Governments are leveraging digital tools, including civic tech to enhance both in-person and online participation in policymaking. They are also addressing regulatory gaps in election integrity, political advertising, and online campaign finance. Digital identification systems are also being implemented, and a greater emphasis is being placed on open data. However, the public sector frequently lags behind in adopting the technologies required to fulfil the expectations of a digital democracy. The rapid proliferation of mis- and disinformation underscores the need for more decisive government action. Public institutions can improve their capacity to harness digital tools, including artificial intelligence to improve service delivery and operational efficiency.
The OECD Reinforcing Democracy Initiative
Abstract
Democratic institutions are facing new challenges as well as opportunities, in the digital era, particularly in terms of how the use of digital technologies may influence or advance the conditions, institutions and practices of political engagement and democratic governance. These issues are commonly identified as part of “digital democracy” and their risks and opportunities were outlined in the OECD 2022 RDI report. While governments have become aware of these risks and opportunities and have acted in several areas, rapid technological advancements and increased reliance on social media and digital channels by citizens have often made it a challenge for governments to keep pace, and thus have contributed to a rapidly changing political landscape.
The key question is therefore whether countries are in a position to keep pace with such a rapid diffusion of digital channels, and are able to exploit the opportunities in terms of meaningful citizen participation and democratic engagement. The year 2024 does offer a number of opportunities to mobilise digital channels to support stronger open democracies, and a greater readiness to address these challenges in a more adverse globalised world The Action Plan on Transforming Public Governance for Digital Democracy (henceforth “the Action Plan”), approved by the PGC has identified three key areas and the steps needed to tackle them:
Key area 1 – Strengthen democratic representation and participation in the context of digitalisation
Key area 2 – Upgrade democratic institutions to respond to the opportunities and challenges of digitalisation for democracies
Key area 3 – Leverage key policy tools to respond to the opportunities and challenges of digitalisation for democracy
The work in some of these areas is also closely related to the two other action plans, including the Action Plan on Combating Mis- and Dis-information, and the Action Plan on Enhancing representation, participation and Openness in Public Life. In addition, the recent “Facts not Fakes: Tackling Disinformation, Strengthening Information Integrity” (OECD, 2024[1]) has offered opportunities to upgrade governance measures and public institutions in a digital context.
Given the timing of adoption of the Action Plan and the fragmented nature of the information available in this area, this chapter attempts to provide an overview of recent and relevant initiatives where they have been identified. For some issues such as those related to protecting electoral systems and elections, which have not necessarily been addressed as such by the OECD work on public governance, the report has mobilised recent evidence from the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), a long standing partner of the OECD Reinforcing Democracy Initiative. In some novel cases, such as the use of artificial intelligence (AI) in elections, the chapter provides preliminary insights.
Data shows that electoral participation varies greatly across OECD countries and in most countries it is below 70%. Digitalisation has the potential to unlock greater participation by reducing barriers to entry, thus fostering greater perception of political inclusion, as well as increasing the practicality of voting and other forms of civic engagement. However, technology has its own risks, including security risks, with cyberattack concerns, social risks, with dangers of greater socioeconomic disparities due to digital divides, and data privacy concerns (International IDEA, 2019[2]). A more nuanced narrative will emerge from discussing country practices in greater detail in light of the action plan.
Turnout of the voting age population in national elections
Note: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Peru, Türkiye and Brazil practice compulsory voting.
Source: International IDEA (2023[3]), “Global State of Democracy Indices”, https://www.idea.int/democracytracker/gsod-indices/.
5.1.1. Encourage greater participation and engagement in elections and wider democratic processes through digital means
Using dedicated digital channels to better inform, listen to and increase the engagement of citizens before, during and after electoral processes and offering targeted support to effectively and safely leverage digital channels to enhance participation in democratic processes
The OECD 2022 RDI report had identified the need to foster citizen participation in the digital age, but it fell short of addressing the role of digital channels in the context of elections. While governments have made significant efforts to foster citizen participation in the digital age (see subsequent section), the attention on use of digital tools to enhance participation during and around electoral processes election is more recent. As highlighted in Building Trust and Reinforcing Democracy, digitalisation has opened up a range of opportunities to increase citizens’ voices in policymaking, allowing larger audiences to engage on particular issues, and enabling participation from groups that may otherwise struggle to have their voices heard. One such group is often young people, whose greater propensity towards use of digital services, presents a unique opportunity to engage them, as highlighted by International IDEA.
Grannicus, an organisation engaging with state and federal government in the United States, has identified 10 strategies to boost voter Turnout and engagement in local elections:
1. community surveys
2. reminder Emails
3. I voted incentives
4. Enhanced accessibility
5. Civic education campaigns
6. Early voting opportunities
7. Mobile polling stations
8. Transparent Communication
9. Celebrate civic pride
10. Continue to engage post-election
Many of these tools can be used through digital channels. However, information as to which country would have specifically invested in which tools was not available for the preparation of the report. The scope for further progress is vast. Given the significant engagement that takes place on social media ahead of elections, increasing citizen maturity and scope for participation in digital channels is an area where governments, at national and local levels, can hope to see significant returns on investment in the future.
Supporting the development of digital channels for meaningful participation, deliberation and consultation beyond elections, at the national and sub national levels, leveraging civic technologies
The OECD 2022 report underlined the need to foster active participation of citizens in democratic processes beyond the ballot box as well as democratic deliberation through digital means, stating that engaging citizens through digital channels can contribute to a healthy democracy by demonstrating that citizens’ suggestions and contributions can have a tangible impact.
Digital technologies are contributing to an increase in citizen participation by supporting existing in-person mechanisms and enabling new forms and channels of interaction between citizens and public institutions. Digital tools are regularly used by public authorities at all levels of government to collect and process citizen inputs, to inform them about participation opportunities, in-person events, to provide learning materials, to perform online voting and to follow-up on the implementation of the results of participatory and deliberative processes, with a wealth of recent European examples gathered through IDEA (García and Al., 2023[4]). Estonia has also mobilised digital channels through a school-based initiative, based on the model of inclusive budgeting, under which, students can submit proposals and vote for them on an online platform. The initiative can increase students’ awareness of democratic decision-making processes and highlight how their civic contributions can have real-life impacts, thus setting important groundwork for their adult lives (Democratisation Workbook, n.d.[5]) Other efforts to involve citizens in democratic decision making through digital tools tend to take place at the local level. Antwerp, in Belgium, is currently updating and renovating its digital participation tool ‘OOR’, which allows people to participate in plans for city projects. This digital format allows those who do not have the time to participate in public forums to nevertheless have a say in how their city is governed (City of Antwerpen, n.d.[6]) Leipzig, in Germany, is planning on running civil councils of randomly selected people, including in digital format, in the hope to “reach more young people and working people that have limited time but want to participate” (International IDEA, 2023[7]).
The OECD has also gathered country experiences with ‘civic tech’, meaning “the use of digital technologies to reinforce democracy by enabling the public to be informed, participate in decision and policymaking, and increase governments’ responsiveness and accountability” (OECD, forthcoming[8]). Among the benefits, civic tech can help reach out to a larger number of individuals, allow asynchronous participation, innovate in how citizens express their opinion, and process large amounts of citizen inputs (OECD, 2022[9]). Recent examples gathered at the OECD 2023 Civic Tech event also show an important role for civil society and initiatives by other actors such as foundations. (e.g. Make.Org foundation as well as your priorities). The Civic Tech field guide offers a catalogue of tools and resources covering the full breadth of “tech for the common good”.
In recent years, governments have used digital platforms to involve large numbers of participants for diverse policy issues to an increasing extent. According to the most recent data on Open Government from the OECD, almost all OECD countries have deployed a digital portal dedicated to informing about participation opportunities or to carrying out online consultation and participatory processes (OECD, 2023[10]). For example, in 2023 the government of Brazil launched the platform Brazil Participativo to involve citizens in the definition of the priorities for the 2024-2027 Multiannual Plan. This initiative encompassed three dimensions of citizen participation: (1) 27 plenaries across all Brazilian federations, engaging 32 000 participants; and (2) digital engagement via the Brasil Participativo platform, with 4 million registered accesses and 1.4 million individuals actively participating in the process. The European Union recently deployed the first EU-wide online portal in late 2022, FuturEU to gather citizens’ ideas and inputs, based on the open-source participatory platform Decidim which gathered more than 18 000 ideas and 22 000 comments. The built-in AI-powered automatic translation tool eTranslations allowed citizens from across the European Union to submit their ideas and comments in their native language, helping to overcome the language divide. The government of Italy setup a public consultation platform, ParteciPA, which has since its launch grown to over 34 000 users. The platform had hosted 46 participatory processes as of May 2024, with citizens providing over 4 000 inputs.
While traditional face-to-face deliberation remains the preferred mode, digital media have become a key element of deliberative processes. According to recent OECD data (OECD, 2023[11]), online deliberation had become the most used medium for conducting a deliberative process in 2020-21, give the sanitary restrictions of the Covid-19 pandemic. While this figure did drop significantly as pandemic-related restrictions were lifted, in 2022 and 2023 on third of processes continued to opt for digital or hybrid settings. (OECD, 2023[11]).
Digital tools can support deliberative processes in different ways:
Bridging the gap between participants and the broader population: This can be done by embedding forms of participation within deliberative processes that target a wider public. 55% of the cases that used a complementary form of participation in this manner opted for a digital solution. In late 2022, the Austrian National Council embedded deliberation tool Pol.is in the Austrian Citizens’ Climate Council (Paice, 2022[12]). In Latin America, a participatory digital platform was launched in 2024 alongside climate assemblies in four cities across the region: Mar del Plata (Argentina), Bujarú (Brazil), Buenaventura (Colombia), and Monterrey (Mexico). to become a digital space of participation for both assembly members and the broader public.
Increasing transparency and ensuring continuous communication. In 40% of cases, communication was done through online or digital channels including social media and dedicated websites. For instance, the City of Barcelona, following its Citizens' Assembly for Climate, is using the platform decidim.barcelona to follow-up on the implementation of the members' recommendations (Decidim Barcelona, 2024[13]).
OECD countries have also been innovating in the use of civic technologies to promote more meaningful and inclusive citizen participation. Artificial intelligence has played a notable role here – while governments usually face the challenge of analysing large amounts of qualitative inputs received in online or in-person processes, AI systems, and in particular natural language processing (NLPs) models, can make sense of large amounts of textual inputs to support participatory and deliberative processes by efficiently analysing and summarising citizen inputs. Sense-making tools can help public officials and civil servants to understand and visualise citizens’ priorities and opinions on the issues at stake and support them in translating large amounts of inputs into actionable recommendations. For example, in 2023, France organised a representative deliberative process (Convention Citoyenne) to inform the upcoming law on the End of Life. Together with the final report, the civic tech provider Make.org deployed Panoramic, an AI-powered responsive interface to help citizens navigate the discussions and the results of the deliberative process in a lighter and more interactive manner (Make.org, 2024[14]).
Countries have also made use of virtual assistants such as ChatBots to support citizens in navigating participatory and deliberative processes by responding to their queries in human language and sending them personalised notifications and reminders based on their interests (Cortés-Cediel, 2023[15]). This is the case of Chatico in Bogota (Colombia) (see Box 5.1). A current limitation of deliberative processes is their difficulty to scale up due to lack of resources and the complexity to facilitate large deliberations. AI can help overcome some of these challenges. Scaling deliberation can take the form of multiplying the number of small, representative groups deliberating on a same subject with the help of AI moderators. (Landemore, 2022[16]). All in all, AI could significantly reduce the costs associated with the design and implementation of representative deliberative process.
In 2022, the City of Bogotá (Colombia) deployed Chatico, a conversational chatbot that informs citizens in a clear, simple, and user-friendly way to encourage active citizen participation in local governance issues, in particular the design of Bogotá’s development plan for the next 4 years. The chatbot is anchored in Colombia’s most used instant messaging application (WhatsApp) to promote broader usage, and gives citizens three ways to engage: 1) “short route”, which offers the option to participate by selecting one of the five priority objectives; 2) “intermediate route”, where citizens can choose both an objective and a solution; and 3) “long route”, which allows citizens to leave specific comments addressed to the mayor. On average, it takes citizens 5 minutes to participate, and so far, Chatico has attracted more than 10 000 interactions and gathered 22 000 proposals.
In 2021, the city of Madrid (Spain) embedded Clara, an AI-based virtual assistant, on its existing participatory platform Decide_Madrid based on the open-source software Consul. Clara responds to users’ questions on the functioning of the platform and of the participatory processes of the city.
Source: (Decide_Madrid, 2021[17]; OECD, 2022[18]).
Fostering information integrity to support fact-based public debate, promoting safe digital civic spaces and combatting manipulation and deceptive content generated through or as a product of artificial intelligence systems
This point of the Action Plan is aligned with challenges and solutions outlined in the chapter on Pillar one, on Mis and DisInformation, building on the OECD Report Facts not Fakes (OECD, 2024[1]):
Effective digital democracy requires governments to protect online civic spaces, foster resilience to misinformation and disinformation, mitigate online hate speech, promote access to information and data on digital channels and protect free, independent and pluralistic media.
Civic freedoms and pluralistic public opinion cannot be fully realised if individuals feel they must refrain from discussing certain topics or withdraw from public debate due to fear of vilification or harmful racial, gender-based, and other forms of discrimination. Therefore, fostering a civic space that mitigates hate speech, an especially pressing challenge in the digital sphere, is essential for the full realisation of civic freedoms. Recognising this, in March 2024 Costa Rica launched the National Strategy to Prevent and Address Hate Speech and Discrimination, the first of its kind in Latin America (Government of Costa Rica, 2024[19]).
Fostering resilience to mis- and disinformation also requires reviewing the risks involved in online public consultation processes. While such processes increase government transparency and promote greater interest in democratic processes, they can also be vulnerable to AI-driven submissions or hate speech. To mitigate this risk, a working group in Ireland tasked with forming a counter disinformation strategy launched a public consultation process, open to everyone. In response to the responses received, which expressed concern over how such a strategy would affect free speech, the working group highlighted the importance of taking into account any risks to freedom of speech when formulating the strategy (Government of Ireland, 2023[20]). The risks of bots are also recognised by citizens’ themselves. The 2022 Public Policy Forum report in Canada recommended to severely limit the use of bots on social media platforms as part of its Citizens’ Assembly on Democratic expression (Public Policy Forum, 2022[21]).
5.1.2. Ensure participation and engagement in elections and wider democratic processes is open to all
Fostering political agency and political inclusion, including by providing easily accessible options for participation in electoral processes, in particular for young people, while preserving privacy and security and providing a smooth and cohesive experience, while ensuring that human support remains
The OECD 2022 RDI report addressed e-voting issues, digital participation and the need to enlarge electoral participation, and these issues were further recognised by the Action Plan, in particular with reference to young people. E-voting is a rapidly evolving technology, and its benefits can be numerous, among them fostering of political agency and greater accessibility for marginalised groups1. However, it's essential to acknowledge potential risks associated with these systems, such as privacy concerns stemming from increased data collection and the potential for misuse or manipulation of information.
A close look at actual possibilities in terms of E voting practices provides additional useful insights. Use of technology to encourage and streamline voting varies significantly across the OECD, as indicated in Table 5.1. It is hard to point to a general trend, as a number of countries seem to have explored E voting before ceasing to use it, such as Finland, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, and Portugal. Data of implementation also varies significantly – while voting machines were introduced in 1999 in Belgium, and digital voting in 2005 in Estonia, in countries such as Colombia, Costa Rica and Türkiye pilots for e-voting were run in 2024. In federal countries, such as the United States or Switzerland use of such tools has been left to the discretion of the subnational level. In the United States, more than 6 million voters registered through the online voter registration platform “Rock the Vote” since 1991. Similar platforms exist in Australia, Canada, France and the United Kingdom where citizens can check their registration, update their address and register to vote (European Commission, 2017[22]).
In some countries, first-time voters face challenges to register for voting, which might be one reason for lower turnouts among youth compared to other age groups but information on specific youth related initiatives were not available.
Notes: (1) E-voting recommendations have been reviewed by the Ministry of Interior but have not been implemented due to it being unconstitutional. (2) Online voting used in sub-national referenda. (3) Voting machines were introduced in 1999. (4) Voting machines have been introduced for sub-national elections in certain provinces in 2010, online voting in some municipalities. (5) E-voting pilots are being carried out. (6) Voting machines were used in a number of polling stations across the country. Pilot test was run in the 2024 national election. (7) Digital voting been used in a sub-national election in 2020. (8) Online voting introduced in 2005. (9) E-voting was used from 2006 but has been abandoned in 2010 after a memorandum was run. (10) Mobile voting available in sub-national elections for French citizens abroad. Re-Introduced in 2022. Voting machines in some municipalities. (11) E-voting used from 1993 until 2005; Efforts largely abandoned/discontinued; the Federal Electoral Act (2021) allows for e-voting, however a 2009 Constitutional Court ruling does not allow for it. (12) E-voting pilot tests had been carried out but have been abandoned. (13) Test run in 2002 during sub-national elections but were abandoned in 2009 due to cost and public dissatisfaction. (14) In-person tablet voting used in the Lombardy election 2017. E-voting guidelines approved in 2021. (15) Only for local elections starting 2002. As of 2018, no municipality is using e-voting after Rokunohe municipality also stopped. (16) Online “K-voting” used for elections directly managed by the NEC and provided to institutions and organisations that have received approval. Not yet for public office. (17) Feasibility tests conducted on a smaller scale, especially during COVID-19. Online voting feasibility has been considered, especially during Covid-19. (18) Available for voters living abroad to vote online. Electronic vote recorders used at some facilities. 2 constituencies within Mexico have online voting. (19) After the initial ban of e-voting systems in 2006, there have been some discussions about a return to some electronic tools, but no explicit governmental intention. (20) Available for overseas voters, pilot for local council elections was attempted in 2019. (21) After pilots, an online voting project was abandoned in 2019. (22) Some e-voting experiments carried in 2004-5, no extensive effort since. (23) Feasibility being studied: In 2016, the election commission said that a shift towards online voting could be appropriate. (24) Some effort by KTH University but no explicit government intention. (25) Every canton decides for itself whether to conduct online voting trials. Mostly for abroad voter. (26) Turkish government is collaborating with Ankara University to create an e-voting system for 2028 elections. (27) There have been 17 pilots in local/European elections. Some states allow online voting for those covered by the UOCAVA (mostly military personnel). (28) Most states use more than one type of voting machine.
These are sensitive issues, as providing voters with alternative, digital or postal means for participation, can become an issue that can be amplified for political purposes. Significant controversies arose in Australia, during the so called ticks-and-cross issue when the government proposed machinery provisions to avoid a physical pamphlet during the 2023 Australian Indigenous Voice Referendum, as well as in Brazil, where there were issues around the undermining of voting machines, or controversies around postal votes in the United States. In the Netherlands, the risks of hackers has also forced the government to limit digital voting options ahead the elections. However, multiple channels, and particularly digital channels, are crucial to maintain the capacity of the democratic system, particularly during major events such as the Covid-19 pandemic, or during natural disasters.
Lessons learned during the pandemic, and other emergencies such as cybersecurity attacks and natural disasters have emerged from IDEA work in this area. These lessons point to the importance of inter-agency co-operation for effectively delivering elections in increasingly unstable contexts. OECD Countries with high levels of institutional and political co-operation were able to shift quickly and responsively by expanding voting arrangements. The following countries have significant institutionalised co-operation among ICT driven working groups:
Australia: Electoral Integrity Assurance Taskforce
Bulgaria: Interservice group under the prime Minister
Canada: Election Integrity Office
Denmark: Inter-ministerial Task Force
Estonia: Weekly ICT working group+ public relations group, + working groups for registries voting cards and voting from abroad task force
Latvia: Cyber security in elections working group
Sweden: working group co-ordinated by the civil contingency agency
United States: Elections government sector co-ordinating council.
Preventing digital disenfranchisement of vulnerable and under-represented groups – such as the elderly, people with disabilities, and minorities, guaranteeing equitable access to digital tools and closing divides in participation in elections and democratic processes between urban and rural communities, with special considerations to vulnerable and under-represented groups to promote inclusion
The OECD 2022 RDI Monitoring report discussed the need to foster political inclusion, including through digital technologies, while recognising the potential risks of the growing use of digital fora for women and other underrepresented groups. However, the digital divide can also exacerbate disparities between urban and rural communities, with the latter often feeling left behind and disenfranchised. The Action Plan clearly highlights the need to tackle this issue, particularly in a context of polarisation of the democratic debate.
Closing the participation gap between urban and rural communities in democratic processes is crucial for ensuring equitable representation and fostering healthy democracies. Urban areas often enjoy better access to resources, infrastructure (Paula Caldas, Veneri and Marshalian, 2023[23]), and opportunities (Eurofound, 2023[24]), which can lead to higher political engagement compared to rural communities. Indeed, recent Eurofound research shows that, across EU Member States, rural residents are more likely to perceive disrespect or disregard towards themselves and their communities, significantly impacting their political participation (Eurofound, 2023[24]) and representation in decision making.
Studies show that political attitudes and behaviours differ across rural and urban-based populations, and the geographical divide is likely to have a major impact on several of the elections to be held in 2024. For instance, citizens living in rural areas tend to display lower political responsiveness and are more likely to support anti-establishment political parties than citizens living in urban areas (Rubén García del Horno, 2023[25]).
Training programmes can play a key role in equipping vulnerable individuals or people living in rural areas with the knowledge and skills necessary for navigating the digital space and increasing their civic engagement. In 2023, New Zealand took action to this effect, expanding essential digital skills courses for up to 5 000 older people, including Māori, Pacific and East Asian people, to help them develop the skills needed to get online safely as a key element for participation in modern life (Government of New Zealand, 2023[26]).
Access to infrastructure, particularly digital public infrastructure, is becoming increasingly vital in closing the participation gap between urban and rural areas, given the role of online platforms and technology in political communication, campaigning, and voter registration (OECD, 2022[27]). To address this issue, OECD countries have launched initiatives to expand broadband infrastructure, including Canada’s Universal Broadband Fund, launched in 2024 to support high-speed Internet projects in rural and remote communities, and their Connecting Families Initiative, launched to help low-income Canadians access the Internet (OECD, 2024[28]). Likewise, in 2022, the United States’ Federal Communications Commission launched a cross-agency effort to “combat digital discrimination”, i.e. to promote equal access to broadband across the country regardless of where people live, their income level, ethnicity, race, religion, or national origin (OECD, 2023[29]).
These actions also concern persons with disabilities or mobility restrictions. The 2023 Elections Act of Norway aims to provide voters with disabilities with greater options for receiving aid in voting, by ensuring that they can receive aid by an election official or other designated person (International IDEA, 2023[30]). With similar intentions of enhancing accessibility, Latvia also approved electoral amendments in order to enable voters to cast their ballots at any polling station for the European Parliament elections, rather than exclusively at the polling station where ethe voter is registered, thus making it easier for those with work dedications or mobility restrictions to vote in the easiest way possible (International IDEA, 2023[31]).
Preventing abuse and online harassment of women candidates and candidates from vulnerable and under-represented groups during electoral campaigns and in public debates
While the OECD 2022 RDI report does address digital and political inclusion as a component of strengthening representation, it did not tackle abuse and online harassment specifically as part of digital democracy. These issues are, however, recognised in the Action Plan on Gender Equality, which calls for taking measures to tackle all forms of violence and harassment both online and offline in order to eliminate barriers to women and girls’ full, equal and meaningful representation.
Digital technology presents a significant opportunity for the inclusion of women and under-represented groups in politics by providing platforms for amplifying their voices, connecting with constituents, and mobilising support. Social media, for instance, allows them to bypass traditional gatekeepers and communicate directly with voters. Digital tools can also facilitate access to information and resources, empowering women and other under-represented groups to participate in decision-making processes and advocate for their interests. An approach grounded in human rights is necessary to help shape digital policies that put people at the centre (OECD, 2024[32]). However, new risks are emerging, including hate speech, online harassment, cyberbullying, and gender-based dis-information which disproportionately target women in politics, deterring many from engaging in public discourse or running for office (National Democratic Institute, n.d.[33]). Several studies including both men and women have demonstrated that women are more likely to experience more severe forms of technology-facilitated violence such as harassment and stalking , and that they are often targeted due to their sex (UN Women, 2023[34]). This can even be internal – a study by the African Parliamentary Union across 50 African countries found that a third of online harassment cases against female Parliamentarians had come from male parliamentary colleagues (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2021[35]). These emerging phenomena not only limit freedom of expression (European Union, 2024[36]) and cause severe psychological harm, but also pose threats to democratic governance (UN Women, 2021[37]), by undermining diverse representation in elected institutions.
Several OECD countries have recognised the urgency of addressing online harassment and abuse in the political realm and have recently implemented legislative measures. In 2022, Costa Rica passed Law 10235 aiming to prevent, address, punish, and eradicate violence against women in politics. The law protects women’s rights to a life free of gender-based violence (GBV) in politics, including online. Other countries have produced studies and manuals. For example, in 2022, Spain’s Ministry of Equality published an exploratory study with a qualitative approach to gender-based political violence, including in its digital forms, recognising that there are few or no normative references to the problem of gender-based political violence in the Spanish legal system (Ministerio de Igualdad, 2022[38]). In the same year, the Government of Victoria in Australia, as part of its commitment to preventing violence against women, girls and members of the LGBTQI+ community, commissioned a study to develop recommendations for online safety for women working in politics (Gender Equity Victoria, 2022[39]), as well as a study on women’s experiences of technology-facilitated domestic violence in regional, rural and remote areas (Harris and Woodlock, 2022[40]). Several Australian projects have sought to understand the challenges faced by women living in regional, rural and remote areas (eSafety’s Women in the Spotlight (WITS), programme which provides training and resources about gendered online abuse, and the Australian Institute of Criminology Study on Spaceless violence, examining the impact of technology-facilitated violence in regional rural or remote areas in Australia). In 2024, Mexico’s National Electoral Institute released a “Manual on political violence against women in the digital and media sphere” to explain and sensitise the general public to the concepts of online violence and the ways it interacts with gender-based political violence, as well as to provide tools to prevent (Instituto Nacional Electoral, 2024[41]).
There is also an increasing recognition across OECD countries that engaging with online platforms is essential in forming joint responses to technology-facilitated GBV (TF-GBV). For instance, in 2023, Mexico’s National Electoral Institute collaborated with Meta to develop a guide on “Tackling political violence against women” including tools and tips for women interested in politics to participate safely with the members of the communities on Facebook, Instagram and WhatsApp (Instituto Nacional Electoral, 2023[42]). Similar guides were launched in other Latin American countries, including Chile and Costa Rica over 2022 and 2023 (Comunidad Mujer, 2023[43]; Naciones Unidas Costa Rica, 2022[44]). In Australia, the eSafety Commissioner engages with national and regional stakeholders in the pacific to identify and respond to technology facilitated gender based violence, through capacity development and strengthening national and regional policy responses.
Moreover, steps have been taken to address potential harms to democratic governance and human rights on online platforms while promoting transparency and accountability. The 2022 European Union’s Digital Services Act (DSA) aims at standardising approaches to keeping online spaces safer, including swift actions on removing content containing TF-GBV. Non-EU OECD countries have also introduced national legislation: the United Kingdom 2023 Online Safety Act increases online platforms’ responsibilities in addressing unlawful and harmful content, with a particular focus on “duties to protect content of democratic importance and journalistic content” (Government of the United Kingdom, 2023[45]). Australia’s national independent regulator and educator for online safety, the eSafety Commissioner, works with national and regional stakeholders in the Pacific to identify and respond to technology-facilitated gender-based violence, through capacity development and strengthening national and regional policy responses to this issue. These examples underscore the importance of proactive measures at both legislative and societal levels to safeguard the integrity of electoral processes and ensure equal participation.
Preventing disengagement from civic life and democratic processes by strengthening media and digital literacy of citizens in relation to civic education, in particular young people
The OECD 2022 RDI report did not address this issue in the context of digital democracy. However, the issue of media literacy was addressed as part of Pillar one on Public Governance for Combatting Mis- and Disinformation. The Action Plan on Digital Democracy highlights the need to focus broadly on civic education, including media literacy, particularly in relation to young people to reduce disengagement from civic life. Civic education can prepare young people to participate in elections at the relevant age and increase their interest and effectiveness in civic engagement. Increasing media literacy amongst citizens carries a variety of benefits, not least increasing capacity for citizens to participate in civic processes in an informed manner, and reducing the impact caused by dissemination of disinformation. Students enrolled in selective-admission media literacy programmes gain significantly higher levels of media knowledge, news analysis, and advertising analysis skills compared to their peers.
It is therefore important that government media literacy programmes keep up with the digital age. The European Union has recently put forward a recommendation highlighting that use of new technologies can support enhanced interaction between citizens and government, but should ‘respect the checks and balances of a democratic society’. It also encourages media literacy and digital skills to be further developed to allow people to participate in online public policymaking processes (European Commission, 2023[46]). Similarly, UNESCO guidelines state the importance of promoting media and information literacy in digital spaces as a complementary approach to regulation, in order to empower users (UNESCO, 2023[47]).
At country, level the 2022 Irish Electoral Act states that the Electoral Commission should promote public awareness and participation through educational and informational events (Government of Ireland, 2022[48]). Several other practices related to civic education and media literacy on line can be seen in Box 5.2.
MediaSmarts, Canada
MediaSmarts provides information and resources for media professionals, organisations and teachers. The focus is on topical media issues such as body image, gender representations and diversity, as well as digital issues such as online hate, cyber-bullying and online ethics. The “diversity” information section focusses on specific examples of media representations which are relevant in the Canadian context, for example representations of Aboriginal people, portrayals of visible minorities, people with disabilities and LGBT. Teachers can access these materials and leverage them online and off line.
Speak Up! Media for Inclusion
Speak Up! Media for Inclusion is a cross-European project adopted by France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, and the Netherlands, aiming to provide media literacy training to migrant and refugee children, emphasising radio and film-making to help them create a sense of belonging. Activities include media training workshops to help young migrants tell their stories. Following its success, Team Up!, an Erasmus+ project in France, Greece, Italy, and Portugal, aims to enhance adults' digital and media literacy through toolkits, workshops, and events, focusing on themes like gender in media, hate speech, and migration. The Non Profit NGO ERIM collaborates with Team Up! to offer training, promoting human rights and empowering citizens to critically analyse information.
Promoting voter education to raise awareness about the potential risks and benefits of artificial intelligence in electoral processes, engaging citizens in understanding how these technologies are being used in elections and how they can contribute to safeguarding the integrity of the democratic process
The use of AI in electoral processes is rapidly becoming a highly relevant policy issue for governments, in particular in the context of recent elections. Many electoral authorities are devising strategies to address and, in some instances, harness AI to ensure elections remain free, fair, and secure.2 AI represents a swiftly advancing field of technology that operates with minimal regulation, and there has been limited research on its potential implications for electoral processes (International IDEA, 2024[49]).
While countries have taken steps to regulate AI from a general perspective, and Brazil adopted court regulations covering use of AI for political campaigning, in general information was not available about voter education programmes about the risks and benefits of AI, and on citizen engagement on how these technologies can be used in elections.
5.1.3. Protect the integrity of electoral systems, elections and wider democratic processes
Ensuring the integrity, fairness, accuracy, and accountability of electoral administration, when using digital tools, including artificial intelligence, to strengthen trust in the electoral process
As highlighted in the OECD 2022 RDI Report, digitalisation of the electoral administration and the electoral process itself is becoming increasingly commonplace. If done effectively and with the necessary safeguards in place, this can bring with it several benefits, including greater public trust in the process, further-reaching capacity to vote, and more effective administration. However, designing mechanisms to this end is not always straightforward. The relative lack of understanding and consequent apprehension around digital tools, in particular artificial intelligence (AI), means that these challenges are all the more relevant when considering how to use AI to improve democratic processes. The 2022 report identified a number of institutions close to centres of government which provide advice in support of democracy and the use of AI and data, such as Germany’s Data Ethics Commission, the Data Ethics Advisory Group in New Zealand, the UK’s Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation and the Singapore’s Advisory Council on the Ethical Use of AI and Data.
For example, the 2022 Irish Electoral Reform Act has taken similar steps to improve election integrity, including ensuring that members of its Electoral Commission (which was formed as part of the Act) have skills regarding advertising and publicity around digital political messaging, in order to reduce the impacts of negative online influence. This is an area of work that merits further learning from other member country experiences.
Engaging policymakers, experts and civil society in improving collective understanding of the promises, risks, and potential uses of artificial intelligence for democratic processes
Development of government AI tools alongside civil society can have multiple benefits, including highlighting the value of civil participation and demonstrating the benefits that such tools can have. For example, in 2023, the French Economic, Social and Environmental Committee (CESE) partnered with NOG Make.org to create an AI-powered interface to help citizens navigate the discussions occurring during representative deliberative processes, helping demonstrate the value of AI to the citizens taking part in the process (Make.org, 2024[14]). Similarly, in 2023 the City of Helsinki, Finland, made use of AI tool Urbanist in a discussion with a representative group of citizens and local business owners to visualise alternative scenarios for the pedestrianisation of three streets (OECD, 2023[50]; UrbanistAI, 2023[51]). In some cases, effective and transparent responses to public stakeholder fears over AI are needed to assuage them. A strong example of this has been evident in the Netherlands, where in 2022 the Dutch government launched an Algorithm Register to provide information about the algorithms they used, in order to address the lack of transparency often associated with AI (Government of the Netherlands, 2022[52]).
Combating mis- and dis-information during electoral campaigns, putting in place safeguards against undue domestic and foreign influence through digital platforms and other parts of the digital information eco-system and strengthening the digital capacities of electoral administrations to ensure electoral integrity and protect electoral data against undue domestic and foreign influence
The OECD 2022 RDI report had addressed issues of regulatory oversight, the need for ethical oversight, and for international co-operation, but had not fully developed the analysis of mis- and disinformation and foreign influence in relation to digital platforms and the digital capacities of electoral administrations. The issues addressed in these various bullets of the Digital Democracy Action plan are also closely related to the issues of Mis and Dis Information addressed in Chapter 1. The Action Plan on digital democracy is very topical on these issues as recent years have seen a notable uptick in the spread of misinformation and disinformation during elections, including from foreign sources. This, combined with online co-ordinated efforts to push fringe narratives and foster social polarisation, as well as the rise of AI-generated content, can greatly distort public opinion and potentially impact election results (International IDEA, 2024[53]).
Several countries have taken steps to increasingly recognise and fight back against foreign disinformation, both through more targeted legislation and via greater efforts to inform and educate the electorate. For example, the UK Online Safety Act states that foreign interference is a ‘priority threat’, defined as a serious and prevalent online threat that companies must take proactive steps to tackle. The Act introduced an amendment to the 2022 Elections Act, highlighting that any dissemination of false information or threatening messages as covered in section 179 and section 183 of the Online Safety Act is also an offence under the Elections Act (Government of the United Kingdom, 2023[54]). The Australian Government also recently released the exposure draft Communications Legislation Amendment (Combatting Misinformation and Disinformation) Bill, aimed at combatting misinformation and disinformation. The draft Bill gives the Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) powers to increase transparency of platform measures to address misinformation, and request that the industry make a new code with stronger protections for the Australian community. The ACMA would be able to use these new powers in relation to election or referendum matters, provided the issue is specifically related to disinformation (Government of Australia, 2023[55]). In Ireland, the 2022 Electoral Reform Act bans political advertising by foreign buyers, while introducing transparency requirements at the domestic level (Library and Research Service, 2022[56]). California has taken a similar transparency approach, with a recent legislative package aiming to require large platforms to seek identity verification from users with large followings or using AI-generated content, as well to keep deepfakes out of campaign ads for elections (Padilla, 2024[57]).
At the European level, the Council of the European Union adopted a new regulation on transparency and targeted political advertising in March 2024. This new regulation will require that political advertisements provide key information including their sponsor, the election or referendum to which they are linked, the amounts paid, and any use of targeting techniques. Online targeting will only be permitted under strict conditions, and third country sponsors will not be able to advertise three months before an election or referendum (Council of the EU, 2024[58]). The 2022 EU’s Digital Services Act also referred to above states that any actual or foreseeable negative effects on civic discourse, electoral processes and public security must have risk assessments written about them by very large online platforms and very large online search engines (Article 34(1)(c)), (EUR-Lex, 2022[59]).
Several other countries are attempting to better inform the electorate, through campaigns and greater access to information online. Elections Canada, an independent federal agency, recently launched a website named ‘ElectoFacts’, which Canadian electors can use to verify whether information they come across regarding Canada’s federal electoral process is accurate (Elections Canada, 2024[60]). Sweden took a similar awareness-raising approach in anticipation of the 2022 election, launching its “don’t be fooled” education campaign in order to raise awareness of the threats posed by foreign influence, and to encourage voters to share information on social media with care (Swedish Psychological Defense Agency, n.d.[61]). In the context of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Estonia has increased its efforts to better inform the Russian-speaking segment of its population on election issues and beyond, supporting four private media companies for the production of Russian-language journalism (ERR, 2023[62]).
Closing regulatory gaps in online election-related processes, such as online campaign financing, online political advertising, and data-driven political micro-targeting, and support appropriate enforcement and redress mechanisms
The 2022 OECD report pointed to both the benefits and challenges of digital campaigning (which includes digital media used for campaigning and use of political campaigning software and data tools for political micro-targeting3). On the one hand, digital campaigning has helped improve the access and engagement of the electorate in election campaigns. Through online campaigning, political parties and candidates can engage a broader audience, at lower cost, with political messages. This has helped facilitate access by smaller parties with fewer resources to a broader spectrum of voters. On the other hand, digital campaigning presents risks, with increased vulnerability to cyber-attacks and misinformation and disinformation campaigns, in particular foreign information manipulation and interference. Specific tools of digital campaigning, such as using political campaigning software and data tools for targeted political advertising, raise key questions concerning data protection, privacy and individual free will.
To maximise the benefits and mitigate the risks of digital campaigning, the Action Plan highlighted the need to close regulatory gaps in online election-related processes, such as online campaign financing, online political advertising, and data-driven political micro-targeting, and support appropriate enforcement and redress mechanisms in case of breaches by electoral justice authorities.
Regulating spending on digital campaigning to ensure transparency and fairness in election-related processes requires an effective regulatory framework for political finance in general, which should cover disclosure requirements, spending limits, and control and enforcement. In principle, general disclosure requirements and spending limits could be applied to digital campaigning activities. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the majority of OECD countries (32 out of 38) require political parties and/or candidates to report on itemised spending, meaning the majority of countries could, in principle, provide transparency around digital campaign spending. However, when it comes to spending limits, only 15 OECD countries have spending limits of any kind, and only seven OECD countries limit spending by parties and/or candidates on online media advertising. Of these seven countries, four adopted tailored regulation in the past two years: Greece now limits online media advertising spending for political candidates; Latvia has limits in place for political parties, and Lithuania and Ireland have limits for both political parties and candidates (International IDEA, 2024[63]). In other words, while there is in principle transparency on what is spent, the regulatory framework across OECD countries remains insufficient to shed light on how much is spent and mitigate the challenges posed by online campaigning (OECD, 2021[64]; OECD, 2022[27]).
In addition, only a few OECD countries currently regulate third-party campaigning and have established limits on spending by third parties on online campaigning. Third party campaigning refers to activities by people or organisations who do not seek to be elected themselves but try to influence voters’ choices. In the United Kingdom, spending limits apply to a range of campaigning activities, including online political advertising. There isn’t a separate spending limit for online political ads – but, if campaigners choose to spend more on online political ads, then they have less to spend on printed campaign materials.
Understanding how much is spent is only one side of the coin; it is also essential that voters have information on who is behind the messages they are receiving. In recent years, this has become more complex, given the challenges posed by political advertising and electoral micro-targeting in the digital sphere (OECD, 2022[27]). Since November 2023, campaigners in the United Kingdom are required to include imprints on their digital campaign material. This means that many types of digital material such as social media adverts, tweets and posts, will require an imprint, i.e. details that need to appear on political or election-related material to show who has produced and paid for the material (UK Electoral Commission, 2021[65]).
In Europe, the Digital Services Act requires that platforms provide “information necessary for users to understand when and on whose behalf the advertisement is presented”. In March 2024, the European Union adopted a new regulation on the transparency and targeting of political advertising (European Union, 2024[66]), which aims to counter the risks posed by digital political advertising by introducing full harmonisation across all EU member state on rules concerning transparency and related due diligence obligations for providing political advertising services, as well as on the use of targeting and ad-delivery techniques (see Box 5.3). The entry-into-force of the EU regulation will lead to the adoption of tailored measures across many OECD countries by default.
In March 2024, the European Union introduced new rules on transparency and targeting of political advertising. According to the European Union, the regulation aims to make it easier for citizens to recognise political advertisements, understand who is behind them and know whether they have received a targeted advertisement, so that they are better placed to make informed choices. The regulation seeks to ensure that political advertising activities respect the rights to privacy, freedom of opinion and speech.
The new rules cover the transparency and targeting of political advertising in relation to an election, referendum, or a legislative process at EU level or in a member state. The rules are not concerned with the content, including content under editorial responsibility or views expressed in a personal capacity, or conduct of political campaigns. A key feature of the rules require transparency labels and an easily retrievable transparency notice to be placed on all political advertisements. The label and notice must clearly identify political advertisements as such and provide some key information about them, including their sponsor, the election or referendum to which they are linked, the amounts paid, and any use of targeting techniques.
The rules also now provide clear parameters around targeting political advertising online. In particular, the data has to be collected from the data subject, and use for political advertising is only allowed after the data subject have given explicit and separate consent. Special categories of personal data, such as data revealing racial or ethnic origin or political opinions, cannot be used for profiling. Finally, to prevent foreign interference, the rules provide for a ban on the provision of advertising services to third country sponsors three months before an election or referendum.
Source: adapted from European Council (2024[67]), “EU introduces new rules on transparency and targeting of political advertising”, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/03/11/eu-introduces-new-rules-on-transparency-and-targeting-of-political-advertising/#:~:text=Targeting%20political%20advertising%20online%20will,its%20use%20for%20political%20advertising.
Several electoral management bodies have made recommendations to improve monitoring and enforcement mechanisms related to digital campaigning. For example, in 2022, the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada proposed amendments to the Canada Elections Act, including improving the digital advertising registry by requiring political entities to disclose comprehensive information about their paid digital electoral communications in a timely manner and by requiring that registries be searchable and allow data to be exported (Office of the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada, 2022[68]).
Supporting increased open data on political parties and campaign finance to facilitate civic monitoring and improve trust in electoral campaigns
The OECD 2022 report highlighted the potential for open data, and this is reflected in the Action Plan. However, the evidence suggests that since 2022, limited reforms have been adopted to enhance transparency and open data related to political parties and campaign finance. One notable reform can be found in Estonia, where the e-business register, which includes information on political parties and donations, was made accessible free of charge. Reforms to enhance open data have also been enacted at the EU level: In 2024, the European Union introduced The Regulation on the Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising obliges parties and other political actors to make it clear to citizens when they are exposed to sponsored political content. This should include the identity of the sponsor; the amounts spent and the source of funds, and criteria used for that targeting, among other factors (Wolfs, 2024[69]).
The section looks at both what democratic institutions themselves need to do to both leverage the benefits of digitalisation for democracy and manage the potential risks, including from a regulatory perspective.
5.2.1. Enhance parliamentary engagement and oversight by:
Leveraging digital technologies and innovations to enhance the representative, legislative and oversight role of parliaments, including to strengthen relations with constituencies, open deliberative processes, and facilitate digital hearings and strengthening the digital capabilities of institutions responsible for oversight, accountability and integrity of democratic institutions (such as parliamentary committees, audit institutions, anti-corruption bodies, ombudspersons) leveraging data analytics, artificial intelligence and emerging technologies
While the 2022 report had explored the issues of ensuring accountability, leveraging emerging technologies and refitting public institutions for digital democracy, it had not specifically discussed the role of Parliamentary engagement and oversight. Strengthening digital capabilities in parliamentary settings has the benefit of increasing efficiencies (e.g., automating processes that help to decrease costs) and improving user experience, thereby creating greater trust in parliamentary processes. Digital capability enables faster decision making, enhances data management and allows for greater data sharing. It also means that Parliaments can offer diverse opportunities for citizens and stakeholders to better understand and be part of decisions. For example, information about the legislative activities, the agendas of elected members, and information about the administration of Parliament (expenses, salaries, lobby register, etc.) can help increase trust towards the institution. These issues have been explored at the level of interparliamentary unions and individual parliaments. The Inter-Parliamentary union released an Issues brief in April 2024 about the use of Generative Artificial Intelligence (GenAI) in parliamentary settings also referring to the 2023 guide to digital transformation in Parliaments.
One area that is relevant for digital democracy is citizen engagement and consultation. Parliaments in OECD countries offer different opportunities to involve citizens and stakeholders in legislative decisions. The three main instruments to facilitate participation are petitions, consultations, and hearings. According to the Inter-Parliamentary Union (2022[70]), petitions are the most widespread tool for citizen and stakeholder participation in Parliament, with 79% of the Global Parliamentary Report Survey respondents stating that they have a petition process. 72% of parliaments used committee meetings for stakeholders to provide inputs, followed by 30% that involved the public in budget decisions. In this context digital tools can improve the consultation process by enabling new ways for citizens and stakeholders to provide inputs and by increasing transparency of the process. For example, in April 2023 the Colombian Senate announced its app “Mi Senado”, through which users can connect with senators via email and provide their opinions on topics being discussed that their, which are displayed to senators for consideration when voting (Government of Colombia, 2023[71]).
Another area where recent OECD work has identified potential for digital technologies is in relation to involving the public in budget decisions and empowering public understanding on public finance. This work aims to improve understanding of public finances and generate the political will for action on global fiscal challenges. Some interesting examples emerge that are relevant for digital democracy. For fiscal literacy among elected officials, the use of digital tools in Scotland in the United Kingdom such as short video explainers and online interactives have proven helpful. These offer convenient and accessible ways to enhance fiscal literacy, leveraging modern technologies and adaptable formats to accommodate busy schedules. In terms of broader communications, countries like the Netherlands and Canada use creative communications on digital media formats to improve people’s understanding of the public finances. These include creative infographics and visualisations to communicate complex economic data, such as the national debt, in an engaging and accessible way. Ireland’s fiscal council has used readability software to enhance its communications.
5.2.2. Strengthen digital capabilities and capacities across the public sector to support citizens’ engagement in democratic institutions and protect citizens’ rights
Ensuring that civil servants have the digital capacity and competencies necessary to support digital inclusion, as well as awareness of considerations for the trustworthy and ethical use of data and emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence, while promoting tools and policies to attract and retain diverse digital talents in the civil service
While the 2022 RDI report had addressed the broader issues of refitting public institutions, it had not addressed the need for governments to create capacity to make this happen. Supporting digital government maturity extends beyond digital literacy, as it requires an understanding of how digital technologies and data can transform government operations and better serve the public. Digital government user skills need to become a core competency for all civil servants. Governments are working hard to upskill civil servants in the competencies required to effectively design and implement better digital tools and enact a broader digital transformation in government. Governments need to address two related challenges. The first is how to access and integrate digital expertise into the public service, to provide the technical skills needed to develop digital and AI applications aligned to specific business needs. The second is to upskills the broader public service workforce, to ensure that civil servants understand the opportunities, risks, and ethical considerations of technologies applied to their areas of work. A particularly important group here are the senior managers who must be the champions of digital transformation in their organisations, identifying opportunities to implement new technologies within their business lines, putting in place appropriate governance and change management systems, and work effectively with the right stakeholders including service providers and users.
Several countries have made significant progress in this area in terms of human resource management over the recent period since 2022. For example, in April 2024, the United States’ Office of Personnel Management released “Skills-Based Hiring Guidance and Competency Model to Artificial Intelligence Work.”, with the goal of developing a common system to support federal agencies in better identifying and targeting the digital skills they need, as well as classifying AI roles within existing job classification structures and supporting recruiters in their definition and assessment of necessary skills. The Competency Model presents 43 general competencies and 14 technical competencies. General competencies include transversal competencies such as accountability, digital collaboration, information management, problem solving, and strategic thinking. Technical competencies include application development, AI and machine learning, data analysis, modelling and simulation, and values-driven design. In Korea, the National Human Resources Development Institute (NHI) has recently provided training to the civil service on AI with the objective to raise their general awareness and capabilities in 2024. The NHI is also providing more technical training on specific AI applications to policy areas, such as “digital twinning” whereby AI is used to test the impacts of different policy options using complex simulation models and its 2023 conference focused on AI.
Other countries are also working to improve the digital skills levels within civil services, including via training programmes. The OECD Survey on Digital Government 2.0 found that almost all respondent countries4 have training programmes in place to develop core digital skills. These programmes predominantly focus on service design skills and raising awareness about the benefits and risks associated with digital transformation (Figure 5.2). Other skills developed by these programmes include data-related skills, trustworthy use of technologies and understanding user needs. However, only 38% of respondents reported having programmes dedicated to open collaboration, an essential element for fostering agile and iterative processes in digital service delivery.
Source: Results of the OECD Survey on Digital Government 2.0 (2022).
Many countries have been investing in this area. In Europe, Slovenia’s Administration Academy of the Ministry of Public Administration offers courses for public servants, covering digital skills, the use of technology in creative and safe ways, and the use of data and emerging technologies to improve decision making. In Denmark, Government Digital Academy uses the Digital Competences Model as a framework to develop the tailored digital skills needed in public institutions (Danish Agency for Digital Government, 2022[72]). Italy’s Syllabus framework maps the digital skills needs for all public sector employees working in a digital environment, at the individual and organisational level based on the EU’s DigComp Framework. It has at this point enrolled over 815 000 public sector employees. Italy’s National AI Strategy 2024-2026 also includes a plan for the upskilling of civil servants, with a plan to set up a specific department dedicated to AI within the national school of government.
The Australian Public Service Commission supported the development of the APS Career Pathfinder tool which explores digital and other career options in government. This tool is part of their strategy to attract and develop digital talent for the Australian Public Service where users are able to self-identify skills and career pathways. Career Pathfinder provides an evidence base to identify capability gaps and relevant training opportunities efficiently based on what skills a person has already and where they want to be. The framework will use a variety of data sources to measure proportion of suitable applicants for digital job roles, attendance rates of training programmes, extent to which employees apply what they learn in trainings, and several other factors, thus allowing the Commission to alter its hiring and training practices based on evidence (Burtscher, Piano and Welby, 2024[73]). Similarly, the UK’s Central Digital Data and Data Office launched its Civil Service Digital Skills Survey in late 2022, which found that over three quarters of civil servants would like to receive more digital skills training. In this light, the Office has committed to upskill at least 90% of senior civil servants on digital and data essentials and partnered with the government recruitment service to reducing hiring times (Central Digital and Data Office, 2022[74]).
Ensuring that public service providers have the necessary capabilities to design and deliver high-quality services in the digital age, including developing a deep understanding of users, their needs, and the relevant technologies best suited to address them
As mentioned above, while the 2022 OECD RDI report had framed the main challenges and issues to make digital democracy happen, it had remained more limited in terms of the practical options to make this happen, including in terms of capacity to design and deliver high quality services in the digital age. Indeed, in order to foster greater citizen participation, improve transparency and safeguard election integrity in the digital era, governments must be capable of developing effective digital tools and services in a timely manner. This relates to the draft Recommendation on Human-Centred Public Administrative Services, currently under consultation, which also relates to capability issues.5
A first important point in designing such services is to share strategy and vision and facilitate collaboration to ensure that ideas and strategies are diffused across all agencies. Recognising this, Luxembourg launched the High-Committee for Digital Transformation in September 2022, with the aim of bringing together different ministers and societal actors to discuss government actions regarding digitising government. Alongside this, the Inter-Ministerial Committee for Digitalisation allows ministries to co-ordinate in the development of digital government initiatives (OECD, 2022[75]). Similarly, Portugal’s Common Model for the Design and Development of Digital Public Services (MOSAICO), was launched in October 2022 in recognition of the fact that there was no systematic approach for the design and development of digital public services. MOSAICO not only allows different components of government to better communicate, but it also makes the citizen experience more straightforward, integrating different online sources to allow for easier navigating.
Effective development of digital capacities also requires a clear framework for project planning and prioritisation. To this end, the Department of the Taoiseach in Ireland released its Digital Framework for the Country in early 2022. The framework includes a peer review process by experts on digital government to approve any new digital projects, in order to ensure that projects have value and fit into the Government’s wider goals (Department of the Taoiseach, 2022[76]). Netherlands’ Directorate General for Digitalisation and Public Organisation is currently improving the government’s ICT structure, which will include developing ministerial plans into “fully fledged digitalisation plans”, and from them creating a quality framework (Government of the Netherlands, 2022[77]).
These results are still preliminary. Following the adoption of the forthcoming OECD Recommendation on Human Centred Services, further work will be done to monitor country progress in this area.
Strengthening the digital capabilities of regulatory and enforcement authorities to keep pace with rapidly evolving technologies, including bolstering their expertise in fields such as data science, cybersecurity and artificial intelligence and ensuring citizen engagement in the development, deployment and regulation of artificial intelligence in the public sector
The OECD 2022 RDI Report highlighted the importance of digital tools for fostering transparency and accountability. This also applies to regulatory decision making, which it stated should be proportionate, and outcome focused. Digitisation of government processes has multiple benefits including improved trust, transparency, efficiency and effectiveness. The use of digital tools can present opportunities to regulators designing and enforcing regulations as well as to those wanting to communicate effectively with citizens. As digitalisation has also enabled the development of new products, services and business models in sectors that deliver essential services such as energy, e-communications, transport and water, regulators in this sector that are at the forefront of these developments must also keep pace with such digital developments.
A first area is to ensure that mandates and powers are updated such that they remain fit-for-purpose in the new digital reality. Changes brought about by digitalisation have sometimes blurred traditional sector lines or given rise to new categories of market actors such as “prosumers” (simultaneously producers and consumers of services). Such phenomena can be difficult to accommodate under existing regulatory frameworks. Furthermore, regulators’ detailed knowledge of the sectors they oversee rests on the data and information that they collect. The regulation of these increasingly complex markets therefore requires appropriate data collection, inspection and enforcement powers, which can be a daunting tasks given the amount of data that are generated.
Regulators can also themselves take advantage of digital technologies to perform their duties more effectively, including by empowering consumers with accurate and up-to-date knowledge on sectors, supporting citizens in engaging in the regulatory process and increasing their capacity to uphold consumer rights. For example:
“Sunshine regulation” aims to improve sector performance by making information publicly available. For example, Portugal’s communications regulator ANACOM launched the GEO.ANACOM geospatial platform that aggregates information from fixed, mobile and satellite operators. Its mapping functionality allows users to know which operators have network services in a specific location. In addition ANACOM is starting, as of 2024, to use AI based on vast amounts of complaints data to generate automated responses to better guide consumers.
France’s e-communications regulator, Arcep, has similarly developed interactive maps of mobile and fixed internet coverage. Arcep has also developed a tool to involve users in regulatory and enforcement processes. “J’alerte Arcep” (I alert Arcep) enables users to notify the regulator about malfunctions in the network. This crowd-sourced data enables Arcep to detect weak signals and systemic issues that feed into an accelerated and efficient regulatory decision-making process.
In Canada, regulators recognised that digital technology and analytics can be leveraged to increase accessibility to regulatory information and modernise key regulatory functions. Putting the regulator at the heart of the digital platform’s design, regulators from key regulatory agencies were mobilised to inform the development of functionalities that met the needs of Canadian regulators and develop strategies and methodologies for a horizontal approach to regulatory analysis and performance measurement.
While these examples are welcomed, digital capabilities of economic regulators can be further improved. A poll at the April 2024 meeting of the OECD Network of Economic Regulators (NER) revealed that most delegates (60%) characterised their regulator’s use of technology as “digitally transformed” (use of automated dashboards, descriptive/diagnostic analytics tools etc.), while a quarter still use only minimal tech (e.g. manual data analysis, static report generation) and just 13% use advanced tech such as dynamic and interactive visualisations or predictive analytics. 55% of regulators are currently developing a data strategy and 29% already have one in operation. Far fewer (8%) have an AI policy or strategy, although 41% are currently developing one. Ireland’s e-communications regulator, ComReg is developing a data strategy to improve the acquisition, integration, analysis and delivery of data, to maintain a deep understanding of its markets and support robust evidence-based decision making.
Ensuring that the institutions that protect citizens’ political rights and civil liberties, notably justice systems, are equipped with the necessary digital capacities and tools, guaranteeing the respect of individual and collective political rights and civil liberties, required for democracy to thrive both offline and online by embedding them in policy commitments and ensuring the responsible and trustworthy use of data and emerging technologies, in line with democratic values, including mitigating risks - e.g. of unauthorised access, data leaks and algorithmic bias - and establishing safeguards, guardrails and means of redress, especially in sensitive policy areas such as fraud prevention, law enforcement, and justice administration
As a core component of a functioning democracy, it is vital that public institutions, including justice institutions, are able to uphold citizens political rights and civils liberties in the context of digitalisation.
First, digital technologies and data hold significant potential to strengthen access, resilience, efficiency, and effectiveness of justice systems. Global challenges in the past few years (e.g. wars, natural disasters resulting from climate change, pandemic) showcased the important role that digital technologies and data can have in helping justice systems quickly react and respond to people’s needs and ensuring justice systems remained accessible. In Ukraine, for example, despite the challenging context of the Russian war of aggression, the Government was able to ensure a continued provision of justice services with regular publication of useful information, including justice-related datasets, on its Open Data Web Portal (Government of Ukraine, 2024[78]). Securing online access to public information constituted an important step for reinforcing access to justice in the country. With the aim of fostering transparency in the administration of justice, in early 2024, the Courts Service of Ireland launched a pilot of its Open Data Portal (Courts Service of Ireland, 2022[79]). The Portal features a user-centric design, utilising the courts data to enhance accountability for access to justice in a transparent, participative and continuous manner.
In 2023 Spain adopted its National Strategy for Artificial Intelligence and the Digital Spain 2026 Agenda, and established the Spanish Agency for the Supervision of Artificial Intelligence, the first of its kind in Europe. The ultimate objective of this undertaking is to minimise risks that the use of AI may entail and promote adequate development and enhancement of AI systems. The Spanish government is responsible for the supervision, and when appropriate, the sanctioning of AI systems, with the aim of eliminating or reducing risks to integrity, privacy, and non-discrimination, particularly gender-based bias, and threats to other fundamental rights that may be affected by the misuse of AI systems (Government of Spain, 2024[80]).
The use of AI in law enforcement and justice administration, in particular, gives rise to questions of bias, discrimination and transparency. In this context, in March 2024, the European Parliament approved the AI Act, which sets out a general prohibition of using biometric identification systems (RBI) by law enforcement. In order to balance fundamental rights protection with maximising innovation, the use of “real-time” RBI may be permitted only in exceptional circumstances, when it seeks to protect a substantial public interest and if strict safeguards are met, namely its use is limited in time and geographic scope and subject to specific prior judicial or administrative authorisation (European Parliament, 2024[81]).
Digital technologies and data can also help governments better understand user needs through data-driven approaches, increase efficiency by reducing the length and complexity of processes. In particular, the use of digital technologies in dispute resolution mechanisms (before and in court) can significantly increase access to and responsiveness of justice systems to legal needs, accompanied by appropriate safeguards not to create additional barriers. Numerous jurisdictions have started introducing online dispute resolution (ODR) for money claims and consumer-trader disputes. For example, in Spain, the Virtual Desktop for Digital Mediation, introduced in 2023, allows amicable divorces to be formalised from home. Elderly people and those with intellectual disabilities may also appear in court from their nursing homes or medical centres, thus avoiding the burden of travel while guaranteeing the legal certainty of the hearing (OECD, 2024[82]).
The Latvian Court Administration has worked in the past years to develop the e-case portal (“E-lieta.lv”). The portal provides access to online justice services to citizens and case information for parties, allowing them to consult their files, calculate legal fees, receive decisions and notifications. The United Kingdom (GOV.UK) and French government (Justice.fr) have developed one-stop-shop platforms to help people and businesses find information and government services (OECD, 2024[82]). In Italy’s Linea Amica Digitale initiative aims to increase the availability of accessible, reusable, and constantly updated data to enhance public service design and delivery, and to co-design spaces for services, thereby improving their accountability and quality.
Improving transparency and accountability in the use of emerging technologies in the public sector through open registries and public access to the data and algorithms used to support decision making and public policies
The importance of opening up government data is an area that has received significant focus within the OECD, and the OECD 2022 RDI report fully addressed the issue. While leveraging data and AI to enhance public services offers numerous advantages, it is essential to ensure transparency, trustworthiness, and proactive risk mitigation. Algorithms can be influenced by the values of their designers, the quality of training data, and the intended objectives. As governments increasingly adopt algorithmic decision making for service delivery, algorithm usage becomes a critical aspect of fairness, accountability, and liability. It is therefore important to explore the recent steps adopted by countries in this area.
Setting up transparency, monitoring and oversight mechanisms on AI in the public sector remains a challenge in most countries (OECD, 2024[83]). While algorithmic registries offer citizens a means to evaluate or question government AI applications, such initiatives are relatively scarce at the central or federal level. Among the few examples are Canada’s requirement for publication of completed Algorithmic Impact Assessments (Government of Canada, 2024[84]) and the Netherlands’ use of an Algorithm Register (Overheid.nl, n.d.[85]) with detailed information about algorithms that government organisations use in their work. Italy’s AI strategy includes recommendations for the creation of datasets that are ethical by design to ensure that AI systems are fair, transparent, accountable, private, secure, inclusive, and responsibly used. This approach ensures that ethical values and standards are embedded throughout the entire development and implementation process of the AI system rather than being added as an afterthought.
In terms of opening up government data, the OECD benchmarks efforts made by governments to design and implement national open government data policies through the Open, Useful and Re-usable data (OURdata) Index , as aligned with the standards and good practices of the OECD Recommendations on Digital Government Strategies (OECD, 2014[86]) and on Enhancing Access to and Sharing of Data (OECD, 2021[87]). The results show that OECD countries perform significantly better in the pillars on data accessibility and availability compared to the pillar on government support for data re-use. This indicates that more could be done by governments to partner and engage with external stakeholders and potential data users to deliver better policies and services (OECD, 2023[88]).
Note: Data is not available for Hungary and the United States.
Source: OECD (2023[88]), “2023 OECD Open, Useful and Re-usable data (OURdata) Index: Results and key findings”, OECD Public Governance Policy Papers, No. 43, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/a37f51c3-en.
Another positive factor is that OECD countries have improved the quality of open government data, an important capability considering recent advancements in Artificial Intelligence (AI). Relevant factors here include ensuring data are provided in open, non-proprietary file formats and that they are up to date, which is the case for 80-89% of high-value datasets published as open data by OECD countries. Areas to improve include metadata quality and API access, which are currently only implemented for around 50% of datasets. On average, OECD countries are well-advanced in publishing HVD in open formats, ensuring data is up to date and making them accessible through a central open data portal. Areas that deserve further improvement include metadata quality (47%) and API access (47%), which are important factors for making open data feed into advanced, data-intensive applications, such as AI. For example, Italy’s AI strategy includes recommendations for the creation of datasets that are ethical by design and to ensure ethical values and standards are embedded throughout the entire development and implementation process. In terms of integrated datasets for open data and open AI models, Italy's new Interoperability Model aims to enhance collaboration between Public Administrations and third parties through advanced technological solution, with standards for API security to ensure authentication, data protection, integrity, and confidentiality.
Accessibility of high value datasets, results by country (2022)
Note: Data is not available for Hungary and the United States.
Source: OECD (2023[88]), “2023 OECD Open, Useful and Re-usable data (OURdata) Index: Results and key findings”, OECD Public Governance Policy Papers, No. 43, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/a37f51c3-en.
Reducing discretion and improving fairness in access to public services by leveraging digital technologies to involve users in the design and delivery of public services that are human-centric proactive and digital by design
While the OECD 2022 RDI report had addressed the broader challenges of digital transformation, it did not delve into the challenges faced by countries to foster more proactive, and human-centric public services, although they are addressed within the upcoming Recommendation on Human Centred Public Administrative Services. Digital technologies can enable such human-centric public services by facilitating feedback collection and processing users’ insights when designing and delivering services and can also help in advancing towards an omnichannel approach for service delivery.
Recent data shows that 85% of OECD countries have developed a service standard for interacting with the public, and 76% of OECD countries also set requirements for understanding user needs and expectations (OECD, 2024[89]). Beyond this, alignment and adherence to shared ethical values and principles for the management of algorithms are essential when using AI in the public sector. Building on the OECD AI Principles, a 2022 survey found that a great majority of countries (85%) has put in place instruments to ensure the ethical management and use of algorithms by public sector institutions at the central/federal level of government (Digital Government 2.0 survey, results for 2022).
Governments are working to establish an enabling environment for trustworthy and human-centred AI deployment and use to make the most of AI and address its related challenges. Among these actions, OECD countries have been increasingly updating their regulatory frameworks and developing dedicated policy mechanisms such as standards, guidelines, and transparency tools to support safe and trustworthy AI use in the public sector. For example, Australia developed policy tools, such as the “Artificial Intelligence Ethics Framework” and the “Automated decision-making Better Practice Guide”, aimed at providing direction to government officials for the ethical use and management of algorithms. In Colombia, the Ethical Framework for Artificial Intelligence (Government of Colombia, 2021[90]) offers a series of principles, along with a methodology for their implementation, that should be considered in the design, development, and implementation of AI systems. Canada’s Guide on the use of generative AI (Government of Canada, 2024[91]) advises public sector organisations to be aware of amplification of biases that might be dominant in the training of data and requires to mitigate them from the planning and design stage. Other tools include France’s guide for public algorithms’ transparency (Etalab, n.d.[92]), the Netherlands’ guide on governance for a responsible application of AI (Government of the Netherlands, 2022[93]), and the United Kingdom’s Algorithmic Transparency Recording Standard (OPSI, 2021[94]).
Some countries have also been very active in updating their regulatory frameworks to support a safe, secure and trustworthy AI use in the public sector in recent years. For example, Canada’s federal government issued the Treasury Board Directive on Automated Decision-Making (Government of Canada, 2023[95]), a mandatory policy instrument to ensure that automation in administrative decision making is compatible with administrative legal principles such as transparency, accountability, legality, and procedural fairness. Similarly, in the United States the 2024 Executive Order on Advancing Governance, Innovation, and Risk Management for Agency Use of Artificial Intelligence (OMB, 2024[96]) sets guidelines for the responsible use of AI across the federal government. In Chile, the transparency Council is developing a General Instruction on Algorithmic Transparency at the time of writing that will mandate more than a thousand public agencies to disclose the algorithms they employ in providing services to the population, allowing citizens to understand whether the services they receive are driven by algorithmic models and understand the underlying decision-making logic (OPSI, 2023[97]). Finally, in Europe, the adopted AI Act (European Commission, 2024[98]) establishes a novel regulatory framework on a wider level (see Box 5.4).
The EU AI Act was agreed in negotiations with member states in December 2023 and approved by the European Parliament in March 2024. The regulation establishes obligations for AI based on its potential risks and level of impact. The Act fosters a reformed institutional architecture both within individual countries and at the European level. The Act identifies different levels of risks which are relevant for governments’ use of AI and offers a governance framework.
The AI Act defines four risk levels:
Unacceptable risk: AI uses under this category are prohibited by the AI Act. Examples include predictive policing, ‘real-time’ remote biometric identification (including facial recognition) in publicly accessible spaces for law enforcement, social scoring, or assessing the risk of an individual committing criminal offenses. Law enforcement and justice are among the public sector policy areas most concerned by this category, although some exceptions apply, such as use cases concerned with national security and those remaining subject to judicial oversight.
High-risk - AI uses under this category are allowed but regulated due to their significant potential harm to health, safety, fundamental rights, environment, democracy, and the rule of law. Due to its potential impact on these aspects, most public sector uses of AI might fall under this category. Examples include systems used to influence the outcome of elections and voter behaviour, automated processing of personal data to assess various aspects of a person’s life, assessing eligibility to benefits and services, and safety components used in the management and operation of critical infrastructure. Obligations include establishing a risk management system, conducting data governance, having in place technical documentation to demonstrate compliance, mandatory fundamental rights impact assessment, among others.
Limited risk – These systems might include chatbots, deepfakes, emotion recognition systems, among others, and have transparency obligations where developers and deployers must ensure that end-users are aware that they are interacting with AI.
Minimal risk – These systems are unregulated, but a code of conduct is suggested. Examples include video games and spam filters.
The Act also introduces a restructured governance framework at both national and European levels. Each member state must designate one or more National Competent Authorities to supervise the Act’s enforcement. At the European level, the European Artificial Intelligence Board will gather official points of contact of each Member country to ensure uniform application across member states. It will be complemented by an advisory forum, representing a balanced selection of stakeholders, and a new European AI Office, to be established within the Commission, which will be supported by a Scientific Panel of Independent Experts.
Ensuring citizen engagement in the development, deployment and regulation of artificial intelligence in the public sector
Given rapid advancements in recent years following the 2022 RDI report, the development and deployment of AI systems entails numerous challenges and risks with ethical concerns, which the OECD Recommendation of the Council on Artificial Intelligence (OECD, 2024[102]) adopted in 2019 as the first intergovernmental standard on AI, seeks to address. Some of these challenges have direct implications on citizens, particularly when AI tools are used in the context of citizen participation. While technological advancement is likely to address and overcome at least some of these challenges, citizens should be aware of their implications when deciding on the use of AI tools for participatory and deliberative processes.
Involving stakeholders – whether they are scientists and engineers, affected communities, investors, companies, institutions, or citizens – can enrich the understanding of issues related to technology, help policymakers anticipate problems of public acceptance, and promote good communication about science (OECD, 2024[103]). From a long-term perspective, participation can help align science and technology with societal goals and needs. Citizens and stakeholders can be involved at different moments of the technology cycle (OECD, 2024[103]), as illustrated by the following examples:
Agenda-setting: In 2024, the Belgian Presidency of the Council of the European Union launched a Citizen Panel gathered a representative group of 60 Belgians to collect citizens’ views on artificial intelligence with the European Union (see Box 5.4).
Technology design: In 2020, the French Government launched PIAF, a collaborative initiative with citizens, academia and civil society to build databases in French language to train AI models.
Technology assessment: in the United States, the Expert & Citizen Assessment of Science & Technology (ECAST) Participatory Technology Assessment is bringing public perspectives to bear on critical government science and technology decisions.
Regulation: In 2023, the United Kingdom engaged in a series of public consultations with more than 300 stakeholders to build an adapted regulatory framework for AI (Government of the United Kingdom, 2024[104])
In addition, AI systems can be built and trained by civil society organisations in a collaborative manner with both public authorities and private sector organisations, in order to leverage local knowledge and data and actively involving the communities they aim at empowering. However, the fact that existing AI has received the lion’s share of its training in English presents more significant challenges for smaller and non-English speaking countries, as opportunities for further training are more narrow.
5.3.1. Providing the necessary budgetary resources for the development, maintenance and use of technology-neutral and resilient digital tools for democratic purposes
Beyond the issues considered in the OECD 2022 RDI report, the Action Plan invites us to consider the conditions that are needed to make such improvements to democratic governance happen. Governments need to invest in digital capabilities to keep pace with emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence, and address the growing needs and expectations from users, including digital natives.
The OECD comparative insights on digital government show that OECD countries are increasingly adopting strategic and co-ordinated approaches to digital government investment to mitigate risks, secure return on investments and promote human-centric digital services. These strategic and co-ordinated approaches can be reflected in the use of value proposition mechanisms, such as business cases, to sustain the funding and inform investments decision making when investing in digital. The OECD Survey on Digital Government 2.0 shows that over three quarter of countries use standardised models/methods to develop business cases for digital government investments, either for all projects or when projects meet specific criteria (Figure 5.5). At a strategic level, countries such as Australia, Ireland and New Zealand have developed whole-of-government approaches when investing in digital government to secure coherence and alignment between strategic policy goals:
Australia has set a whole-of-government Digital and ICT Oversight Framework, providing the Digital Transformation Agency with the administrative tools to manage digital investments from early planning to project delivery and realisation of planned benefits (Government of Australia, n.d.[105]).
Ireland makes use of a Digital Oversight approach, in which the Office of the Government Chief Information Officer, through the Digital Government Oversight Unit (DGOU), supervises new digital/ICT projects proposed by Civil and Public Service bodies to ensure alignment with Government policy (OGCIO, 2024[106]).
New Zealand’s Treasury (Ministry of Finance), together with the Government Chief Digital Officer (GCDO) and the Government Chief Data Steward (GCDS), have developed digital guiding principles to support line ministries and public sector organisations in planning and developing digital investments (New Zealand Government, 2021[107]).
Note: Preliminary results of 38 member and accession countries that completed the survey.
Source: OECD (2023[108]), Digital Government Review of Romania: Towards a Digitally Mature Government, OECD Digital Government Studies, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/68361e0d-en.
Taking a risk-based, technology-neutral and future-proof approach to the regulation of digital activities that impact democracy and designing solutions with international partners to ensure a global level playing field and reduce opportunities for regulatory arbitrage
The OECD 2022 RDI report did address the issues of institutions and legal frameworks, as well as the necessary regulatory frameworks, although these have since been picked up in the work of the OECD Regulatory Policy Committee (RPC). Maintaining a well-functioning democracy while digital innovations continue to grow requires careful consideration of the potential implications for regulation, as illustrated through the OECD Recommendation on Agile Regulatory Governance of the RPC. This includes identifying, assessing, and managing risks, and revising existing risk governance frameworks with data-driven approaches. Risk-based approaches to the regulation of digital technologies can ensure that regulations are proportionate to the potential harms, thereby protecting public safety and democratic integrity while promoting innovation.
Several countries have made significant progress in this direction since 2022. For example, the United Kingdom, through the NHS AI Lab, are trying to emulate the Canada’s open source Algorithmic Impact Assessment (AIA) developed in 2022, to support the Treasury Board’s Directive on Automated Decision-Making. The European Union's AI Act approved in 2024 (see Box 5.4), also offers a risk based framework to ensure that higher-risk AI applications, such as those used in healthcare or law enforcement, face stringent regulations, including mandatory transparency and data governance measures.
Another important avenue is for countries to promote technology-neutral approaches that focus on regulating on the desired outcomes, rather than prescribing specific technologies to ensure that regulation does not 'lock-in' technologies by being too prescriptive or specific. Again, Canada’s 2023 Digitalization and Technology-Neutral Regulations Roadmap promoted by ISED Canada invites federal departments and agencies working to modernise regulations to focus on outcomes rather than prescribing specific technologies.
Securing universal access to digital identification, with safeguards for privacy and security, allowing citizens to prove their identity online, claim their civic rights, and exercise their democratic duties
The OECD 2022 RDI report recognised digital identity as an important enabler for carrying out civic duties, as it is important to allow citizens to be able prove their identify online in order to claim their rights, exercise their duties for democracy and create a safe digital public space.
In OECD countries, the effectiveness and usability of digital identity systems, including different solutions for accessing public services, varies. Data from 2023 shows that that there are cases where citizens avoid online public services due to issues with eID: in Austria more than 4% of adult citizens and close to 6% of young adults (16-24 year olds) avoided engaging with online public services due to eID issues. Some of these issues are also found for limited shares of the citizenry in Hungary, Slovak Republic, and Spain. 6
Countries have been working to simplify access to digital identity and promote more user friendly solutions in line with the OECD Recommendation on the Governance of Digital Identity adopted in 2023. For example, Norway's ID-porten is a single-sign on solution that enables citizens to log in to public services using existing well-known electronic IDs, such as MinID, BankID, Buypass and Commfides (OECD, 2024[109]; Norwegian Digitalisation Agency, 2024[110]). New Zealand also adopted its Digital Identity Services Trust Framework Act in 2023, while Australia’s Digital ID Bill 2024 is entering into force in December 2024.
% of population, 16-74 and 16-24 y/o, 2023 or latest data available
Note: Individuals did not submit forms to public authorities: electronic signature/ID/certificate issues - last 12 m, 2023 or latest data available.
Source: OECD Data Kitchen. Data accessed on June 3, 2024. The OECD ICT Access and Usage by Households and Individuals database includes indicators based on the 2nd revision of the OECD Model Survey on ICT Access and Usage by Households and Individuals. For more information about the underlying sources, please see: https://oe.cd/dx/ict-access-usage.
Enhancing civic engagement through increased availability, accessibility, and re-use of relevant data (e.g. on elections, lobbying, budgeting, and procurement) by civil society, independent media, political parties and parliaments
The OECD 2022 RDI report addressed the issues of opening up government data, relying on long standing OECD work in the area. Facilitating the availability, accessibility, and re-use of data is central for civil society organisations, independent media, parliamentary bodies and other stakeholders to make more informed decisions, hold institutions accountable, and actively participate in democratic processes. Open data initiatives not only foster transparency but also encourage collaboration and innovation within society, ultimately strengthening democratic governance and fostering a more engaged citizenry. Providing timely, reliable, and relevant public sector data and information to citizens and stakeholders has become crucial in promoting governments’ accountability and combatting corruption. The Action plan therefore invites us to consider how countries can leverage various aspects of open data to enhance civic engagement. Whereas the 2022 RDI report relied upon 2019 data, more recent data from 2022 are now available to support the analysis of the current report.
Data on election results is most frequently available as open data, with over 70% of OECD countries providing this data to the public. Budgeting is an intermediate situation as overall 40% of countries provide data on government spending. According to this 2022 data ten OECD countries provide data on both government budget and spending,7 while twelve countries provide neither budget nor spending as open data.8 In fact, in Italy the OpenBudget App allows every citizen to access and consult the State Budget and the Ministry of Finance publishes regularly all figures related to public expenditure also as open data.
In contrast, aggregated data on lobbying of public policy decisions is only provided by 5 OECD countries, namely Canada, Chile, France, Ireland and Slovenia. The objective is for data on lobbying to avoid monolithic statements or lists of lobbyists that do not give any relevant information for citizens to understand the state of play of lobbying activities and their concrete impact on decision-making processes. They should also include relevant filters enabling searches by lobbying entities, public policy areas, targeted public officials or specific public decisions. However, evidence on such practices remains limited at this stage.
Note: Data is considered available as open data if it is free of charge, machine-readable, and provided under an open licence.
Source: OECD (2022[18]), Survey on Open Government Data 5.0.
Note: Data is not available for the United States or Hungary. Data is considered available as open data if it is free of charge, machine-readable, and provided under an open licence.
Source: OECD (2022[18]), Survey on Open Government Data 5.0.
Assessing countries’ capacity to ensure open data for public procurement relies on the standards established by the Open Contracting Partnership’s Open Contracting Data Standard (OCDS), which specifies five elements of public contracts to provide as open data. The data need to be published in open data formats – meaning data is free, machine-readable, structured, and provided with an open license, with no limitations for re-use (Open Contracting Partnership, 2024[111]). In this area, only two OECD countries (Colombia and Korea) provide open data for the whole public contracting cycle: planning, call for tender, awards, contracts, and implementation, whereas twenty-one OECD countries provide open data for at least one of the elements (55%). Most OECD countries who publish contracting data publish calls for tenders (44%) or awards (31%). Few OECD countries provide open data on the planning (19%) and implementation (22%) of public procurement projects. Therefore, data containing all relevant public procurement information is still largely unavailable, especially in standardised formats that facilitate data reuse.
Note: Data is considered available as open data if it is free of charge, machine-readable, and provided under an open licence. The five dataset categories are based on the Open Contracting Data Standard (OCDS) by the Open Contracting Partnership.
Source: OECD (2022[18]), Survey on Open Government Data 5.0.
Note: Data is not available for the United States or Hungary. Data is considered available as open data if it is free of charge, machine-readable, and provided under an open licence. The five dataset categories are based on the Open Contracting Data Standard (OCDS) by the Open Contracting Partnership.
Source: OECD (2022[18]), Survey on Open Government Data 5.0.
Against this backdrop, central government bodies are increasingly developing integrity analytics tools leveraging open procurement data. Finance ministries, tax authorities, and central procurement agencies are developing and deploying data analytics and artificial intelligence platforms to better monitor public spending. The priorities are to advance the availability, accessibility, and re-use of open government data, and ensure the ethical and responsible use of data and artificial intelligence solutions in the public sector. Expanding the reuse of data and applying new technologies along the whole policy cycle and in particular to improve value-for-money can strengthen public accountability. Recent initiatives in this area include:
The European Union’s Public Procurement Data Space (PPDS), which aims to create an EU-level platform with European and national procurement databases to improve data quality, availability and completeness for public buyers, policymakers, the private sector, researchers and citizens. (European Commission, 2023[112]). The EU legislative open standard for public procurement data, eForms became mandatory in October 2023. It aims to improve the quality and analysis of procurement data as eForms are to be used by public buyers to publish notices on Tenders Electronic Daily, the European Union’s e-procurement portal. Well-implemented eForms will also increase the ability of businesses and other organisations to find procurement notices, as well as increase transparency and the ability of governments to make data-driven decisions about public spending.
An initiative to leverage the data produced through the e-procurement systems in the Netherlands by sharing more real-time information and establishing various output channels for data and analysis sharing. This includes publishing analysis of procurement trends and figures in specific sectors and giving contracting authorities and the private sector more opportunities to access and use data (TenderNed, 2023[113]).
Public procurement authorities, oversight bodies and public buyers are increasingly applying AI and data analytics to improve value-for-money and strengthen accountability. Italy’s National Anti-Corruption Authority has developed indicators to measure corruption risks in public procurement and can flag potential anomalies in public tendering. The indicators include matters such as the number and value of “non-open” procedures and the proportion of excluded bids (OECD, 2024[114]). The Danish Business Authority has put into operation a platform that automates the process of assessing the probability that a specific company is more prone to commit fraud in comparison to others, and in 2021 implemented their third generation Intelligent Control Platform working with real-time graph machine learning for fraud detection (Hartmann, 2021[115]). In Portugal, since 2024, the Court of Audit is implementing a data-driven approach to assess risks in public procurement, through a risk-based approach (OECD, 2024[114]).
Finally, countries are also mobilising open data to support greater civic engagement, harnessing data to strengthen information ecosystems. For instance, Colombia’s 2023 Corruption Radar & Economic, Cultural and Social Rights: Right to Education assesses the impact of corruption on the right to education using open data, generating an indicator of likelihood of corruption and reduced effectiveness of education rights for each municipality in the country (OECD, 2024[116]).
5.4.1. Working collectively through the OECD
The OECD has engaged actively through the Information Integrity Hub to identify common challenges and exchange best practices to fight disinformation and promote information integrity, in line with the Action plan on Public Governance for Combating Mis- and Dis-information (see Chapter 1). The OECD is analysing the links between information integrity and AI tools, exploring what this means for the information space, with an upcoming report to explore how emerging technologies are used to magnify challenges faced in the information space to offer policy responses.
The OECD is thus engaging with countries to ensure that the Good Practice Principles for Public Communication Responses to Mis- and Disinformation are used to their full potential, and integrated, when relevant, into overall country strategies for tackling mis- and disinformation.
To tackle on line harassment, the OECD is focusing on how to increase evidence on technology-facilitated gender-based violence (TF-GBV) with a framework which proposes key areas of action against TF-GBV, as well as indicators on TF-GBV in G7 countries. The intersections between digital technologies and the promotion of women’s participation in public life were also explored as one of the key themes of the inaugural 2024 OECD Forum on Gender Equality.
The OECD is building on the existing work on digital skills, education, and on digital citizen participation, to focus on digital literacy.
Following the 2023 event on “Getting civic tech right for democracy”, the OECD is developing global dialogue, to foster policy analysis, and to share evidence on impact. The OECD Observatory of Public Sector Innovation (OPSI) scans highlight the potential for participatory and collaborative approaches to involve citizens throughout the policymaking cycle. The OECD is preparing a global report on the use of Civic Tech for Participation and representation, as well as a best practice report on how to improve citizen participation with emerging technologies.
The OECD is exploring how governments and regulators can best keep pace with technological change, through the Better Regulation In the Digital age (BRIDGE) initiative. This seeks to support countries, based on a risk-informed and technology neutral approach, to ensure effective regulatory governance for digital activities.
The OECD is developing an OECD Recommendation on Human-Centric Public Administrative Services, called for by Ministers in the Declaration on Building Trust and Reinforcing Democracy [OECD/LEGAL/0484]. The Recommendation recognises the importance of adequate core infrastructure, including the use of digital technologies and innovative design, to improve user experience and increase satisfaction with public services, recognising the importance ensuring inclusion and equity in access and use via both online and in-person channels. The OPSI has collected almost 800 cases of innovations in public services, covering a total of 83 countries.
The OECD is also engaging with countries on the digital transformation of justice through its justice roundtables, the ethical use of emerging technologies in law enforcement and judicial administration, and the role of judicial authorities in enforcing rights in the digital era.
The OECD is addressing the digital skills and knowledge of public servants to support digital democracy through its work on digital government and on public employment. The OECD developed a Framework for Digital Talent and Skills in the Public Sector. The May 2024 Public Service Leaders’ Roundtable helped to share approaches to addressing the complex leadership challenges facing senior management of OECD civil services in a digital context. The Network of Schools of Government discussed the opportunities of training institutions in this area.
The OECD has advanced work on human rights in the digital age under the OECD Digital Policy Committee, including in the context of the Digital Economy Policy Ministerial Meeting hosted by Spain in December 2022. The meeting concluded with the adoption of the Declaration on a Trusted, Sustainable and Inclusive Digital Future that reiterated the need to respect the rule of law, human rights and democratic values, with the announcement of the Global Forum on Technology to inform the development and use of technology in line with democratic values, and with the adoption of the Declaration on Government Access to Personal Data held by private sector entities which highlighted common principles for government access to such data founded in shared democratic values.
The OECD is advancing policy analysis, dialogue, and guidance on the trustworthy and responsible use of artificial intelligence in the public sector, including on data ethics and algorithmic transparency, including in terms of governing with AI. The OECD has been supporting the 2024 G7 Italian Presidency as a Knowledge Partner with the development of a Toolkit for Artificial Intelligence in the Public Sector, together with UNESCO. At the G7 Digital and Technology Ministers' Meeting in Verona and Trento, Ministers agreed on advancing international discussions on policies, tools and mechanisms in the areas of AI in the public sector and of taking stock of the opportunities and challenges brought by generative AI (G7 Italian Presidency, 2024[117]).
The OECD 2022 report on Civic Space also offered a review of common elements in national strategies on AI related to the protection of civic space. The Global Trends in Government Innovation report 2023 shows how governments are exploring new forms of accountability and highlights the need to ensure that the algorithms and underlying data avoid bias and discrimination, and that public servants understand data ethics (OECD, 2023[50]).
The Anti-Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2024 explores how AI can be instrumental for mitigating fraud, corruption and foreign bribery risks and warns about its weaknesses and how it can also be used to enable corrupt activities (OECD, 2024[118]).
The OECD could consider exploring the development of standards and principles for the use of civic technologies for democratic processes, and promote the inclusion and engagement of citizens and stakeholders in the design and regulation of these technologies. The OECD could promote a digital civic space perspective, meaning the actions taken by governments to ensure an online space that is healthy, where citizens and stakeholders can participate equally and freely.
5.4.2. Conclusions and priorities for the future
Across the OECD and beyond, governments are using digital tools, including civic tech to enhance both in -person and online participation in policymaking. The pace of change is such that public institutions are struggling to keep up – yet they must. The goal being to preserve citizens’ fundamental liberties and civic rights in an increasingly “digital” democracy. In particular countries have taken steps to
Strengthen democratic representation and participation by using digital tools to support in-person participation in representative, participatory and deliberative processes – while opening up new channels for online citizen participation in policymaking. Some digital tools aim to lower barriers to participation. Others aim to strengthen citizens’ capacity for effective participation, for example with the use of AI-powered virtual assistants. Many countries recognise the need to counter polarisation and disengagement from civic life by strengthening citizens’ media and digital literacy, while preventing online abuse and harassment. They also recognise the need to close regulatory gaps in online election-related processes, such as online campaign financing, online political advertising, and data-driven political micro-targeting, while supporting appropriate enforcement and redress mechanisms in case of breaches.
Upgrading democratic institutions to respond to the opportunities and challenges of digitalisation by leveraging data analytics, artificial intelligence and emerging technologies to enhance the capacity to engage with citizens in policymaking and to strengthen parliamentary oversight. Countries have mobilised open registries and public access to the data and algorithms used to support decision making and public policies to build public trust. However, successful deployment of digital technologies requires attracting, building and retaining digital talents in the civil service with expertise in data science, digital communications, cybersecurity and AI.
Leveraging key policy tools to respond to the opportunities and challenges of digitalisation for democracy by taking a risk-based, technology-neutral and future-proof approach to the regulation of digital activities. Securing universal access to digital identification will allow citizens to exercise their civic rights and democratic duties but requires safeguards for privacy and security. Open government data fosters civic society innovation and accountability for the ethical and responsible use of data and artificial intelligence solutions in the public sector.
However, the public sector still often lags in adopting the necessary technologies needed to meet the expectations of a digital democracy. The rapid spread of mis- and disinformation demonstrates the urgent need for more decisive action. The forthcoming recommendation on Human Centred Public Services will offer opportunities for mobilising digital technologies. Protecting civic space in the future, by moving new frontiers in this area, will also entail protecting digital civic spaces for democratic dialogue. Moving forward, the Reinforcing Democracy Initiative will also support governments in the responsible safe and trustworthy use of AI in the public sector, building on a comprehensive framework presented in the flagship report Governing with AI. This will also offer further opportunities for engagement in international for a focused on AI in the future. The new Recommendation on Information Integrity, with a focus on strengthening societal resilience, will also offer an opportunity to continue advancing digital democracy
References
[73] Burtscher, M., S. Piano and B. Welby (2024), “Developing skills for digital government: A review of good practices across OECD governments”, OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers, No. 303, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/f4dab2e9-en.
[74] Central Digital and Data Office (2022), “The Civil Service’s digital skills imperative”, https://cddo.blog.gov.uk/2022/11/29/the-civil-services-digital-skills-imperative/ (accessed on 20 June 2024).
[6] City of Antwerpen (n.d.), “Oor”, https://oor.antwerpen.be/over-oor (accessed on 19 June 2024).
[43] Comunidad Mujer (2023), Lanzamos junto a Meta guia para prevenir la violencia política de género en redes sociales, https://comunidadmujer.cl/lanzamos-junto-a-meta-guia-para-prevenir-la-violencia-politica-de-genero-en-redes-sociales/.
[15] Cortés-Cediel, M. (2023), “Trends and challenges of e-government chatbots: Advances in exploring open government data and citizen participation content.”, Government Information Quarterly, Vol. 40/4, p. 101877, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.giq.2023.101877.
[58] Council of the EU (2024), “EU introduces new rules on transparency and targeting of political advertising”, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/03/11/eu-introduces-new-rules-on-transparency-and-targeting-of-political-advertising/ (accessed on 23 May 2024).
[79] Courts Service of Ireland (2022), Courts Data Overview, https://data.courts.ie/en/apps/courts-data/.
[72] Danish Agency for Digital Government (2022), “Government Digital Academy”, https://en.digst.dk/policy/government-digital-academy/.
[17] Decide_Madrid (2021), Como utilizar Decide Madrid y su asistente virtual “Clara”, https://decide.madrid.es/system/documents/attachments/000/007/952/original/3779c5bafc46109e4b9f57fbeecf680b5224c302.pdf.
[13] Decidim Barcelona (2024), “Assemblea Ciutadana pel Clima [Citizens’ Assembly for the Climate]”, https://www.decidim.barcelona/processes/AssembleaClima/f/5251/ (accessed on 24 June 2024).
[5] Democratisation Workbook (n.d.), “Koolide kaasav eelarve [Inclusive Budgeting for Schools]”, https://demokraatia.rahvaalgatus.ee/eelarve (accessed on 19 June 2024).
[76] Department of the Taoiseach (2022), “Harnessing Digital - The Digital Ireland Framework”, https://www.gov.ie/en/publication/adf42-harnessing-digital-the-digital-ireland-framework/ (accessed on 20 June 2024).
[101] Edwards, L. (2022), “The EU AI Act: a summary of its significance and scope”, https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Expert-explainer-The-EU-AI-Act-11-April-2022.pdf (accessed on 27 September 2024).
[60] Elections Canada (2024), “ElectoFacts”, https://www.elections.ca/content.aspx?section=res&dir=dis&document=index&lang=e (accessed on 23 May 2024).
[62] ERR (2023), Estonian Russian-language private media receive €1 million from state, https://news.err.ee/1608898790/estonian-russian-language-private-media-receive-1-million-from-state.
[92] Etalab (n.d.), “Les algorithmes publics : enjeux et obligations”, https://guides.etalab.gouv.fr/algorithmes/guide/#_1-a-quoi-servent-les-algorithmes-publics (accessed on 3 October 2024).
[59] EUR-Lex (2022), “Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act)”, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj (accessed on 23 May 2024).
[24] Eurofound (2023), Bridging the rural–urban divide: Addressing inequalities and empowering communities, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/en/publications/2023/bridging-rural-urban-divide-addressing-inequalities-and-empowering-communities.
[98] European Commission (2024), “AI Act”, https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/regulatory-framework-ai (accessed on 3 October 2024).
[100] European Commission (2024), “Artificial Intelligence – Questions and Answers*”, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_21_1683 (accessed on 27 September 2024).
[46] European Commission (2023), “COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION (EU) 2023/2836 of 12 December 2023 on promoting the engagement and effective participation of citizens and civil society organisations in public policy-making processes”, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202302836 (accessed on 21 June 2024).
[112] European Commission (2023), Public Procurement: A data space to improve public spending, boost data-driven policy-making and improve access to tenders for SMEs, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52023XC0316%2802%29&qid=1678976891382.
[22] European Commission (2017), Youth Participation in Electoral Processes Handbook for Electoral Management Bodies, https://aceproject.org/ero-en/misc/undp-ec-youth-participation-in-electoral-processes (accessed on 21 May 2024).
[67] European Council (2024), EU introduces new rules on transparency and targeting of political advertising, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/03/11/eu-introduces-new-rules-on-transparency-and-targeting-of-political-advertising/#:~:text=Targeting%20political%20advertising%20online%20will,its%20use%20for%20political%20advertising. (accessed on 17 May 2024).
[81] European Parliament (2024), “Artificial Intelligence Act: MEPs adopt landmark law”, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20240308IPR19015/artificial-intelligence-act-meps-adopt-landmark-law (accessed on 27 September 2024).
[66] European Union (2024), Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the transparency and targeting of political advertising.
[36] European Union (2024), Violence against women active in politics in the EU: A serious obstacle to political participation, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2024/759600/EPRS_BRI(2024)759600_EN.pdf.
[99] Future of Life Institute (2024), AI Act Overview, https://artificialintelligenceact.eu/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/AI-Act-Overview_24-01-2024.pdf (accessed on 10 April 2024).
[117] G7 Italian Presidency (2024), G7: Ministerial Declaration on Industry, Technology, and Digital, https://innovazione.gov.it/notizie/articoli/en/g7-ministerial-declaration-on-industry-technology-and-digital/ (accessed on 24 May 2024).
[4] García, D. and E. Al. (2023), Democracy Technologies in Europe: Online Participation, Deliberation and Voting, Innovation in Politics Institute, https://www.idea.int/publications/catalogue/democracy-technologies-europe.
[39] Gender Equity Victoria (2022), Gendered Online Harassment in Politics, https://www.genvic.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/GEN_VIC_GenderedOnlineHarassment_Report.pdf.
[55] Government of Australia (2023), “Communications Legislation Amendment (Combatting Misinformation and Disinformation) Bill 2023”, https://www.infrastructure.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/communications-legislation-amendment-combatting-misinformation-and-disinformation-bill-2023-guidance-note-june2023_2.pdf (accessed on 23 May 2024).
[105] Government of Australia (n.d.), “Digital and ICT Investment Oversight Framework (IOF)”, https://www.dta.gov.au/advice/digital-and-ict-investments/digital-and-ict-investment-oversight-framework-iof (accessed on 4 October 2024).
[84] Government of Canada (2024), “Algorithmic Impact Assessment tool”, https://www.canada.ca/en/government/system/digital-government/digital-government-innovations/responsible-use-ai/algorithmic-impact-assessment.html (accessed on 3 October 2024).
[91] Government of Canada (2024), “Guide on the use of generative artificial intelligence”, https://www.canada.ca/en/government/system/digital-government/digital-government-innovations/responsible-use-ai/guide-use-generative-ai.html (accessed on 4 October 2024).
[95] Government of Canada (2023), “Directive on Automated Decision-Making”, https://www.tbs-sct.canada.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=32592 (accessed on 3 October 2024).
[71] Government of Colombia (2023), “APP Mi Senado al día con actividad legislativa [My Senate app up to date with legislative activity]”, https://www.senado.gov.co/index.php/el-senado/noticias/4483-app-mi-senado-al-dia-con-actividad-legislativa (accessed on 25 June 2024).
[90] Government of Colombia (2021), “Marco Ético Para la Inteligencia Artifical en Colombia [Ethical Framework for Artifical Intelligence in Colombia]”, https://minciencias.gov.co/sites/default/files/marco-etico-ia-colombia-2021.pdf (accessed on 3 October 2024).
[19] Government of Costa Rica (2024), Estrategia nacional para prevenir y abordar los discursos de odio y discriminación.
[20] Government of Ireland (2023), “National Counter Disinformation Strategy Public Consultation”, https://www.gov.ie/pdf/?file=https://assets.gov.ie/280301/074a3edd-57eb-4626-9c83-097ff59710f3.pdf#page=null (accessed on 23 May 2024).
[48] Government of Ireland (2022), “Electoral Reform Act 2022”, https://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2022/act/30/enacted/en/html (accessed on 21 June 2024).
[26] Government of New Zealand (2023), More digital training for seniors rolls out across New Zealand, https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/more-digital-training-seniors-rolls-out-across-new-zealand.
[80] Government of Spain (2024), Estrategia de Inteligencia Artificial 2024, https://portal.mineco.gob.es/es-es/digitalizacionIA/Documents/Estrategia_IA_2024.pdf.
[93] Government of the Netherlands (2022), “Governance voor een verantwoorde toepassing van algoritmen [Governance for a responsible use of algorithms]”, https://www.berenschot.nl/media/vf5fj1mw/handreiking_governance-voor-een-verantwoorde-toepassing-van-algoritmen.pdf (accessed on 3 October 2024).
[52] Government of the Netherlands (2022), The Algorithm Register of the Dutch Government, https://algoritmes.overheid.nl/en (accessed on 23 May 2024).
[77] Government of the Netherlands (2022), “Value-Driven Digitalisation Work Agenda”, https://www.government.nl/documents/reports/2022/11/30/value-driven-digitalisation-work-agenda (accessed on 20 June 2024).
[104] Government of the United Kingdom (2024), A pro-innovation approach to AI regulation: government response, https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/ai-regulation-a-pro-innovation-approach-policy-proposals/outcome/a-pro-innovation-approach-to-ai-regulation-government-response#introduction.
[45] Government of the United Kingdom (2023), Online Safety Act 2023, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2023/50/enacted.
[54] Government of the United Kingdom (2023), “Online Safety Act 2023”, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2023/50/enacted (accessed on 23 May 2024).
[78] Government of Ukraine (2024), Open Data Web Portal, https://se.diia.gov.ua/en/opendata.
[40] Harris, B. and D. Woodlock (2022), “Spaceless violence: Women’s experiences of technology-facilitated domestic violence in regional, rural and remote areas”, https://www.aic.gov.au/publications/tandi/tandi644 (accessed on 18 September 2024).
[115] Hartmann, M. (2021), Fraud Detection with Graphs at the Danish Business Authority, https://www.slideshare.net/neo4j/fraud-detection-with-graphs-at-the-danish-business-authority.
[41] Instituto Nacional Electoral (2024), Manual sobre violencia política contra las mujeres en la esfera digital y mediática, https://igualdad.ine.mx/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Manual_sobre_violencia_politica_contra_las_mujeres_en_la_esfera_digital_y_mediatica.pdf.
[42] Instituto Nacional Electoral (2023), Enfrentando la violencia política contra las mujeres, https://igualdad.ine.mx/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/Guia-de-Seguridad-General.pdf.
[49] International IDEA (2024), “Artificial Intelligence for Electoral Management”, https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/2024-04/artificial-intelligence-for-electoral-management.pdf (accessed on 1 July 2024).
[63] International IDEA (2024), “Political Finance Database”, https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/political-finance-database (accessed on 16 May 2024).
[53] International IDEA (2024), “Protecting Democratic Elections Through Safeguarding Information Integrity”, https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/2024-01/protecting-democratic-elections-through-safeguarding-information-integrity.pdf (accessed on 1 July 2024).
[7] International IDEA (2023), “Democracy Technologies in Europe: Online Participation, Deliberation and Voting”, https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/democracy-technologies-in-europe.pdf (accessed on 19 June 2024).
[3] International IDEA (2023), “Global State of Democracy Indices”, https://www.idea.int/democracytracker/gsod-indices/ (accessed on 24 September 2024).
[31] International IDEA (2023), “Latvia - May 2023”, https://www.idea.int/democracytracker/report/latvia/may-2023?pid=4318 (accessed on 24 June 2024).
[30] International IDEA (2023), “Norway - June 2023”, https://www.idea.int/democracytracker/report/norway/june-2023?pid=4383 (accessed on 24 June 2024).
[2] International IDEA (2019), “Cybersecurity in Elections”, https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/cybersecurity-in-elections-models-of-interagency-collaboration.pdf (accessed on 1 July 2024).
[35] Inter-Parliamentary Union (2021), “Sexism, harassment and violence against women in parliaments in Africa”, https://www.ipu.org/resources/publications/issue-briefs/2021-11/sexism-harassment-and-violence-against-women-in-parliaments-in-africa (accessed on 23 September 2024).
[70] IPU (2022), Global Parliamentary Report 2022 - Public engagement in the work of parliament.
[16] Landemore, H. (2022), “Landemore, H. (2022). Can AI bring deliberative democracy to the masses?”, HAI Weekley Seminar, pp. 1-35.
[56] Library and Research Service (2022), “Bill Digest: Electoral Reform Bill 2022”, https://data.oireachtas.ie/ie/oireachtas/bill/2022/37/eng/digest/billdigest-electoralreformbill-040422-164202.pdf (accessed on 23 May 2024).
[14] Make.org (2024), Convention citoyenne sur la fin de vie : le CESE avec Make.org propose au grand public et aux parlementaires de mieux s’approprier les débats des citoyens grâce à l’intelligence artificielle, https://about.make.org/post/convention-citoyenne-sur-la-fin-de-vie-le-cese-avec-make-org-propose-au-grand-public-et-aux-parlementaires-de-mieux-sapproprier-les-debats-des-citoyens-grace-a-lintelligence-artificielle (accessed on 23 May 2024).
[38] Ministerio de Igualdad (2022), La violencia política por razón de género en España: una aproximación cualitativa, https://violenciagenero.igualdad.gob.es/violenciaEnCifras/estudios/investigaciones/2022/pdf/La_violencia_politica_por_razon_de_genero_HYBRIDAS_DGVG_DEF.pdf.
[44] Naciones Unidas Costa Rica (2022), Enfrentando la violencia política contra las mujeres, https://costarica.un.org/sites/default/files/2022-01/ONUFBTSE-viol.pdf.
[33] National Democratic Institute (n.d.), Ending Online Violence Against Women in Politics, https://www.ndi.org/ending-online-violence-against-women-politics.
[107] New Zealand Government (2021), “Aligning digital, data and ICT investment to digital public service outcomes”, https://www.digital.govt.nz/standards-and-guidance/governance/investment/aligning-digital-data-and-ict-investment-to-digital-public-service-outcomes (accessed on 4 October 2024).
[110] Norwegian Digitalisation Agency (2024), Nasjonale fellesløsninger - ID-porten.
[118] OECD (2024), Anti-Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2024, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/968587cd-en.
[82] OECD (2024), Developing Effective Online Dispute Resolution in Latvia, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/75ef5c4c-en.
[28] OECD (2024), Enhancing Rural Innovation in Canada, OECD Rural Studies, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/a9919c66-en.
[1] OECD (2024), Facts not Fakes: Tackling Disinformation, Strengthening Information Integrity, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/d909ff7a-en.
[103] OECD (2024), “Framework for Anticipatory Governance of Emerging Technologies”, OECD Science, Technology and Industry Policy Papers, No. 165, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/0248ead5-en.
[83] OECD (2024), “Governing with Artificial Intelligence: Are governments ready?”, OECD Artificial Intelligence Papers, No. 20, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/26324bc2-en.
[89] OECD (2024), Government at a Glance: Latin America and the Caribbean 2024, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/4abdba16-en.
[109] OECD (2024), “Norway’s progress to date”, in The Digital Transformation of Norway’s Public Sector, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/6f9a0481-en.
[116] OECD (2024), OECD Webinar: Protecting and promoting civic space: Good practices from Latin America, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AOO6qTnASqc.
[102] OECD (2024), “Recommendation of the Council on Artificial Intelligence”, OECD Legal Instruments, OECD/LEGAL/0449, OECD, Paris, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/oecd-legal-0449.
[32] OECD (2024), “Shaping a rights-oriented digital transformation”, OECD Digital Economy Papers, No. 368, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/86ee84e2-en.
[114] OECD (2024), Strengthening Oversight of the Court of Auditors for Effective Public Procurement in Portugal: Digital Transformation and Data-driven Risk Assessments, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/35aeab1e-en.
[88] OECD (2023), “2023 OECD Open, Useful and Re-usable data (OURdata) Index: Results and key findings”, OECD Public Governance Policy Papers, No. 43, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/a37f51c3-en.
[11] OECD (2023), “Deliberative Democracy Database”, https://airtable.com/appP4czQlAU1My2M3/shrX048tmQLl8yzdc/tblrttW98WGpdnX3Y/viwX5ZutDDGdDMEep (accessed on 27 March 2024).
[108] OECD (2023), Digital Government Review of Romania: Towards a Digitally Mature Government, OECD Digital Government Studies, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/68361e0d-en.
[29] OECD (2023), Enhancing Rural Innovation in the United States, OECD Rural Studies, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/22a8261b-en.
[50] OECD (2023), Global Trends in Government Innovation 2023, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/0655b570-en.
[10] OECD (2023), Open Government for Stronger Democracies: A Global Assessment, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/5478db5b-en.
[27] OECD (2022), Building Trust and Reinforcing Democracy: Preparing the Ground for Government Action, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/76972a4a-en.
[75] OECD (2022), Digital Government Review of Luxembourg: Towards More Digital, Innovative and Inclusive Public Services, OECD Digital Government Studies, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/b623803d-en.
[9] OECD (2022), OECD Guidelines for Citizen Participation Processes, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/f765caf6-en.
[18] OECD (2022), Survey on Open Government Data 5.0, Unpublished.
[64] OECD (2021), Lobbying in the 21st Century: Transparency, Integrity and Access, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/c6d8eff8-en.
[87] OECD (2021), “Recommendation of the Council on Enhancing Access to and Sharing of Data”, OECD Legal Instruments, OECD/LEGAL/0463, OECD, Paris, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0463.
[86] OECD (2014), “Recommendation of the Council on Digital Government Strategies”, OECD Legal Instruments, OECD/LEGAL/0406, OECD, Paris, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0406.
[8] OECD (forthcoming), Civic Tech for Democracy.
[68] Office of the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada (2022), Meeting New Challenges: Recommendations from the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada following the 43rd and 44th General Elections, https://www.elections.ca/res/rep/off/rec_2022/rec2022_e.pdf.
[106] OGCIO (2024), “Digital Oversight”, https://www.ogcio.gov.ie/en/corporate-pages/policy/digital-oversight/ (accessed on 4 October 2024).
[96] OMB (2024), “Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies: Advancing Governance, Innovation and Risk Management for Agency Use of Artificial Intelligence”, US Office of Management and Budget, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/M-24-10-Advancing-Governance-Innovation-and-Risk-Management-for-Agency-Use-of-Artificial-Intelligence.pdf (accessed on 3 October 2024).
[111] Open Contracting Partnership (2024), Put open data to use, https://www.open-contracting.org/data/ (accessed on 31 May 2024).
[97] OPSI (2023), “Chile’s road to algorithmic transparency: Setting new standards in Latin America”, https://oecd-opsi.org/blog/chile-algorithmic-transparency/ (accessed on 3 October 2024).
[94] OPSI (2021), “Algorithmic Transparency Recording Standard”, https://oecd-opsi.org/innovations/algorithmic-transparency-standard/ (accessed on 3 October 2024).
[85] Overheid.nl (n.d.), “Het Algoritmeregister van de Nederlandse overheid [The Dutch government’s Algorithm Register]”, https://algoritmes.overheid.nl/nl (accessed on 3 October 2024).
[57] Padilla, S. (2024), “Senator Padilla And Legislative Partners Announce Bill Package Combating Election Misinformation”, https://sd18.senate.ca.gov/news/senator-padilla-and-legislative-partners-announce-bill-package-combating-election (accessed on 6 June 2024).
[12] Paice, A. (2022), “Creating an online conversation between a nation and a mini-public: a case study on Polis & the Austrian Citizens’ Climate Council”, Co-Intelligence Institute, https://www.co-intelligence.institute/case-study-polis-c.
[23] Paula Caldas, M., P. Veneri and M. Marshalian (2023), “Assessing spatial disparities in Internet quality using speed tests”, OECD Regional Development Papers, No. 47, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/77c42f5e-en.
[21] Public Policy Forum (2022), “Citizens’ Assembly on Democratic Expression: Recommendations for reducing online harms and safeguarding human rights in Canada”, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5f8ee1ed6216f64197dc541b/t/632c7bdbe8994a793e6256d8/16 (accessed on 23 May 2024).
[25] Rubén García del Horno, G. (2023), “Do they feel like they don’t matter? The rural-urban divide in external political efficacy”, West European Politics, p. 26, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2023.2261085 (accessed on 22 May 2024).
[61] Swedish Psychological Defense Agency (n.d.), “Lär dig knepen! [Learn the tricks!]”, https://www.bliintelurad.se/ (accessed on 23 May 2024).
[113] TenderNed (2023), TenderNed Vision 2023-2027, https://www.tenderned.nl/cms/nl/visie/2023-2027.
[119] Tham, J. et al. (2022), Digital Campaigning and Political Finance in the Asia and the Pacific Region, International IDEA, Stockholm, https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/digital-campaigning-and-political-finance-in-AP-region.pdf (accessed on 16 May 2024).
[65] UK Electoral Commission (2021), Introducing digital imprints, https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/news-and-views/elections-act/introducing-digital-imprints.
[34] UN Women (2023), “Technology-facilitated violence against women: Taking stock of evidence and data collection”, https://www.unwomen.org/en/digital-library/publications/2023/04/technology-facilitated-violence-against-women-taking-stock-of-evidence-and-data-collection (accessed on 18 September 2024).
[37] UN Women (2021), Preventing Violence Against Women in Politics: Guidance Note, https://www.unwomen.org/sites/default/files/Headquarters/Attachments/Sections/Library/Publications/2021/Guidance-note-Preventing-violence-against-women-in-politics-en.pdf.
[47] UNESCO (2023), “Guidelines for the governance of digital platforms: safeguarding freedom of expression and access to information through a multi-stakeholder approach”, https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000387339 (accessed on 11 April 2024).
[51] UrbanistAI (2023), UrbanistAI in Action: Participatory Workshops to Design Helsinki’s Summer Streets, https://medium.com/urbanistai/urbanistai-in-action-participatory-workshops-to-design-helsinkis-summer-streets-b14b733c54c8.
[69] Wolfs, W. (2024), Political Finance in the Digital Age: A Case Study of the European Union, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), https://doi.org/10.31752/idea.2024.26.
← 1. The Republic of Türkiye interprets the marginalised groups in line with its own national legislation.
← 2. Given that the OECD conducts relatively limited analysis of electoral processes as such, this section relies on some information from IDEA to ensure a narrative.
← 3. See for example (Tham et al., 2022[119]).
← 4. Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czechia, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Türkiye, and the United Kingdom.
← 5. The consultation period was opened from 14 June until 5 July under Draft Recommendation for Consultation Human-centred Public Administrative Services.
← 6. These figures can also be influenced by the overall lack of eID tools or lack of online public services or need to submit forms to public authorities.
← 7. Canada, Colombia, Finland, France, Luxembourg, Latvia, Mexico, Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Sweden.
← 8. Austria, Chile, Costa Rica, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, the United Kingdom, Greece, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands and Türkiye.