[80] Adam, I. and M. Fazekas (2018), “Are emerging technologies helping win the fight against corruption in developing countries?”, Background Paper Series, No. 21, Pathways for Prosperity Commission, Oxford UK, https://pathwayscommission.bsg.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2019-09/are_emerging_technologies_helping_win_the_fight_against_corruption_in_developing_countries.pdf (accessed on 20 September 2023).
[58] AIE (2023), Critical Minerals Market Review 2023, Agencia Internacional de la Energía, https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/afc35261-41b2-47d4-86d6-d5d77fc259be/CriticalMineralsMarketReview2023.pdf (accessed on 10 October 2023).
[60] AIE (2023), Energy Technology Perspectives 2023, Agencia Internacional de la Energía.
[56] AIE (2021), The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions, Agencia Internacional de la Energía, https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-minerals-in-clean-energy-transitions (accessed on 10 October 2023).
[95] Australian Department of Home Affairs (2023), Defining Foreign Interference, https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/about-us/our-portfolios/national-security/countering-foreign-interference/defining-foreign-interference (accessed on 10 October 2023).
[67] Australian Financial Review (2023), “Meet the mining lobby boss leading critical minerals charge”, https://www.afr.com/companies/mining/meet-the-mining-lobby-boss-leading-critical-minerals-charge-20230525-p5dba5 (accessed on 25 September 2023).
[40] Baum, A. et al. (2019), “Governance and State-Owned Enterprises: How Costly is Corruption?”, IMF Working Papers, Vol. 2019/253, https://doi.org/10.5089/9781513519296.001.
[20] Benamouzig, D. and J. Cortinas Muñoz (2019), “Les stratégies politiques des entreprises en santé publique : le cas de l’agroalimentaire en France”, Revue française des affaires sociales 3, pp. 189-208, https://doi.org/10.3917/rfas.193.0189.
[69] Bloomberg (2023), “Copper’s Fight for Critical Mineral Status Gets Political Push”, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-02-01/copper-industry-gains-political-allies-in-fight-to-declare-metal-critical-to-us?embedded-checkout=true#xj4y7vzkg (accessed on 10 October 2023).
[10] Bressanelli, E. et al. (2020), Institutions and foreign interferences, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/655290/IPOL_STU(2020)655290_EN.pdf (accessed on 10 August 2023).
[30] Brezis, E. and J. Cariolle (2014), The Revolving Door Indicator: Estimating the distortionary power of the revolving door, U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute.
[78] Business at OECD (s.f.), Stepping up the game: Digital technologies for the promotion of the fight against corruption – a business perspective, https://25159535.fs1.hubspotusercontent-eu1.net/hubfs/25159535/website/documents/pdf/Anti-Corruption/FIN%20Anti-Corruption%20and%20Digital%20Technologies_BUSINESS%20AT%20OECD.pdf?hsCtaTracking=792ac73a-b51e-4d4f-905c-8995849b978b%7Cd9fd58bc-96e7-435a-b2c2-5feac6611147 (accessed on 28 February 2024).
[14] Castro, A., N. Phillips and S. Ansari (2020), “Corporate Corruption: A Review and an Agenda for Future Research”, Academy of Management Annals, Vol. 14/2, pp. 935-968, https://doi.org/10.5465/annals.2018.0156.
[66] CBS News (2022), “New documents show top Trump officials disregarded concerns by State Dept. staff in relaxing sanctions on Israeli “Blood Diamond” magnate”, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/dan-gertler-sanctions-trump-officials-israeli-businessman-blood-diamonds-congo/ (accessed on 10 October 2023).
[33] Charon, P. and J. Jeangène Vilmer (2021), Chinese Influence Operations: A Machiavellian Moment, Institute for Strategic Research (IRSEM), Paris.
[2] Cieślik, A. and Ł. Goczek (2018), “Control of corruption, international investment, and economic growth – Evidence from panel data”, World Development, Vol. 103, pp. 323-335, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.10.028.
[93] Comisión Europea (2023), Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing harmonised requirements in the internal market on transparency of interest representation carried out on behalf of third countries and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937, https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2023-12/COM_2023_637_2_EN_ACT_part1_v4.pdf (accessed on 15 December 2023).
[89] Conley, H. et al. (2016), The Kremlin Playbook: Understanding Russian Influence in Central and Eastern Europe, Rowman and Littlefield, London.
[50] Conway, D. and B. Hermann (2021), Dealing with corruption in adopting and implementing carbon taxes, U4, https://www.u4.no/publications/dealing-with-corruption-in-adopting-and-implementing-carbon-tax.pdf (accessed on 1 October 2023).
[47] Conway, E. and N. Oreskes (2010), Merchants of Doubt, Bloomsbury, London.
[51] Correctiv (2022), The Gazprom Lobby: How Russia enlisted German politicians, business leaders and lawyers to ensure German dependence on Russian gas, https://correctiv.org/en/latest-stories/2022/10/07/gazprom-lobby-germany/ (accessed on 4 March 2024).
[23] Crepaz, M. (2020), “To inform, strategise, collaborate, or compete: what use do lobbyists make of lobby registers?”, European Political Science Review, Vol. 12/3, pp. 347-369, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755773920000156.
[92] EEAS (2023), 1st EEAS Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Threats Towards a framework for networked defence, European External Action Service.
[59] EITI (2023), Race to renewables: Tackling corruption and integrity risks in the renewable energy sector, Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, https://eiti.org/sites/default/files/2023-11/EITI_Report_Race%20to%20renewables.pdf (accessed on 19 March 2024).
[70] Europol (2022), Environmental crime in the age of climate change: 2022 threat assessment, Europol, https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/Environmental%20Crime%20in%20the%20Age%20of%20Climate%20Change%20-%20Public%20report_5.pdf (accessed on 28 February 2024).
[64] Friends of the Earth (2023), Mining the Depths of Influence: How industry is forging the EU Critical Raw Materials Act, https://friendsoftheearth.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/Mining-the-depths-of-influence.pdf (accessed on 10 October 2023).
[35] Graham, N., S. Daub and W. Carroll (2017), Mapping Political Influence: Political Donations and Lobbying by the Fossil Fuel Industry in BC.
[27] Heywood, P. et al. (2017), Integrity and Integrity Management in Public Life, University of Birmingham.
[55] Huter, M. et al. (2018), Revolving Doors and the Fossil Fuel Industry: Time to tackle conflicts of interest in climate policy-making.
[41] IDEA (2014), Funding of Political Parties and Election Campaigns, A Handbook on Political Finance, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance.
[49] Influence Map (2022), Big Oil’s Real Agenda on Climate Change 2022, Influence Map, https://influencemap.org/report/Big-Oil-s-Agenda-on-Climate-Change-2022-19585 (accessed on 1 October 2023).
[52] Influence Map (2022), The EU’s Green Deal vs The Fossil Gas Industry, https://influencemap.org/EN/report/Gas-Lobbying-And-the-EU-Green-Deal-16405 (accessed on 4 March 2024).
[37] Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament (2023), Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament: China, https://isc.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/ISC-China.pdf (accessed on 27 October 2023).
[73] International Public Sector Fraud Forum (2020), International Public Sector Fraud Forum: The use of Artificial Intelligence to Combat Public Sector Fraud, Professional Guidance, International Public Sector Fraud Forum, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/865721/Artificial_intelligence_13_Feb.pdf (accessed on 10 October 2023).
[26] Jenkins, M. (2022), The effectiveness of integrity led anti-corruption interventions, U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute.
[5] Johnston, M. (1999), Public Officials, Private Interests, and Sustainable Democracy: When Politics and Corruption Meet, Peterson Institute for International Economics, https://policycommons.net/artifacts/2206720/3-public-officials-private-interests-and-sustainable-democracy/2963082/ (accessed on 20 February 2024).
[97] Jones, K. (2023), Legal loopholes and the risk of foreign interference, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2023/702575/EXPO_IDA(2023)702575_EN.pdf (accessed on 10 August 2023).
[72] Kotlyar, D. and L. Pop (2021), Automated Risk Analysis of Asset and Interest Declarations of Public Officials: A Technical Guide, Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative, https://star.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/2021-08/Automated%20Risk%20Analysis-publication.pdf (accessed on 10 October 2023).
[31] Lee, K. and H. You (2023), “Bureaucratic Revolving Doors and Interest Group Participation in Policy Making”, The Journal of Politics, Vol. 85/2, pp. 701-717, https://doi.org/10.1086/722340.
[82] Lee, P. (2024), “Synthetic Data and the Future of AI”, 110 Cornell Law Review (Forthcoming), https://ssrn.com/abstract=4722162 (accessed on 4 March 2024).
[96] Levin, D. (2016), “When the Great Power Gets a Vote: The Effects of Great Power Electoral Interventions on Election Results”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 60/2, pp. 189-202, https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqv016.
[3] Mark E. Warren (2014), “The meaning of Corruption in Democracies”, in Heywood, P. (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Political Corruption, Routledge.
[45] McCarthy, N. (2019), “Oil And Gas Giants Spend Millions Lobbying To Block Climate Change Policies”, Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2019/03/25/oil-and-gas-giants-spend-millions-lobbying-to-block-climate-change-policies-infographic/?sh=7ac2858e7c4f (accessed on 10 October 2023).
[21] Mialon, M., B. Swinburn and G. Sacks (2015), “A proposed approach to systematically identify and monitor the corporate political activity of the food industry with respect to public health using publicly available information”, Obesity Reviews, Vol. 16/7, pp. 519-530, https://doi.org/10.1111/obr.12289.
[4] Mungiu-Pippidi, A. (2011), Contextual Choices in Fighting Corruption: Lessons Learned, Oslo: Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/256017483_Contextual_Choices_in_Fighting_Corruption_Lessons_Learned (accessed on 20 February 2024).
[88] Murphy, M. (2024), “Biden Audio Deepfake Alarms Experts in Lead-Up to Elections”, Time, https://time.com/6565446/biden-deepfake-audio/ (accessed on 5 February 2024).
[24] Năstase, A. and C. Muurmans (2020), “Regulating lobbying activities in the European Union: A voluntary club perspective”, Regulation & Governance, Vol. 14/2, pp. 238-255, https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12200.
[87] Nay, J. (2023), Large Language Models as Lobbyists, https://law.stanford.edu/2023/01/06/large-language-models-as-lobbyists/ (accessed on 22 February 2024).
[84] NY Times (2023), “How ChatGPT Hijacks Democracy”, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/15/opinion/ai-chatgpt-lobbying-democracy.html (accessed on 19 September 2023).
[7] OCDE (2024), Indicadores de Integridad Pública de la OCDE, https://data-explorer.oecd.org/ (accessed on 18 March 2024).
[81] OCDE (2023), “Advancing accountability in AI: Governing and managing risks throughout the lifecycle for trustworthy AI”, OECD Digital Economy Papers, No. 349, OECD Publishing, París, https://doi.org/10.1787/2448f04b-en.
[44] OCDE (2023), Government at a Glance 2023, OECD Publishing, París, https://doi.org/10.1787/3d5c5d31-en.
[57] OCDE (2023), Responsible is reliable – How responsible sourcing can address disruption factors and geopolitical risks in the supply of transition minerals, OCDE, París, https://mneguidelines.oecd.org/duediligence/Responsible_is_Reliable.pdf (accessed on 10 October 2023).
[74] OCDE (2023), Tax Administration 2023: Comparative Information on OECD and other Advanced and Emerging Economies, OECD Publishing, París, https://doi.org/10.1787/900b6382-en.
[6] OCDE (2022), Building Trust to Reinforce Democracy: Main Findings from the 2021 OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions, Building Trust in Public Institutions, OECD Publishing, París, https://doi.org/10.1787/b407f99c-en.
[90] OCDE (2022), “Declaration on Building Trust and Reinforcing Democracy”, OECD Legal Instruments, OECD/LEGAL/0484, OCDE, París, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0484.
[53] OCDE (2022), “Governing Green: Gearing up government to deliver on climate and other environmental challenges”, in Building Trust and Reinforcing Democracy: Preparing the Ground for Government Action, OECD Publishing, París, https://doi.org/10.1787/45cc57a7-en.
[42] OCDE (2022), The Protection and Promotion of Civic Space: Strengthening Alignment with International Standards and Guidance, OECD Publishing, París, https://doi.org/10.1787/d234e975-en.
[8] OCDE (2021), Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning and Big Data in Finance: Opportunities, Challenges, and Implications for Policy Makers, OCDE, París, https://www.oecd.org/finance/artificial-intelligence-machine-learning-big-data-in-finance.htm (accessed on 10 October 2023).
[62] OCDE (2021), Frequently Asked Questions: How to address bribery and corruption risks in mineral supply chains, OCDE, París, https://mneguidelines.oecd.org/faq-how-to-address-bribery-and-corruption-risks-in-mineral-supply-chains.pdf (accessed on 10 October 2023).
[15] OCDE (2021), Government at a Glance 2021, OECD Publishing, París, https://doi.org/10.1787/1c258f55-en.
[71] OCDE (2021), La Lucha contra el Fraude en las Subvenciones Públicas en España: Aprendizaje Automático para Evaluar los Riesgos y Orientar las Actividades de Control, Estudios de la OCDE sobre Gobernanza Pública, OECD Publishing, París, https://doi.org/10.1787/6a4ab581-es.
[19] OCDE (2021), Lobbying in the 21st Century: Transparency, Integrity and Access, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/c6d8eff8-en.
[77] OCDE (2021), OECD Business and Finance Outlook 2021: AI in Business and Finance, OECD Publishing, París, https://doi.org/10.1787/ba682899-en.
[12] OCDE (2020), Manual de la OCDE sobre Integridad Pública, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/8a2fac21-es.
[79] OCDE (2019), Analytics for Integrity: Data-Driven Approaches for Enhancing Fraud and Corruption Risk Assessments, OCDE, París, https://www.oecd.org/gov/ethics/analytics-for-integrity.pdf (accessed on 20 September 2023).
[39] OCDE (2019), Guidelines on Anti-corruption and Integrity in State-Owned Enterprises, OCDE, París, https://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/Guidelines-Anti-Corruption-Integrity-State-Owned-Enterprises.pdf (accessed on 12 October 2023).
[9] OCDE (2019), “Recommendation of the Council on Artificial Intelligence”, OECD Legal Instruments, OECD/LEGAL/0449, OCDE, París, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0449.
[29] OCDE (2018), Contra la captura de políticas públicas: Integridad en la toma de decisiones públicas, Estudios de la OCDE sobre Gobernanza Pública, OECD Publishing, París, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264306769-es.
[1] OCDE (2018), Investing in Integrity for Productivity, OCDE, París, https://www.oecd.org/gov/ethics/investing-in-integrity-for-productivity.pdf (accessed on 10 August 2023).
[43] OCDE (2017), “Recommendation of the Council on Open Government”, OECD Legal Instruments, OECD/LEGAL/0438, OCDE, París, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0438.
[17] OCDE (2017), “Recommendation of the Council on Public Integrity”, OECD Legal Instruments, OECD/LEGAL/0435, OCDE, París, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0435.
[38] OCDE (2016), Financing Democracy: Funding of Political Parties and Election Campaigns and the Risk of Policy Capture, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, París, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264249455-en.
[28] OCDE (2014), Lobbyists, Governments and Public Trust, Volume 3: Implementing the OECD Principles for Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying, OECD Publishing, París, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264214224-en.
[18] OCDE (2010), “Recommendation of the Council on Principles for Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying”, OECD Legal Instruments, OECD/LEGAL/0379, OCDE, París, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0379.
[25] OCDE (2003), OECD Guidelines for Managing Conflict of Interest in the Public Service, OCDE, París, https://www.oecd.org/gov/ethics/48994419.pdf (accessed on 29 September 2023).
[91] OTAN (s.f.), Countering hybrid threats, Organización del Tratado del Atlántico Norte, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_156338.htm#:~:text=What%20are%20the%20hybrid%20threats,and%20use%20of%20regular%20forces. (accessed on 5 October 2023).
[76] Parycek, P., V. Schmid and A. Novak (2023), “Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Automation in Administrative Procedures: Potentials, Limitations, and Framework Conditions”, Journal of the Knowledge Economy, https://doi.org/10.1007/s13132-023-01433-3.
[65] Politico (2023), “Lobbying ‘frenzy’ follows Biden’s electric car push”, https://www.politico.com/news/2023/04/17/biden-electric-car-lobbying-companies-00091779 (accessed on 10 October 2023).
[54] Pons-Hernández, M. (2022), “Power(ful) Connections: Exploring the Revolving Doors Phenomenon as a Form of State-Corporate Crime”, Critical Criminology, Vol. 30/2, pp. 305-320, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10612-022-09626-z.
[34] Resimić, M. (2022), Grand corruption and climate change policies: Overview of grand corruption evidence in energy transition, biodiversity loss and climate finance, U4, https://www.u4.no/publications/grand-corruption-and-climate-change-policies.pdf (accessed on 25 September 2023).
[86] Sanders, N. and B. Schneier (2023), How AI could write our laws, MIT Technology Review, https://www.technologyreview.com/2023/03/14/1069717/how-ai-could-write-our-laws/ (accessed on 22 February 2024).
[13] Shaheer, N. et al. (2019), “State-Owned Enterprises as Bribe Payers: The Role of Institutional Environment”, Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 159/1, pp. 221-238, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-017-3768-z.
[22] Šimral, V. (2020), “Two problems with lobbying regulations in EEA countries”, Studies of Transition States and Societies, Vol. 12/1, pp. 53-67.
[46] Slowiczek, J. (2022), “Oil and gas heavily outspends clean energy, environmental groups on California lobbying”, Energy News Network, https://energynews.us/2022/03/17/oil-and-gas-heavily-outspends-clean-energy-environmental-groups-on-california-lobbying%EF%BF%BC/ (accessed on 10 October 2023).
[32] Strickland, J. (2023), “The contingent value of connections: legislative turnover and revolving-door lobbyists”, Business and Politics, Vol. 25/2, pp. 152-172, https://doi.org/10.1017/bap.2023.4.
[48] Supran, G. and N. Oreskes (2017), “Assessing ExxonMobil’s climate change communications (1977–2014)”, Environmental Research Letters, Vol. 12/8, p. 084019, https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/aa815f.
[68] The Africa Report (2023), “Glencore launches in-house lobbying as US targets cobalt operations in DRC”, https://www.theafricareport.com/314548/glencore-launches-in-house-lobbying-as-us-targets-cobalt-operations-in-drc/ (accessed on 10 October 2023).
[83] The Royal Commission into the Robodebt Scheme (2023), Royal Commission into the Robodebt Scheme, https://robodebt.royalcommission.gov.au/system/files/2023-09/rrc-accessible-full-report.PDF (accessed on 4 March 2024).
[63] TI (2022), Corruption in Critical Minerals Puts the Energy Transition at Risk, Transparencia Internacional Australia, https://transparency.org.au/corruption-minerals-energy-transition-risk/ (accessed on 10 October 2023).
[61] TI (2017), Corruption Risks in Mining Approvals: A Global Snapshot, Transparencia Internacional.
[75] U4 (s.f.), Exploring artificial intelligence for anti-corruption, https://www.u4.no/publications/artificial-intelligence-a-promising-anti-corruption-tool-in-development-settings/shortversion (accessed on 10 October 2023).
[94] US Department of Homeland Security (2018), Foreign Interference Taxonomy, https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/19_0717_cisa_foreign-influence-taxonomy.pdf (accessed on 10 October 2023).
[36] Vandewalker, I. and L. Norden (2021), “Using Campaign Finance Reform to Protect U.S. Elections from “Dark Money” and Foreign Influence”, in Defending Democracies, Oxford University Press, https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197556979.003.0016.
[85] WFD and POPVOX (2023), How artificial intelligence and large language models may impact transparency, https://www.wfd.org/news/how-artificial-intelligence-and-large-language-models-may-impact-transparency (accessed on 22 February 2024).
[11] Zelikow, P. et al. (2020), “The Rise of Strategic Corruption: How States Weaponize Graft”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 99/4, pp. 107-120.
[16] Zuzana Smidova, Agnès Cavaciuti and Jesper Johnsøn (2022), OECD Public Integrity Indicators – New data on quality of anti-corruption and public integrity strategies – ECOSCOPE, https://oecdecoscope.blog/2022/08/26/oecd-public-integrity-indicators-new-data-on-quality-of-anti-corruption-and-public-integrity-strategies/?subscribe=success#subscribe-blog-blog_subscription-3 (accessed on 5 January 2023).