Countries are employing tools such as green budgeting and public procurement to align government actions with environmental goals. Countries are also monitoring and reducing greenhouse gas emissions and environmental footprints. Some are engaging with civil society, strengthening public communication and citizen participation to foster consensus for green policies. However, more is needed to accelerate the transition to a green economy. Democratic governments need to garner public understanding and support for policies that may be seen as contentious. Governments can act to refine governance processes, streamlining the permitting of green infrastructure, and making use of strategic public procurement. Finally, they need to make further efforts in employing public communication and engaging with citizens to build trust and buy in.
The OECD Reinforcing Democracy Initiative
Abstract
The OECD Reinforcing Democracy Initiative’s pillar on Governing Green underscores the crucial interlinkage between the future of democratic governance and environmental action, highlighting the expectation on democratic governments to effectively manage complex, interconnected, and long-term policy challenges, including the intricate trade-offs necessary for the collective good. The efficacy of climate and environmental policies hinges on robust and efficient public governance, calling for a clear strategic direction, long-term priorities, coherence, trust in governmental action, and co-ordinated approaches across different sectors and levels of government. A transformative shift in governance is essential to effectively tackle environmental pressures, especially the urgent climate crisis, requiring not only society-wide efforts but also specific, government-led initiatives.
This draft chapter discusses country’s action to advance on key areas included in the Action Plan on Governing Green, welcomed in the OECD Declaration on Building Trust and Reinforcing Democracy [OECD/LEGAL/0484], namely focused on:
Key area 1 – Steering and building consensus and trust for delivering green in the next decade.
Key area 2 – Using the right tools for climate and environmental action.
Key area 3 – Leading by example – a greener and more resilient public sector.
This draft chapter has been developed mainly building on the work carried out by OECD bodies and integrates the latest results from the 2023 OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions (OECD, 2024[1]). These results show that only an overage of four in ten among citizens from countries participating in the survey are confident that their country will reduce greenhouse gas emissions (Figure 4.1).
This chapter provide a brief description of the current context and challenges for governments to deliver on climate. It will identify progress by OECD countries in their efforts to govern green and potential gaps and barriers for further progress, building on the PGC’s work and on work of relevant OECD bodies.
Share of population reporting different levels of confidence that their country will succeed in reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the next ten years, 2023
Note: The figure presents the within-country distributions of responses to the question “On a scale of 0 to 10, how confident are you that [COUNTRY] will succeed in reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the next ten years?”. The “confident” proportion is the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the scale; “neutral” is equal to a response of 5; “not confident” is the aggregation of responses from 0-4; and “Don't know” was a separate answer choice. “OECD” presents the unweighted average of responses across countries.
Source: OECD (2024[1]), OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions – 2024 Results: Building Trust in a Complex Policy Environment, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9a20554b-en.
4.2.1. Promote meaningful and two-way dialogue that enhances opportunities for stakeholder exchange and promotes effective citizen participation in the decision-making process for climate action and the green transition, including through innovative processes such as deliberative democracy mechanisms
More recently, public authorities have been using civic technologies to enable citizens to collect data and better inform decision making or alert the authorities on environmental challenges. These have been used in many cities around the world, with several examples available on the OECD surveys and OPSI platform (see the general discussion on participation and deliberation in Chapter 2, which also has numerous climate related examples).
Governments reliance on more democratic and participatory approaches to address the pressing challenges of climate change and the green transition is a settled practice. Countries have continued to step up their efforts to develop innovative and deliberative processes to give a greater voice to citizens, broaden dialogue and strengthen a sense of ownership of the decisions taken.
There continues to be an increasing use of deliberative processes, as part of a wider effort by democratic institutions to become more participatory and open to informed citizen input and collective intelligence (see Chapter 2). Representative deliberative processes offer a means for public authorities to involve citizens in public decision making, including sectors and population groups that are usually marginalised1 or excluded. These processes can contribute to better policy outcomes by generating public judgements rather than mere public opinions. When conducted effectively, they can empower policymakers to address public policy issues and build trust between citizens and government building consensus around policy challenges that require complex trade-offs.
Many deliberative assemblies dealing with a subject directly related to the green transition have been set in place in recent years (OECD, 2023[2]). They involve a group of citizens selected at random and statistically stratified to form a microcosm of society that deliberates on environmental issues. For example, in Denmark, a set of citizens deliberated in the presence of representatives from five political organisations in order to produce a set of recommendations on the future of sustainable consumption, recommendations that these representatives were then obliged to present to the relevant councils/committees (OECD, 2023[2]). At a broader European level, 150 citizens contributed 23 recommendations to reduce food waste during a 2022 citizen’s panel. In some cases, such deliberative forums have been institutionalised, such as the Permanent Climate Assembly of Brussels (Box 4.1).
The Citizen’s Climate Assembly is a permanent deliberative process founded in 2023 and run by Brussels Environment, the administration responsible for climate and energy in the Brussels region. It aims to mobilise the experience of Brussels citizens and enable them to feed into government policies and strategies developed to achieve the Region’s climate objectives. Brussels Environment plans to organise a new cycle of the Assembly once a year, each time made up of 100 randomly selected citizens.
The first cycle of the Climate Assembly focused on housing in Brussels. It was supported by a technical expert group, which provided input on the content of the discussion, as well as by an advisory committee, whose role was to consider the overall process – i.e. how inclusion was considered, what impact was had on the administration, etc. The participating citizens ultimately made more than 40 recommendations, including on fair renovation, new ways of living, and the role of nature in the city. The government of the Brussels-Capital Region has committed to developing a roadmap to integrate these recommendations into the climate governance of the Region.
The Climate Assembly’s second cycle, focusing on food sustainability, is currently underway and expected to come to an end in October 2023.
Countries have also made progress institutionalising deliberative process to go beyond one-off exercises, helping ensure their continuity through the political cycle, and increases the opportunities for citizens to participate in such processes. Institutionalising deliberation can help governments plan for the long term. Some countries have created institutions responsible for taking decisions relating to future generations, particularly about the green agenda. Recent years have shown striking progress. The institutionalised or permanent cases collected by the OECD doubled between 2020 to 2023, going from 22 to 41 — the majority of which are implemented by subnational governments at the local or regional levels and on topics related to the green agenda. In Portugal, the 50-member Lisbon’s Citizen Council deliberated in 2022 on strategies to enable the city to face the climate crisis and in 2023 on how to make Lisbon a 15-minute city.
Several studies have found that young people feel more strongly about government action for climate change than other age groups – for example, a 2022 OECD survey found that 62% of those aged 18-29 support more government action on climate, compared to 57-58% in other age groups (OECD, 2023[4]). In this light, OECD countries have started taking innovative approaches to enhance opportunities for young people to participate in decision-making processes for climate action at the global, national and local levels. At the global level, OECD countries as Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change have reiterated the role of youth as agents of change in addressing and responding to climate change in the COP28 negotiated outcomes (COP28 UAE, 2023[5]). The Parties also decided that all future COP Presidencies should appoint a Presidency Youth Climate Champion to help facilitate the engagement of children and young people in climate action. Engaging and empowering young people through innovative channels can also sustain political ambition in the climate policy agenda; youth-led mobilisations, including through the Fridays for the Future movement, have been critical in placing climate justice at the top of the political agenda.
At the national level, countries such as Ireland established advisory bodies and organised deliberative processes to strengthen young people’s participation in decision making on climate action (Box 4.2). In 2023, the Irish government renewed funding for empowering voluntary youth organisations to address climate change by reallocating approximately EUR 500 000 to the Youth Climate Justice Fund (Government of Ireland, 2024[6]). In Canada, the Local Conference of Youth (LCOY), was also established in 2022 to gather young people and youth organisations to share perspectives on topics related to climate change and environmental matters. As a result, a yearly “Output Policy Document” including policy actions is developed to communicate demands to the government. This document, merged with more than 88 others from similar assemblies worldwide, was also presented at COP28 in 2023 (LCOY Canada, 2023[7]).
Since 2019, Ireland convenes a National Youth Assembly on Climate. In 2023, the Assembly was hosted by the Department of Children, Equality, Disability, Integration and Youth (DCEDIY) and the Department of Environment, Climate and Communications (DECC) in partnership with the National Participation Office. It consisted of 50 young people, aged 12-24 years, representing Comhairle an Óg (youth councils), youth organisations and climate organisations from across Ireland. Young people were tasked to identify priorities, shape the agenda and formulate recommendations on sustainable transport, circular economy, communications and engagement for the consideration of the Government of Ireland to inform the Climate Action Plan 2024. When reporting on the 2024 Assembly’s proceedings, the Government of Ireland also outlined how the recommendations from the 2022 Assembly were addressed in Ireland’s 2023 Climate Action Plan (Government of Ireland, 2024[6]).
Besides youth, empowering and engaging with those most impacted by climate change, such as indigenous people (where applicable) matters to improve the legitimacy and sustainability of green policymaking is crucial. Mindful of these considerations, governments across OECD countries have already started to establish new institutions, structures and processes to involve young people and indigenous groups (where applicable) in the process and to support them in leading action and innovation on climate justice. In this regard, Canada funded several projects led by indigenous organisations through its Environmental Damage Fund administered by Environment and Climate Change Canada (ECCC). For example, between 2023 and 2024, the Okanagan Nation Alliance was granted CAD 129 409.61 to implement a project on Salmon reintroduction in the Upper Columbia River (Government of Canada, 2024[10]). Furthermore, in 2023, Finland undertook a significant step in actively involving indigenous peoples in the climate policy process. The government appointed a climate council with at least half of the members holding traditional Sámi knowledge, the Sámi Climate Council. For a four-year term, the council will act as an independent expert body to bring the knowledge and perspectives of the Sámi people to environmental policies (Government of Finland, 2023[11]). Similarly, in Australia a First Nations Clean Energy and Emissions Reduction Advisory Committee, composed solely of First Australians, was created in April 2023 to provide advice directly to the Australian government on First Nations’ perspectives regarding climate change priorities and ensure that they are appropriately considered in the development of policy, reform, and program implementation (Government of Australia, 2023[12]).
Moving forward, ensuring full citizen participation in decision-making processes is essential for success. This includes paying specific attention to groups with specific needs and rights, adopting a people- and right-centred approach to environmental justice. Building a strong case for strengthening green related actions and better understanding the barriers that hinder meaningful engagement opportunities remain a priority. While innovative participation processes and tools offer valuable opportunities for effective participation, it is imperative that they are genuinely inclusive. Governments should take an active role in fostering effective two-way dialogue through these new instruments. Further efforts in promoting climate and civic education and awareness must also be undertaken to enhance both participation in decision-making processes related to the green agenda.
4.2.2. Ensure that climate and environmental governance institutions meet integrity and transparency standards and have the expertise and tools to ensure lobbying and other influence activities concerning climate policy design and implementation do not undermine international and domestic climate commitments
Addressing climate change and other environmental goals is a priority for governments across the OECD and beyond. Faced with this long-term, complex, and systemic challenge, public policymaking is under unprecedented pressure, as governments try to manage difficult trade-offs and competing interests, and respond to rapidly changing and unknown circumstances. Complicating matters further, governments cannot deliver climate targets by themselves, and the response to climate change and the green transition requires the expertise, experience and innovation of a range of actors, notably the private sector.
The speed and scale of the green transition is putting an increased strain on public integrity systems within OECD countries. This impact on public integrity may in turn be leading to less effective green policy development. In particular:
While increased engagement with external stakeholders brings a wider range of interests, knowledge and expertise to bear on the policymaking process, there is also evidence that misleading lobbying and conflicts of interest may be obstructing the delivery of the green transition.
Shortcomings in law enforcement against transnational corruption can also impede the green transition.
Maintaining integrity standards to ensure that increased engagement with external stakeholders related to the green transition enables governments to meet their climate goals and uphold the public interest. Governments across the OECD are committed to deliver their climate and sustainability targets through co-operation with a broad range of external actors. This increased engagement brings a wider range of interests, knowledge and expertise to bear on the policymaking process, and is also crucial for the business sectors and industries which often have significant stakes in ongoing debates, negotiations, and policy development around climate change.
However, evidence of lobbying and other influence practices aimed at blocking progress on climate change policies demonstrates the risks this increased engagement can bring emissions (Oreskes and Conway, 2010[13]; Supran and Oreskes, 2017[14]; Influence Map, 2022[15]). While these instances are not representative of all lobbying on climate targets, these illegitimate or misleading lobbying practices affect public integrity as they diminish public office holders’ ability to act in the public interest. In the worst cases, where lobbying activity is designed to influence policy development away from established science, it also increases the risk that policy is made which is less suited to meeting governments’ climate goals and delivering the green transition.
Many OECD governments are also benefitting from external input on climate initiatives through advisory bodies and expert groups, which through their diverse membership can bring much needed knowledge and skills to policy development. These groups can, however, increase risks around conflict of interest and revolving door, particularly where they do not have adequate transparency and integrity standards to ensure the legitimacy of their advice. Private sector representatives participating in these groups often have direct access to policymaking processes without being considered external lobbyists or subject to rules and conventions on engagement with outside organisations. Several studies have explored how, whether consciously or not, members of these groups may favour the interests of their company or industry, increasing the risk that policy is not made in the public interest or as effective as it could otherwise have been (Conway and Hermann, 2021[16]; OECD, 2022[17]).
The race to secure transition minerals is an important part of the green transition, but is particularly vulnerable to corruption risks. The world’s energy and digital transitions are dependent on the vast expansion of renewable energy and the electrification of the global economy. The development of this infrastructure and production capacity is dependent on large amounts of minerals and other critical raw materials, and OECD countries are making substantial new investments and a wave of new policies and regulations to secure mineral supplies (IEA, 2021[18]; IEA, 2023[19]). As they do so, countries are encountering corruption risks throughout the supply chain, including through increased influencing activity around regulatory processes or financing initiatives, greater pressure on licensing processes, or bribery in contracts or infrastructure projects (OECD, 2024[20]).
Strong conflict-of-interest regimes, political finance regulations, lobbying regulations and open government agendas provide a framework to ensure engagement on environmental and climate policies happens in a way that upholds democratic principles of integrity and accountability. Countries have taken action in these areas. For example, the Lobbying Register of Finland came into force on 1 January 2024 (National Audit Office of Finland, 2024[21]) and Germany recently introduced reforms to its lobbying register to extend its scope and require a greater level of transparency. In addition, new initiatives are ensuring that companies’ lobbying activities are consistent with their commitments and goals on responsible business conduct matters. Sustainability reporting standards have been developed in particular at the European level, with the European Commission’s Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD) and Sustainability Reporting Standards (ESRS), including G1-5 “Political influence and lobbying activities” (European Commission, 2023[22]). These provide additional disclosure requirements on companies’ political contributions and lobbying activities to ensure that they align with their sustainability goals and commitments related to climate change (Box 4.3). The standards cover the full range of environmental, social, and governance issues, including climate change, biodiversity and human rights. While these are positive steps, as Chapter 2 above shows, there is scope to continue to improve implementation and monitoring of integrity frameworks in future.
The undertaking shall provide information on the activities and commitments related to exerting its political influence, including its lobbying activities related to its material impacts, risks and opportunities.
The objective of this Disclosure Requirement is to provide transparency on the undertaking’s activities and commitments related to exerting its political influence with political contributions, including the types and purpose of lobbying activities. The disclosure required shall include:
(a) If applicable, the representative(s) responsible in the administrative, management and supervisory bodies for the oversight of these activities;
(b) for financial or in-kind political contributions:
i. the total monetary value of financial and in-kind political contributions made directly and indirectly by the undertaking aggregated by country or geographical area where relevant, as well as type of recipient/beneficiary; and
ii. where appropriate, how the monetary value of in-kind contributions is estimated.
(c) the main topics covered by its lobbying activities and the undertaking’s main positions on these in brief. This shall include explanations on how this interacts with its material impacts, risks and opportunities identified in its materiality assessment per ESRS 2; and
(d) if the undertaking is registered in the EU Transparency Register or in an equivalent transparency register in a Member State, the name of any such register and its identification number in the register.
The disclosure shall also include information about the appointment of any members of the administrative, management and supervisory bodies who held a comparable position in public administration (including regulators) in the 2 years preceding such appointment in the current reporting period.
Source: European Commission (2023[23]), Annex to the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) .../... supplementing Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards sustainability reporting standards, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:a17f44bd-2f9c-11ee-9e98-01aa75ed71a1.0008.02/DOC_2&format=PDF.,
4.2.3. Strengthening law enforcement against transnational corruption to safeguard the green transition
International bribery, particularly where it is not met with a strong law enforcement response, is an important way in which governments’ responses to climate change can be undermined. A key challenge in, for instance, the forestry, fisheries or conservation sectors is regulatory capture, where regulatory agencies tasked with safeguarding the public interest become influenced or controlled by the industries they are meant to oversee. Regulatory capture often involves transnational criminal networks, which use bribery to exploit opportunities for high profits, legal discrepancies among countries, low risk of detection, and marginal penalties (Europol, 2022[24]). Corrupt relationships between private industry and regulatory authorities, often with the involvement of criminal entrepreneurs, may lead to lax enforcement of regulations, allowing companies to engage in illegal and unsustainable practices without fear of repercussions. This weakening of the regulatory framework undermines sustainability goals, perpetuates a cycle of environmental exploitation, and can have enormous financial impacts for the governments and corporations involved.
To address the challenges which the green transition presents for bribery investigations, law enforcement authorities need to adopt a proactive approach to tackling corruption in sectors critical to the green transition and which present complicated corruption risks. Drawing from the lessons learnt from the fossil fuel or forestry industry, for instance relating to licencing or the award of contracts, law enforcement agencies should strengthen their capacities to identify and investigate similar criminal patterns in a growing number of projects related to the green transition.
Given the transnational nature of the green transition and of corruption schemes, robust international co-operation between law enforcement authorities is paramount. Collaborative efforts to establish and enforce international anti-corruption standards, share best practices, and provide oversight can help mitigate the risks associated with corruption in the global green agenda. Facilitating the exchange of intelligence and information across borders to identify and track corrupt actors involved in green initiatives, collaborative efforts to investigate and prosecute transnational bribery cases are key to strengthening international co-operation between authorities. In addition, building robust co-operation of law enforcement with the private sector and the expert community can contribute to developing a much-needed level of knowledge and expertise with respect to corruption risks linked to the green transition. This, in combination with effective whistleblower protection mechanisms and partnerships with investigative media, can help law enforcement agencies recognise corruption and take appropriate measures to combat it in these sectors. The role of the private sector in investing in integrity in the context of the green transition, supporting the efforts of public actors and civil society, is of paramount importance.
4.2.4. Strengthening integrity standards in public institutions involved in green policies
The public institutions responsible for green governance must be trustworthy and meet integrity and transparency requirements if the policies they design are to be seen as legitimate and acceptable. Public integrity frameworks need to remain resilient in the face of the added challenges which the green transition is presenting to policymaking. Using a risk-based approach to reviewing and strengthening existing integrity systems in public institutions allows government to identify the public employees involved in the design, implementation or evaluation of climate change policies that may be at higher risk and to take steps to mitigate them. National and international regulatory bodies, such as institutions that govern natural resource management or set pollution standards, for example, should have robust integrity standards including clear and proportionate measures to identify and manage conflicts of interest. In addition, governments should set rules for people from the private sector taking up employment in these bodies (and vice-versa), as well as cooling-off periods tailored to the level of seniority. In particular, OECD countries must introduce precise and clear criteria for the award of licences and contracts, and ensure that public office holders working in licensing and regulation are subject to adequate conflict-of-interest processes and that, where appropriate, licensing decisions are subject to strong transparency requirements and open government policies.
4.2.5. Ensure that governance mechanisms are in place to ensure a co-ordinated and coherent approach to address climate change and other environmental threats across the whole of government, using centres of governments to effectively steer and set strategies promoting co-ordination among different government actors
The Action Plan and OECD 2022 report recognised the role of government leadership and highlighted opportunities for placing climate portfolios at the centre of government. They underscored the role of institutional arrangements in ensuring that government decisions align with climate action. Centres of government have an important role to play in steering the green transition, supporting the development and monitoring of national strategies, facilitating dialogue amongst stakeholders, among other roles. However, the OECD 2022 RDI report also highlighted that effective cross-government co-ordination on climate change has been a significant challenge for most governments.
A recent OECD stocktaking of the institutional arrangements used to steer and govern climate action shows that centres of government in OECD Member countries often play a crucial role in providing leadership and co-ordination for climate policy (Kaur et al., 2023[25]). It identifies four categories: i) a lead unit at the centre of government; ii) appointment of special advisors; iii) permanent intergovernmental committees or commissions; and iv) climate focal points within line ministries and government agencies (Figure 4.2). The diverse institutional approaches underscore a lack of internationally recognised best practices, though OECD data suggests dedicated units within government centres can facilitate co-ordinated actions.
OECD Member countries
Note: “CoG” stands for Centre of Government.
Source: Kaur, M., et al. (2023[25]), “Steering responses to climate change from the centre of government: A stocktaking”, OECD Working Papers on Public Governance, No. 65, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/b95c8396-en.
When it comes to policies related to climate change, centres of government in several OECD countries follow up on the implementation of priorities to ensure that goals are being achieved. According to data from the OECD Survey on Strategic Decision-making at the Centre of Government, centres of government in 52% of the countries surveyed monitor the implementation of the national climate strategy and 48% monitor a selection of climate and/or environmental policies (Figure 4.3).
Note: n=27; Respondents to the survey were asked “What is the centre of government’s role with regards to climate and environmental policy?”
Source: Kaur, M., et al. (2023[25]), “Steering responses to climate change from the centre of government: A stocktaking”, OECD Working Papers on Public Governance, No. 65, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/b95c8396-en.
4.2.6. Pursue holistic public communications efforts to support the timely and effective sharing of information and data around climate change and other environmental pressures and develop strategies for preparedness and prevention of mis- and dis-information on environmental threats and policy responses
The OECD RDI report (OECD, 2022[26]) underlined the need for governments to transform how their approach to public communication to effectively inform and engage with the public, and prevent and tackle to mis-and disinformation on climate and environmental action. Governments need to be able to communicate complex policy narratives in a compelling and meaningful manner. Public communication is key to strengthen the link between awareness, intention and action on climate change and environmental threats.
OECD countries continue to undertake action to promote citizen engagement with the green agenda through communication campaigns. Some of these efforts aim to foster behavioural change in support of environmental goals. One notable example is the United Kingdom’s “It all Adds Up” campaign, launched in December 2022. The initiative highlighted individual actions to reduce energy usage and save money, leveraging several platforms including TV, radio, social and traditional media. As a result, it reduced household energy consumption by an estimated 1 200 GWh and saved UK households GBP 120 million.
Public communicators in OECD countries have collaborated with third party messengers, such as social media influencers, to amplify key messages. For instance, in France, the Government Information Service partnered with different actors including supermarkets to launch a campaign promoting energy reduction and “energy sobriety” in October 2023. The campaign highlighted short-term changes to avoid power cuts and encouraged long-term commitment to energy sobriety.
Furthermore, communications efforts on the green agenda have also been co-ordinated at the level of centres of government to ensure a whole-of-government approach. Ireland’s Government Information Service, operating under the Department of the Taoiseach (Prime Minister's Office), developed a values-based communication framework as part of the government’s 2024 Climate Action Plan. This framework, based on audience insights and workshops with communications and policy experts, a checklist for green transition-related communications to ensure consistent messaging.
Public communication is crucial for addressing the “policy adoption gap” (the difference between the policies that should have been adopted versus those that were actually adopted) and the “policy outcome gap” (the difference between the expected impact of a policy and its actual results). The OECD Environmental Policies and Individual Behaviour Change (EPIC) Survey 2022 and other work point to the importance of communicating in a manner that addresses public concerns over the effectiveness and fairness of green agenda policies in order to increase public support for such policies (Dechezleprêtre et al., 2022[27]). Values-based communication strategies, tailor to resonate with different segments of the population, including through relatable messengers, are key to driving acceptance of green reforms and fostering engagement for their implementation.
4.2.7. Reinforce the capacity of the justice system to resolve environmental claims and enforce environmental commitments, including through dispute resolution mechanisms
The OECD 2022 RDI report highlights the importance of enhancing justice systems capacity to improve environmental accountability. Strengthening countries’ capacities to identify and respond to specific legal needs related the environment is crucial for building trust, maintaining accountability, and upholding environmental law. This includes addressing both direct legal issues, like those concerning natural resource use, and indirect issues stemming from environmental degradation. Many OECD countries, including Australia, Germany, New Zealand and Sweden paved the way more than 25 years ago by establishing specialised courts and tribunals for environmental justice. Constant progress continues among OECD countries. For instance, in 2022, Belgium inaugurated its first specialised chamber within the Mons Court of Appeal to deal with both civil and criminal cases related to environmental and town planning matters. Other countries such as Colombia are also exploring the feasibility of creating an environmental jurisdiction (UNEP, 2023[28]).
This becomes increasingly important as the range of environmental and climate-related legal cases expands, a trend that has accelerated over the past two years. The “youth lens” is also essential here: youth-led mobilisations have been critical in reintroducing climate justice at the top of the political agenda, highlighting that young people and future generations are the primary groups affected by long-term environmental degradation. There is increasing global recognition of intergenerational concerns posed by climate change in legal judgments, notably with references to future generations in courts’ decisions on climate-related cases (OECD, 2022[26]). In recent years, young individuals have brought forward lawsuits to enforce government compliance with climate targets, sometimes successfully (OECD, 2022[26]). Notable cases include a 2023 ruling by the Judicial District Court of Montana (USA) in favour 16 young people (Box 4.4) and a pending judgement in Sweden on a class action by over 600 young people born between 1996 and 2015, challenging the adequacy of Sweden’s climate change mitigation efforts in ensuring their rights to life, private and family life, and non-discrimination under the European Convention on Human Rights.
In an unprecedented decision, a judge ruled wholly in favour of the youth plaintiffs in Held v. State of Montana (August 2023), the first youth climate lawsuit to make it to trial in the United States. In March 2020, sixteen young people from Montana sued their government for promoting fossil fuel extraction, a catalyst for climate change. They argued that the current energy system is contributing to the depletion of the quality of the atmosphere and the diversity of the wildlife despite their status of protected public trust resources. By supporting this system, the state of Montana was accused of violating their rights to a “clean and healthful environment” (Article IX, Section 1 of the Montana Constitution), as well as transgressing individual dignity and equal protection of the law. The Court declared that the state of Montana was indeed violating the youth’s rights to equal protection, dignity, liberty, health, and public trust. It was stated that the government has the “discretion to deny permits for fossil fuel activities that would result in unconstitutional levels of GHG emissions, unconstitutional degradation and depletion of Montana’s environment and natural resources, or infringement of the constitutional rights of Montanans and Youth Plaintiffs” (Montana First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County).
The young complainants are represented by Our Children’s Trust, a not-for-profit law firm, in the context of Youth v. Gov legal campaign carried out across the United States to press states to act on climate change. Most of the cases were dismissed but some have seen success, such as Juliana v. United States, a case where 21 young people asserted that the federal government violated their constitutional rights by causing dangerous carbon dioxide emissions levels, which can now proceed to trial after the ruling of a U.S. District Court Judge rejected the Department of Justice’s motion to halt proceedings in December 2023 and again in February 2024.
Reinforcing capacities to address environmental claims also involves promoting training in environmental law and related fields for judges, magistrates, and government officials. Countries are making efforts to provide effective and appropriate training for judges; EU national judges at first instance (and prosecutors) report that their knowledge of EU environmental law is poor (55%) or only adequate (30%) (European Commission, 2022[31]). In 2022, French magistrates created the “French Society of Judges and Prosecutors for Environmental Justice” to promote and disseminate environmental law among magistrates, both in France and abroad, through dialogue and exchange of best practices, tools, and a common international database (EUFJE, 2023[32]). Considering that environmental justice intersects with criminal, administrative and civil justice, an interdisciplinary approach in training and practice in environmental law is essential. In May 2022, the U.S Department of Justice (DoJ) launched a “Comprehensive Environmental Justice Enforcement Strategy” and created the Office of Environmental Justice (OEJ) to monitor its implementation, as detailed in its 2023 annual report. Recent initiatives of the DoJ include the development of environmental justice training materials, training sessions, monthly sessions for Environmental Justice Coordinators, and the incorporation of environmental justice into various training programmes (Government of the United States of America, 2023[33]).
Although some alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms addressing environmental issues exist in OECD countries, many handle a broad spectrum of claims and lack specialisation in environmental matters. As the number of litigations involving private corporate actors increases, progress should be made in developing out-of-court dispute resolution mechanisms, involving specialised mediators and arbitrators with expertise in environmental matters. Integrating environmental ADR mechanisms within court systems should also be considered when building capacities of justice systems, as this can significantly enhance their responsiveness in effectively managing environmental cases.
As countries work to develop justice systems’ capacities to address environmental actions, some have placed focus on making legal remedies accessible and the justice system more centred around the needs of people. For example, in British Columbia, Canada, the Environmental Dispute Resolution Fund (EDRF) distributes USD 150 000 in grants annually. These grants are available to individuals, community groups, non-profit organisations, and First Nations, supporting them to engage more effectively with legal processes concerning environmental issues (West Coast Environmental Law, 2024[34]).
4.2.8. Establish effective, open and transparent accountability mechanisms to monitor and disclose government progress in implementing its national and international commitments for action on climate
The OECD 2022 RDI report underscored the importance of establishing effective, open, and transparent accountability mechanisms to monitor and disclose government progress in implementing national and international commitments on climate action. This can promote public ownership of policy measures. Access to environmental information has long been recognised as a key element of sustainable development since the adoption of the Rio Declaration in 1992 and the Aarhus Declaration in 1998. Since then, the principles of transparency, participation and disclose of information are central to international instruments supporting the green transition exemplified by Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 and the Escazu Agreement signed by Chile, Colombia and Mexico. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) also highlights the role of access to information in connecting decision makers and stakeholder impacted by climate change (UNFCC, n.d.[35]).
In recent years, countries have actively established dedicated websites or platforms to share information and data on their climate policies, strategies, and progress, enabling citizens and stakeholders to monitor and oversee their implementation. These platforms often include reports, action plans, and updates on specific programmes and initiatives. For example, Canada has a webpages, both at national and in some cases at provincial level, on climate change which includes details on emissions-reduction targets, climate resilience, international partnerships and agreements, and progress reports (British Columbia, n.d.[36]). The United States also provides information on its climate policies through various agencies and platforms, for instance, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Department of Energy (DOE) both share relevant data and showcase progress on climate initiatives.
OECD countries have also made this part of their open data strategies. Most OECD countries have identified priority datasets to publish as open data to support climate action: 34 out of 35 OECD countries (97%) have identified a list of datasets to be released as open data for the purpose of monitoring or tackling climate change (OECD, 2023[37]). Moreover, 30 out of 36 OECD countries (83%) have an open government strategy or action plan in place, and some, such as France and Sweden, have integrated green data provisions in their strategy (OECD, 2023[38]).
Efforts also focus on sharing of environmental information, allowing citizens to contribute to scientific research and build collaborative evidence, holding governments accountable for their climate action progress. For example, in Barcelona, Spain individuals can obtain sensors to monitor air quality and provide real-time data to the city council. This citizen-led data collection supports permanent mechanisms such as advisory committees or expert groups, providing the government with expert advice and public feedback. These mechanisms represent best practice for effective and open accountability.
Acting on climate and the green transition requires governments to adopt innovative and comprehensive approaches, including mobilising data for transparency and accountability. This allows actors to hold governments accountable for the implementation of national and international climate and environmental commitments. However, these efforts have not always gone far enough – the 2024 OECD Trust Survey shows that more than a third of people believe that government-provided statistics do not allow them to assess whether a government keeps its promises (OECD, 2024[1]). Going forward, key efforts will continue to be needed to ensure access to timely, accurate, and re-usable information on these commitments to raise public awareness and accountability among governments and private actors. Additionally, greater efforts to publish open green data to inform policymaking, stimulate innovation, and provide means to monitor government actions. Developing accountability mechanisms involve integrating diverse stakeholders and extensive data across sectors and institutions. This complexity underscores the need for adequate governance arrangements, and systematic data-sharing practices within the public sector and across sectors at both domestic and international levels.
4.2.9. Strengthen government global climate and other environmental competences, boosting civil service capacities, establishing adequate mechanisms to ensure that global issues are considered across government and considering a stronger global perspective in rulemaking through international regulatory co-operation
The OECD 2022 RDI report highlighted the need to enhance government competencies to address climate and other environmental challenges. This involves improving the skill set of the civil service and ensuring that mechanisms are in place for considering global issues, such as the green transition, across all government activities, including rulemaking.
Within government, building competencies and enhancing civil service capacities in global climate issues and other environmental areas, requires action at the level of senior leadership. Leaders and managers bear a significant responsibility in fostering green skills and awareness and should therefore be at the forefront of this effort. However, despite their importance, virtually no OECD Member has identified Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)2 or global competencies3 as a priority area for learning and development of managers (OECD, 2022[39]).
Governments in Chile, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, and the United Kingdom are placing specific focus on developing a workforce to support climate issues. For example, since 2022 the green transition is a key priority in the training of French civil servants. The main objective is to ensure all civil servants understand environmental stakes – including climate, adaptation to climate change, biodiversity, resources and environmental health- and contribute to improving the ecological performance of public policy. The training of senior-level public officials has been prioritised, with a goal to train 25 000 senior-level public servants by the end of 2024. The French government’s ambition is that all civil servants will have benefited from the training by 2027. In the United Kingdom, the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero are working towards embedding specific training on climate in the competency frameworks, training activities and curricula (Kaur et al., 2023[25]). The green transition has also been a core topic for the training of Italian public servants since 2023. Syllabus, the e-learning platform for the Italian public service, hosts two training modules on governing green, Agenda 2030 and sustainable development goals. Over 510 000 public servants have joined the training courses (Syllabus, n.d.[40]).
In terms of global co-operation and despite the availability of many mechanisms, domestic and international regulatory action remains decentralised and often disconnected (OECD, 2021[41]). Addressing this disconnect is particularly important for environmental regulation. International regulatory co-operation (IRC) allows countries to exchange regulatory experiences, learn from each other, ensure coherent approaches and, when possible, adopt joint regulatory approaches, as per the OECD Recommendation on International Regulatory Co-operation to Tackle Global Challenges (OECD, 2022[42]). However, national regulatory frameworks do not sufficiently reflect international environmental considerations. As part of regulatory impact assessment, impacts of the policy on foreign jurisdictions are not sufficiently assessed during policy development. Even though environmental issues are frequently transboundary issues, only 5 out of 36 OECD members require the assessment of transboundary impacts.
More broadly, national regulatory frameworks need to be complemented by a complex system of public and private actors that support regulators to ensure the right measurement, technical standards, testing or certification, and accreditation takes place and contribute to achieving environmental objectives. While this system is essential to support the global nature of global climate action, it has become incredibly difficult to distinguish between product marketing and governmental requirements to ensure a true protection of the planet. This complexity and disconnect between regulators and policymakers risks undermining its contribution to effective protection of the environment with implications for citizens’ trust in government acting for the green transition.
4.2.10. Promote the collection of evidence on people’s trust in climate policies to inform decision making and strengthen public support and acceptability for green reforms
The OECD 2022 RDI report highlights that trust in government is a significant factor in citizens’ willingness to support climate policies. Results from the more recent 2023 Trust Survey show that public perceptions by people tend to be more optimistic than the evidence should allow, as 42% are confident that their country will reduce greenhouse gas emissions, against 35% who lack confidence, whereas current predictions show that greenhouse gas emissions are not currently on a path that would allow to limit global warming by 1.5 °C, and this confidence has tended to slightly increase in many countries compared to the 2021 survey. This points to the need for further action to increase people’s understanding and trust in climate policies in relation to actual targets. However, contrasting results also emerge from other sources, including specific OCDE country case studies on trust, which offer more granular results as well as some European data. In Portugal, just under half of respondents said that they wanted the government to do more to reduce their country’s contribution to climate change (OECD, 2023[43]). Across the European Union, 67% of EU citizens believing that their government is not doing enough to tackle climate change (European Commission, 2023[44]).
An example of public desire to see government tackle climate change is that in 2022 in Brazil 65% of survey respondents said that their government should prioritise reducing their country's contribution to climate change. At that time, however, only 40% were confident that their government would succeed. This may reflect setbacks at the time in Brazil`s pledge to reduce its emissions. However, since 2023 Brazil has taken positive action, including developing legislation on environmental information, water and waste management, and biodiversity (OECD, 2023[45]). Additionally, the launch of the Participatory Climate Plan (Plano Clima Participativo) in late 2023 by an Inter-Ministerial Committee on Climate Change, which includes representatives from 23 ministries, aims to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and enhance the resilience of cities and natural environments in alignment with Brazil`s commitments under the Paris Agreement. This initiative reflects a comprehensive approach to climate action that incorporates social justice, transparency, and civic engagement, emphasising broad social participation through hybrid processes that combine digital tools with in-person meetings and conferences.
4.3.1. Adopt and expand green budgeting practices to improve the consistency of public expenditure with climate and environmental goals
The OECD 2022 RDI report recognised the importance of budgetary tools. Budgets can be a powerful instrument to align policies with climate and environmental commitments at national. Green budgeting practices are becoming widespread across OECD countries. While in 2021, 14 out of 38 OECD countries reported practising green budgeting, the breadth and depth of such practices varies. Countries are facing a number of challenges: the lack of common methodologies to assess environmental effects, the absence of a modern multi-annual budgetary framework linked to strategic planning, and capacity challenges, including lack of relevant knowledge and technical expertise.
Countries have made significant progress in this area. Since 2020, the number of countries reporting such practices has doubled, increasing from 14 to 24 out of 38, (Figure 4.4).4 The 11 OECD countries that introduced green budgeting since 2021 were Chile, Finland, Greece, Israel, Korea, Lithuania, New Zealand, Slovak Republic, Spain, Switzerland and Türkiye.
Note: For 2022, data for Costa Rica and Slovenia are not available, and Hungary, Latvia and Portugal are not practicing green budgeting but have plans to introduce green budgeting in the future. For 2021, data for Costa Rica, Israel and the United States are not available.
Source: OECD (2023[38]), Government at a Glance 2023, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/3d5c5d31-en.
The OECD has made progress to understand the extent to which countries are addressing the challenges highlighted above, in terms of depth and adequacy of green practices. The 2022 OECD Green Budgeting Index5 shows the varying degrees to which OECD countries have adopted green budgeting (Figure 4.5).
Note: OECD Green Budgeting Index reflecting changing practices.
Source: OECD (2023[38]), Government at a Glance 2023, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/3d5c5d31-en.
The results show that progress has been made in all four building blocks in the index:
Institutional arrangements were strengthened in most OECD countries. Countries with developed practices have passed legislation on green budgeting, as is the case in Norway. Most countries have developed frameworks through administrative practices.
Methods and tools used to implement green budgeting are widely adopted (Figure 4.6). Most countries have carbon pricing mechanisms (22 out of 24, 92%), environmental impact assessments (18 out of 24, 75%), and sovereign green bonds (18 out of 24, 75%) as tools to implement green budgeting. Emerging tools include for example green elements in medium-term budgets (8 out of 24, 33%), or green perspectives in spending reviews (6 out of 24, 25%).
Accountability and transparency arrangements are progressing but are an emerging practice. The involvement of civil society, monitoring of green budgeting and the submission of a green budget statement to parliament are not widespread practices. Green accounting standards and oversight mechanisms are at an early stage of development.
Enabling Environment displays large disparities among OECD countries. Countries that fare comparatively well are those that have implemented programme and performance budgeting with relevant links to green initiatives, as is the case in France and Sweden. Many countries have put in place capacity building initiatives, with 10 out of 24 countries initiating training and skills development for line ministries (42%) in 2022.
Source: OECD (2023[38]), Government at a Glance 2023, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/3d5c5d31-en.
4.3.2. Ensure that regulations are aligned with green goals by promoting the systematic use of regulatory management tools (including RIA, ex post assessment and stakeholder consultation) that take into account climate and environmental impacts
The OECD 2022 RDI report recognised the importance of regulatory policy to help governments put the economy and society on a carbon-neutral, resilient and sustainable path to achieve climate action and the green transition. The report highlighted the need for regulatory policy to evolve along with green government priorities through adjusting and refocusing traditional regulatory management tools – stakeholder engagement, regulatory impact assessment (RIA) and ex post evaluation of existing regulations on climate goals – while simultaneously suggesting the introduction of new approaches and more recent tools such as international regulatory co-operation (IRC) to achieve environmental goals. The report also stressed the need for both agile and risk-based regulation so that innovators can move quickly to deploy sustainable technologies.
Recent country experiences highlight that, while regulation is a key tool for achieving environmental goals, governments still face significant challenges in designing and implementing regulations that effectively pursue these objectives. The challenge lies in balancing competing economic, social, and environmental targets and trade-offs. Economic concerns often take precedence over environmental (particularly non-climate) and distributional considerations, resulting in negative consequences for the environment and society.
Recent OECD work highlights the potential of better regulation tools to efficiently and effectively design, implement and evaluate regulations for the environment (OECD, 2023[46]). Currently, assessments of regulations’ environment impacts are not sufficient integrated in governments’ ex ante impact assessment processes. Implementation across different ministries is often uneven. A robust appraisal of the different policy options and their impacts on economy, society and the environment would help minimise unintended consequences. While preliminary data of the 2023 Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance (iReg) survey suggests that countries are increasingly assessing environmental impacts as part of regulatory impact assessment (RIA), more granular assessment are not conducted systematically and often limited to a narrow range of issues. Adopting a more horizontal approach to RIA and adapting its methodologies accordingly could promote policy effectiveness, coherence and predictability. As an example of how to assess distributional impacts when drafting regulations, the United States Environmental Protection Agency recently revised its estimate of the social cost of greenhouse gases based on up-to date scientific and economic understanding (Government of the United States of America, 2023[47]).
Due to the urgency of environmental threats, it is key to ensure that regulations, once in place, remain fit-for-purpose, encourage innovation and support environmental goals. This requires ex post assessment and managing the stock of existing regulations. OECD work underscores the benefits of a whole-of-government approach to review regulations from an environmental perspective (OECD, 2023[46]). Although ex post evaluations are essential for adjusting regulations based on new evidence and experiences, currently only a minority of OECD countries systematically evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of existing regulations with a green lens that prioritises environmental and sustainability consideration and commitments. Evaluations of individual regulations are not always complemented with sector-wide reviews Principle-based reviews in specific sectors can capture the cumulative environmental impacts and help balance synergies and trade-offs. The upcoming OECD 2025 Regulatory Policy Outlook will include a chapter on Regulation for the Planet, highlighting the need for comprehensive sector-wide reviews that go beyond initial impacts to include indirect and second-order environmental effects.
Stakeholder engagement in rulemaking is also key and should be related to the broader challenges of citizen engagement highlighted above. In the regulatory area, governments are not sufficiently engaging with a wide range of stakeholders at all stages of the regulatory cycle (OECD, 2023[46]). While preliminary evidence from the iReg survey finds that a majority of OECD countries make systematic efforts to engage with stakeholders, only few countries consult systematically at the early stage of the process, to define policy problems and consider potential solutions and only a limited number of countries consult when reviewing existing regulations. Moreover, marginalised groups6 and minorities are disproportionally affected by environmental threats, but they are often underrepresented in the participatory process. As a result, government regulations can be poorly planned, ineffective, and negatively impact vulnerable groups in society. Adopting innovative forms of public consultation can help engage a more diverse group of stakeholders, improve regulations and foster public trust.7
Effective regulatory delivery, including licensing and permitting, regulatory enforcement and inspections, is essential to close the compliance gap in environmental regulation. However, recent OECD data shows that the implementation and enforcement of these regulations falls short of what is required to address both environmental and economic challenges effectively (OECD, 2023[46]). Environmental permits and licenses can burden businesses, hinder investment and stifle innovation. Adopting a risk-based approach to permitting and enforcement can help minimise these while protecting the environment.
Economic regulators can substantially affect environmental outcomes by developing regulations to target producer and consumer behaviour in key sectors such as water, energy, e-communications and transport. To reconcile economic, social and environmental objectives, regulators may have to effectively manage trade-offs. Preliminary iReg data shows that not enough regulators are legally empowered to collect data related to environmental sustainability on the sectors that they oversee. This limits regulators’ ability to focus on outcomes, remain agile, risk-based and take a whole of government approach to environmental goals. Governments can help regulators meet these goals by providing them with a clear role, appropriate powers, and sufficient capacities.
In short, while sound laws and regulations, grounded in evidence, are vital in combating environmental challenges, but broader and more systemic action is needed. In the broader climate change discussions, the use of regulatory tools takes a broader perspective, which also includes technology standards and performance standards as well as bans and phase outs. From a governance perspective, two areas can be highlighted for further action (OECD, 2023[46]):
Introducing a green lens to regulatory design: While data indicates that many governments do assess regulatory impact on the environment, data also shows that many individual regulators lack data gathering power which may be preventing a whole-of-government approach. Because climate change disproportionately affects minorities and marginalised groups8, governments should ensure to systematically consult these groups throughout the regulatory process.
Risk-informed regulation: Governments should move away from process focused approach to focus on outcome-based, risk-informed regulation. Outcome-based regulation allows economic actors to choose the best way for them to meet the requirements and thus can enhance innovation and compliance. Informing regulations by the goals they want to achieve and the risks they aim to prevent can foster a proportional approach. Putting in place agile and risk-based regulatory systems can help encourage innovation and promote green investment and economic growth all while protecting the environment.
4.3.3. Link major infrastructure decisions and plans with climate and environmental objectives, including by developing long-term strategic infrastructure plans that align with commitments on environmental protection and climate change mitigation as well as adaptation, and by promoting comprehensive socioeconomic assessment of projects
The OECD 2022 RDI report identified the need for a new holistic approach to infrastructure planning and delivery: the long lifespan of infrastructure projects entails that decisions made today will have enduring consequences for the environment and might lock in vulnerability if they fail to consider the environmental and climate dimensions. New infrastructure assets need to be designed, built, and operated to account for climate change over their life cycle. Moreover, existing infrastructure may need to be retrofitted or managed differently given the impacts of changing climate conditions and extreme weather events (OECD, 2018[48]). This calls for mobilising existing and new governance strategies and tools to integrate environmental and climate considerations into infrastructure planning and delivery.
Delivering environmentally sustainable and climate-resilient infrastructure requires a clear vision for the future and a credible roadmap to achieve it, with long-term infrastructure strategies that are aligned with environmental goals and climate change adaptation and mitigation objectives. In fact, a 2022 survey shows that most OECD countries consider several environmental and climate dimensions when developing national or sectoral infrastructure strategies: climate change mitigation (97% or 28 out of 29 countries), climate change adaptation (93% or 27 countries), protection and restoration of biodiversity and ecosystems (93% or 27 countries), pollution prevention and control (79% or 23 countries), sustainable use and protection of water and marine resources (79% or 23 countries), and transition to a circular economy (69% or 20 countries). (OECD, 2022[49])
Many OECD countries have also developed guidelines to integrate environmental and climate considerations into infrastructure decision making: 71% (20 out of 28) have developed infrastructure guidelines specifically addressing adaptation, 68% (19 countries) for mitigation, and 57% (16 countries) have focused on biodiversity considerations (OECD, 2023[38]). Such guidelines can increase the integration of environmental and climate considerations into infrastructure planning and delivery. For example, Spain’s Centro de Estudios y Experimentación de Obras Públicas co-ordinates the cross-cutting working group on climate change and resilience in roads to provide guidelines for incorporating climate change considerations into all phases of the road life cycle (OECD, 2023[50]).
Despite the efforts undertaken by countries, more could be done to promote the integration of biodiversity and ecosystem considerations into infrastructure design. Less than half of the countries (14 out of 29 or 48%) have guidelines on the use of Nature-based Solutions (NbS) in infrastructure development (OECD, 2023[38]). NbS offer innovative, cost-effective opportunities for supporting infrastructure sustainability and resilience to extreme weather events. Other socioeconomic benefits of NbS include long-term cost savings from reduced need for retrofitting, the potential for creating green jobs, and the economic resilience from climate change mitigation. Scaling up the use of NbS requires strategic government leadership. For example, the region of Flanders in Belgium has developed a handbook for planning, design and management of green-blue spaces as building blocks of healthy and resilient living environments (OECD, 2023[51]). Similarly, OECD has proposed an integrated approach to green infrastructure (GI) and NbS in Italy in the planning, appraisal, financing, procurement, and maintenance of infrastructure (OECD, 2023[52]).
While countries have developed long-term strategic visions for sustainable and climate-resilient infrastructure, there is potential for improvement in integrating these visions into effective governance throughout the infrastructure lifecycle. Project appraisal tools can assess the present and future resilience, biodiversity impact, and both present and future cost and benefits of project. These tools enable decision makers to consider a broader range of responses to natural hazards, factoring in frequency, potential costs to lives, businesses, or access to essential services, and help prioritise projects with greater resilience or minimal biodiversity impact. For instance, the Netherlands has introduced a novel approach called biodiversity points, which enhances cost-benefit analyses by measuring the volume and quality of ecosystem services and biodiversity (OECD, 2023[53]).
Countries could make greater use of methodological tools to integrate environmental and climate considerations into the project appraisal process. While 28 OECD countries require an environmental impact assessment to evaluate the possible impacts of a transport infrastructure project, only 68% (19 out of 28) systematically use the assessment results to inform project selection and prioritisation. Similarly, while 63% (17 out of 27) require a climate impact assessment to estimate the potential emissions of a transport infrastructure project, only 44% (12 out of 27) systematically use the results to select or prioritise projects. Less than half of the countries (12 out of 26 or 46%) require climate change adaptation measures to be integrated into the design of transport infrastructure projects. Only 35% (9 out of 26) systematically use climate resilience criteria to inform project selection and prioritisation (OECD, 2023[38]). For example, new methodologies can be developed for assessing a project(‘s contribution to climate change mitigation and adaptation, as was recently proposed by the OECD to Ireland under the EU Technical Support Instrument (Percoco et al., 2023[54]).
Government leadership is crucial in attracting private investment in sustainable infrastructure. To facilitate the delivery of environmentally sustainable and climate-resilient infrastructure, countries must set in place enabling policy and regulatory frameworks. This includes updating land use regulations, spatial plans, and providing investment signals that guide market investment in low-carbon infrastructure. Streamlining permit procedures is particularly important to expedite infrastructure projects that promote the green transition. Many OECD countries have adopted good practices in promoting transparency in permit procedures; 87% of them (27 out of 31) allow public tracking of progress in issuing transport infrastructure permits. However, more could be done to increase the accountability of permitting agencies. Currently, only 43% of OECD countries (13 out of 30) assess permitting agencies’ performance based on regulatory goals in the transport sector (based on outcomes rather than on outputs). For example, the United States’ Department of Transportation is required to establish system to monitor the environmental review and permit process for major projects (OECD, 2023[38]). There is also significant potential to establish synergies with efforts to scale up mobilisation of private finance for climate action both in OECD and developing countries (OECD, 2023[55]).
Going forward, climate change may increasingly expose infrastructure assets and networks to damage and disruption. This is compounded by ongoing infrastructure governance challenges such as ageing and poor maintenance. A lifecycle approach to infrastructure planning and management can help increase assets’ resilience, which will require broader measurement tools.
4.3.4. Expand the use of green public procurement ensuring, to the extent possible, that all participants in the supply chain for public contracts meet environmental rules and standards, and improve the measurement of the impact of green procurement practices
The OECD 2022 RDI report (OECD, 2022[26]) underscores persistent challenges in greening government procurement which helped to identify areas for action. Governments aspiring to enhance the implementation of green public procurement must address the existing data gap, which hinders a comprehensive assessment of the impacts of green procurement strategies. This step is crucial for gaining insights into the environmental advantages derived from more sustainable government operations and fosters sustainable economic development as public procurement represents almost 13% of GDP across OECD countries. Green Public Procurement (GPP) is increasingly seen as a strategic policy tool to achieve sustainability objectives and meet countries’ commitments on climate change.
The results of the OECD 2022 Survey on Green Public Procurement offer comparative results across a range of 34 OECD countries, and four non-members (Brazil, Bulgaria, Peru and Romania). Results show that, in terms of whether all participants in the SC for public contracts meet environmental rules and standards, 34 out of the 38 countries surveyed had an active GPP policy or strategic framework. The broad objectives contained in GPP policies are usually translated into more tangible obligations or objectives assigned to public procurement officers (Figure 4.7). Countries might establish an obligation to introduce green requirements in public tenders or they can set more incremental targets such as the percentage of goods or services subject to green public procurement strategies. The provision of mandatory requirements to use GPP in specific instances as well as targets in terms of share of procurement subject to GPP limit the discretionary power of public contracting authorities to decide whether and how to adopt GPP.
Note: Figures shows respondents responses to two different questions: (1) “Does the national policy or strategic framework include a mandatory requirement to use GPP in specific instances?”, (2) “Does the national policy or strategic GPP framework include targets in terms of share of procurement subject to GPP?”
Source: OECD (2024[56]), Harnessing Public Procurement for the Green Transition: Good Practices in OECD Countries, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/e551f448-en.
For example, Italy has developed Minimum Environmental Criteria for 18 product categories that are mandatory for all contracting authorities at every level of government and for all public tenders, irrespective of the contract’s value (Ministry of Environment and Energy Security, n.d.[57]). However, none of the countries examined have adopted mandatory GPP requirements for all procurement categories. In the Slovak Republic, according to the Strategy for environmental policy, the targets for GPP are 70% of the total value and number of contracts by 2030, applicable across levels of government.
The survey shows that only a limited number of countries require reporting on the use of green criteria in procurement processes, focusing mainly on immediate outputs such as the value or number of contracts, rather than on outcomes such as impact on greenhouse gas emissions. A major challenge in monitoring is the granularity of procurement data, which often does not distinguish between different product types (e.g. electric cars vs. diesel cars). Most e-Procurement systems broadly categorise products, such as “car purchase”, where environmental footprints are averaged, hindering the assessment of the impact of specific procurement strategies. However, some positive practices have emerged; both Slovenia and Croatia have developed frameworks to measure the environmental effects, including GHG emissions, of green procurement for certain product categories (Box 4.5).
As part of the larger initiative CARE4CLIMATE, co-founded by the European LIFE Programme and aimed at supporting Slovenia in achieving its emissions reduction targets, the Ministry of Environment and Spatial Planning has been working to develop a measurement framework to monitor the environmental, social, and economic effects of Green Public Procurement. Notably, the methodology covers impacts that can be measured either directly or indirectly, and it applies to three procurement categories: electrical and electronic appliances, road vehicles, design/construction of buildings. In the case of environmental impacts, in addition to directly measuring the reduction (or increase) in GHG emissions, the methodology indirectly measures pollution, waste generation and recycling, threats to biodiversity, and smog generation. Moreover, the methodology is comprehensive and considers all stages of a product lifecycle.
To assess the impacts of green procurement decisions, a baseline is always identified for comparison. The baseline can be defined in different ways, also according to the procurement category considered. For example, it can be defined through an energy label that provides information on the energy consumption of products and appliances, and it is useful for electronic devices and indirectly for road vehicles and building construction. In the absence of this, the baseline can be determined as an average of the items of a comparable class of product/service.
Beside creating a yardstick for the monitoring of the effects of green procurement strategies over time, results from measurement are also used to further improve GPP policy design and related instruments.
Source: Lakić, Gregor Golja and Ferdo Gubina (2022[58]), “Analiza Učinkov Zelenega Javnega Naročanja V Republiki Sloveniji” [Analysis of the effects of green public procurement in the Republic of Slovenia], https://www.care4climate.si/sl/novice/vse-novice/analiza-ucinkov-zelenega-javnega-narocanja-v-republiki-sloveniji.
The results above highlight the value of holistic approaches to expand the reach and impact of green public procurement. Countries need to invest in monitoring systems, leverage e-Procurement for efficiency, and focus on standardised environmental standards across supply chains. The emphasis should be not only on formalising policies but ensuring their effective implementation, with the ultimate aim of realising tangible environmental benefits.
4.3.5. Enable public institutions and economic and network regulators to promote environmental action through mandates, funding, tools and governance arrangements that allow them to achieve environmental goals
The network sectors that economic regulators oversee – typically energy, transport, e-communications and water - often have significant environmental impacts and are highly resource intensive. Green transition involves the profound transformation of these network sectors. As leading public bodies in the governance of these sectors, economic regulators can substantially influence environmental outcomes. There is a growing expectation from stakeholders, regulated entities and citizens that economic regulators, as contributors to the implementation of the government policy agendas, also play a role in meeting environmental objectives.
Whilst regulators are already starting to respond, there is currently no standard approach taken toward defining the role of economic regulators in contributing to environmental policy objectives and the green transition.
Several functions that economic regulators routinely carry out can have important impacts on environmental outcomes and are therefore potential levers to contribute to the green transition. The OECD’s report on Better Regulation for the Green Transition (OECD, 2023[46]) provides examples of some of those available levers, which include tariff-setting, infrastructure access and planning, measures that target consumer and operator behaviour, collecting and publishing data, and monitoring standards and ensuring compliance, among others. More broadly, the choice of regulatory approach could support environmental objectives. For example, innovation can be stimulated through outcome-based regulation, where regulators set envisaged outcomes rather than dictate procedures for how operators should achieve them. Regulatory experimentation through regulatory sandboxes, pilot projects and pilot regulations can also be used to harness innovations that will have a beneficial environmental impact.
The potential contribution of economic regulators to the green transition rests on several important considerations around governance arrangements, which may be summarised under the themes of role clarity, the adapting of regulatory tools and processes, and addressing capacity and resources.
Providing clear objectives for regulators will motivate intervention, whilst setting clear roles and responsibilities within the institutional framework can help avoid misalignment regarding the delivery of those objectives. Lacking or unclear legal mandates may limit potential action beyond information gathering and knowledge building, as Economic regulators would not be able to employ the levers noted above and promote environmental goals when doing so would compromise on the attainment of their primary objectives as defined in legislation. Furthermore, if the mandates of economic regulators expand to encompass environmental goals, regulators must be afforded the appropriate powers to deliver their objectives.
Where mandates are broadened, regulators will inevitably be required to balance multiple objectives and clear guidance from the executive or within legislation on priorities and resolving trade-offs should be provided. Having clear guidance can help mitigate the risk of blurring the boundary between political and technical decision making.
Since a regulator’s ability to make accurate assessments and informed regulatory decisions, including on trade-offs, rests on its knowledge and understanding of the regulated sector, consideration should also be given to the regulators’ powers to collect and manage data and information.
Co-ordination between economic regulators and other public institutions becomes increasingly important in the context of a broadened mandate that encompasses economic, social, and environmental objectives, given the complex interactions between these issues. At a minimum, joint efforts can be useful to explore and understand how regulation can support environmental objectives. In some cases, more extensive co-ordination may be required.
Regulators can also take advantage of regulatory management tools to support the delivery of broadened remits. Regulatory impact assessments (RIA) that encompass cost benefit analyses can help to reveal potential trade-offs and identify solutions with the greatest net benefits for the environment. It is important that regulators are aware of the impacts of their regulatory actions and decisions. This helps drive improvements and enhance systems and processes internally. It also demonstrates the effectiveness of the regulator to whom it is accountable and helps to build confidence in the regulatory system.
Regulators may need to reassess the design of stakeholder engagement processes to support the delivery of broadened remits. The knowledge of regulated sectors and the businesses and citizens affected by regulatory schemes assists regulators to regulate effectively and regulators may need to engage with a more diverse range of stakeholder groups if they need to consider environmental goals in their decision making.
Approaches to managing regulation and the regulatory design process may need to adapt to better support environmental objectives and ensure regulation remains fit-for-purpose, especially where economic regulators are provided with a broadened mandate and therefore have responsibilities to manage new risks on the horizon. For example, innovation can be stimulated through outcome-based regulation, regulatory experimentation can be used to harness innovation with environmental benefits, and regulators involved in licensing and inspection may reap the benefits of a risk-based system of regulatory delivery.
Importantly, regulators will need to build sufficient capacity and capabilities to deliver on new or expanded mandates for environmental protection. This will entail ensuring that they have the right skills, appropriate technologies, and sufficient financial resources.
Regulators with mandates relating to environmental sustainability will need to continually update and enhance the skills, knowledge, and capacity of their staff to keep pace with changes in the sector, including relevant technological developments, and the possibilities available to all regulators due to digitalisation and the use of big data. However, many regulators report difficulties in hiring well-qualified staff, especially IT and data specialists, which can affect their ability to execute their regulatory activities (OECD, 2022[59]).
Close attention will be needed around regulators’ staffing and funding arrangements – such as its ability to hire new staff, allow existing staff to build new capacities, re-organise itself internally, or to manage resources autonomously – as these can have an important bearing on its agility to respond to new roles and expectations. At the same time, funding levels should be adequate to enable the regulator, operating efficiently, to effectively fulfil the objectives set by government, including obligations relating to environmental sustainability and the green transition.
Finally, broadened remits and new objectives for economic regulators relating to environmental sustainability may require new ways of thinking and working. Regulators should identify the need for organisational change, diagnose the current state, and take steps to anticipate and understand the potential implications of change, which may include a process institutional and cultural adjustment too.
4.3.6. Promote green competencies, skills and leadership practices in government that allow them to mainstream awareness and consideration of the environmental impacts of all government policies and action and ensure environmental stewardship by government
The OECD RDI 2022 report (OECD, 2022[26]) recognised the role of public employment practices in supporting the green transition. In fact, public administrations are increasingly gearing up for the green transition and its anticipated impacts across all facets of operations and workforce. From a broader public employment perspective, the challenge regarding the workforce lies not so much in the creation of new "green jobs" but rather in integrating green principles throughout public employment and management systems and the HR function.
Considering the transversal nature of climate considerations, countries are increasingly seeking to develop so-called “green” competencies, skills and leadership practices, enabling governments to assess and adapt policies and services to meet sustainability objectives. These efforts aim to foster shared understanding of the environmental ramifications of government policies and actions, and to be aware of potential adverse effects. This emphasis may lead to the emergence of specific sets of “green” competencies and skills in specific public service professions. For instance, public procurement specialists are increasingly expected to master and develop green skills focusing on the environmental impact of tenders, which can support the Green Public Procurement practices highlighted above. Similarly, all staff managing EU investment funds in national administrations need to implement the “Do No Significant Harm” principle, requiring them to be able to assess a range of sustainability impacts of funded projects.
Besides the leadership level, discussed as part of the global competences above, building green competencies at the operational level within the administration calls for the recruitment of specialists and the development of public servants with these skill sets. However, across OECD member countries, virtually all public administrations face challenges attracting the right candidate for particular job categories. This is even more the case for profiles with specific skills in high demand in the private sector. This requires public administrations to better understand what candidates expect from a public service role or career, and how is the public service positioned to deliver on that. The OECD has developed a framework to tie these threads together that looks at the quality of the job, the prospects for career development, and the quality of life the professional opportunity offers, as perceived by candidates (OECD, 2023[60]). Offering stimulating job opportunities to specialists focused on the green transition can help build capacity to address climate change-related challenges.
Over the long term, similar initiatives aimed at providing learning and development opportunities for all public servants can facilitate developing an approach taking into account climate change and the green transition. However, across OECD member countries, this topic is not yet a primary focus of public service learning and development strategies. Only 3% and 8% of OECD member countries have respectively identified SDGs and global competencies as a priority area for training non-manager public servants. The development of those training offers remains limited, but some countries have already started structuring trainings. For instance, France seeks to extend its green national training plan to all public servants by 2027.
Schools of government have an increasingly important role to play to achieve this goal. Climate policy is identified as one the main areas in which schools of government aim to develop new programmes (OECD, 2022[61]). However, less than half of schools of government surveyed indicated already having programmes on SDGs or global competencies (OECD, 2022[61]). Despite this, several schools have indicated great interest in developing programmes having to do with skills for sustainability or the green transition, though indicate that they are in the beginning stages of developing curricula. Examples include Spain and the United States, in which ministries responsible for environmental matters have discussed forming curriculums or courses focusing on specific “green” skills, potentially in conjunction with centralised training institutes. Further, many schools of government incorporate climate or environmental policies into course work focused on evaluating policies and policy proposals, even if not directly related to specific green skills.
Finally, these changes actively impact the human resources (HR) function, which are called on to develop training opportunities, ensure that green skills and competencies are valued throughout one’s career, or identify the skills and profiles needed for new and emerging green jobs. Other HR functions are also relevant to “leading by examples”, and will be discussed below.
Ultimately, public administrations can effectively address the green transition by fostering a shared understanding of environmental impacts and integrating green practices. Despite some progress and initiatives in a few countries, there remains scope for greater emphasis on green training initiatives and integration of environmental considerations into learning and development strategies. Concerted efforts are required to ensure that green skills are in place to help governments deliver on the green transition.
4.3.7. Use innovative governance approaches, including mission-oriented innovation and anticipatory governance mechanisms, to inform climate and environmental decision making and policies
The 2022 OECD RDI report recognised the potential for public sector innovation and innovative governance approaches to support climate and environmental decision making and policies. Policymakers, facing complex challenges, increasingly find that traditional, often isolated, and reactive approaches based on single instruments are insufficient. Missions and mission-oriented policies, which extend beyond the remit of a particular governmental office, provide a useful tool. In policymaking, a mission refers to a well-defined, bold, and ambitious overarching policy objective to tackle a societal challenge within a defined timeframe. They involve diverse stakeholders, demand innovation and co-ordination, and embody long-term transformative visions.
The OECD actively supports countries in adopting mission approaches through the multidisciplinary Mission Action Lab (MAL), established in 2021. The MAL has partnered with countries to develop a mission practitioner need assessment survey, online toolkits and databases, country case-studies, bootcamp training seminars, practical guides and a mission diagnostic methodology.
In 2023, the MAL facilitated the development of a mission assessment analytical framework in Austria, testing it during the implementation of the five EU missions, including the Climate-neutral and smart cities and the Adaptation to climate change missions. Austria provides one of the most elaborated efforts not only to mobilise and co-ordinate relevant communities of actors around the five EU missions, but also to adopt them as national missions in their own right. This monitoring tool aims to provide a self-assessment of their progress in the mission design and implementation ‘journey’ as well as a compass to reach consensus on the way(s) forward based on the identified gaps in each mission and at the level of the overall mission initiative. The conclusions of this self-assessment exercise were synthetised in a final report that included overarching and mission-specific recommendations.9
Moving forward and building on the Mission Action Lab collaboration on mission-oriented approaches with policymakers and partners from across the globe, the Mission Action Lab has launched a reoccurring Community of Practice around mission-oriented approaches in Spring 2024. The Community of Practice serves to connect and promote knowledge exchange among policymakers, mission practitioners, researchers and experts actively involved in the mission field. Over a third of the 250+ community members are involved in missions related to climate or environmental policy, and a community session will be dedicated to their specific challenges during 2024.
In late 2024, the OECD will also publish ha report examining how the mission approach can be leveraged to secure governance frameworks that are better able to deliver on national climate mitigation targets. This work builds on previous OECD research on the effectiveness of mission-oriented innovation policies for reaching net zero targets, as well as MAL research into the topic of effective mission governance.
4.3.8. Use behavioural insight approaches to ensure the effective design and implementation of green policies considering behavioural barriers and biases in all the stages of policymaking, including assessment
The OECD 2022 RDI report (OECD, 2022[26]) identified the role of behavioural insights (BI) in designing, implementing, and promoting green policies acknowledging the need for individuals, business and governments to shift behaviours towards a sustainable, low carbon economy. Behavioural insights tools can support governments by helping to identify behavioural drivers and barriers, thereby promoting interventions that encourage more sustainable decisions.
Behavioural science is increasingly used for policymaking across OECD countries (Varazzani and Hubble, 2023[62]), offering direct opportunities to support the green agenda. Specifically, behavioural science units are focusing on promoting the green transition, recognising the need to rely on evidence-based insights to understand drivers of and barriers to green behaviours. The OECD Behavioural Insights Knowledge Hub - which aggregates findings from behavioural science studies uploaded by practitioners worldwide - the environmental sector is one of the top three policy domains where behavioural science interventions are most frequently applied (Figure 4.8).
Note: n=143 (as of October 2023).
Source: OECD (n.d.[63]), OECD behavioural science Knowledge Hub.
The PARCA survey, launched in 2022 and highlighted in the 2022 RDI report, now offers more than 35 000 observations (respondents) across 18 studies (both online surveys and qualitative studies). It provides insights on the views of Canadian citizens regarding systemic concerns (such as misinformation and trust in government), organisational concerns (such as increasing the recognition of ecologically-sensitive lands), and individual concerns (such as the adoption of electric heat pumps and zero-emission vehicles). PARCA found that 75% of respondents were open to making lifestyle changes to limit climate change, and that recycling (92%) and reducing food waste (77%) were two of the most common pro-environmental actions (Impact Canada Initiative, 2024[64]).
Ireland’s Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) collaborated with Yale University’s Programme on Climate Communications (YPCCC) on two reports: Climate Change in the Irish Mind and Climate Change’s Four Irelands (Environmental Protection Agency, n.d.[65]; Leiserowitz, A., Goldberg, M., Carman, J. et al., 2022[66]). Through their work, the Ireland EPA and the YPCCC found that the majority of people in Ireland (78%) have moderate knowledge about climate change, and that nearly all of the population (95%) think climate change is happening and that it is caused by human activities to some extent (Leiserowitz, A., Goldberg, M., Carman, J. et al., 2022[66]; Environmental Protection Agency, n.d.[65]). Both reports were extremely well received across the country.
BI continues to be used to identify barriers to and drivers of green behaviour. The Behavioural Economics Team of the Australian Government (BETA) is developing a survey series on the drivers of household behaviours that limit greenhouse gas emissions. BETA previously worked on Energy Labels That Make Cents, an RCT in which they tested the effect of appliance energy rating labels (Behavioural Economics Team of the Australian Government, 2018[67]). The study found that the presence of energy labels had a positive effect on consumer behaviour when compared to the scenario with no energy labels. Similarly, in Canada, PARCA also aims to understand barriers and drivers of green behaviour through in-field studies that aim to understand whether solutions that positively influence intentions lead to real behaviour changes (Impact Canada Initiative, 2024[64]).
The Danish Competition and Consumer Authority recently conducted an online experiment to test different climate labels in a supermarket setting. The first label was a “best-in-class” label (BIC), awarded to products in different categories with emissions below a specific threshold. The second label was a scale label, assigning every product a label with a letter (A to E) and a colour (green to red) based on a uniform scale. The experiment demonstrated that neither label had immediate effect on consumers’ choices, likely due to a failure of the labels to accurately represent magnitudes of difference. However, the scale label did help consumers identify the most climate-friendly option, unlike the BIC label. This highlights that even when labels are noticed and understood, they may still fail to influence consumer decisions. Therefore, when designing labels, agencies must seek to effectively capture attention and communicate clearly, while also considering how simplification may influence consumers’ evaluation.
Moving forward, the green transition requires individuals, businesses, and governments to change their behaviours. Indeed, it is estimated that demand-side measures, including behavioural changes, can reduce emissions by 40 to 70% across sectors (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2022[68]). As governments increasingly integrate behavioural science in green policies, this presents with many opportunities in terms of:
Mainstreaming behavioural science for policymaking. A key prerequisite for governments to be able to effectively apply behavioural science to green policies, is for them to be able to rely on robust behavioural science expertise and governance. The OECD 2024 LOGIC report on mainstreaming behavioural public policy (OECD, 2024[69]) identifies opportunities for action in terms of Leadership, Objectives, Governance, Integration, and Capability.
Behavioural science for societal transformation to Net-Zero. A forthcoming study will present best practices for policymakers to stimulate behaviour change in favour of the green transition. This will draw on case studies from the BI Network and its Government Working Group on Citizen Climate Attitudes, and will aim to provide a matrix for policymakers to prioritise behavioural interventions based on impact and context.
4.3.9. Build capacities to anticipate and prioritise climate-related risks and co-ordinate whole-of-society preparedness, including by incorporating climate change into national risk assessments
The OECD 2022 RDI report had identified the role of risk governance to anticipate and prioritise climate related risks and the role of co-ordinated whole of society preparedness. Attribution studies report that climate change is a key contributing factor to the severity and extent of recent large-scale wildfire incidents (OECD, 2021[70]). In recent years, countries in many of the worst hit areas by wildfire across the globe have recorded a combination of record high summer temperatures and drought conditions in the lead up to these extreme events (OECD, 2023[71]). Across the OECD, this was the case in countries as diverse as Spain, Portugal, Greece, Chile, the United States, Canada and Australia. Over the past twenty years, government risk management efforts across OECD countries have succeeded in reducing industrial accidents at an average year on year rate of 1.12%. By comparison, disasters linked to natural hazards have been growing at more than twice this rate). In other words, while human knowledge and skills to reduce disasters are improving, the rise in intensity and frequency of natural hazards exacerbated by impacts of climate change more than obscure this progress.
Source: OECD calculation using data from EM-DAT: The Emergency Events Database (2023) www.emdat.be.
Given this challenging context, governments have an opportunity to leverage national risk assessments to further enhance action on addressing risk drivers, exposures and vulnerabilities across all levels of government and involving the whole of society. The opportunities are highlighted by the Report on the Implementation of the OECD Recommendation on the Governance of critical risks [C(2023)163] Building preparedness for extreme events and crises through evidence-backed risk assessments is an essential component of improving countries’ abilities to anticipate the complex and wide-ranging impacts of climate change. The report shows that governments have been increasingly taking steps to enhance risk governance functions. They have designated lead institutions to co-ordinate joined up efforts between ministries and agencies, aligning priorities and fostering co-operation between governmental and non-governmental organisations [C(2023)163]. Recent results show that as of 2022, most OECD countries had implemented processes to assess significant disaster risks, with an increasing number integrating the potential implications of extreme natural hazards into these assessments (see Figure 4.10).
Source: 2022 OECD Questionnaire on Governance of Critical Risks.
A large proportion of the national strategies on governance of critical risks include references to priority topics, such as climate change adaptation, tackling mis/ disinformation, and security of supply of essential goods. In terms of good practice examples, , the United Kingdom includes explicit in efforts their National Security Risk Assessment to consider the chronic vulnerabilities and challenges that arise from global challenges such as climate change (Government of the United Kingdom, 2023[72]). Canada accompanies their strategy with an action plan that outlines implementation outcomes for priorities areas that include enhancing whole-of-society collaboration and governance to strengthen resilience and improving the understanding of disaster risks in all sectors of society (Government of Canada, 2024[73]).
As countries have now fully emerged from the COVID pandemic, they need to continue aligning their forward-looking risk assessments to confront the broader structural challenges presented by climate change and climate induced extreme events, and also to nurture a greater focus on ex ante prevention. This needs to be supported by leadership at the highest level, as is for example the case in Canada, with the appointment of Minister of Emergency Preparedness. There is also a need for specific attention to issues such as extreme wildfires and rising costs of floods which calls for a co-ordinated and proactive approach to facilitate prevention. For example, in Portugal, the Government has created a specific structure attached to the Prime Minister to co-ordinate the prevention of wildfires, AGIF, in 20217, and in the context of TSI EC project, the OECD is currently reviewing the effectiveness and the lessons that can be drawn from this important experience. There are also wider opportunities to leverage open science and data-driven decision making to better inform on potential climate risks. A good practice example is offered by France's DRIAS portal, to communicate climate risks and prompt mitigation and adaptation actions.
4.4.1. Collect data and improve reporting on the environmental footprint of government real property and operations, including GHG emissions
While acknowledging the role of greening by example, the OECD 2022 RDI report also acknowledged that governments were only starting to collect data about the environmental implications of their ecological footprint. Individual public agencies have targets for the use of energy, water, paper, etc., but the ability to track overall carbon emissions or other environmental hazards is not widely established. This is why the Action Plan called for collecting data in this area. This can include key indicators, such as carbon emissions, to compare regional authorities, municipalities and government agencies (both with each other and over time) and which will help focus the attention of decision makers and the wider public.
The OECD engaged with procurement experts on these issues in 2023 to discuss the different methodological approaches developed by countries to measure the carbon footprint of public procurement. To date, there are only a few countries that have developed measurement systems to keep track of the carbon footprint of public purchases. Initiatives shared by countries revealed promising efforts but also displayed systemic limitations of current methodologies. For example, as part of its commitment to reach an emission free vehicle fleet, the New Zealand Government Procurement had set up a dashboard that uses vehicle registration data from the New Zealand Transport Agency to track vehicle purchased and disposed by government agencies. With this method it is possible to monitor the emissions saved from the procurement of e-vehicles vs. non-electric vehicles. However, it does not consider the actual usage of the vehicles, making the results only indicative. The government of Canada estimates the embodied carbon footprint of the goods and services purchased by its central procurement organisations. The model uses average emissions based on the amount spent in each category, making this method not adequate to measure the effect of specific green public procurement choices.
These discussions evidenced limitations in terms of available procurement data which is not granular enough to provide information on specific characteristics of products and services purchased by public organisations. Data in e-Procurement systems often do not cover the entire procurement cycle, notably actual consumption under contracts. Procurement data alone cannot depict the carbon footprint of public procurement strategies as these need to be linked with credible and verified emissions data. There is also potential to connect those discussions with current efforts to obtain granular product level carbon intensity metrics that are currently developed for some of the emissions intensive trade-exposed sectors and are currently being expanded as part of the OECD Inclusive Forum for Carbon Mitigation Approaches (IFCMA). (OECD, 2024[74])
4.4.2. Develop whole-of-public-sector strategies to promote green operations and the achievement of climate and environmental goals, targeting government assets and real property, services, and procurement of goods and services, and aligning internal operation policies with these goals, while enhancing public sector operations for adaptation
The OECD 2022 RDI report highlighted the importance of public sector operations to achieve the green transition. To fully realise the environmental benefits of government purchasing power, a comprehensive whole-of-government approach is crucial due to the decentralised nature of procurement spending in OECD countries, with sub-national governments accounting for an average of 63%. Establishing strategies or regulatory frameworks aligning procurement practices with environmental goals is critical for policy coherence. While OECD countries generally have frameworks to promote environmental objectives in procurement, efforts remain to be done. Indeed, public tenders should consider lifecycle costs and environmental impacts to incentivise green competition from the private sector. Early market engagement, co-ordinated governance mechanisms, and accountability are also key to addressing climate change.
Countries have been active in this area as highlighted by the results of the OECD 2022 Green Public Procurement survey covering 38 countries, including 4 non-members, which became available in 2023 (OECD, 2023[38]). Besides Green Public Procurement (GPP) discussed earlier, the survey also helps to understand the coherence of public procurement framework with climate related strategies. In fact, 27 out of the 34 countries that have a GPP, have a -specific policy or strategic framework that refers to GPP or public procurement in their national environmental commitments. For example, Japan includes its national GPP policy in its Plan for Global Warming Countermeasures and National Action Plan. Similarly, Canada recognises GPP as an important means to achieve its net-zero emissions target by 2050.
To ensure alignment with their commitments on climate action, most of the surveyed countries revise GPP policies on a regular basis. More than half (22 out of 38, or 53%) of them have updated their GPP framework in the past three years to target high-impact sectors and accelerate the transition towards more sustainable productions patterns Furthermore, and considering the expertise needed to define ambitious and coherent objectives in GPP policies, public procurement authorities in all OECD countries rely on other government bodies including on ministries of environment or similar agencies to formally co-ordinate GPP and broader environmental policies, thereby reinforcing the role of GPP in implementing their environmental objectives. Countries sometimes also rely on inter-ministerial or ad hoc working groups convening different stakeholders. In the United States, the alignment between GPP and environmental policies is assigned to the Executive Office of the President. In France, the General Commission for Sustainable Development, an inter-ministerial delegation for sustainable development, is responsible for steering the National Sustainable Procurement Plan (PNAD) 2022-2025.
These recent trends show that countries have been moving away from the traditional transaction-centric view of public procurement to integrate broader climate objectives. Procurement is now recognised as a strategic instrument to advance environmental policy goals. As a result, strengthening collaboration among key stakeholders is imperative to ensure that procurement and a greener public sector can effectively contribute to government’s climate commitments. Many surveyed countries have already initiated such collaboration, and its importance is expected to increase further in the future.
4.4.3. Implement climate-friendly work arrangements and systems for the public sector workforce
The OECD 2022 RDI report identified the need to promote a “Green Ethos” in the public service. The public sector, as the largest employer in most OECD member countries, wields significant influence in implementing climate-friendly work arrangements and systems. OECD member countries increasingly prioritise leveraging flexible working arrangements, office space configurations, and leadership practices to lead by example. The human resources (HR) function is also called upon to rethink policies related to remote work or travel. In addition, HR function are also often responsible issues related to corporate social responsibility, such as the organisation of selective sorting, providing sustainable food options at the workplace, or encouraging green mobility alternatives.
Looking back at countries’ experience in recent years, climate friendly work arrangements were rather prompted by the need to adapt to the COVID-19 pandemic, which then people realised also had the potential for reducing emissions in public administrations. Remote work, previously used occasional in most countries, is now available to a majority of public servants in 61% of OECD member countries and is allowed to some extent in all OECD member countries (OECD, 2023[75]). This "new normal" presents an opportunity for public administrations to reconsider their carbon footprint. Indeed, the widespread adoption of remote flexible working arrangements has led to a decrease in office usage. Recent OECD survey data shows that 39% of OECD countries have plans to make greater use of flexible office designs, and 31% create interdepartmental shared spaces. Additionally, 28% of member countries are developing strategies to reduce the office space of public administrations, with which helps to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
The next step is to ensure that the remaining office space undergo transformation to promote energy efficiency. Central government buildings produce an important share of the greenhouse gases emitted produced by public administrations. Throughout the European Union, Directive EU/2023/1791 mandates member States to renovate at least 3% of the total floor areas of heated and/or cooled buildings owned and occupied by public bodies, to transform them into nearly zero-energy buildings or zero-emission buildings. On top of having a positive impact on their carbon footprint, such work has the potential to significantly diminish public administrations’ energy bills and improve workplace experiences.
Public administrations' carbon footprint is also related to corporate travel and other services. For instance, the shift to online meetings and conferences across OECD member countries has curbed the need for commuting and travel. For example, Austria has undertaken various other initiatives to promote sustainable mobility and alter civil service attitudes, implementing measures such as a climate ticket reimbursed by public service employers for all public transportation use within the country while discontinuing subsidies for car commuting. Additionally, Austria aims to reduce short-distance flights by encouraging train travel whenever feasible.
Finally, attitudes taken by leadership can contribute to identifying governing green as a strategic priority. For instance, leaders can signal the importance of green initiatives by launching and conducting management and audit schemes related to the green transition. Such schemes can help improve the environmental performance of administrations themselves. The Eco-Management and Audit Schemes (EMAS), developed by the European Commission, helps organisations improve their environmental performance, by looking amongst others at energy and material efficiency, waste, and emissions. Engagement in such schemes contributes to improved performance, transparency, and credibility of organisations. As of November 2023, over 300 public administrations out of 4 000 organisations from across the European Union are registered participants in the EMAS database (EMAS, 2023[76]).
The last set of actions concerns the capital stock, which will require more longer term action, as ultimately, the carbon footprint of public administrations also arises from building infrastructure. While climate-friendly work arrangements are evolving and are being implemented across OECD member countries, ambitious renovation programmes and policies promoting eco-friendly transportation options will also help public administrations adapt to ongoing climate challenges affecting all segments of society.
4.4.4. Strengthen the resilience of the public sector workforce, ensuring continuity of operations and business during disruptions
Public sector organisations’ resilience is essential to maintain public services and adapt to fast changing circumstances that may challenge business and operations. Earlier OECD work on the future of the public service suggests some elements which contribute to resilient public servants include wellness, motivation and commitment to mission, anticipation and foresight, creative problem solving, learning agility, and systems thinking and collaboration (OECD, 2021[77]).
A wealth of experiences is offered by a recent OECD EC supported project, using a Common Action Framework at European level, and engaging with ten EU Member States. The results show that organisational resilience depended on many things, but central to them all is the workforce. (OECD, 2023[78]). The case studies conducted for the project showed how managers in resilient organisations ensured that individual workers were themselves resilient. In many cases, public employees had to drastically change their work, working habits and environments, all the while keeping healthy and motivated. Personal resilience is a complex construct that will be different for each person, but is intrinsically related to health and wellbeing, as well as motivation and engagement. Investing in these skills and capabilities requires HR systems that are aligned and forward looking.
Resilience also requires organisations to develop learning cultures that promote the development of resilient employees and encourage employees to learn and grow throughout their career. However, recent results show that only 25% of OECD countries intentionally target resilience in their learning strategies (and only 10% at the senior levels) (OECD, 2023[75]). The COVID pandemic helped create an impetus to move learning online. Indeed almost all OECD countries have online learning platforms for their civil servants, although the use of many of the more advanced technologies, like AI remain exploratory. One example is Korea’s new e-learning platform which uses the latest technology to provide a platform for learning and sharing across the public service, where public servants can be learning and teachers.
Health and wellbeing is an important element of resilience. This starts with prevention to ensure the work environment is healthy, and continues by ensuring appropriate access to medical help, including mental health. It also means that employees should have access to the right kind of leave and support, to minimise disruptions and return to work healthy as quickly as possible, for which the COVID related experience remains fundamental. Belgium’s National Employment Office, for example, established a single point of contact for their wellbeing@work initiative in each division which co-ordinated information and measures during the COVID crisis. In Spain, Madrid Salud had to implement a wide range of measures to protect the health of frontline workers who could not stay home during the pandemic. This included revisiting the role of essential emergency workers and the contributions they were best placed to make, providing the right kinds of health protections, and managing simultaneously for higher levels of sick leave and burnout (OECD, 2023[78]).
Leadership and management cultures are also fundamental to workforce resilience. Some good practices that were put into place during the pandemic in many organisations included pulse surveys to get a feel for employees’ relative levels of stress and engagement, and more regular and deliberate check in sessions to give employees opportunities to support each other in their stress. These are likely important elements to continue when building a resilient workforce in the future.
Furthermore, resilient workforces depend on the resilience of the HR management systems, which require agility to respond to crises. For example, resilient HR systems ensured that people continued working even if they could no longer be present in the office or work in the same configurations as before. For many this meant flexibility in work location and in working time. The study showed that organisations that were equipped to provide both of these forms of flexibility were more resilient and prepared. Most public sector organisations found ways to implement these kinds of flexibilities although some more quickly than others. Anecdotal evidence suggests that countries which already had significant experience with flexible working methods found the adaptation to be less challenging. A recent OECD survey also shows how 65% of OECD countries provide additional guidance on the use of flexible working methods, including charters that clearly identify the expectations of employees and their managers so as clarify some of the grey areas around this kind of working (OECD, 2023[75]).
Resilient HR systems also need to be able to match employee skills with demand while that demand is changing significantly. This requires many elements to be in place – first a good understanding of the skills available in the organisations’ workforce, and second the conditions and systems in place to facilitate job mobility. Case studies of the Sofia Regional Health Inspectorate and Thessaloniki Municipality conducted for the project show how this happened more naturally in smaller organisations. However, many national public services were slower to identify the need and put the right mobility mechanisms in place. Recent work on this also shows how mobility systems are under-used by most OECD countries. For example, only 40% of OECD countries recommend or require employees to systematically change jobs throughout their career, while only 31% of countries explicitly promote mobility as a priority of public service management (OECD, 2023[75]). The Report contains many tips and insights, including a Strategic Mobility Framework, to help guide countries in finding the right balance of mobility supported by the right policy instruments.
As a result, a resilience focus suggests opportunities to put in place HR policies that focus on 2 areas - boosting the resilience of individual public servants and ensuring the HR system itself is resilient to unforeseen shocks and crises. HR functions can support the resilience of the public service by reinforcing “resilience skills” such as creative problem solving, foresight, systems thinking, and learning agility. They can also update health and wellbeing policies and service to ensure that public servants are available to work. Learning cultures and reskilling strategies are also essential in the public service, to ensure that all public servants can develop new skills quickly to respond to fast changing circumstance. To ensure resilient HR systems, governments can embed new forms of flexible working to enable public servants to work from anywhere, any time; and they can invest in new mobility tools to quickly align skills demand with supply. This fundamentally requires deep consideration of the role and structure of the HR function in crisis management, likely investment in new HR skills, and the transformation of organisational HR models in the public service.
4.4.5. Invest in sustainable and green digital infrastructure for the public sector to reduce CO2 emissions and public sector’s demand for natural resources (i.e. scarce minerals) and enhance adaptation to climate change, and take action to address the potential environmental impact of public sector digital and data infrastructure
The OECD 2022 RDI report clearly identified the need for designing greener public services in the digital age. Countries are faced with the triple challenge of making public sector digital infrastructure more resilient, reducing infrastructure-related emissions, and meeting an increasing demand for digital infrastructure to support government operations and services. These challenges call for renewed policies and actions to secure sustainable and green digital infrastructure for the public sector. However, uncertainties arising from rapidly evolving technologies and climate change create a challenge for planning infrastructure assets with specific hurdles for digital infrastructure. These include higher temperatures that necessitate equipment cooling, leading to increased electricity consumption, extreme weather events that expose digital infrastructure to damage and power outages, and new dependencies on natural resources, such as scarce minerals. There is also a resilience angle to this discussion, given the critical role of digital infrastructure in ensuring digital government service continuity in the face of major weather-related events.
OECD countries have been active in this area in recent years. For example, the United Kingdom established a policy paper titled "Greening government: ICT and digital services strategy 2020-2025” (Government of the United Kingdom, 2020[79]). The Danish Agency for Governmental IT Services “Strategy 2023-2026,” includes a strategic pillar on “Climate-friendly and sustainable IT”, covering the establishment of a high-tech and energy-efficient data centre for government IT operations and green procurement (Danish Agency for Governmental IT Services, 2023[80]). In Australia, the Government has strengthened the requirements of its panel arrangement for data centres, ensuring that any new data centre contracts include sustainability measures and mandatory reporting on energy efficiency (DTA, 2023[81]).
OECD governments have also developed specific tools to support green digital procurement, including standardised sustainability criteria and requirements which can be incorporated by public buyers into public procurement tenders. For example, the European Commission has developed green criteria and requirements for two ICT categories (personal devices and data centres and cloud services) (European Commission, n.d.[82]) and Ireland has published criteria for ICT products and services in an online tool that allows users to find, select and download criteria relevant to their specific procurement (Government of Ireland, n.d.[83]). Similarly, Germany’s Guide on Green Public Procurement of Software which presents criteria for sustainable software and proposes methods for their implementation in public tenders (German Environmental Agency, 2020[84]). Many OECD countries have also developed relevant goals and targets in their broader infrastructure plans to promote environmentally sustainable infrastructure (OECD, 2023[85]).
With demand for digital government services increasing, energy and resource efficient digital infrastructure in the public sector is vital. As is the case for infrastructure in general, Nature-based Solutions (NbS) offer innovative, cost-effective opportunities for improving the environmental performance of digital infrastructure assets and services. For example, renewable energy solutions can help design and build energy efficient and sustainable data centres. Other strategies to lower emissions from ICT infrastructure include e-waste recycling. In 2020, Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada initiated a challenge for a solution to enable government departments to recycle e-waste plastics and metals10. Ignoring the value of natural resources such as scarce minerals may lead to overexploitation of natural assets and ecosystems or unbalanced policy and investment decisions. Methodologies for financial valuation of natural assets are increasingly being used across OECD countries as 14 out of 28 countries either already have in place such methodologies or are in the process of developing them (OECD, 2022[49]).
Public procurement also has a role to play to take a more strategic approach to digital investment, including to evaluate environmental risks and impact and choose more sustainable digital solutions, as discussed in general above as part of Green Public Procurement. However, only 27% of OECD countries are evaluating the environmental impact of digital government. A greater focus on environmental impacts as part of the strategic management of digital government investments could help, as 33% of OECD countries assess environmental impact when developing the value proposition for a digital project and only 12% are considering environmental risks in the risk management of their digital projects (OECD, 2024[86]). Countries could also do more to measure the results of digital procurement with respect to green objectives. For digital projects, only 18% of OECD countries apply a common methodology for evaluating the environmental impact of digital projects on government, citizens, and businesses (OECD, 2024[86]).
Systematic evaluation of general infrastructure projects’ environmental and climate impact brings to light key considerations, risks, and mitigation strategies, which facilitate better decision making in both current and future digital infrastructure projects. Such monitoring and mitigation measures could inform planning and design of infrastructure with lower environmental and climate impact. This is equally relevant for digital infrastructure considering its resource consumption and carbon footprint. Over half of OECD countries (15 out of 26 or 57%) use mechanisms to monitor and mitigate environmental and climate impact throughout operation, maintenance, and possible decommissioning of infrastructure assets (OECD, 2022[49]). For example, France has launched a methodological guide to assess the impacts of infrastructure projects on GHG emissions. The guide proposes an avoid-reduce-compensate (ERC) sequence throughout construction, operation and decommissioning of infrastructure assets, which is required for infrastructure projects for which GHG emissions are quantified and significant impacts are identified. It illustrates examples of ERC measures at different stages of life cycle and recommends monitoring their progress as well as effectiveness (OECD, 2023[87]).
Looking ahead to the future, technologies will continue to change and demand for digital government services increase exponentially. Planning for digital infrastructure in the public sector has to remain flexible and adaptive to reduce the costs of irreversibility. The OECD is currently surveying countries on the use of InfraTech solutions such as Building Information Modelling (BIM), digital twins and robotics and unmanned aerial vehicles to monitor performance of infrastructure assets over the life cycle.
4.5.1. Working collectively through the OECD
Actively supporting countries in terms of governing green, contributing from a public governance perspective to the Net Zero+ horizontal project.
Engaged to support countries in steering and building consensus and trust for delivering green: collect of information on engaging with citizen, including young people, and facilitative deliberative democracy mechanisms to support the green transitions. forthcoming working paper on “Applying Open Government Approaches to Engage Citizens in the Green Transition”.
Engaged with the private sector on these issues, building on corporate social responsibility initiative, as part of the Getting Influence Right Initiative.
Engaged with centres of government through the report on Steering responses to climate change from the centre of government (Kaur et al., 2023[25]).
Engaged through PGC, SBO and RPC communities on how to use the right tools for climate and environmental action: Green budgeting: a way forward” (Blazey and Lelong, 2022[88]), “Better regulation for the green transition Toolkit” (OECD, 2023[46]). Understanding and applying the precautionary principle in the green transition (OECD, 2023[89]). The OECD Paris Collaborative on Green Budgeting has offered a multidimensional platform for public officials from finance, environmental ministries and independent fiscal institutions to develop innovative tools and common methodologies.
Currently developing Infrastructure Governance Indicators (IGI) to monitor how countries ensure asset performance throughout its life.
Leveraging the OECD multidisciplinary Mission Action Lab to explore how mission governance frameworks – i.e., the design and implementation of organisational structures and processes to enable broad government efforts towards specific and timebound objectives – can help governments reach climate transition outcomes.
Created a Working Group on Citizen Climate Attitudes and Behaviours, as part of its network of Behavioural Insights Experts in Government.
Green focus in country reviews: the 2023 Public Governance Monitor of Sweden (OECD, 2023[90]) focus on “Enhancing government Capabilities to address climate change”. The 2023 Public Governance Review of the Czech Republic (OECD, 2023[91]) focus on “Whole of Government efforts to address climate change”. The 2023 policy paper on “Co-ordination of green policies at the centre of government in Romania” (OECD, 2024[92]).
Drafting new principles for responsible lobbying and corporate political engagement as part of “getting influence right”, with guidelines on transparency and integrity in climate.
4.5.2. Conclusions and priorities for the future
Countries have been using a variety of policy tools to ensure that government actions align with green objectives, including green budgeting, green public procurement, regulatory impact assessment and others. Governments are also monitoring and reducing their own greenhouse gas emissions and environmental footprint. Some countries are investing in participatory mechanisms and engaging with civil society in order to build consensus on green policies and strengthen trust in governments’ ability to manage the green transition. Countries are also reinforcing cross-sectoral co-ordination and monitoring mechanisms.
However, countries continue to be presented with great challenges in terms of designing effective policy measures that balance intersectoral trade-offs and intergenerational equity, and more remains to be done for governments to accelerate the transition to a green economy. In a democratic context, governments need to empower public understanding and support for policies that have a direct impact on citizens in their daily life. They will need to continue investing in their tools and taking them to the next strategic level, including permitting for green infrastructure, mobilising procurement more strategically, and mobilising the right evidence to inform policy choices and trade-offs.
The Reinforcing Democracy Initiative will support governments in managing a citizen-centred green transition, as well as fostering public support and active citizen engagement. It will also advance analysis and guidance on encouraging citizen participation, shaping social norms for behavioural change, reducing public administrations emissions, and consolidating governance structures that align with climate goals. Furthermore, it will support countries in ensuring that governments are equipped with strong evidence and are able to mobilise it at the right time and in the right format to enable evidence informed policymaking in this complex area.
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← 1. The Republic of Türkiye interprets the marginalised groups in line with its own national legislation.
← 2. The Sustainable Development Goals are a set of 17 goals adopted by all United Nations Member States in 2015. They recognise that ending poverty and other deprivations must go hand-in-hand with strategies that improve health and education, reduce inequality, and tackle climate change (United Nations, n.d.[93]).
← 3. Global competence is a multidimensional capacity. Globally competent public servants understand the interactions between local and global policy issues, understand and appreciate different (intercultural) perspectives and world views, interact successfully with others (including in international forums), and take responsible action toward sustainability and collective well-being. To this end, global competencies can relate closely to a subcategory of green skills.
← 4. Data are derived from the 2022 OECD Green Budgeting Survey, encompassing responses from 36 OECD countries and referring only to central/federal government practices as of end-June 2022. Respondents were predominantly budget officials within central budget authorities. Responses represent the country’s own assessment of current practices and procedures.
← 5. The 2022 OECD Green Budgeting Index is based on the four building blocks of the OECD Green Budgeting Framework, each with an equal weight (0.25). The index ranges from 0 (not implementing) to 1 (high level of green budgeting practices). Country green budgeting practice scores were determined by adding together the weighted scores of each building block, varying from 0 to 1. The variables comprising the index were selected by OECD experts based on the relevance to the concept and these have been reviewed by county delegates to the OECD Paris Collaborative on Green Budgeting.
← 6. The Republic of Türkiye interprets the marginalised groups in line with its own national legislation.
← 7. See bullet above in this chapter on engagement and giving a voice to under-represented and indigenous groups (where applicable).
← 8. The Republic of Türkiye interprets the marginalised groups in line with its own national legislation.
← 9. The full report, “Leveraging EU missions in Austria: Assessing Progress Using a Novel OECD Mission Monitoring Tool” can be found here: (OECD, 2023[94]).
← 10. Plastics challenge: E-waste (Government of Canada, 2020[95]).