Governments are enhancing their capacity to tackle global challenges through international co-operation, taking better account of transboundary impacts, and developing new reporting mechanisms for global commitments. They recognise that intensifying foreign interference is altering the landscape of international relations and impacting the democratic governance model. Countries are therefore fortifying institutional frameworks for lobbying and political finance, applying pre- and post- employment restrictions on public officials, and protecting media and civil society organisations. Greater international co-operation amongst democracies is needed to better understand foreign interference and craft appropriate policy responses. This includes countering corruption, further regulating political finance, and minimising trade and debt dependency on single foreign actors. However, it is important to safeguard legitimate foreign influence efforts to foster transparent international relations.
The OECD Reinforcing Democracy Initiative
Abstract
In a global context marked by increased fragmentation open democracies face significant challenges. While the levers of government are largely domestic, many of the challenges they currently face, including the digital and green transitions, are global in nature, and thus require international co-operation to be effectively handled. These challenges are apparent in the results of the 2023 OECD Trust Survey which show that while a majority of people see public institutions as reliable in delivering domestic public services, they are seen as less reliable in addressing complex policy challenges involving many unknown unknowns or trade-offs. For example, just over one third think it is likely that government can regulate new technologies appropriately and help businesses and citizens use them responsibly.
At the same time, the open nature of democracies means that they are potentially more exposed to undue influence from foreign actors. Foreign actors can take advantage of the open and inclusive context under which democracies operate to advance adverse interests and seek to exert undue influence in policymaking at the domestic level. While many of these challenges relate to the threats posed by mis- and disinformation, many others have repercussions far beyond information, media and public opinion, and can exert pressures deep into the institutional and regulatory frameworks of open democracies.
The Action Plan on Stronger Open Democracies in a Globalised World (henceforth “the Action Plan”) addresses these two key areas and the steps needed to tackle them:
Key area 1 – Reinforcing public governance capacities to address global challenges; and
Key area 2 – Building resilience to foreign undue influence in policymaking and democratic processes.
This chapter identifies the progress made by OECD countries in terms of capacities to tackle global challenges, including progress in reinforcing human resource capacity, strengthening the readiness of public institutions, mobilising governance tools, and countering foreign influence in terms of regulation and oversight, as framed in the terms of the Action Plan approved by PGC in 2024, building on the work of the OECD public governance policy communities.
3.1.1. Strengthen national institutions to make them fit for a globalised world
The OECD 2022 RDI report identified the need to focus on building the global capacities of governments to address challenges such as climate change, the digital transition, terrorism and pandemic mitigation. It identified the challenges involved in building trust, the need for demonstrating progress on global action, and the need for countries to put in place specific mechanisms to ensure policy coherence and co-ordination for global affairs, as well as the need to strengthen skills to think in global terms.
The rise in interconnected economic, environmental, social and geopolitical crises have had serious implications on countries’ prospects to develop sustainably and in line with international commitments such as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Effectively tackling such increasingly interconnected challenges requires governance mechanisms to adjust policy in light of potential negative transboundary impacts, to maximise benefits while addressing trade-offs, and to effectively work across sectors in a whole-of-government approach. Recent progress in this area can be seen in the monitoring report on the implementation of the OECD Recommendation on Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development (OECD, 2024[1]). The OECD’s report on the implementation of this recommendation shows that countries use high-level co-ordinating mechanisms, located within the Centre of Government or a lead line ministry, to promote the integration of global priorities such as sustainable development across public institutions and central agencies. Many countries have also established formal governance arrangements that support effective communication between ministries (Figure 3.1). While in many cases countries have had such mechanisms for some time, further progress is being observed. For example, In Portugal, the Resolution of the Council of Ministers no. 5/2023, of 23 January 2024, establishes a new inter-institutional co-ordination mechanism that positions monitoring of the 2030 Agenda within the Presidency of the Council of Ministers (Government of Portugal, 2023[2]).
Dedicated cross-government strategies can be another important lever to strengthen the transboundary perspective in the policy work of line ministries, as well as regulatory impact assessments and sustainability reporting. Some initiatives even involve engaging with Parliament – for example, in 2023, the Dutch government adopted its third action plan defining policy areas, objectives and actions and providing a basis for accountability to parliament (Government of the Netherlands, 2022[3]). The Netherlands’ first priority is reducing its global trade, production and consumption footprint.
Implementation by Respondents
Note: 26 Respondents (The 25 original Respondents plus the United Kingdom).
Source: 2023 Questionnaire to Adherents for assessing the implementation, dissemination and continued relevance of the OECD Recommendation on Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development.
Beyond these institutional mechanisms, engaging with citizens to strengthen the democratic mandate for governments to act on global challenges is crucial. Engaging and partnering with citizens and stakeholders is particularly important in addressing the climate crisis. OECD countries have been actively implementing participatory and deliberative processes at all levels of government in recent years to involve citizens and stakeholders in climate related decisions (see Chapter 4). Countries and organisations are also experimenting with such participatory approaches at the transnational level. At the global level, the results of the global citizens’ assembly organised ahead of the UN COP26 in Glasgow became available in 2023 and show that as well as influencing global climate negotiations, this pilot provided a “blueprint for a new piece of global governance infrastructure” that could be used to place citizen engagement at the heart of the multilateral system (Curato et al., 2023[4]).
Justice systems also have a key role in ensuring accountability for action on global commitments. The comprehensive amendments to the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, adopted on 13 June 2023, recognise the right to a healthy environment, placing a legal obligation on the Government of Canada to develop an implementation framework within two years1. In the United States, the “Executive Order 14096: Revitalizing Our Nation’s Commitment to Environmental Justice for All”, signed in April 2023, underlines the need to continue advancing environmental justice, with an emphasis on citizens’ rights to be protected from harmful pollution and exposure and the priority of building a more equitable, inclusive, and sustainable economy (Government of the Unites States, 2023[5]).
Furthermore, governments across OECD countries are developing new accountability mechanisms to ensure stronger enforcement of global commitments. For instance, in April 2023, the Government of the United States published the first-ever Environmental Justice Scorecard, assessing government-wide efforts to advance environmental justice (Council on Environmental Quality, 2023[6]). The Scorecard will be updated on an annual basis, with the objective of “creating a durable, robust, and comprehensive tool” to hold the federal government accountable for its global commitments to address climate injustice (Council on Environmental Quality, 2023[6]). In addition, the new adoption of the OECD Recommendation on Access to Justice and People-Centred Justice Systems (OECD, 2023[7]), by 38 OECD countries and the European Commission in 2023 will further support to facilitate effective enforcement of rights, and by extension ensure that governments are accountable to their international obligations.
3.1.2. Leverage governance tools and innovation to enhance capacity for global action
Promoting a foundational culture of evidence-based and science-based policymaking for action on global challenges
The OECD RDI 2022 report highlights the importance of developing skills related to evidence-informed policymaking to tackle global challenges. It further highlights the importance of leveraging innovative approaches to increase the effectiveness of public expenditure in relation to global challenges, such as climate change, gender equality, health and sustainable development goals.
This area has emerged as a priority in the 2023 OECD Trust Survey (OECD, 2024[8]). Only 4 in ten believe that it is likely that governments make decisions based on the best available evidence, and more than a third of people do not believe that government-provided statistics allow them to assess whether government keeps its promises. Overall, there is a high correlation between the confidence in the ability of government to make policies based on the best available evidence and trust in National Government. What is more the results show that the fact that government decisions are based on evidence appears as the second most powerful driver of trust in national government, just behind whether government balances intergenerational interests (Figure 1.12 in (OECD, 2024[8])), way above many other public governance levers, pointing to the relevance and priority of government efforts in this area.
Share of population with high or moderately high trust in the national government (y-axis) by share of people that think it is likely government takes decisions based on best available evidence (x-axis), 2023
Note: The scatterplot presents the share of “high to moderately high trust” responses to the question “On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is not at all and 10 is completely, how much do you trust the national government?” on the y-axis. The y-axis presents the share of “likely” responses to the question “If the national government takes a decision, how likely do you think it is that it will draw on the best available evidence, research, and statistical data?”. Both high or moderately high trust and ‘likely’ correspond to the 6-10 responses on the 0-10 scale
Source: OECD (2024[8]), OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions – 2024 Results: Building Trust in a Complex Policy Environment, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9a20554b-en.
A number of OECD countries are taking significant steps to strengthen their capacity for evidence informed policymaking, to better mobilise evidence and increase government capacity to benefit from science. This was in fact done for multiple reasons, some linked to the aftermath of COVID and the need to tackle global challenges such as climate change or ageing, and others given more domestic policymaking needs. The initiatives below present some recent initiatives in the area.
In 2022, the United States launched the year of Evidence for Action (The White House, 2022[9]), following the sharing of a Memorandum on Restoring Trust in Government through Scientific Integrity and Evidence Based Policy Making (The White House, 2021[10]) sent by the President to all heads of executive departments and agencies. The initiative involves sharing leading practices from agencies to generate and use researched backed knowledge, strengthen existing strategies and structures, and increasing connection and collaboration among researchers, knowledge producers and decision makers, all in order to ensure that workers are as equipped as possible to effectively use evidence. The federal government is monitoring progress on the White House Year of Evidence for Action, with initial results released in 2023 (Evaluation Gov, 2023[11]).
New Zealand has also recognised the importance of ensuring that workers within government have the skills needed to effectively use evidence, and thus in 2023 updated its Policy Skills Framework to include engaging and sustaining relationships as well as planning and managing work, both of which are key in incorporating science and evidence into the policymaking cycle. Italy’s civil servant e-learning platform, Syllabus, hosts three training modules on data collection to support evidence-based policymaking, digital public services design and delivery, and public communication to improve data availability for citizens and businesses (over 240 800 public servants passed at least one training module).
In Europe, several countries have committed to improving their use of evidence within policymaking. The Ghent Declaration, adopted under the Belgian Presidency in February 2024, explicitly acknowledged the importance for all EU Member states to give attention to analytical skills and the capacity to mobilise evidence. Since January 2023 Lithuanian ministries have been required to justify with data why proposed measures should be applied when submitting draft legislation to government. In order to ensure civil servants are able to do this effectively, the statistics body has created competency trainings for analytical skills. In 2022, Czechia created a specific analytical unit at the centre of government to strengthen capacity for high quality evidence (VAU).
Several other countries have recognised that effective collaboration between researchers and policymakers, as well as between different types of policymakers, is crucial for the effective dissemination and uptake of evidence, and thus have put in place measures to improve such collaboration. For example, Estonia’s Cross-Sector Mobility Programme, which opened for its first application round in 2023, aims to increase intersectoral movement of employees, encouraging co-operation between government, higher education institutions, the private sector and third sector institutions. In Belgium, the federal body for science policy introduced a funding mechanism for cross-institution initiatives in 2023, thereby incentivising different actors to collaborate, and in doing so share information and skills.
Despite these recent initiatives, more needs to be done to increase countries’ capacity to tackle global challenges. The capacity to mobilise evidence for domestic policymaking needs is a first important step, which will need to be complemented with cross cutting and holistic approaches to tackle global issues, such as climate change, ageing or migration.
Using budgetary mechanisms to increase the effectiveness of public expenditure in relation to global challenges, and multidimensional considerations
The OECD 2022 RDI report emphasised the importance of better government spending to deliver on global priorities. It highlighted the role of budgeting in promoting green initiatives, supporting the SDGs, and investing in health to reduce pandemic risks.
Countries are increasingly adopting strategic budget initiatives, such as gender budgeting and green budgeting, to drive the transformations needed to deliver on global challenges demanding a whole-of-government response. Strategic budget initiatives allow governments to signal the importance of certain cross-cutting policy priorities both to citizens and within the administration. They provide the impetus for more inter-connected thinking, allowing governments address key policy issues through a more systematic and clearly defined manner.
Gender budgeting was historically the first strategic budget initiative in many OECD countries and was discussed as part of the section on gender equality. In some countries – such as Canada, Finland and Sweden – gender budgeting has expanded to include intersectional analysis, allowing for consideration of how gender inequalities intersect with inequalities based on race, socioeconomic class, sexual orientation2 and disability. Other countries – such as Ireland – implement equality budgeting rather than gender budgeting, analysing the impact of policies and budget measures on individuals according to a range of factors including gender, age, ethnicity and race. Beyond these OECD countries, Brazil is aiming to integrate racial considerations into gender budgeting.
Specific OECD analysis, published in 2024, has investigated how countries address inequality in budgeting, looking at advanced recent practices in a set of OECD countries (OECD/KIPF, 2024[12]). It found that countries employ two main types of approach to address distributional concerns in the budget process, including using microsimulation models, such as in the Netherlands, Sweden, France and Italy, or using results-based budgeting frameworks, as in New Zealand and Ireland, or a mix of both.
Countries have also made significant progress over the past 2 years in terms of green budgeting, moving beyond green tagging, and fully addressing the implications of global climate impacts in budget modelling and costing (OECD, 2024[13]). Overall, four out of five OECD countries (79%) have one strategic budget initiative in place and a growing number of countries are also employing more than one type of strategic budget initiative, many of which have legal underpinnings. Five OECD countries implement three or more (OECD, n.d.[14]).
Note: Legal underpinning includes initiatives underpinned by constitution, organic budget law or other legislation
Source: Nicol and Dosen (2024[15]), “The emergence of strategic budget initiatives”, OECD Journal on Budgeting, Vol. 23/3, https://doi.org/10.1787/8053099b-en.
Using public procurement strategically to take into account environmental and social considerations
The OECD 2022 RDI report recognised the importance of strategic public procurement for achieving government missions and addressing global challenges. Accounting for 12.9% of GDP in OECD countries in 2021 (OECD, 2023[16]), public procurement can significantly influence health outcomes, climate actions, and social responsibility. OECD countries are increasingly using procurement to achieve strategic policy objectives, such as requiring suppliers to adhere to responsible business conduct, including human and labour rights, environmental protection, and inclusion. Since 2022, a greater emphasis on global value chains has given a new focus to strategic public procurement to drive market innovation and promote sustainability.
Recent OECD 2023 results (OECD, 2023[17]) show that countries increasingly use public procurement to advance policy objectives aligned with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (SDGs). These objectives include promoting a circular and green economy, stimulating innovation, supporting small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), promoting ethical behaviour and responsible business conduct., and fostering the inclusion of under-represented groups. Notably, 92% of OECD countries and accession countries3 have integrated environmental considerations into their procurement frameworks implementing national green public procurement policies or frameworks (see Chapter 4 on Governing Green) (OECD, 2024[18]).
Some countries are also using their public procurement frameworks for economic empowerment of unrepresented groups or to address racial inequality. For example, Canada’s Supplier Diversity Action Plan supports the participation of businesses from underrepresented groups in public procurement through measures such as targeted support and coaching (Government of Canada, 2024[19]). The South African constitution makes a direct reference to leveraging public contracts to advance economic empowerment of black-owned businesses (MAPS, forthcoming). Despite this progress and growing awareness of the potential risks of human and labour rights abuses in global supply chains, human rights considerations remain emerging in many countries.4
The potential human and labour rights issues brought about by global supply chains can create unique challenges for public buyers. It can thus be valuable to create communities of practice, where public buyers can share good practices and discuss ways to address these global challenges. In 2023, the Norwegian Agency for Public and Financial Management (DFØ) and the OECD collaborated in the field of Strategic Public Procurement, with a special focus on human rights. The OECD facilitated knowledge sharing and peer learning workshops, gathering representatives from various contracting authorities from Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark to discuss emerging issues around incorporating human rights considerations into public procurement. Examples shared by the participants highlighted how combining purchasing power and using joint procurement can help to address global challenges. For example, in the health sector area, the Swedish, Finnish, and Danish hospital procurement organisations signed a memorandum of agreement to share knowledge about the market, high-risk products, suppliers, audits, and criteria applied in tender procedures (see Box 3.1 and OECD (forthcoming[20])).
Norwegian and Swedish contracting authorities started their collaboration with investigating the benefits of co-operating in safeguarding human and labour rights in procurement.
Working together, healthcare institutions from the two countries developed contractual clauses to be used in tenders and collaborated on follow up of contracts. In 2022, the Common Nordic Criteria for more Sustainable Packaging in Healthcare were released with the aim of reducing material waste, increasing recycling, and increasing the usage of recycled or renewable materials in hospitals. In 2023, the stakeholders signed a letter of intent on sustainable public procurement in the Nordics.
Source: OECD (forthcoming[20]), Human Rights and Public Procurement – the Nordic Approach - Workshop Report.
Ensuring that data and digital tools are inter-operable across ministries and international borders, enabling public administrations to exchange real-time data safely across borders and thus strengthen governments’ ability to identify, understand, and address global challenges
Effective and efficient data access and sharing across ministries and international borders is an important element for democracies and their public services to thrive in a global environment. The 2023 OECD Recommendation on Enhancing Access to and Sharing of Data (OECD, 2021[21]) promotes international co-operation to foster data access and sharing across jurisdictions, as well as the interoperability and mutual recognition of data access and sharing arrangements, considering applicable legal requirements and global standards.
In terms of national practices, as of 2022, 28 out of 33 OECD countries had a data interoperability system at the central or federal level of government (OECD Survey on Digital Government). Among those countries with an interoperability system, personal data is the type of data most frequently shared. This includes identity (22 out of 28), residence data (21 out of 28), and civil registry data such as birth, marriage or death records (or 21 out of 28) (Figure 3.4).
Types of data exchanged through the data interoperability system
Note: The data collection period is from 1 January 2020 to 31 October 2022. Data for Germany, Greece, Slovak Republic, Switzerland, and the United States are not included.
Source: OECD Survey on Digital Government (2022).
Several countries have national interoperability systems that facilitate secure and efficient data exchange in the public sector, such as Hungary’s Central Governmental Service Bus and Sweden’s ‘Navet’ for data exchange amongst agencies, regions and municipalities. However, implementing such data sharing systems at global level is more challenging. The European Union’s Once-Only Technical System (OOTS) (European Commission, n.d.[22]), introduced in 2023, addresses this by enabling cross-sectoral sharing of information between public administrations across EU borders. It implements the Once-Only Principle, ensuring that citizens are not required to provide information multiple times if its already held in electronic format by an authority.
Cross-border interoperability is increasingly relevant for digital identity. As of 2022, 48% of surveyed OECD countries have digital identity solutions for accessing public services domestically and in other countries. Additionally, 52% of OECD countries allow foreign citizens to use their own digital identity solutions to access public services within their country. Progress is particularly significant in Europe, as where all OECD countries where cross-border digital identity is already possible are also members of the European Union. In 2024, the European Parliament and the Council approved a new regulation on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market. By 2026, all Members states should offer citizens and businesses digital wallets linking national digital identities with proof of other personal attributes (e.g., driving EU member states license, qualifications, bank account). These wallets will be usable across borders within the European Union.
Beyond the strict European level, other examples of cross-border interoperability of digital identity solutions also show significant progress in recent years, including bilateral co-operation agreements and free trade agreements. For example, in April 2024 the European Union and Japan signed a Memorandum of Cooperation to ensure co-operation on digital identity initiatives (European Commission, 2024[23]), while in 2024 South Korea joined the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA) between Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore, which allows parties to exchange knowledge related to digital identity policies and regulations (The Straits Times, 2024[24]). In a similar vein, discussions of the G7 Digital & Tech Working Group in 2024 led to a reaffirming of the commitment to the OECD Recommendation on the Governance of Digital Identity and an underlining of the importance of learning from each other (G7 Italia, 2024[25]).
Systematising the consideration of transboundary impacts and mainstreaming International Regulatory Co-operation (IRC) in rulemaking to limit adverse impacts beyond international borders
As mentioned in the introduction of the chapter, the results from the 2023 Trust Survey show that government is seen as less reliable in addressing complex policy challenges involving many unknowns or trade-offs (OECD, 2024[8]). There is therefore a need for countries to invest in their public governance approaches to ensure that they have the necessary capacities to ‘go global’. One such capacity is the ability to integrate transboundary impacts into domestic policy and rulemaking, to ensure that there is an understanding of how any new policies or laws are likely to impact other countries.
Overall, results on the implementation of the OECD Council Recommendation on Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development (PSD) show that 16 out of 25 respondents do use impact assessment tools to assess positive and negative impacts of policies on sustainable development (GRC, JPN, LUX, MEX, NLD, PRT). However, only six countries include impact on PCSD in information provided by Ministers to Parliament, and only four use impact assessment tools to assess transboundary impacts of policies (BEL, GRC, JPN, NLD). Therefore, assessing the transboundary impact of policies remains a key challenge (OECD, 2024[26]).
As the need for International Regulatory Co-operation (IRC) is explicitly recognised in the OECD 2022 Recommendation on International Regulatory Co-operation to Tackle Global Challenges, countries are increasingly sharing IRC responsibilities across several central government bodies through a whole-of-government approach (OECD, 2021[27]). As of 2020, two-thirds of OECD members had an explicit whole-of-government IRC policy in place, or a partial, sectoral policy. This is an area where countries are continuing to make progress. As they conduct their RIAs, some OECD countries increasingly take into consideration the international impacts of their proposed regulations, including in market openness, trade impacts, and impacts beyond jurisdiction. For example, in 2023 the United States adopted Circular No. A-4 which recommends regulators analyse effects of proposed regulations on noncitizens residing abroad, as well as effects within the US border (Office of Management and Budget, 2023[28]). In the United Kingdom, IRC is highlighted as a key tool to achieve its environmental objectives, in particular in relation to the drive towards fusion and hydrogen energies as part of its net zero ambitions (Government of the United Kingdom, 2022[29]). At a more global level, engagement by countries in international organisations can help to address transboundary effects, as evident in the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee on Plastic Pollution, which has involved over 160 countries in negotiations on how to reduce plastic waste across the supply chain. Negotiations are expected to be completed by the end of 2024.
Another dimension of transboundary effects is related to the citizen experience when accessing public services. While as it currently stands, it is rare for regulations, let alone international regulatory co-operation efforts, to be shaped based on citizen experience, some countries are beginning to explore the possibility of consulting citizens directly in the regulation formation process. For example, France and Germany have been working in 2023-24 with the European Union to form Franco-German Barometer on Administrative Complexity, which uses a citizen survey based on life-events to prioritise administrative transformation that is aligned with the most pressing needs of citizens.
Tackling global challenges through international collaboration on public sector innovation and policy experimentation
The OECD 2022 RDI report highlighted the potential for international collaboration on policy experimentation to be harnessed to tackle global challenges. It highlighted several areas in which this could occur: behavioural science, which it noted to be particularly active in facilitating cross-border experimentation, and mission-oriented policies, which are defined as policy frameworks put in place to collectively address complex societal challenges, and which it noted to have been undertaken by organisations and governments alike. Most notably, it highlighted the European Commission’s launching of five EU missions as part of its 2021-2027 Horizon Europe research and innovation programme: namely supporting climate resilience, tackling cancer, restoring oceans and waters, developing climate neutral smart cities, and fostering healthy soils.
The behavioural science community has continued to facilitate exchanging internationally on good practices on policy experimentation through the OECD Network of Behavioural Insights Experts. A notable example is the successful application of the sludge audit methodology – i.e. a behaviourally-informed methodology to identify and address unnecessary frictions and psychological costs (OECD, 2024[30]). In terms of policy experimentation, the Netherlands presented in 2024 a case study with an evaluation of a tool offering tailored sustainability advice to homeowners. The study found that personalised situation-specific advice significantly boosted the intension to adopt sustainability measures compared to standard advice, highlighting the value of citizen centred and targeted efforts.
Collaboration on mission-oriented innovation has also continued to evolve, as part of a maturing process. For example, the initiatives in place in the Netherlands led by the Ministry of Economic Affairs that mobilise public and private stakeholders around research higher education and innovation to achieve 25 missions have been recently streamlined and adapted to better leverage the mission oriented innovation. In 2024 Sweden launched Impact Innovation, its latest mission-oriented innovation funding instrument led by the Energy Agency, Innovation Agency, and Research Council for Sustainable Development. It aims to advance the green transition and enhance international competitiveness by funding five ecosystem-driven innovation platforms centred around missions ranging from net-zero to public sector reforms. Building on previous experiences, the funding agencies are integrating a dedicated cross-mission accelerator function to secure capacity-building to enable a truly mission-oriented approach.
Another area of recent progress is through the five EU missions, with increased horizon funding in 2024 and plans to streamline their governance and increase their capabilities and further support through the EU Mission Action Lab. With just some of the examples highlighted below:
As part of the mission on supporting climate resilience, Valencia, in Spain, developed in 2023 a multi-level governance framework to help drive climate action across different levels of government, including by offering support to local governments in the design and implementation of local adaptation strategies (EU Missions, n.d.[31]).
In 2023, the Mission Action Lab conducted a diagnostic of the Austrian national implementation of the EU Missions.
In 2024, in support of the combatting cancer mission, a serious of focus groups were organised with citizens from Bulgaria, Czechia, Finland, France, Lithuania, and Malta. These groups underlined the importance of improving information and communication on cancer prevention and early detection and screening for EU citizens (EU Missions, 2024[32]).
Mobilising policy monitoring and evaluation mechanisms to report back to citizens on the progress made on tackling global challenges
The OECD 2022 RDI recognised the importance of monitoring and evaluation promoting government accountability and thus ensuring public trust in governments’ capacity to tackle complex global issues.
While in 2022, OECD countries adopted the Recommendation on Public Policy Evaluation, thus committing to developing systematic approaches to evaluation (OECD, 2022[33]), preliminary results from the 2023 OECD Survey on Public Policy Evaluation show that countries are still facing persistent challenges in developing such approaches. Many countries suffer from weak evaluation cultures in the public sector, skills shortages, and limited resources to conduct evaluations (OECD, 2023[34]). On the positive side, 80% of survey respondents have created a least one “evaluation champion”, in terms of an institution in charge of co-ordinating evaluation efforts nationally. For example, Australia’s Centre for Evaluation, developed in 2023, works with departments and agencies to help ensure evaluations are conducted in line with established principles, and that these evaluations are embedded into decision-making processes (Australian Centre for Evaluation, n.d.[35]).
Governments are also monitoring and evaluating their efforts to address global challenges, such as the United Nation’s Agenda 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), or global climate commitments. Evaluation results and data are often publicly disseminated, providing citizens with access to information on government action, thus enhancing transparency and potentially increasing trust in government. Countries have taken additional steps in this area in recent years, particularly in terms of Climate or the SDGs. In France for instance, the High Council for the Climate (HCC), placed under the authority of the Prime Minister, monitors France's commitments to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Its June 2024 annual report, released publicly, monitored compliance with the emissions reduction trajectory, tracked progress made in reducing these emissions, and provided recommendations on how to improve national climate policies (Haut Conseil pour le Climat, 2024[36]). In Mexico, the national SDG information system - a joint initiative of the Office of the Presidency and the National Statistical and Geographical Institute – provides access to a set of indicators measuring progress in the achievement of 17 SDGs (Presidencia de la República & INEGI, n.d.[37]). Similarly, in 2022, the United Kingdom’s Department for Science, Innovation and Technology published the results of an evaluation of the Global Challenges Research Fund which addresses SDGs, to provide evidence on how the fund is contributing to tackling these challenges (Vogel, Guthrie and Hepworth, 2022[38]). In October 2023, the UK Climate Change Policy also provided an update on progress towards reaching Net Zero in the UK.
There is also a growing recognition of the importance of disseminating evaluation results and monitoring data to relevant stakeholders, including citizens. As part of this trend, efforts continue to be invested to make evaluation findings and monitoring data increasingly accessible, as well as to tailor the presentation and packaging of evaluation data to the needs of different users and uses. In France, the Cour des Comptes launched a new platform in May 2024 which contains more than 900 evaluations performed by 37 French institutions between 2008 and 2023 (CRTC, 2024[39]). The platform also provides a one page summary with the key results and the recommendations for each of the evaluations. This represents a good initiative to further disseminate the results of evaluations and keep citizens informed about the results of government action.
3.1.3. Build capacity for public servants to tackle global challenges
The OECD 2022 RDI report identified the importance of strengthening skills within government to think in a global manner. While this raises key questions on how to develop such global competencies in the public administration, skills gaps even at the domestic level mean that the primary focus of most governments continues to be on domestic policy issues. The Action Plan therefore calls on governments to define global competencies, and to develop them through appropriate talent management practices, including by demonstrating themselves to be attractive employers to people with the right experience and expertise.
Defining global competencies
Global competencies are multidimensional capabilities. Public servants with capacities to think in global terms understand the interactions between local and global policy issues, understand and appreciate different (intercultural) perspectives and world views, interact successfully with others (including in international forums), and take responsible action toward sustainability and collective well-being. Therefore, global competencies can refer to skills, knowledge and attitudes needed to understand and address global challenges. Developing global competencies in the public service requires first identifying what ‘global’ competencies entail, before deciding how they should be allocated, and developing them through relevant talent management tools and programmes.
Some countries have specific policy analysis tracks which incorporate global competencies. For instance, in the United Kingdom, the civil service competency framework highlights the need for policymakers to understand the international context, work effectively with international bodies, understand the role of international development work, and understand international trade implications for policy areas (Government of the United Kingdom, 2024[40]). In New Zealand, the 2023 Policy skills framework also recognises the need for developing understanding of the international level for current and emerging issues, and for developing an understanding of the international settings relevant to civil servants’ work.
One increasingly important skill for public servants is evidence literacy – that is, the capacity to work and engage with evidence – as they need to access and evaluate expertise and evidence from different sources. Understanding research, data and good practices produced in other countries represents an important share of the work of public servants designing policies. Knowing how to access, evaluate and translate this evidence into the local context, and use it to communicate with citizens, is thus an essential part of being a globally competent public service. Several countries have taken active steps in this area – for example, between 2023 and 2024, Belgium, Czechia, Latvia, Lithuania, and the Netherlands engaged in a project with the European Commission and the OECD, which has in part involved capacity building for senior policymakers to engage with evidence. In April 2024 the United States’ Office of Management and Budget opened up a call for participation by staff from federal agencies to take part in an Evidence Based Decision Making Leadership academy, opened to staff from all agencies.
As countries work together to address issues such as greenhouse emissions, biodiversity loss and sustainable development, ‘green competencies’ are becoming increasingly relevant in public management. An increasing number of policies have a green aspect to them and have a role to play in tackling climate change. In response to this, some countries are taking active steps to develop such “green competencies” among senior civil servants. For example, in late 2023 France’s National Institute for the Public Service announced its training module on the ecological transition for ambassadors. This module will aim to develop ambassador’s scientific knowledge of the causes and consequences of climate change, as well as carbon footprint of organisations and the links between human activity and biodiversity issues (INSP, 2023[41]).
Attracting, strengthening and retaining global competencies in public administrations
Once identified, global competencies need to be developed and managed through appropriate talent and career management mechanisms throughout the public service, rather than being concentrated only in foreign ministries or international relations branches of Ministries. Three avenues to help achieve greater development and distribution of global competencies across administrations may be through an emphasis on non-formal ways of learning, mobility programmes, and dedicated strategic workforce planning.
Attracting global competencies may be challenging in a competitive labour market. These competences are part of an increasingly diverse range of experiences, many of whom may be less attracted by the traditional offering of the public service. Across any number of policy areas at the core of those global challenges – climate change, inequality, migration, the rise of AI – the public service is in competition for a range of skills that are also highly sought-after by the private sector.
Developing global competencies through learning and development opportunities is essential to ensure public servants are able to engage with complex and multidimensional policy challenges. However, much progress remains to be made, as only 8% of OECD member countries identified global competencies as one of the top competencies to train non-manager employees for, and none to train senior managers for (OECD, 2023[42]). Few formal learning and development programmes therefore have an explicit focus on global competencies per se. France appears as an exception, as training offered on climate change and its implications has a direct relation with global competencies. In 2022, France had highlighted training efforts to the green transition as a key priority. This is currently being done by prioritising training of senior level public servants at all levels of the administration as highlighted above.
National schools of government play an important role in formally developing these competencies. In 2022, only 33% of schools of government surveyed by the OECD network of schools of government had programmes in place covering global competencies, while 39% stated they were developing similar programmes. However, even though 62% of schools declared global competencies would be a high priority by 2027, the topic remains largely less prioritised than innovation, new types of leadership, digitisation, foresight, crisis management, AI or the SDGs (OECD, 2022[43]).
International mobility programmes as a way to improve global competencies
International mobility programmes provide essential opportunities for individuals to enhance their global competencies by experiencing diverse perspectives and work environments. Through exposure to different languages, environments and professional practices, participants develop cross-cultural communication skills and a broader understanding of global issues. OECD member countries, especially members of the European Union, have largely developed international mobility programmes, and almost 70% of them have tools in place to enable international mobility (OECD, 2022[44]). These tools can take different shapes and forms. For instance, 66% of OECD member countries use longer-term secondments to send public servants to work in other countries or in international organisations, 46% enable short term international assignments, and 23% have specific international exchange programmes (OECD, 2023[42]). Therefore, even though learning and development programmes do not focus explicitly on development of global competencies, there is still strong recognition of the value of international postings as a way to bring an international outlook back to national policy work.
A recent important initiative is the ComPAct programme developed in the context of the European Union to enhance the European Administrative Space. ComPAct builds upon three pillars on public administration skills, capacity for the digital decade, and capacity to lead the green transition. Part of the public administration skills agenda relies on PACE (Public Administration Cooperation Exchange), a programme building global administrative capacity by organising international mobility across EU administrations in selected areas. As of 2023, over 300 public servants had participated to the more than 70 exchanges facilitated (European Commision, 2023[45]). One of the main goals of the programme are to increase awareness of the European dimension in national administrations, facilitate knowledge transfers and enhance collaboration opportunities on areas of common interest.
3.2.1. Strengthen institutional and regulatory frameworks to ensure transparency and integrity on lobbying and influence activities, including political finance from foreign governments and related entities, foreign political organisations, and foreign commercial interests
The 2022 OECD RDI report highlighted how foreign governments can attempt to influence policy- and decision-making processes by capitalising on loopholes in existing lobbying and political finance frameworks (OECD, 2022[33]). Indeed, the evolving lobbying and influence landscape poses new risks for the integrity of public decision-making processes, particularly in a world with increased geopolitical tension, including the repercussions of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine. These risks include new channels of influence, such as social media and artificial intelligence tools, as well as lobbying and influence by foreign actors, including foreign governments and their related entities or individuals, foreign political organisations, and foreign state-owned and controlled entities. This makes it crucial for governments to strengthen transparency and openness of lobbying and influence activities in public decision-making processes, including from foreign state interest actors.
Among the public policies being implemented in various OECD countries, transparency registers are gaining traction and have been subject to greater scrutiny since 2022. Certain lobbying registers in force in OECD jurisdictions partially cover some of the lobbying and influence activities carried out on behalf of foreign governments, such as Canada, for example. In Europe the 2021 Interinstitutional Agreement on a common transparency register specifies that authorities of third countries, including their diplomatic missions and embassies, are excluded from the scope of application “except where such authorities are represented by legal entities, offices or networks without diplomatic status or are represented by an intermediary”, who are therefore required to register and disclose their interest representation activities carried out on behalf of third countries (EUR-Lex, 2021[46]).
Building on the models of lobbying registers, an increasing number of countries are opting for a separate transparency register dedicated to foreign influence. While the United States and Australia have such systems in place since, respectively, 1938 (Foreign Agents Registration Act, FARA) and 2018 (Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme, FITS), the United Kingdom adopted its Foreign Influence Registration Scheme (FIRS) in 2023. France also recently made progress on these issues with the adoption in March 2024 of a law on preventing foreign interference, which took into account key recommendations from the OECD and provides for the establishment of a transparency register dedicated to influence activities conducted on behalf of foreign state interests (Box 3.2).
United Kingdom
The establishment of a Foreign Influence Registration Scheme (FIRS) was provided for in the National Security Bill (Part 4) passed in the summer of 2023. The register is scheduled to come into force in autumn 2024 and detailed guidelines will be published before the scheme’s requirements come into force.
The Scheme covers “political influence activities” conducted in the United Kingdom on behalf of foreign powers, including a foreign government or part of a foreign government, or a political party which is a governing political party of a foreign government. Foreign powers themselves are not required to register, only people who have entered into agreements with foreign powers. An arrangement involves a “direction” from the foreign power to carry out “political influence activities” in the United Kingdom, directly or through another natural or legal person.
An activity is considered a “political influence activity” (article 70 of the National Security Act 2023) if it meets the following two criteria:
Criterion 1 – the activity is one of the following:
A communication to a senior public official or politician.
A public communication (for example, the publication or production of an article) except where it is reasonably clear that it is made at the direction of a foreign power (for example, if an article is labelled in a way that makes this fact clear, or if the writer mentions this fact in the article itself).
The provision of money, goods or services to an individual or entity in the United Kingdom.
Criterion 2 – the purpose of the activity is to influence one of the following:
An election or referendum in the United Kingdom.
A decision of a Minister or Government department (including a Minister or Government department of Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland).
The proceedings of a UK registered political party (such as their manifesto commitments).
A Member of the House of Commons, House of Lords, Northern Ireland Assembly, Scottish Parliament or Senedd Cymru (when acting in their capacity as such).
The FIRS distinguishes between two types of influence with distinct disclosure regimes: a “political influence tier”, which requires the registration of arrangements to carry out political influence activities in the United Kingdom at the direction of a foreign power, and an “enhanced tier” for all activities carried out on behalf of certain foreign powers or power-controlled entities that pose a risk to UK safety and interests.
France
The law on preventing foreign interference in France, adopted in March 2024, provides for the creation by 2025 of a register of foreign influence activities to be set up by the High Authority for Transparency in Public Life (HATVP), and separate from the existing register of interest representatives established in 2016.
Registrable activities will include activities of any natural or legal person, regardless of nationality, acting on behalf of foreign powers outside the European Union and their related entities, and that aim to influence public decision making or the conduct of public policies, including France's European or foreign policy. These activities may involve communicating with elected representatives or public decision makers (declared candidates in national or European elections, leaders of political parties, ministers, ministerial advisers or advisers to the Head of State, members of parliament, regional and departmental executives, mayors of towns with more than 20 000 inhabitants, former presidents of the Republic or ministers for five years after leaving office, etc.). They also include carrying out communication campaigns and the disbursement of money for influence purposes.
Source: OECD (2024[47]), Strengthening the Transparency and Integrity of Foreign Influence Activities in France: A Tool for Tackling Foreign Interference Risks, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/438da77f-en; United Kingdom Home Office, Foreign Influence Registration Scheme factsheet, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-security-bill-factsheets/foreign-influence-registration-scheme-factsheet.
Since 2023, Canada has also been considering the possibility of establishing a separate foreign influence transparency registry and launched a public consultation on the matter (Public Safety Canada, 2023[48]; Public Safety Canada, 2023[49]). Furthermore, in December 2023, as part of the European Defence of Democracy Package, the European Union presented a proposal (European Commission, 2023[50]) for a Directive that would establish harmonised requirements in the internal market regarding the transparency of interest representation activities carried on behalf of third countries (European Commission, 2023[51]).
Another way through which foreign powers or their proxies can interfere in other countries’ democratic processes is through the abuse of political financing. Interfering countries can help policymakers get elected to office and later ask for favours in return. This can be achieved, for instance, by providing financial contributions to candidates or political parties and their campaigns. Recent OECD evidence shows that countries’ current political finance safeguards are leaving them exposed to foreign interference. While 30 OECD member states ban contributions to political parties from foreign sources, fewer than half of OECD countries ban anonymous contributions to political parties, enabling foreign states or enterprises to contribute anonymously and circumvent current prohibitions (Figure 3.5). These gaps should be filled if countries are to successfully mitigate the risks of foreign interference.
Regulations completely ban financial contributions from…
Note: The following OECD countries impose a threshold but not a complete ban on anonymous donations: Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, United Kingdom and United States. Australia imposes a threshold on financial contributions from foreign states and foreign enterprises. Ireland imposes a threshold on financial contributions from publicly owned enterprises. Italy did not provide information for the criterion regarding “publicly owned enterprises”. Data for Belgium, Colombia, Germany, Hungary and New Zealand were not provided.
How to read: Regulations in Chile impose a complete ban on political parties from receiving financial contributions from anonymous donations, foreign states and foreign enterprises, and publicly owned enterprises.
Source: OECD (2024[52]), Anti-Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2024, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/968587cd-en; OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database.
3.2.2. Improve regulation and oversight of pre- and post-public employment restrictions for high-level public officials seeking positions or roles in foreign governments or related entities, or foreign companies
In addition to a transparency mechanism for foreign influence, policies relating to the integrity of public officials must take the risk of foreign interference into account. A particularly important issue to consider in the context of foreign influence is the “revolving door” between the public and private sectors. This has received increased attention since 2022 – as noted in the report by the European Parliament's “Special Committee on Foreign Interference in all Democratic Processes in the European Union, including Disinformation”, the employment of former public officials and civil servants in companies controlled directly or indirectly by foreign states may entail a risk of interference (European Parliament, 2022[53]). The knowledge they may have acquired during their time in office or while carrying public functions, their network of influence within the administration or among elected representatives, or more broadly in society, may constitute valuable sources of influence for a foreign power carrying out interference activities. However, the specific risks to high level public officials seeking positions or roles in foreign governments, foreign companies, and related entities, currently appears to be poorly addressed within OECD countries, outside of general post-public employment rules (see Chapter 2 and Action Plan on enhancing representation, participation and openness in public life).
While the United States has explicitly recognised such risks in its post government restrictions for some time, other countries are now making progress. For example, in 2023 France implemented the Military Planning Act 2024-2030 and Decree no. 2023-1171 of 13 December 2023, tightening the rules for members of the armed forces: a declaration must now be made to the Ministry of the Armed Forces, which has the power to prevent the post-public employment activity of military personnel who have held positions in strategic areas. The recently adopted law to prevent foreign interference, also strengthens control over the professional reconversion in the private sector of former ministers, local executives and members of an independent authority has been strengthened. This control, currently carried out by the HATVP in relation to conflicts of interest, has been extended to cover the risks of foreign influence over a five-year period following recommendations from the OECD (OECD, 2024[47]).
3.2.3. Require not-for-profit organisations and higher education institutions to apply transparency and integrity frameworks to activities and donations from abroad
The OECD 2022 RDI report had identified how actors from some autocratic regimes can undermine educational, social and cultural institutions in democracies. Indeed, academic and cultural co-operation, including through think-tanks and CSOs, offer rich possibilities for direct or indirect foreign interference. In recent years, several countries and organisations have established or discussed establishing transparency and integrity frameworks for not-for-profit organisations and higher-education institutions in order to better account for foreign interference risks. For example, in 2022, the European Commission published a toolkit on how to mitigate foreign interference in research and innovation. The publication outlines best practices to support EU Higher Education Institutions and Research Performing Organisations in safeguarding their fundamental values, including academic freedom, integrity and institutional autonomy, as well as to protect their staff, students, research findings and assets (European Commission, 2022[54]).
In France, 2024 law to prevent foreign interference includes a requirement for think tanks to publish their sources of funding to the High Authority for transparency in public life (HATVP). In Chile, a special Ministerial Advisory Commission for the regulation of the relationship between private non-profit institutions and the State proposed in 2023 the creation of an electronic portal that allows monitoring and accessing information on transfers of public resources to civil society organisations (OECD, 2024[55]).
3.2.4. Strengthen policy responses to counteract the threat of foreign information manipulation operations, including via the spread of disinformation and intentionally misleading information activities that seek to manipulate and unduly influence democratic processes and public debate
While it is important to recognise that foreign influence can effectively contribute to democratic debates if conducted transparently and through official channels, risks arise when foreign agents attempt to undermine democratic processes (OECD, 2024[56]). As highlighted in the Building Trust and Reinforcing Democracy report, undue foreign influence can destabilise democracies in a variety of forms, one of the most significant of which is through the spreading of disinformation and other divisive content (OECD, 2022[57]). In order to combat this, since 2022, countries have adopted new legislation, as well as a number of governance measures to provide clearer strategic guidance.
The increasing attention paid to foreign disinformation threats is evident in the increasing frequency that they are included in legislation. For example, the UK Online Safety Act states that foreign interference is a priority threat, meaning it is a serious and prevalent online threat and companies must take proactive steps to tackle it. Schedule 7 Section 37 of the Act says that anything considered an offence under the 2023 National Security Act (which itself considers a wide variety of foreign interference risks, including disinformation) is also considered an offence under this Act (Government of the United Kingdom, 2023[58]; Government of the United Kingdom, 2023[59]). In Canada, An Act respecting countering foreign interference was announced in May 2024, which aims to modify various security acts for the internet era, and creates a Foreign Influence Transparency Registry, promoting transparency from people who advocate on behalf of a foreign principle (Government of Canada, 2024[60]). Lithuania is also currently discussing modernisation efforts for existing laws, with a proposal to amend the Law on the Provision of Information to the Public and to the Criminal Code to include criminal liability for disinformation spread by ‘bot farms’, including automatically created fake accounts designing to spread disinformation (LRT, 2023[61]).
Other countries have responded to these threats by developing existing strategies or creating new ones to better combat them. For example, the German National Security Strategy, adopted by the Federal Cabinet in June 2023, mentions a variety of measures to prevent disinformation campaigns and to understand how they intersect with other national security threats. In particular, it states its intention to set out a strategy on tackling disinformation that will improve the tools for early identification of manipulative communications, as well as its plan to increase support for research on disinformation (German Ministry of Defence, n.d.[62]). Estonia has also recently further developed its approach to national security. Its updated National Security Concept, approved by the government in January 2023, recognises the threat posed by the dissemination of disinformation, and underlines the importance of ensuring that the people of Estonia are able to recognise and oppose such information (Republic of Estonia Government, 2023[63]).
Increasing recognition of the threat that disinformation poses has also been seen at the international level, via cross-country agreements. For example, in September 2023 the Netherlands launched the Global Declaration on Information Integrity Online, endorsed by 30 other countries5. The Declaration highlights the need to combat the spread of misinformation and disinformation, both by state and non-state actors, and requests that the participating States abstain from conducting or sponsoring disinformation campaigns, and condemn any such acts (Government of the Netherlands, 2023[64]).
Several countries have also set up new bodies in order to respond to foreign disinformation threats more effectively. While the French Agency VIGINUM and the United States Global Engagement Center of the State Department are well-known, another interesting example is Lithuania’s National Crisis Management Centre (Government of the Republic of Lithuania, 2023[65]), which was founded in January 2023 and provides continuous monitoring of threats of interest to national security. Should a crisis occur, the Centre would be responsible for preparing data-based solutions and fostering inter-institutional co-ordination in their implementation. Latvia’s State Chancellery also published a 2022 digital book titled “Handbook against disinformation: recognise and oppose” which provides advice on handling information manipulation both for public sector employees and the general public (OECD, 2024[56]). Similar to Lithuania’s Crisis Management Centre, Moldova’s Centre for Strategic Communication and Combatting Misinformation, approved in July 2023, takes on a co-ordination role, fostering inter-institutional co-ordination in its fight against foreign interference.
3.2.5. Ensure an enabling environment for journalists, media outlets, civil society organisations, including by ensuring protection from threats, intimidation and Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs)
The OECD 2022 RDI report warned of emerging attempts by foreign actors to undermine an enabling environment for journalists, media outlets and civil society organisations. As such, taking measures to protect all those who scrutinise and report on foreign interference operations from intimidation, threats, physical attacks and abusive strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs), is of paramount importance to build resilience to foreign undue influence in policymaking and democratic processes (OECD, 2010[66]). This is of course related to the issues of mis and disinformation analysed (see Chapter 1 on Public Governance for Combatting Mis- and Disinformation.
A first type of measure is to engage in initiatives to counter Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs) that increasingly endanger freedom of expression for activists, media workers and members of CSOs with the aim of silencing them. Therefore, against a backdrop of rising awareness of the threats posed by SLAPPs, Belgium, Croatia, Ireland, Italy, Slovenia and United Kingdom are all in the process of, or have already, introduced related draft laws, focal points, and working groups (European Commission, 2023[67]; European Commission, 2023[68]; Houses of the Oireachtas, 2023[69]; Senate of Italy, 2024[70]; Senate of Italy, 2024[71]; Senate of Italy, 2024[72]; Senate of Italy, 2024[73]; Senate of Italy, 2024[74]; European Commission, 2023[75]; Government of the United Kingdom, 2024[76]). Moreover, Ireland is in the process of reforming its defamation law, introducing changes that are expected to help countering SLAPPs (Joint Committee on Justice, 2023[77]). At European level, the European Union adopted a Directive in April 2024 to counter cross-border SLAPPs, introducing early dismissal procedures and requiring plaintiffs to cover estimated legal costs, in addition to additional penalties that can be imposed on plaintiffs by the courts, following an earlier Recommendation from the European Commission (EU, 2024[78]). Moreover, in April 2024, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe approved a recommendation with guidelines for identifying and countering SLAPPs (Council of Europe, 2024[79]).
Beyond the specific issue of SLAPPS, a number of countries including Germany, Italy, the Slovak Republic and Sweden have taken steps to protect journalists during assemblies. Recognising that media workers can be subject to harassment and violence during protests, these countries adopted a comprehensive action plan to safeguard journalists in 2023. Lithuania also has several measures in place to protect media workers, including specialised training sessions for prosecutors, police officers, and judges to address threats against journalists. Moreover, targeted training sessions and consultations between law enforcement agencies and journalists' associations aim to prevent threats and attacks during public gatherings and demonstrations. Additionally, efforts are underway to develop a mechanism for gathering data on various forms of attacks against journalists (Article 19, 2023[80]). (Reporters without Borders, 2023[81]).
Finally, countries can also take action to support Human rights defenders (HRDs) which play an essential role in democratic societies by defending individuals' rights to express dissenting opinions and advocate for marginalised voices (OECD, 2022[82]). In 2022, Chile joined the Escazú Agreement, the first treaty on environmental matters to include binding, specific provisions for the protection of HRDs in environmental matters (United Nations, 2024[83]). To implement the Escazú Agreement, Chile approved the “National Participatory Implementation Plan for the Escazú Agreement 2024-2030” in April 2024, with specific measures to collect data, raise awareness, train public officials, and establish a protection programme for environmental defenders in the country (Government of Chile, 2024[84]). In Denmark, the independent state-funded Danish Institute for Human Rights is the co-creator of the Inclusive SDG Data Partnerships initiative. The initiative aims to generate official data on HRDs worldwide through alliances in several countries. The partnerships comprise national statistics offices, CSOs and NHRIs. They identify missing data and plan how to fill the gaps (Danish Institute for Human Rights, 2022[85]).
3.2.6. Designing and implementing policies to limit the abuse of Residence-by-Investment (RBI) and Citizenship-by-Investment (CBI) schemes by individuals that hide or facilitate financial and economic crimes, including corruption, tax evasion and money laundering
The OECD 2022 RDI report highlighted that Residence-by-Investment (RBI) and Citizen-by-Investment (CBI) schemes can be used and abused to hide or facilitate financial and economic crimes, including corruption, tax evasion and money-laundering. The involvement of multiple agencies across government as well as intermediaries can provide challenges in the regulation, implementation and oversight of these schemes and make them vulnerable to abuse by professional enablers and fraudsters targeting opportunities to service or exploit recipients (OECD/FATF, 2023[86]). For example, in Türkiye good domestic co-ordination in processing CBI application has helped to prevent some individuals to apply to the programme.
The OECD/FATF 2023 report identifies a number of mitigation measures that can help address such abuse. Conducting sound analysis of money laundering and corruption risks, setting clear objectives, ensuring clarity around the respective roles and responsibilities of public and private sector actors and building accountability mechanisms into the design and implementation of RBI/CBI programmes can help mitigate above-mentioned risks (OECD/FATF, 2023[86]). In terms of concrete country initiatives, in Malta, a regulator monitors and supervises the granting of CBI, with an annual report to Parliament. In Ireland, an immigrant investor programme was closed in 2023, even though an independent evaluation committee did assess all project applications under this programme. In Portugal the Court of Auditors has powers to audit the ”Golden Visa programme”, and made recommendations to improve the transparency and simplicity of the procedure. The United Kingdom has had a security vetting for immigration officials for quite some time, and New Zealand has established a code of conduct for immigration officials.
3.3.1. Working collectively through the OECD
Global Capacities
The OECD monitors its Recommendation for Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development (PCSD), including a report on Driving Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development and a Monitoring report on the implementation of the Recommendation for OECD Council in 2024. The OECD also released a cross directorate report in 2024 on OECD Contributions to the 2030 Agenda and Beyond, based on OECD knowledge, data, tools and best practices to prepare for future global challenges.
The OECD Paris Collaborative on Green Budgeting and the OECD network on Gender Budgeting also provide avenues to discuss strategic budget initiatives. The Working Party of the Leading Practitioners for Public Procurement supports countries in their efforts towards strategic public procurement, including cross-cutting objectives such as human rights and gender equality that are discussed throughout the annual Public Procurement Weeks.
The network of OECD behavioural experts has now helped to prepare an Interactive BI Unit Map, featuring units across 43 countries, an International Project Repository, including more than 100 BI projects, some of which related to global challenges. 2023 Guide to support policymakers in the use of different experimentation methodologies (Seven routes to experimentation in policymaking).
The OECD’s cross directorate Mission Action Lab is supporting people across levels of government, as well as co-operating with the European Union, with the support of a Mission Community of Practice connecting over 250 policymakers and mission practitioners from around the world launched in 2024.
To discuss global competences of civil servants, the OECD convened a Public Service Leaders’ Roundtable in 2024 to discuss the increasingly complex leadership challenges facing senior management of civil services. The OECD’s Network of Schools of Government discussed the opportunities of training institutions to develop leaders of transformation in their public services. The European Commission’s Public Administration Cooperation Exchange (PACE) can also greatly support those efforts, offering concrete opportunities to build such approaches at European level.
The OECD Public Governance Reviews to carry out comparative analysis of public governance competencies of governments to tackle global challenges, including through centres of government. The Public Governance Monitor of Sweden did address government capacity to lead and co-ordinate cross-cutting issues, with a focus on climate policies. Dedicated reviews have also been looking at the role and capacities of government institutions in steering, coordinating and implementing the green agenda, particularly in Romania. These Reviews will increasingly integrate themes that support the reinforcement of democratic governance in the face of global challenges, such as participation, information integrity and governing with AI, as is the case with the Public Governance Review of Ukraine.
Finally, the OECD is actively engaging youth in contributing to policy solutions to global and intergenerational challenges. Over the 2023-24 period, the OECD Horizontal Project “A Better Future for Young People in Ageing Societies” has helped Members work together to identify good practices and inspire more ambitious government action. The OECD Youth Policy Toolkit, which will provide hands-on guidance to policymakers in line with the OECD Recommendation on Creating Better Opportunities for Young People, is expected to be launched in 2024.
Foreign Interference
The OECD convened two High-Level Dialogues on Building Resilience to Foreign Interference, the first in November 2023 and the second in June 2024. The OECD is also supporting countries in the design of policy responses to the risk of foreign interference as exemplified by the report Strengthening Transparency and Integrity of Foreign Influence Activities in France. The OECD is currently conducting a stocktaking of countries’ resilience policies with the aim to support the development of an OECD Framework to Build Resilience to Foreign Interference in a Globalised World.
The amended Recommendation of the Council on Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying and Influence was adopted by the OECD Ministerial Council Meeting in Spring 2024.
Responding to the mandates of the ministerial meetings of the Financial Action Task Force in April 2022 and of the Public Governance Committee in November 2022, the OECD and FATF published the first ever joint OECD-FATF report, on Misuse of Citizenship and Residency by Investment Programmes (CBI/RBI) in November 2023.
3.3.2. Conclusions and priorities for the future
Governments are strengthening governance capacities to address global challenges. At the same time, there is a clear recognition that in many cases democracy is under threat in open and global societies, with intensifying foreign interference changing the landscape of international relations. Countries have taken many steps in this area by:
Reinforcing public governance capacities to address global challenges including the systematic consideration of the transboundary impacts; strengthening civil servants’ capacity to identify and select high quality evidence when considering global policy issues; new reporting and accountability mechanisms to ensure governments are complying with their commitments made at the global level (e.g. climate change); international co-operation to foster data access as well as interoperability and mutual recognition of data access and sharing arrangements.
Building resilience to foreign undue influence in democratic processes. This includes strengthening institutional and regulatory frameworks to ensure transparency and integrity of lobbying - including political finance from foreign sources; improving regulation and oversight of pre- and post-public employment restrictions on senior public officials; ensuring that journalists, media outlets, civil society organisations are protected from threats, intimidation and Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs).
However, the scale of the problem requires greater co-operation amongst democracies. This includes pursuing efforts to promote and share good practices on evidence informed policymaking to reinforce public governance capacities to address global challenges, as use of evidence is a key driver of trust in government.
This will also involve greater investments to better understand foreign interference and design appropriate policy responses. The OECD is supporting countries in strengthening their public governance systems to reap the benefits of global co-operation, while reducing the risk of malevolent interference by external actors. The OECD will be developing a Framework to Build Resilience to Foreign Interference in a Globalised World, enabling to distinguish transparent foreign influence and undue foreign interference, to support countries to better exercise their legitimate foreign influence in fully transparent and accountable terms. The Reinforcing Democracy Initiative will continue to offer opportunity for global dialogue to delineate foreign influence from foreign interference, putting transparency as a key requirement and countering the latter.
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← 1. Section 2, clause 5.1 of the Canadian Environmental Protection Act 1999. The implementation framework is currently under development (Government of Canada, 2024[87]).
← 2. The Republic of Türkiye interprets the term “gender”, throughout the document, as identical with “sex” pursuant to the binary concept of biological female and male sex. The term "gender equality" shall be interpreted as “equality between women and men”.
← 3. Accession countries surveyed were Romania, Bulgaria and Brazil.
← 4. Results from the OECD Survey on Green Public Procurement (2022) to which 38 countries, including 4 accession countries replied.
← 5. Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Czechia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Georgia, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Kenya, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Moldova, Netherlands, New Zealand, Slovak Republic, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Uruguay and United States.