2023 Eurostat report revealed an average gender pay gap of 9.1% in the public sector in 2021, contrasting with a higher figure of 15.1% in the private sector (Eurostat, 2023[100]). While there are cases where reporting requirements only apply to the private sector, at least 15 OECD countries also mandate reporting in the public sector (OECD, 2023[101]). For example, New Zealand’s Te Kawa Mataaho Public Service Commission supports pay gap reporting, offering guidance on implementing pay equity aligned with the Equal Pay Act (OECD, 2023[101]). In Australia, new regulations publicly name non-compliant employers annually, acting as a deterrent. Starting in 2024, legislation requires the Workplace Gender Equality Agency to publish employer gender pay gaps (OECD, 2023[101]). However, addressing root causes perpetuating this gap, such as differences in occupational choices, career patterns, and take-up of family-related leaves and flexible work arrangements, requires more comprehensive policies (OECD, 2023[44]).
OECD countries are committing to addressing various forms of violence and harassment at the national level, encompassing emerging threats such as technology-facilitated violence. A 2023 OECD report shows that almost two thirds of OECD countries had recognised violence against women as a top priority to advance gender equality as of 2021 (OECD, 2023[102]). In 2024, the European Union (EU) approved the Directive on combating violence against women and domestic violence. Notably, this significant milestone includes provisions to criminalise cyber violence and promote digital literacy to enhance protection and prevention (European Commission, 2024[103]). The upcoming implementation of the directive will enable further progress in this area across EU countries. Technology-facilitated gender-based violence (TF-GBV) is progressively accounted for as a threat to women’s participation and well-being, with steps towards more extensive legal coverage and robust data collection. Italy reports a promising example, as it has recently started recording administrative data on non-consensual image-sharing and stalking, as well as a forthcoming population-based survey, which collects Big Data on TF-GBV. Importantly, OECD countries are increasingly recognising that regulating and engaging with online platforms is essential in forming joined up responses to TF-GBV. The Digital Services Act (DSA) introduced by the European Union in 2022 is a key initiative in standardising approaches to keeping online spaces safer, including on swifter actions on removing content containing TF-GBV (European Commission, 2022[104]).
With regard to sexual harassment, a number of OECD countries have put in place various measures in the public sector, although there is room for further improvement (OECD, 2023[38]). The most common approaches include standardised, confidential complaint procedures (54%), internal training on sexual harassment (46%), workplace initiatives (38%), and adopting anti-sexual harassment policies (38%) (OECD, 2023[38]). Meanwhile, few public services collect data on workplace sexual harassment complaints (OECD, 2023[38]). Moreover, reports from OECD members highlight the necessity for legislation encompassing emerging forms of sexual harassment, including those occurring on online spaces, which constitute an increasing method for perpetration (Pew Research Center, 2021[105]). However, in at least 14 OECD countries, existing sexual harassment laws do not explicitly address cyber harassment or cyberstalking (OECD, 2023[102]).
While OECD countries are acting against gender biases and negative social norms, sustained and increased efforts are necessary. Gender norms internalised through the encouragement or lack thereof from adults for entering certain career fields continue to influence students' career choices. For example, it partially explains the lack of women in certain fields of studies that lead to the highest-paid professions, such as in ICT, as well as STEM fields, where they are underrepresented including in leadership positions (OECD, 2024[106]; OECD, 2019[107]; OECD, 2015[108]). Gender norms that disproportionately assign domestic and child-rearing responsibilities to women remain as a barrier to their active participation in public life. However, progress in this area is difficult. The 8 March 2024 referendum in Ireland rejected an initiative to remove an article from its Constitution that references women’s roles in the home, which has been criticised for sustaining gender stereotypes (Hunt, 2023[109]). Furthermore, recent evidence suggests a concerning trend across G7 countries where younger generations exhibit more prejudice compared to their parents’ generation, and both men and women demonstrate levels of bias against women in leadership positions (Verian, 2024[110]).
To address cultural bias, in light of the major green and digital transitions, countries have taken steps to increase the number of girls choosing to pursue careers in STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, Mathematics) fields where women often remain underrepresented, including in the public sphere (OECD, n.d.[37]). For example, the European Union has prioritised fostering curiosity and creating a supportive environment for young girls in STEM through initiatives such as the Girls Go Circular programme. Launched in 2020, it has benefitted over 32 000 girls in 23 countries, equipping them with relevant skills (European Commission, 2024[111]). Moreover, the Spanish Agency for the Supervision of Artificial Intelligence, established in 2023, aims to address gender-bias within meeting its broader objectives of minimising the risks associated with AI use and promoting the responsible development of AI systems (OECD, 2024[112]).
2.5.3. Remove all barriers, both overt and implicit, from legal or policy frameworks to close gender gaps and compounding inequalities as well as address all stereotypes, gender-based violence and sexual harassment, which hamper women’s and girls’ representation and participation in public life
Despite proactive measures taken by OECD countries in recent years, barriers in legal frameworks continue to hamper women’s representation in public life. Indeed, while a positive correlation has been demonstrated between legal equality and women’s political representation, women and girls continue to face legal restrictions in many different aspects of their lives, including in OECD countries (OECD, n.d.[37]; Hyland, Djankov and Goldberg, 2021[113]). For example, in 8 OECD countries, the law establishes restrictions that prevent women from joining certain sectors or professions.
Gender-based violence (GBV), in all its forms, remains one of the most fundamental and pervasive threats to women’s inclusion and active participation in public life (Women Political Leaders, 2022[114]; National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 2023[40]). Recent OECD work shows that only 11 OECD countries have a dedicated law comprehensively addressing GBV in all its forms (OECD, n.d.[37]). Women in politics who are marginalised across other identifiers, such as sexual orientation8 and race or ethnicity, are made even more vulnerable to violence (Women Political Leaders, 2022[114]). 85% of women parliamentarians in 45 European countries experienced psychological violence during their term and 58% became targets of online sexist attacks on social networks, prompting many to consider withdrawing from politics (National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 2023[40]). Online harassment, abuse, and threats of violence also explain the poorer retention rate of female MPs compared to their male counterparts in the United Kingdom (UK Parliament, 2022[32]). Online violence and gender-based disinformation campaigns pose a major threat to healthy democracies, since they have been found to be correlated with efforts to weaken democratic institutions and human rights (ShePersisted, 2023[115]). Evidence is also available from Sweden assessing the extent and consequences of harassment, threats, and violence experienced by elected representatives, including women (Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention, 2023[116]).
Against this backdrop, several OECD countries are actively committed to addressing GBV in the political sphere. For example, Colombia approved a law in 2023 to prevent political violence against women. The bill introduces measures to prevent, address, condemn, and penalise violence against women in politics, aiming to ensure and safeguard their right to participate at all levels (Efemenista, 2023[117]). Likewise, in Costa Rica, law 10235/2022 aims to prevent, address, punish, and eradicate violence against women in politics. In 2023, the country announced the development of a national strategy addressing hate speech and discrimination, the first of its kind in Latin America (United Nations, 2023[118]). Additionally, as illustrated in the previous section, OECD countries are increasingly recognising the need to tackle the rising of TF-GBV and ensuring that technological progress neither perpetuates nor exacerbates gender disparities, including in public life.
2.5.4. Working collectively through the OECD
The OECD launched the 2023 Toolkit for Mainstreaming and Implementing Gender Equality (OECD, 2023[44]), building upon the 2018 edition. The OECD also engaged on a bilateral basis with several countries, including Australia, Colombia, and Czechia. Efforts have been done to deepen and mainstream gender equality across all pillars of the Reinforcing Democracy Initiative.
The OECD is also promoting gender equality from a holistic perspective, with its 2023 Gender Strategy The OECD’s Contribution to Promoting Gender Equality (OECD, 2023[119]).
The inaugural OECD Forum on Gender Equality was organised in June 2024 to showcase these efforts, discussing gender mainstreaming in green, energy, and digital transitions.
2.5.5. Conclusions and priorities for the future
Countries have worked to remove legal and policy barriers to women’s participation in electoral and policymaking, and are actively working to address gender stereotypes, gender-based violence and sexual harassment. Only continued investment in these areas can enable women and girls to fully engage in public life. Despite these efforts, many gender gaps remain, with large variations across OECD countries. As such, more needs to be done to continue addressing persistent gender gaps in political representation and participation. There is a need to invest in working together to develop evidence-based policies, using more granular data and addressing tech- facilitated gender-based violence.
Future editions of the biennial OECD Forum on Gender Equality will offer opportunities for continuing the dialogue and promoting efforts in this area, such as addressing technology-facilitated forms of gender -based violence, and further exploring gender trust gaps to strengthen democratic governance.
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← 1. i.e. efforts taken by the conveners of a participatory process to get back to participants about the status of their inputs and the ultimate outcome of their participation (OECD, 2022[9]).
← 2. Convention citoyenne sur la fin de vie.
← 3. The Republic of Türkiye interprets the term “gender”, throughout the document, as identical with “sex" pursuant to the binary concept of biological female and male sex. The term “gender equality” shall be interpreted as “equality between women and men”.
← 4. The Republic of Türkiye interprets the marginalised groups in line with its own national legislation.
← 5. See note 3 above.
← 6. Adherents to the OECD Recommendation on Open Government.
← 7. See note 3 above.
← 8. See note 3 above.